Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-MakingSpringer Science & Business Media, 2006 M03 7 - 99 páginas Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes. |
Contenido
CHAPTER | 1 |
Current Empirical Evidence | 15 |
CHAPTER 3 | 28 |
2 | 34 |
GERMANY ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM | 48 |
CHAPTER 6 | 58 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making Torsten J. Selck Vista previa limitada - 2006 |
Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making Torsten J. Selck Sin vista previa disponible - 2010 |
Términos y frases comunes
agenda-setter amendments analysis analyze assent procedure assumes Bueno de Mesquita Búrca chapter codecision procedure Commission proposal common position compared computer simulation Constitution consultation procedure cooperation procedure Council members Craig Crombez data set decision rule decision-making power different models dimensionality dimensions empirical information European Commission European Parliament European Union legislative evaluate existing Federalist Papers focus formal models France Germany ideal position indifference curves institutional actors institutional arrangements integration issue space Italy König large number Laruelle legislative outcome legislative politics legislative procedures legislative proposal median model median voter theorem Moser negotiations Nice Treaty players policy outcome policy process political actors present qualified majority represents role Selck Shepsle Single European Act spatial models spatial voting models status quo Steunenberg 1994 studies theoretical theory Treaty of Nice Tsebelis and Garrett unanimity UNION LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING Union legislative process United Kingdom veto voting threshold winset