men to a discharge of their duties and debts, by instituting a penalty, that is never voluntarily incurred, but when incurred, is deemed a full equivalent to the creditor.

The great extension of credit, then, being the cause of the belligerent attitude of debtor and creditor, and fraught with mischief and misery so incalculable and endless, its restriction would obviously seem to be demanded by policy and justice, interest and humanity. This restriction would best be accomplished by placing the rights of debtor and creditor upon a basis as proximate to equality, as may be practicable, under a system radically perverted. A simple abolishment of the power of the creditor over the body of the debtor, appears calculated to produce a wholesome restriction in the credit system, leaving it to honour to fulfil the contract of debt where the ability resides; and where the ability, but not the will exists, the criminal intention would justly call for the infliction of a felonious penalty for fraud can no more be justified in the debtor, than force or fraud can be sustained in the creditor. On this principle, it will not, consequently, be inferred, that I would divest the creditor of his legal right to coerce payment, by an execution upon property; such a right is essential to counteract the power of wrong in the debtor.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Imprisonment for Debt.

1 SHALL Consider this question purely on abstract principles, purposely to test the demonstrated injustice of the prevailing system. All indulgence in feeling, sympathy, and imagination, I shall studiously avoid. On such a subject, the pathos of fancy, and the embellishments of rhetoric, are equally out of place. The calamities embraced, and the feelings excited, by such a theme, are too intense, comprehensive, and profound, to be made the sport of imagination, even for the laudable purposes of apposite illustration, or vivacity of impression. It appeared sufficient to view the question as it appeared to the eye of the philosopher, the economist, the statesman, and the philanthropist; but even on these points, I shall omit much that deserves examination. One inquiry, in particular, my limits force me to abandon—an inquiry pregnant with the most useful suggestions and benevolent expedients :-"How far imprisonment for debt augments pauperism, propagates ebriety, and becomes the efficient cause of most of the crime which blackens the existing features of civilized society." These questions I may perhaps examine in the second part of this treatise, at a future day.

Few subjects of great national importance, or deeply affecting the best rights of humanity, have received so little attention, in proportion to their magnitude, as

that of imprisonment for debt. I do not mean in reference to the mere historical character of that odious custom, but in regard to its intrinsic barbarism, and repugnance to that light of reason, vital religion, and philosophical justice, which is partly the characteristic, and so entirely the profession, of the present age.

The motives of nations to adopt this mode of coercion for the payment of debt, it is not worth while to inquire into the only points worthy of consideration, are, First, Is it reasonable? Second, Is it just? Third, Is it consistent with the end of society, happiness? Fourth, Is it compatible with the exercise of equal rights, and the possession of civil liberty?

First, Is it reasonable? This question is answered almost self-evidently in the negative. The debtor's crime is inability to pay his debts; and he is flung into prison, whereby this inability is not merely increased, but completed; he is thus forever rendered incapable of payment, besides being doomed to disease, starvation, death-to heart-breaking woe, under a consciousness of unmerited punishment for a misfortune instead of a crime. It is, therefore, the very extreme of absurdity, to imprison for debt. It effectually defeats. the sole object of the creditor, payment; or it creates a new object, which it gratifies ; an object of the most demoniac kind, which satiates the most diabolical of all human passions, revenge. Grounded originally on the presumption of fraud, and the concealment of pro-. perty by the debtor, it invests, the creditor with the power to torture his victim, whether innocent or guilty, and reduces to a common level, the most unfortunate honesty, and the inost adroit, callous, and consummate knavery. The man who conceals his property, does it with a fore-knowledge of his punishment, and deter

mination to endure it: to him, therefore, imprisonment is no punishment; no corrective; but if he escapes, he deems the possibility of it a sufficient penalty, and discharges his conscience from all future moral responsibility. And in this there seems much reason; for if the creditor prefers imprisonment to payment, he adopts it in his own mind as an equivalent; and surely such a penalty to the debtor is more than payment ten times told.

In every light, therefore, it is unreasonable to the utmost length of absurdity. Under this head we may also class its inhumanity. The character of Shylock, the Jew of Venice, as drawn by Shakspeare, is generally considered as an impossible romance of cruelty, carried beyond all the limits of human ferocity, and superhuman vengeance, because he demanded of his debtor "a pound of flesh nearest the heart," as the penalty of his unpaid bond. This in a Jew of that age is thought to be impossible. Yet, we in a Christian country-we, who are Christians-who affect humanity, tenderness, and all the mild and social virtues to the last degree--we not only take a pound of flesh, but we take heart, body, all the flesh and all the man! And even this we think an insufficient penalty for our bond. After we have all the flesh, and have bruised and broken the heart, not only of the debtor, but of his "wife and little ones," and all-we still demand "the .three thousand ducats"-we still persecute, and hunt him down for payment. He must remain idle for life -a burden to the community-a spectacle of commiseration to mankind! Mercenary, indeed, to the last degree, must be that age, and that country, which can tolerate so monstrous and revolting a practice!

Is it just? This question involves the principle of

personal liberty, the right to which is unalienable, which cannot be sold, or purchased, and hence imprisonment for debt must be unjust. A man cannot form a compact to dispose of his liberty, for no one has a right to buy or to hold it. To make the body of a man equivalent to money, violates the first principle of natural right to personal liberty. It is likewise unjust in another point; one creditor may imprison a debtor, and by this means deprive all the rest of the chance of ever obtaining payment. But it is intrinsically unjust towards the debtor, whose time and liberty may be worth a hundred fold the amount of the claim for which he suffers. This has been the case of thousands, under the afflicting disaster of insolvency, without having the equitable relief of a sound bankrupt law, to shield them from cruelty and oppression.

Is it consistent with the end of society, happiness? To consider this question, after what has been said, may be deemed almost superfluous: yet deeper reflection will show that it requires to be considered. Nothing hardens the heart like the love of money, and it is too apt to be adopted as sound doctrine, that the unfortunate and poor have no right to happiness, and that he who cannot pay his debts, is equally out of the pale of law, justice, humanity, and reason. The bloated pride of the rich is not happiness-the ostentatious vanity of the great and the dignified-what is it-but the care of trifles, that refines misery out of shadows! When the enjoyments of one man are purchased at the price of wretchedness to thousands, the object of the government is destroyed, and its principal ends reversed. True, the security of property, and the prevalence of justice, are indispensable to the happiness of society; but where the unfortunate debtor has no pro