needed for ordinary use) the most perspicuous in which an argument can be exhibited.

All reasoning whatever, then, rests on the one simple principle laid down by Aristotle, that "what is predicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated in like manner (i. e. affirmatively or negatively) of any thing contained under that term." So that when our object is to prove any proposition, i. e. to show that one term may rightly be affirmed or denied of another, the process which really takes place in our minds is, that we refer that term (of which the other is to be thus predicated) to some class (i. e. middle term) of which that other may be affirmed, or denied, as the case may be. Whatever the subject matter of an argument may be, the reasoning itself, considered by itself, is in every case the same process; and if the writers against Logic had kept this in mind, they would have been cautious of expressing their contempt of what they call " syllogistic reasoning," which is in truth all reasoning; and instead of ridiculing Aristotle's principle for its obviousness and simplicity, would have perceived that these are, in fact, its highest praise the easiest, shortest, and most evident theory, provided it answer the purpose of explanation, being ever the best.

§ 6.

If we conceive an inquirer to have reached, in his investigation of the theory of reasoning, the point to which we have now arrived, a question which would be likely next to engage his attention, is that of Predication; i. e. since in reasoning we are to find a middle term, which may be predicated affirmatively of the subject in question, we are led to inquire what terms may be affirmed, and what denied, of what others.

singular

It is evident that proper names, or any other Common and terms, which denote each but a single indivi- terms. dual, as "Cæsar," "the Thames," "the Conqueror of Pompey," "this river" (hence called in Logic "singular terms ") cannot be affirmed of anything besides themselves, and are therefore to be denied of any thing else; we may say, "this river is the Thames," or "Cæsar was the conqueror of Pompey ;" but we cannot say of anything else that it is the Thames, &c.

On the other hand, those terms which are called "common," as denoting any one individual of a whole class, as "river," "conqueror," may of course be affirmed of any, or all that belong to that class: as, "the Thames is a river;" "the Rhine and the Danube are rivers."

Common terms, therefore, are called “predicables" (viz. affirmatively predicable), from their capability of being affirmed of others: a singular term, on the contrary, may be the

Abstraction and generali. zation,

e. g.

Subject of a proposition, but never the Predicate, unless it be of a negative proposition; (as, the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob;) or, unless the subject and predicate be only two expressions for the same individual object; as in some of the above instances.

The process by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed by these "common" (or in popular language, "general") terms, is properly called Generalization; though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of abstraction; for Generalization is one of the purposes to which Abstraction is applied: when we draw off, and contemplate separately, any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, even though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of Abstraction; but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, i. e. a common name, as "rose," we are then said to generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not necessarily imply

Generalization, though Generalization implies Abstraction.

Much needless difficulty has been raised respecting the results of this process; many having contended, and perhaps more having taken for granted, that there must be some really existing thing,* corresponding to each of those general or common terms, and of which such term is the name, standing for and representing it; e. g. that as there is a really existing Being corresponding to the proper name,

66

Etna," and signified by it, so the common term "mountain," must have some one really existing thing corresponding to it, and of course distinct from each individual mountain (since the term is not singular but common), yet existing in each, since the term is applicable to each of them. 66 When many different men," it is said, "are at the same time thinking or speaking about a mountain, i. e. not any particular one, but a mountain generally, their minds must be all employed on something; which must also be one thing, and not several, and yet cannot be any one individual:" and hence a vast train of mystical disquisitions about Ideas, &c. has arisen, which are at best nugatory, and tend to obscure our view of the process which actually takes place in the mind.

* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v.

E

Notions expressed by

common terms.

The fact is, the notion expressed by a common term is merely an inadequate (or incomplete) notion of an individual; and from the very circumstance of its inadequacy, it will apply equally well to any one of several individuals: e. g. if I omit the mention and the consideration of every circumstance which distinguishes Ætna from any other mountain, I then form a notion (expressed by the common term mountain) which inadequately designates Ætna (i. e. which does not imply any of its peculiarities), and is equally applicable to any one of several other individuals.

Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely extended by a further abstraction applied to common terms: e. g. as by abstraction from the term Socrates we obtain the common term "Philosopher;" so, from "philosopher," by a similar process, we arrive at the more general term "man;" from "man" we advance to "animal," &c.

The employment of this faculty at pleasure has been regarded, and perhaps with good reason, as the characteristic distinction of the human mind from that of the Brutes. We are thus enabled not only to separate, and consider singly one part of an object presented to the mind, but also to fix arbitrarily upon whatever part we please, according as may suit the purpose we happen to have in view; e. g. any