Statement of the case.

to surrender, and that the finding of the Secretary was therefore void as an award, because it exceeded the submission." But the court also thought that the facts and circumstances alleged constituted a cause of action independent and irrespective of the award; and that as the repealing resolution referred the case to that court for adjudication, that it would stand there on its merits, unaffected by the award, and to be decided on any proofs submitted. Stating the matter in its own more specific way, the court held and decided, among other things

"1st. That by including in the award the value or price of the real estate upon which the brick-yard was located, Floyd exceeded the powers conferred upon him by the joint resolutions of Congress.

"2d. That having commingled such allowances with the general finding in such manner as to be incapable of separation, it thereby vitiated the whole award.

"4th. Floyd having thus exceeded the powers conferred upon him, it was competent for Congress to disaffirm his acts and revoke the authority conferred upon him by a repeal of the resolution under which he acted."

And they added as another point: "That no sufficient evidence having been given to sustain any part of the claim, irrespective of Floyd's award, which they had held invalid, judgment had been rendered for the defendants."

The case being thus decided in the Court of Claims, De Groot made known to it his desire to bring it here for review.

The judgment of the Court of Claims was rendered in December, 1865. Subsequently to that date, to wit, at December Term, 1865, the Supreme Court announced among its General Rules,* certain "Regulations," as follows:

* 8 Wallace, vii.

Statement of the case.

Regulations under which appeals may be taken from the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court.

RULE I.

In all cases hereafter decided in the Court of Claims in which, by the act of Congress, such appeals are allowable, they shall be heard in the Supreme Court upon the following record, and none other:

1. A transcript of the pleadings in the case, of the final judgment or decree of the court, and of such interlocutory orders, rulings, judgments, and decrees as may be necessary to a proper review of the case.

2. A finding of the facts in the case by the said Court of Claims, and the conclusions of law on said facts on which the court founds its judgment or decree.

The finding of the facts and the conclusion of law to be stated separately, and certified to this court as part of the record.

The facts so found are to be the ultimate facts or propositions which the evidence shall establish, in the nature of a special verdict, and not the evidence on which these ultimate facts are founded. See Burr v. Des Moines Company.*

RULE II.

In all cases in which judgments or decrees have heretofore been rendered, when either party is by law entitled to an appeal, the party desiring it shall make application to the Court of Claims by petition for the allowance of such appeal. Said petition shall contain a distinct specification of the errors alleged to have been committed by said court in its ruling, judgment, or decree in the case. The court shall, if the specification of alleged error be correctly and accurately stated, certify the same, or may certify such alterations and modifications of the points decided and alleged for error as in the judgment of said court shall distinctly, fully, and fairly present the points decided by the court. This, with the transcript mentioned in Rule I (ex. cept the statement of facts and law therein mentioned), shall constitute the record on which those cases shall be heard in the Supreme Court.

* 1 Wallace, 102.

Statement of the case.

Under a supposed conformity with these rules, the record in the case had been made. As it came before this court, it consisted of 244 pages. The first forty were occupied by De Groot's petition for appeal. This document contained the petitioner's statement of his case, copies of contracts; of the different resolutions, already mentioned, of Congress; of the awards made by the Secretaries of the Treasury and of War; of pleadings and opinions in the court below and of some other papers.

At the close of the document there was an entry by the court below, that the petition not being, in the opinion of the court, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States regulating appeals, that the Court of Claims had certified "the following alterations and modifications of the points decided and alleged for error."

The Court of Claims then, itself, made a statement of facts, adding,—the same being presented (supra, at p. 424),— what it held and decided upon them; all this occupying only about fourteen pages.

As appearing in the printed transcript before the court, this statement by the court was set pretty much in the body of the book, and was not very distinguishable to the eye from its other various contents. The opinions of the court were annexed at large. The several matters specified occupied the first seventy-two pages of the book. Following this were all the proofs that had been filed in the Court of Claims-these occupying one hundred and seventy-six pages; and, being returned, as it was certified, by request of counsel, in order to enable the Supreme Court to judge whether plaintiff proved any claim independent of the award, and to review the ruling refusing to strike out defendant's evidence."

On this record the case was now here for review.

Messrs. How, D. D. Field, and Henry Bennett, for the appel lant.

Mr. Weed, Assistant Solicitor of the Court of Claims, contra.

Opinion of the court.

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

This is the first appeal from the Court of Claims which we have been called upon to consider since the rules framed by this court regulating such appeals; and the inconsistency between the record presented and the requirements of those rules calls for some observations in this place.

This case, having been decided before they were published, comes under the provisions of the second rule. The object of that rule, as well as of the first, is to present in simple form the questions of law which arose in the progress of the case, and which were decided by the court adversely to appellant. Only such statement of facts is intended to be brought to this court as may be necessary to enable it to decide upon the correctness of the propositions of law ruled by the Court of Claims, and that is to be presented in the shape of the facts found by that court to be established by the evidence (in such form) as to raise the legal question decided by the court. It should not include the evidence in detail.

We have here, beside this simple statement, a record of two hundred and forty pages of printed matter, of which it is fair to say that two hundred are details of evidence excluded by the rule. We were inclined at first to dismiss the appeal for want of a proper record, but upon a closer examination it was discovered that the court below had in good faith complied with the rule, so far as to give the certified statement of the facts found, and of their legal conclusions thereon, and this, with the pleadings, judgment, and other orders in the case, enables us to examine the alleged error in the rulings of the court within the principles we have stated.

The court, however has, at the request of claimant's counsel, returned the evidence on both sides, which makes the bulky and useless part of the record.

We take this occasion to say that we shall adhere strictly to the rules we have prescribed, and shall regard no other matter found in the transcripts sent to us than what they allow, and that in proper cases the costs of the useless part of the record will be taxed against the party who brings it here.

Opinion of the court.

With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to examine the merits of the case.

It is a claim against the United States founded on an award. The statement of facts by the court below informs us that "the claimant has not seen proper to submit any evidence to sustain his original cause of action, but rests his case entirely upon the validity and conclusiveness of the award made by the Secretary of War."

Among other conclusions of law, the court held the following in reference to this award, which, as they dispose of the case, are all that we need consider.

"1st. That by including in the award the value or price of the real estate upon which the brick-yard was located, Floyd exceeded the powers conferred upon him by the joint resolutions of Congress.

"2d. That having commingled such allowances with the general finding in such manner as to be incapable of separation, it thereby vitiated the whole award.

"4th. Floyd having thus exceeded the powers conferred upon him, it was competent for Congress to disaffirm his acts and revoke the authority conferred upon hiru, by a repeal of the resolution under which he acted."

That part of the record which is here decided not to be within the submission is thus stated in the award itself:

"It must be remembered that when Mr. De Groot's contract was surrendered he delivered to the United States the brick-yard at Hunting Park, with its appurtenances, machinery, and improvements. All these he would have retained had his contract been carried out. But this property was surrendered to the United States in compliance with the requirements of the joint resolution of March 3, 1857. It was, I think, clearly the intention of Congress to make compensation for the loss which he thus sustained. And, accordingly, in addition to the damages already allowed, it is proper to refund to Mr. De Groot such items of expenditure as were necessarily involved in the purchase and improvement of his brick-yard and its appurtenances.