usually treated, may be traced, in part, to a notion, that the science is incapable of useful application to any matters of real importance, and is merely calculated to afford an exercise of ingenuity on insignificant truisms;-syllogisms to prove that a horse is an animal, and distinctions of the different senses of "canis" or gallus;" a mistake which is likely to derive some countenance (however unfairly) from the exclusive employment of such trifling exemplifications.

66

The words and phrases which may be employed as ambiguous middle terms are of course innumerable: but it may be in several respects of service to the learner, to explain the ambiguity of a few of those most frequently occurring in the most important discussions, and whose double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked; and this, not by entering into an examination of all the senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those only which are the most liable to be confounded together.

It

It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the generality consider there is the least room to doubt. is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger arises; words in very common use are both the most liable, from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one sense into another, and also the least likely to have that ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually mistaken for accurate knowledge.

It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not unfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase, "such an author uses such a word in this, or that sense," or means so and so, by this word." We should not use these expressions, (as some have inadvertently done) in

66

reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, in the author's mind, of the object in question; of which the notions conveyed to others by the word may often fall short; nor again should we regard the sense in which they understand him, as necessarily his sense (though it is their's) of the word employed, since they may mistake his meaning; but we must consider what sense it is likely he expected and intended to convey, to those to whom he addressed himself. And a judicious writer will always expect each word to be understood, as nearly as the context will allow, in the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has established, except so far as he may have given some different explanation. But there are many who, from various causes, frequently fail of conveying the sense they design.

It is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my readers; that one who takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense of the words employed in any discussion, whatever care he may use to show that what he is inquiring after, is, the received sense, is yet almost sure to be charged, by the inaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempting to introduce some new sense of the words in question, in order to serve a purpose.

ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been defined in the foregoing treatise; (Compendium, Book II. Ch. iii. § 1) in that sense it includes (as is there remarked) the Conclusion as well as the Premises: and thus it is, that we say a Syllogism consists of three propositions; viz. the Conclusion which is proved, as well as those by which it is proved.

But in ordinary discourse, Argument is very often used for the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Conclusion; e. g. "the Conclusion which this Argument is intended to establish is so and so."

It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly speaking, a course or series of such Arguments; when a certain Conclusion is established by Premises, which are themselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other propositions, and perhaps those again, by others; the whole of this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove the ultimate conclusion designed to be established; though in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e. g. that we speak of "Warburton's Argument to prove the divine legation of Moses," &c.

Sometimes also the word is used to denote what may be properly called a Disputation; i. e. two trains of argument, opposed to each other: as when we say that A and B had a long Argument on such and such a subject; and that A had the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use of the word in this sense has contributed to foster the notion entertained by many, that Logic is the "art of wrangling," that it makes men contentious, &c.: they have heard that it is employed about Arguments; and hastily conclude that it is confined to cases where there is opposition and contest.

It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various forms of stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of Argument: as when we speak of a Categorical or Hypothetical Argument, or of one in the first or some other figure; though every logician knows that the same individual Argument may be stated in various figures, &c.

This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those who speak of the Syllogism as a peculiar kind of Argument; and of "Syllogistic Reasoning," as a distinct mode of Reasoning, instead of being only a certain form of expressing any argument.

AUTHORITY.-This word is sometimes employed in its primary sense when we refer to any one's example,

testimony, or judgment: as when, e. g. we speak of correcting a reading in some book, on the Authority of an ancient MS.-giving a statement of some fact, on the Authority of such and such historians, &c.

In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the Latin 66 Auctoritas."

Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to “Potestas," Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a Magistrate, &c.

Many instances may be found in which writers have unconsciously slid from one sense of the word to another, so as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas. In no case perhaps has this more frequently happened than when we are speaking of the Authority of the Church: in which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority (in the primary sense) of the Catholic, i. e. Universal Church, at any particular period, is often appealed to, in support of this or that doctrine or practice: and it is, justly, supposed that the opinion of the great body of the Christian World affords a presumption (though only a presumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretation of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any ceremony, regulation, &c.

On the other hand, each particular Church has Authority in the other sense, viz. Power, over its own members, to enforce anything not contrary to God's Word. But the Catholic or Universal Church, not being one religious community on earth, can have no Authority in the sense of Power; since, whatever the Romanists may pretend, there never was a time when the power of the Pope, of a Council, or of any other human Governors, over all Christians, was admitted, or could be proved to have any just claim to be admitted.

Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas may have every degree of weight, from absolute infallibility, (such as, in religious matters, Christians attribute to the Scriptures) down to the faintest presumption. See Hawkins on Tradition. Hinds's History of the Early Progress of Christianity, Vol. II. p. 99. Hinds on Inspiration. Errors of Romanism, Chap. iv. And Essay on the Omission of Creeds, &c. in the New Testament.

CAN. See "MAY."

CAPABLE.-See "POSSIBLE, "IMPOSSIBLE," and "NECESSARY."

CASE. Sometimes Grammarians use this word to signify (which is its strict sense) a certain "variation in the writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation in which it stands to some other part of the sentence;" sometimes to denote that relation itself: whether indicated by the termination, or by a preposition, or by its collocation; and there is hardly any writer on the subject who does not occasionally employ the term in each sense, without explaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous debate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a specimen of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Grammar; in which the Authors insist on giving the Greek language an Ablative case, with the same termination, however, as the Dative: (though, by the way, they had better have fixed on the Genitive, which oftener answers to the Latin Ablative) urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termination be necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns will be without an Ablative, some without a Genitive or without a Dative, and all Neuters without an Accusative. And they add, that since it is possible, in every instance,