In the first instance the humblest citizen, white or black, democrat or republican, whether of the north or of the south, might, unmindful of the influence of any person, say, "I believe I am qualified for that place; test me." In accordance with this request a test of his qualifi cations would be applied in competition with other citizens, each of whom had, without the permission of any member of any privileged class, also determined to seek the place upon his merits. If he should pass the test successfully, and be registered as one of the four competitors highest in grade, the appointing officer, with full information concerning his character, business qualifications, and scholastic and other requirements, might select and appoint him-not for life, but for a term of six months; in which time he would, in the actual performance of the duties of the place in question, be required to show that he was in every way qualified to efficiently, and that he would faithfully, perform those duties. At the end of six months he would receive what is called in the law and rules an absolute appointment, which is not, as is generally understood, a permanent appointment, but one to which the conditions applied by a probational appointment are not attached. He would not be appointed permanently any more than the clerks of any business house are appointed permanently.

Now, how would the appointment to the other place be made if made in accordance with all the requirements of the patronage system? Only a member of a particular party, and of a particular faction thereof, would ever think of applying for the place, and no member of the dominant party, and dominant faction thereof, who knew that he could not obtain the influence of prominent members of Congress, or of other members of his party-of members of the privileged class of office-dispensers-would venture to enter into competition for the place. But suppose a citizen, a member of the party in power, and of the controlling faction thereof, were anxious to obtain the place in accordance with the most approved methods of the patronage system. He would make a written application therefor addressed to the ostensible appointing officer, and from partial fellow-partisans get recommendations as to his qualifications and party services. These he would send to the member of Congress from his district, if he were of the member's party and faction; or he would send them to a senator of his own politics; or he might secure the services of a member of the dominant party to whom some influential congressman was under obligation. In some such way he might induce an influential partisan to conclude that he was fit for the place wanted; and thereupon this appointing influence would call upon the appointing officer and inform him of this conclusion, and of his desire to have the ap plicant appointed. The appointing officer would then, if he had not promised to permit some other member of the privileged class of officedispensers to fill the vacant place, issue the order of appointment, and the applicant would take the place, not upon his merits, but because he or his friends had been, or might be, useful in furtherance of the per

sonal interests of a leader of a faction of a party. He would not be re- warded as a useful member of his party, but for the good service he had done, or might do, some politician endeavoring to get the better of some other member of his own party. He would not be appointed upon probation, but absolutely. His appointment would be as permanent as the one made under the civil-service law and rules.

Here in contrast are the two methods by which appointments are made under the two conflicting systems. Which is the better method! Certainly no one can say that an appointment thus made under the civilservice law system, is made upon the suggestion or in the interest of any privileged class; and no one can truthfully say that an appointment made under the patronage system, as thus described, is not obnoxious to the objection that it is made in the interest of a privileged class, the members of which had, under our patronage system as it existed before it was disturbed by the enactment of the civil-service law, infinitely more power in the dispensing of offices to their retainers than the members of the house of lords ever had under the patronage system that formerly prevailed in England. And let it be observed that under neither the patronage system nor the civil-service-law system is an appointment made for life. Appointments under the one system are made in precisely the same way and upon the same terms as appointments are made under the other system; but the tenure of an appointee under the patronage system continues only in the discretion of the influential person of the privileged class who made the appointment, or until his faction or party lose power, while the tenure of an appointee under the civil-service-law system continues in the discretion of the appointing officer under whose eye the appointee daily performs his public duties. Under the patronage system a citizen who may desire to obtain public employment must say to some influential man of the dominant faction of the dominant party: "I want an office; help me to one." Under the civil-service-law system a citizen may conclude that he has qualifications for any office covered by the law and the rules, and as his right, which cannot be taken away b, any influential man or for any partisan reasons, he may say: "I believe I am qualified for the place, and I therefore request that my fitness therefor may be tested by the same tests that are applied to all other citizens who desire appointment to this office." And thus competitively tested he stands or falls. Obtaining in the competition a grade that places him among the four highest of all who have competed for the vacant place, he has a chance to be selected by the appointing officer upon his own merits, and if selected and appointed he enters the office as the servant of the people and not as the henchman of a politician or as the servant of a party.

Thus it is made to appear that the civil-service-law system is in accord with the sentiment of democratic America; that under it appoint ments are made by the people from among the people for the benefit of

the people; that under its operations public office becomes a trust, not conferred by personal influence or party favor, but, according to the fact as well as the phrase, a public trust. And thus it is also made to appear that the patronage system was borrowed from England, at a time when the privileged class of that monarchy controlled and dispensed the offices of the realm; that under it the members of a privileged class, in the exercise of usurped powers, appoint their personal and party friends and henchmen to offices from which they are dismissed whenever the domi nant faction of a party, or the dominant party, is put out of power; that it is utterly at variance with the genius and spirit of our institutions, which will protest against the surrender to any party of the interests of the nation, and refuse to consent that this government shall ever be come, what the patronage system developed into full fruition would make it, a government of the office-holders by office-givers for officeseekers.

The objection that the law does not correct the inequalities of appointment considered.

By section 2 of the civil-service act it is provided that appointments to the classified service of the departments at Washington shall be apportioned among the several states and territories and the District of Columbia upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census. There is no complaint that this has not been fairly done, or that the apportionment is not being equitably maintained; but because the commission cannot remedy the inequalities of apportionment that occurred before the enactment of the civilservice law, the advocates of the patronage system declare that the law should therefore be repealed! They admit that by the operations of the patronage system one state received one appointment to about every 3,625 of her citizens, while another state received one only to about every 26,530 of her citizens; that other states have suffered equal injustice; that it is well known that a large per cent. of the few employés credited to the states most discriminated against in the past are not bona fide residents of such states. They also admit that by the operations of the civil-service law every state now receives its due proportion of appointments, and orly bona fide residents are charged to any state. But while making these admissions they point to the fact that the law which thus equitably distributes the appointments now being made does not provide any means by which the unequal distribution of appointments that occurred under the patronage system can be corrected, and they illogically assert that therefore the most direct way to substantial reform in this respect is by a repeal of the law, so that we may return to the system that created the inequali ties which have been denounced on all sides as outrages upon justice. This statement carries on its face a reproach of this so-called argument in favor of the repeal of the civil-service law, and denounces this objection to the law as unworthy a reply.

The objection that the law is unconstitutional discussed.

All these and other objections are urged against the law; but the most serious objection of all, at least in the opinion of the opponents of the competitive system, is what they call its unconstitutionality. In urging this objection they declare that the President's power of appointment and removal with respect to executive offices is fixed by the constitution; and since the act in question seeks to limit this power, both directly by its own terms and indirectly by the rules established in pursuance of its provisions, it is not a valid law, and can only operate by virtue of executive acquiescence. In reply it may be said that the civil-service act does not limit the President's power of appointment. It leaves that power entirely undisturbed. The act and rules do not in their operation affect any place to which appointments are made by the President. All the places in the classified departmental and customs services, and nearly all those in the classified postal service, are filled by appointments made by the heads of departments in virtue of authority vested in them by law enacted under section 2 of Article II of the Constitution of the United States. In no way, either directly or indirectly, does the civil service act limit the President's power of appointment. On the contrary, it confers upon him authority to prescribe the methods by which all appointments to the classified civil-service shall be made.

It may here be remarked that while the power of appointment by the President is not touched, both the power of appointment and removal vested by Congress in the heads of the departments have been limited by the civil service act. No appointment to the classified service can now legally be made if not made in accordance with the civil-service law and rules; and no removal from the subordinate civil-service can legally be made in violation of any provision of the law or of the rules. The first part of this proposition is established as good in law by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices independently of legislation by Congress, and that he must be gov erned by such legislation, not only in making appointments, but in all that is incident thereto.* It has been urged against the second part of this proposition that legislative restrictions of the power of removal are an infringement upon the constitutional prerogative of the executive. Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides as follows:

The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

*In the Supreme Court of the United States. United States vs. Lyman B. Perkins. See Appendix, Part III, Exhibit 6.

The Supreme Court of the United States has decided that when Congress, under this provision of the constitution, vests the appointment of inferior officers, such as clerks, in the heads of departments, it may prescribe the manner in which such appointments must be made, and may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interests. The constitutional authority of Congress to vest the power of appointment implies authority to not only prescribe the manner of making such appointments, but also to regulate the power of removal in its relation to the officers so appointed.

In what respects the power of removal has been limited by the act of 1883.

The power of appointment vested by Congress in the heads of departments has therefore been limited, in a constitutional way, by section 1753 of the revised statutes, which authorizes the President to prescribe regulations for ascertaining the fitness of applicants for admission to the civil-service, in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, and ability. And in strict accordance with the constitution, this power has been limited still further by the civil-service act, which provides that the fitness of applicants for any place in the classified service shall be determined by open, competitive examination, conducted under the supervision of three commissioners appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. And the civil-service act has also limited the power of removal by providing that no person serv ing in any department or office shall be removed because of his refusal (1) to contribute to a political fund or for a political purpose, or (2) to render political service; or (3) to permit the appointing officer, or any other person in the service, to coerce his political action. The object of Congress in thus limiting the power of appointment and removal was manifestly to divorce the subordinate offices of the government from politics and elections, and to make continuance in such offices dependent not upon party service but upon merit and good behavior. This fact may be made more apparent by further consideration of some of the provisions of the law and of the rules.

The law provides that open competitive examinations shall be held by the commission; that these examinations shall be practical in their character, and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties of the places into which they seek to be appointed. In other words the commissioners are authorized to test fitness for places in the classified service. In the performance of this duty they may ask such questions and do such things as will fairly make the test authorized; but they may not ask any question or do anything that is not directly or indirectly necessary to this test. They may not therefore legally ask in any examination any question the answer to which would require the divulgement of the politics or political affiliations of the competitors. Upon this theory of the law, Rule VIII was made and