for plaintiff, the court arrested the judgment, on the ground that the subject of the wager was not that species of horserace or match which was legalized by stat. 13 and 18 Geo. 2. Semble that a wager between the proprietors of two carriages for the conveyance of passengers for hire, that a given person should go by one of these carriages, and no other, is illegal. But it was holdent, at all events, (the wager having been deposited in the hands of the stakeholder,) that either party having demanded his deposit before the wager was won, was entitled to have it returned to him, and on refusal, to maintain an action against the stake-holder. The plaintiff laid an illegal wager with B., the defendant took a part in the bet. The plaintiff won: it was expected that B. would pay on a certain day, before which the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, because he was going to a distance, advanced to the defendant his share of the winnings. B. died insolvent before the day, and the bet never was paid. It was holden", inasmuch as the plaintiff could not establish his case without the aid of the illegal wager in his proof, in which all were concerned, he could not recover.

2. An action cannot be maintained upon such wagers as in the event may have an influence on the public policy of the kingdom. On this principle it was holden, that a wager between two electors, on the event of the election of members to serve in parliament, was void; because it raised an improper bias in the minds of the parties to vote for one or other of the candidates, which bias would be subversive of the freedom of elections, and detrimental to the constitution. Every contract in restraint of marriage is illegal, as being against the sound policy of the law. Hence, a wager that the plaintiff would not marry within six years, was holden to be voidy; for although the restraint was partial, yet the immediate tendency of such contract, as far as it went, was to discourage marriage, and no circumstance appeared to shew that the restraint, in the particular instance, was prudent and proper. Any wager which leads to a public inquiry into the mode of playing an illegal game, e. g. hazard, by which the by-standers may acquire a knowledge of it, is contrary to good morals and the policy of the law, and, therefore, not a ground on which an action can be maintained. In like manner, the court will not entertain an action on a wager upon an abstract question of law or judicial practice,

t Eltham v. Kingsman, 1 B. & A. 683.
u Simpson v. Bliss, 7 Taunt. 246.
x Allen v. Hearne, 1 T. R. 56.

y Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22.

z Brown v. Leeson, 2 H. Bl. 43.

not arising out of pre-existing circumstances, in which the parties have an interest. And in another caseb, Gibbs, C. J. following the example of Lord Loughborough and Lord Ellenborough, in the foregoing cases of Brown v. Leeson, and Henkin v. Guerss, refused to try an action upon a wager, whether an unmarried woman had had a child. An action cannot be maintained upon a wager on a cock-fight, because it is a barbarous diversion, which ought not to be encouraged or sanctioned in a court of justice; and further, because it would tend to the degradation of the court to entertain such inquiries.

3. So if the subject of the wager lead to improper inquiries, which respect the interest and general importance of the country, they are illegal, as being contrary to sound policy; as wagers on the amount of the hop duties, or the receipt tax, or any other branch of the public revenue. And this rule holds, although the actual discussion may be excluded by the special circumstances of the case: as where the wager being on the amount of the hop duties, the defendant had admitted that he had lost his wager; so where defendant had given a promissory note for the amount of the wagerf.

4. Where the discussion of the subject of the wager will be attended with injury to a third person, and lead to indecent evidence. On this principles, a wager between two indifferent persons on the sex of the Chevalier D'Eon, who had appeared to the world as a man, and acted in that character in a variety of capacities, was holden illegal.

a Henkin v. Guerss, 12 East, 247.
b Ditchburn v. Goldsmith, 4 Campb.
152.

c Squires v. Whisken, 3 Campb. 140.
Lord Ellenborough, C. J.

d Atherfold v. Beard, 2 T. R. 610.
e Atherfold v. Beard, 2 T. R. 610.
f Shirley v. Sankey, 2 Bos. & Pul. 130.
g Dacosta v. Jones, Cowp. 729.

APPENDIX.

Bankrupt, Trover, p. 233.-Potter and another, assignees, &c. v. Starkie, Lancaster Sum. Ass. 1807. MSS. Mr. Justice Williams.

Trover against Sheriff. (Conversion by, without notice, where act of bankruptcy before seizure.) In this case, a writ of fi. fa. was delivered to the sheriff one day, the bankruptcy was committed on the next, and the seizure on the third. The commission was not sued out, nor the assignment executed until after the sale. Wood, Baron, directed the jury, that as the execution was not completed by the delivery, but by the seizure, and as an act of bankruptcy had intervened before that time, the goods were no longer those of bankrupt, but of his assignees, by relation, and that the sheriff was guilty of a conversion.

Richardson, in Mich. term, obtained a rule nisi in the Exchequer,. on the ground that the sheriff having acted only in obedience to the writ, and without notice, was not liable in this form of action. He cited Cooper v. Chitty, 1 Burr. Bl. R. and Timbrell v. Mills, Bl.R. 205, to shew that till there was some notorious act, like commission or assignment (of which, perhaps, the sheriff is bound to take notice,) the sheriff is bound to obey the writ. That he could not have returned nulla bona, the property not being out of bankrupt until assignment; and that Cooper v. Chitty is founded solely on this dictinction, viz.— the sale being there after the assignment; for the seizure is there said to be innocent.

Williams, contra, endeavoured to shew, that the grounds of distinction (as taken by Lord Mansfield in Cooper v. Chitty,) between that case and the present were, in truth, not maintainable; that this is obvious from Lord Mansfield alternately taking and abandoning them; that the sale follows the nature of the seizure, and is, in truth no new transaction; and that, therefore, the seizure was the conversion, or there was none at all. That there was no notice in the cited case, though Lord Mansfield, extra-judicially, talked of length of time, so that this supposed distinction fails. Further, he shewed, that Timbrell v. Mills was, as to the point decided, wholly irrelevant, and objected to the supposed dictum as not being found in the report of Cooper v. Chitty; and concluded, that the sheriff having taken goods not alluded to in the writ, but the goods of other persons, was guilty of a conversion, the point of property in the plaintiffs having been conceded early in the argument; and of this opinion was the court, and discharged the rule, on the ground (as I afterwards heard from Richardson,) that according to the authority of Cooper v. Chitty, the property must be considered as divested by the bankruptcy.

Bills of Exchange, p. 322.-By statute 7 W. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 80, after the 17th of July, 1837, and till the 1st of January 1840, bills of exchange and promissory notes, payable at or within twelve months after date, or not having more than twelve months to run, are exempted from the operation of the laws for prevention of usury.

Bills of Exchange, p. 357.-Solarte v. Palmer, and Hartley v. Case, were recognized in Boulton v. Welsh, 3 Bingh. N. C. 688, and in Hedger v. Stevenson, Exch. 9 June, 1837.

Covenant, p, 494.-The lessee, by deed poll, assigned his interest in the demised premises to A., subject to the payment of the rent, and performance of the covenants contained in the lease. A. took possession, and occupied under this assignment, and before the expiration of the term assigned to a third person. The lessor sued the lessee for breaches of covenant committed during the time that A. continued assignee, and recovered damages; it was holden, that the lessee might maintain an action founded in tort against A. for having neglected to perform the covenants during the time he continued assignee, whereby the lessee sustained damage.

Debt, p. 541.-The authority of Edmunds v. Harris, 2 Ad. & Ell. 414, has been further impeached in Hayseldenv. Staff, 5 Ad. & Ell. 159, and that of Cousins v. Paddon, see p. 542, recognized by Denman, C. J. delivering the judgment of the court.

Debt, p. 544.-Where a party to any instrument seals it, and declares, in the presence of a witness, that he delivers it as his deed. but keeps it in his own possession, and there is nothing to qualify that, or to shew that the executing party did not intend it to operate immediately, excepting the keeping the deed in his hands, it is a valid and effectual deed; and delivery to the party, who is to take by the deed, or to any person for his use, is not essential. Delivery to a third person for the use of the party in whose favour the deed is executed, where the grantor parts with all control over the deed, makes the deed effectual from the instant of such delivery, although the person to whom the deed is so delivered be not the agent of the party for whose benefit the deed is made.

Debt. p. 591.-By stat. 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 42. s. 16, the writ may be executed before sheriff, unless otherwise ordered.

Innkeeper. p. -An innkeeper shall be charged, if there be a default in him or his servants, in the well and safe keeping of his guest's goods and chattels within his common inn; for the innkeeper is bound in law to keep them safe without any stealing; and it is not any excuse for him to say that he delivered to the guest the key of the chamber in which he is lodged, and that he left the chamber door open. And although the guest doth not deliver his goods to the innkeeper to keep, nor acquaints him with them, yet if they be carried away or stolen, the innkeeper shall be charged; and so, though they who stole the goods be unknown. But if the guest's servants, or he who comes with him, or he whom he desires to be a Burnett v. Lynch, 5 B. & C. 589. c S. C.

b Doe d. Garnons v. Knight, 5 B. & C.

lodged with him, steals or carries away his goods, the innkeeper shall not be charged: for here the fault is in the guest to have such companions or servants. Calye's case, 8 Rep. 33. a. So an innkeeper is not answerable for the goods of his guest which are lost through the negligence of the guest out of a private room in the inn, chosen by the guest for the purpose of exhibiting to his customers his goods for sale, the use of which was granted by the innkeeper, who at the same time told the guest that there was a key and that he might lock the door, which he neglected to do. Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. and S. 306. But where a traveller having several packages went to an inn, one of which packages, at his desire, was taken into the commercial room, into which he was shewn, and the others into his bedroom, which, according to the usual practice at that inn, was the place to which goods were taken, unless orders were given to the contrary; the package taken into the commercial room was stolen ; it was holden that the innkeeper was responsible. Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9. There is no distinction between money and goods as far as respects the liability of innkeepers. Kent v. Shuckard, 2 B. & Ad. 803. So where an innkeeper on a fair day, upon being asked by a traveller in a gig whether he had room for his horse, put the horse into the stable of the inn, received the traveller with some goods into the inn, and placed the gig in the open street without the inn yard, where he was accustomed to place carriages of his guests on fair days. The gig having been stolen thence, it was holden, that the innkeeper was liable.

Ejectment, p. 757, l. 15.-After the word deed, insert as follows: It is clear and indisputable law, that for the purpose of proving non access, neither husband nor wife can be a witness; and this rule excludes all questions, which have a tendency to prove access or non access. R. v. Sourton, 5 Ad. & Ell. 180, recognizing Goodright d. Stephens v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, as to the general rule.

Partners, p. 1154.-By stat. 7 W. 4. and 1 Vict. c. 73. Her majesty is enabled to confer certain powers and immunities on trading and other companies by patent; inter alia, 1, the same powers may be granted to persons not incorporated, as if they were so; 2, that suits may be carried on in the name of one of the officers'; 3, individual liability of members may be restricted; 4, evidence of officer or of member of company, is admissible".

Replevin, p. 1225, line 10, for must bring detinue, read may bring detinue or replevin, and add the following case:-Replevin for taking and detaining, &c. Avowry for rent arrear; plea, that after the taking and before the impounding, plaintiff tendered the rent and expenses. On special demurrer, that the plea was an answer only to part, the avowry justifying the taking and detaining; and there was not any instance of a replevin for a mere detention. But the court held the plea good; for the detention after the tender satisfied the declaration every unlawful detention was a new taking.

d Jones v. Tyler, 1 Ad. & Ell. 522.

e S. 2.

f 8.3.

g S. 4.

h S. 23.

i Evans v. Elliott, 5 Ad. & Ell. 142.