Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making

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Springer Science & Business Media, 2006 M03 7 - 99 páginas
Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.
 

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Contenido

INTRODUCTION
1
CONCEPTUALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION
19
ASSESSING THE CURRENT STATE
31
A DATA SET AND AN ANALYSIS OF FRANCE
48
THE EUROPEAN
58
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Acerca del autor (2006)

Torsten J. Selck is working as Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

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