the prayer of the defendant, will award a writ to inquire of the value of the distress (34), and upon return thereof the like judgment shall be given as in case I., that is to say, to recover the rent alleged to be in arrear in the avowry or cognizance, if the distress shall amount to the value of it; if not, then to recover the value of the distress, with full costs (35). That there may not be any failure of justice, the fourth and last section of the statute directs, that in all the preceding cases where the value of the cattle (36) distrained shall not be found to the full value of the arrears, the party to whom such arrears are due, his executors, or administrators, may, from time to time, distrain again for the residue. It is worthy of remark, that this statute, which defines with so much accuracy the mode of proceeding to be adopted by a defendant who succeeds in a replevin suit, has not superseded the judgment at common law, which may still be entered, if the defendant shall be so advised; for the statute is considered as giving a further remedy, and not as extinguishing the remedy to which the defendant was entitled at common law. Under this view of the statute, it has been holden, that an avowant may enter a common-law judgment, and also pray a writ of inquiry under the statute. It ought, however, to be observed, that the remedy provided by the statute is attended with this advantage, that the writ of inquiry awarded under it may be executed, notwithstanding the plaintiff has sued out a writ of h Baker v. Lade, Carth. 254. jury, or writ to inquire of the damages, as the same shall require." The case of Valentine v. Fawcett was recognised in Dewell v. Marshall, 2 Bl. R. 921. and 3 Wils. 442. in which the court awarded a supplemental writ of inquiry, after verdict found for the defendant, who had avowed under the statute 43 Eliz. c. 2. (34) The amount of the rent alleged to be due in the avowry or cognizance being admitted by the demurrer, it is not necessary in this case, as it is in the three preceding cases, that the inquiry should extend to the amount of the rent in arrear. (35) See the form of a judgment on demurrer for an avowant, prayer of writ of inquiry, award thereof, writ, return of the value of the distress, amounting to less than the rent alleged to be due, and final judgment thereupon, in Mounson v. Redshaw, 1 Saund. 195. (36) The preceding clauses of this statute mention goods and cattle distrained, but this speaks of cattle only. The omission of the word "goods" in this clause appears to be casual. ance, second deliverancei (37); whereas the writ of second deliverif delivered to the sheriff before return made, operates as a supersedeas to the writ of retorno habendo, issuing on the common law judgment. X. Of the Costs, and herein of the Costs in Error. 1. As to the Plaintiff.-At the common law, the plaintiff obtaining judgment in replevin was not entitled to costs'; but now, by the stat. of Gloucester, 6 Ed. 1. c. 1. s. 2, the plaintiff is entitled to costs in all cases where he was entitled to damages antecedently to the statute of Gloucester; of course, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to costs in replevin. 2. As to the Defendant.-At the common law, if an avowry, or cognizance, or justification, was found for the defendant in replevin, or if the plaintiff was otherwise barred, the defendant was not entitled to costs; but now, by stat. 7 H. 8. c. 4. s. 3, persons making avowry, cognizance, or justification in replevin, or second deliverance, for any rent, custom, or service, if their avowry, &c. be found for them, or if the plaintiff be otherwise barred, shall recover their damages or costs, as the plaintiff should have done if he had recovered. And by stat. 21 H. 8. c. 19, (which permits avowries, &c. in replevin, and second deliverance to be made by the lord, &c. alleging the land to be holden of him without naming the tenant,) damages and costs are given to the defendants in replevin, not only in the cases provided for by the preceding stat. of 7 H. 8. c. 4., but also in the cases of avowries, &c. for damage feasant, or for other rents, if such avowries, &c. be found for them, or if the plaintiff be otherwise barred. See stat. 11 G. 2. c. 19. s. 22, as to double costs, ante, p. 1220, 1. Under this statute it has been holden", that defendants were entitled to double costs upon a judgment in their favour, i Cooper v. Sherbrook, 2 Wils. 116. k 2 Inst. 341. & S. P. per Holt, C. J. in Prat v. Rutleis, 12 Mod. 547. 1 Tidd's Pr. 956. edn. 7th. (37) The same rule holds with respect to the writ of inquiry of damages under the 21 H. 8. c. 19. which may be executed after a writ of second deliverance has been served. Pratt v. Rutledge, Salk. 95. where they had avowed generally under the statute, although they pleaded many other avowries in various rights, from which it was suggested, that they did not distrain as landlords, but with a view merely to try a title. Upon a dis-. tress for an heriot, the defendant will be entitled to costs, but not upon a distress for an amerciament, in a leet, for not doing suit, because the statute extends only to customs and services". A replevin is not within the meaning of the statute 8 and 9 W. 3. c. 11. s. 1,0 which gives costs to persons who are improperly made defendants in actions or plaint of trespass, assault, false imprisonment, or ejectio firmæ. Costs in Error.-By stat. 3 H. 7. c. 10., reciting that writs of error were often brought for delay, it is enacted, "That if any defendant or tenant, against whom judgment is given, sue any writ of error to reverse it, in delay of execution, if judgment be affirmed, &c. the person against whom the writ of error is issued shall recover his costs, and damages for the delay and vexation." This statute applies only to cases where the judgment below is for the plaintiff; and subsequent statutes, viz. 3 Jac. 1. c. 8, and 16 and 17 Car. 2. c. 8, have not extended the description of persons to whom relief was meant to be given by the stat. 3 H. 7. c. 10. Hence where in replevin in C. B.P, the defendant made cognizance for rent in arrear, and had a verdict and judgment pursuant to the stat. 17 Car. 2. c. 7., which judgment was affirmed in B. R. on a writ of error brought by the plaintiff: On application to the court of B. R. that the defendant in error might be allowed interest on the sum recovered by the judgment below, by force of the stat. 3 H. 7. c. 10., the court refused to grant relief, observing that the case of Cone v. Bowles, 4 Mod. 7, 8., had settled the question, that an avowant in replevin, for whom judgment below was given, which was afterwards affirmed in error, was not within the statute. By stat. 8 and 9 W. 3. c. 11. s. 2, "Costs in error are given to the defendant, where the judgment below is for him and is affirmed on error." This statute applies only to those cases where judgment is given on demurrer for defendants below; consequently, where an avowant in replevin for rent arrear had a verdict and judgment below, which judgment was afterwards affirmed on error; it was holden, that such defendant was not entitled to his costs under the preceding statute. n Porter v. Gray, Cro. Eliz. 300. See p Golding v. Dias, 10 East, 2. CHAP. XXXIV. RESCOUS. THE term rescous, as far as relates to the subject of this chapter (1), means the setting at liberty, against law, a person arrested by process or course of lawa. To recover a compensation for this injury the plaintiff may bring an action of rescous, or an action on the case, against the party guilty of the rescous. The action of rescous having fallen into disuse, the usual mode of proceeding is by an action on the case, to support which, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove; 1. The original cause of action. 2. The writ and warrant, by the production of copies of them, sworn to be true copies by a witness who has compared and examined them with the originals. 3. The manner of the arrest, in order that it may appear to the court whether the arrest was legal or not; for without a legal arrest there cannot be a rescue. Mere words only, as if the officer says to the defendant, "that he has a warrant against him, and that he arrests him," will not constitute an arrest", if the defendant afterwards escapes from the officer; but if the defendant acquiesces, and goes along with the officer, this will be considered as submitting himself to the process, and as complete an arrest as if the officer had touched the person of the defendant. An officer having two warrants in his pocket against the defendant, at a 1 Inst. 160. b. b Genner v. Sparks, Salk. 79. c Horner v. Battyn, B. R. H. 12 G. 2. Bull. N. P. 62. d Hodges v. Marks, Cro. Jac. 485. (1) For rescous of distress, see ante, tit. Distress sect. VIII. Where cattle of defendant's, taken as a distress damage feasant, in the absence of the distrainor, escaped back into the defendant's grounds, and remained for half an hour, whence they were again driven by the plaintiff, and were retaken by defendant, it was holden not to amount to a rescue, there being an abandonment of the right of freshly following. Knowles v. Blake, 5 Bingh. 499. In case of distress for rent arrear, if the distress escapes, the party may distrain Vasper v. Eddows, Ca. Temp. Holt, 257. de novo. the several suits of A. and B. laid his hands on the defendant, and said to him, "I arrest you by virtue of a warrant that Í have;" but he did not shew the defendant the warrant, nor had it in his hand, nor told the defendant at whose suit he arrested him, neither did the defendant demand to see the warrant, or to be informed at whose suit he was arrested. It was holden, 1st, that this arrest, without shewing the warrant, and without mentioning at whose suit the defendant was arrested, was legal, and that it was not incumbent on the officer to shew the warrant to the defendant until he obeyed and demanded it. 2ndly. That this arrest was legal, although the officer had not the warrant in his hand, and although he had two warrants in his pocket for the defendant; for, being under the bailiff's arrest, he was in custody for all causes for which the sheriff had made his warrant against him, although the sheriff or bailiff did not mention any specially. By stat. 29 Car. 2. c. 7. s. 6. "No person upon the Lord's day shall serve or execute any writ, process, warrant, order, judgment, or decree, (except in cases of felony or breach of the peace,) but the service of every such writ, &c. shall be void to all intents and purposes." As it is matter of public policy, that proceedings of the nature described in the statute should not be executed on a Sunday, the regularity or irregularity of them cannot depend on the assent of the party afterwards to wave an objection to such proceedings, because they are in themselves absolutely void by the statute. In the construction of this statute, it has been holden, that an arrest cannot be made on a Sunday for non-payment of a penalty by a defendant who has been convicted on a penal statute. The statute prohibits original arrests only on Sundays. Hence a defendant, who wrongfully escapes from the custody of the law, may be retaken upon a Sunday, on fresh pursuits, or by virtue of an escape warranth, which is in the nature of fresh pursuit, for it is not original process, and a commitment upon it is only the old commitment continued down. But after a voluntary escape, defendant cannot be retaken on a Sunday. So where A. was arrested at the suit of B., and discharged, the sheriff not knowing that there was also a detainer in his office against A. at the suit of C., and on the Sunday following the sheriff arrested A. at the suit of C., the court discharged him out of custody, considering the arrest on the Sunday, either as an original taking, which was prohi e Taylor v. Phillips, 3 East, 155. f R v. Myers, 1 T. R. 265. h Adjudged in Parker v. Moor, Lord Raym. 1028. Salk. 626. 6 Mod. 95. g Admitted in Parker v. Moor, Salk. i Featherstonehaugh v. Atkinson, 626. Barnes, 373. |