Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Authority.

The legislative authority of every State must spend its force within the territorial limits of the State. The legislature of one State cannot make laws by which people outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may have occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides, or to deal with property situated within the State. It can have no authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is the point of contact with other nations, and all international questions belong to the national government. It cannot provide for the punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary, because such acts, if offences at all, must be offences against the sovereignty within whose limits they have been done.2 But if the consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State have reached their ultimate and injurious result within it, it seems that the perpetrator may be punished as an offender against such State.3

1

104; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377; Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Ga. 56, where it was held that the legislature could not bind its successors not to remove a county seat. Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698; Shaw v. Macon, 21 Ga. 280; Regents of University v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 9. In Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 Ill. 53, it was held that, in construing a statute, it will not be intended that the legislature designed to abandon its right as to taxation. This subject is considered further, post, pp. 337-342.

11 Bish. Cr. Law, § 120.

2 State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109; People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R. 590; Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey v. People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley v. People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main, 16 Wis. 398; Watson's Case, 36 Miss. 593; In re Carr, 28 Kan. 1. See In re Rosdeitscher, 33 Fed. Rep. 657. The Constitution of the United States empowers Congress to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over places purchased by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. When the United States acquires lands without such consent, the State jurisdic

tion is as complete as if the lands were owned by private citizens. But the State, in giving consent, may reserve the right to serve State process within the territory: State v. Dimick, 12 N. H. 194; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 60; Opinion of Judges, 1 Met. 580; or to tax railroads in it: Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; and its railroad fencing statutes remain in force. Chicago, R. I., &c. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542. Offences within the purchased territory can only be punished by the United States: United States v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298; even though death ensues out of the territory: Kelly v. United States, 27 Fed. Rep. 616; State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331; and residents within such territory are not citizens of the State. Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Sinks v. Roese, 19 Ohio St. 306. As to jurisdiction over military camps within a State, for military purposes, see United States v. Tierney, 1 Bond, 571; and as to crimes on Indian reservations, United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375; Ex parte Cross, 20 Neb. 417; Marion v. State, id. 233.

3 Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320. Murder is committed in the District of Columbia if the fatal blow is struck there, though the death occurs elsewhere.

Upon the principle of comity, however, which is a part of the law of nations, recognized as such by every civilized people, effect is given in one State or country to the laws of another in a great variety of ways, especially upon questions of contract rights to property, and rights of action connected with and dependent upon such foreign laws; without which commercial and business intercourse between the people of different States and countries could scarcely exist. In the making of contracts, the local law enters into and forms a part of the obligation; and if the contract is valid in the State where it is made, any other State will give remedies for its enforcement, unless, according to the standard of such latter State, it is bad for immorality, or is opposed in its provisions to some accepted principle of public policy, or unless its enforcement would be prejudicial to the State or its people. So, though

United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 498. See Hatfield v. Com., 12 S. W. Rep. 309 (Ky.). That where a larceny is committed in one State and the property carried by the thief into another, this may be treated as a continuous larceny wherever the property is taken, see Commonwealth v. Cullins, 1 Mass. 116; Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14; s. c. 3 Am. Dec. 17; Commonwealth v. Holder, 9 Gray, 7; Commonwealth v. White, 123 Mass. 430; State v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 185; s. c. 8 Am. Dec. 175; State v. Cummings, 33 Conn. 260; State v. Bartlett, 11 Vt. 650; State v. Bennett, 14 Iowa, 479; People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 156; State v. Main, 16 Wis. 398; Hamilton v. State, 11 Ohio, 435; State v. Seay, 3 Stew. 123; s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 66; State v. Johnson, 2 Oreg. 115; Myers v. People, 26 Ill. 173; Watson v. State, 36 Miss. 593; State v. Under wood, 49 Me. 181; Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 153; Regina v. Hennessy, 35 Up. Can. R. 603. Contra, State v. Brown, 1 Hayw. 100; s. c. 1 Am. Dec. 548; People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. 477; Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Binn. 617; Simpson v. State, 4 Humph. 456; Beal v. State, 15 Ind. 378; State v. LeBlanch, 31 N. J. 82; and where the larceny took place in a foreign country: Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166; s. c. 15 Am. Rep. 604; Commonwealth v. Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434.

122: Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. N. s. 569; s. c. 16 Am. Dec. 212; Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 258; s. c. 4 Am. Dee. 145. In this last case, Parsons, Ch. J., says the rule that foreign contracts will be enforced in our own courts is subject to two exceptions. One is, when the Commonwealth or its citizens may be injured by giving legal effect to the contract by a judgment in our courts; and the other is, when the giving of legal effect to the contract would exhibit to the citizens of the State an example pernicious and detestable. The first he illustrates by a contract for an importation forbidden by the local law, and the second by an agreement for an incestuous marriage. Another illustration under the first head is, where enforcing the foreign contract would deprive a home creditor of a lien. Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass. 146. Compare Oliver v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St. 355; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 312; Arayo v. Currell, 1 La. 528; s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 286. If a sale of goods is valid where made though it would not be where the buyer lives and where it is sought to be enforced, it will be upheld in the latter State, unless the seller participates in the reselling there: Feineman v. Sachs, 33 Kan. 621; Parsons Oil Co. v. Boyett, 44 Ark. 230; not if the order was unlawfully solicited in the buyer's State. Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. H. 243. Gambling contracts as to stocks valid in New York will not be enforced in New Jersey. Flagg v. 2 Runyon v. Coster's Lessee, 14 Pet. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219. But a con

1 Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214, 225; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519.

a corporation created by or under the laws of one State has, in strictness, no extra-territorial life or authority, and cannot of right insist upon extending its operations within the limits of another, yet this will be suffered without objection where no local policy forbids; and the corporation may make contracts, and acquire, hold, and convey property as it would have a right to do in the State of its origin.1 Real estate, however, it can only take, hold, and transmit in accordance with the rules prescribed by the law of the State in which the estate is situate; 2 and the principle of comity is never so far extended as to give force and effect to the penal laws of one political society within the territory of another, even though both belong to one political system. The question whether a statute giving a right of action for a death occurring within a State can be enforced in another State has given rise to much discussion. In several States it is held that the remedy is purely local, and that the action can only be brought in the State where the killing takes place. But in several the rule is that an action will lie in another State, if the statutes of the latter are substantially like those of the State where the death is caused.*

tract limiting a carrier's liability, valid in New York where made, will be enforced in Pennsylvania, though invalid if made there. Forepaugh v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 18 Atl. Rep. 503 (Pa.).

1 Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370; Jessup v. Carnegie, 80 N. Y. 441; Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 31; Lothrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana, 114; National Trust Co. v. Murphy, 30 N. J. Eq. 408; Elston v. Piggott, 94 Ind. 14; People v. Howard, 50 Mich. 239; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352. Taking an order in one State for the delivery of goods in another is not such a doing of business as to require compliance with a statute for filing certificate, &c., before transacting of business by a foreign corporation. Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727. But a State may by penal. ties enforce compliance with its laws by a foreign corporation. Moses v. State, 65 Miss. 56. Powers not allowed to such corporation in the State where created, it will not be suffered to exercise elsewhere. Starkweather v. Bible Society, 72 Ill. 50; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 133; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214.

2 A rule which applies even to the government itself. United States v. Fox,

94 U. S. 315. See State v. Scott, 22 Neb. 628.

Only a State can raise the question whether a foreign corporation can rightfully acquire land for its business purposes. Barnes v. Suddard, 117 Ill. 237. Failure of such corporation to comply with statutory conditions precedent to doing business does not avoid a conveyance to it so that a private person can attack it collaterally. Fritts v. Palmer, 10 S. C. Rep. 93. Compare Koenig v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 43 N. W. 423 (Neb.).

8 Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Yerg. 110; s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 444; Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338; s. c. 7 Am. Dec. 467; First National Bank v. Price, 33 Md. 487; s. c. 3 Am. Rep. 204; Lindsey v. Hill, 66 Me. 212; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 564. The federal courts will not enforce at the suit of a State its penal laws against a foreign corporation. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265.

4 See Taylor v. Penn. Co., 78 Ky. 348; Debevoise v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377; St. Louis, I. M. &c. Co. v. McCormick, 9 S. W. Rep. 540 (Tex.); Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11, and cases collected in Cooley on Torts, pp. 311-313.

Other Limitations of Legislative Authority.

Besides the limitations of legislative authority to which we have referred, others exist which do not seem to call for special remark. Some of these are prescribed by constitutions, but

others spring from the very nature of free government. The latter must depend for their enforcement upon legislative wisdom, discretion, and conscience. The legislature is to make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals. It has control of the public moneys, and should provide for disbursing them only for public purposes. Taxes should only be levied for those purposes which properly constitute a public burden. But what is for the public good, and what are public purposes, and what does properly constitute a public burden, are questions which the legislature must decide upon its own judgment, and in respect to which it is vested with a large discretion which cannot be controlled by the courts, except, perhaps, where its action is clearly evasive, and where, under pretence of a lawful authority, it has

47. Where special acts conferring corporate powers are prohibited, the State cannot specially authorize a school district to issue bonds to erect a school-house. School District v. Insurance Co., 103 U. S. 707. The provision does not forbid legalizing bonds of a city void from want of power to issue them: Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568; nor in Tennessee does it cover municipal corporations: State v. Wilson, 12 Lea, 246; nor in Wisconsin a commission created under the police power to establish drains. State v. Stewart, 43 N. W. Rep. 947. A constitutional provision that requires all laws of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the State is complied with in a statute applicable to all cities of a certain class having less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, though in fact there be but one city in the State of that class. Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401. Contra, Divine v. Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590. And see Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 24; Earle v. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 489; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. 123; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 210; State v. Trenton, 42 N. J. 486; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. 435; Worthley v. Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542; Bumsted v. Gov

ern,

47 N. J. L. 368; Van Giesen v. Bloomfield, id. 442; Hightstown v. Glenn, id. 105; New Brunswick v. Fitzgerald, 48 N. J. L. 457; State v. Hoagland, 16 Atl. Rep. 166 (N. J.); McCarthy v. Com., 110 Pa. St. 243; App. of Scranton Sch. Dist., 113 Pa. St. 176; Wilkes-Barre v. Meyers, id. 395; Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St.

328; Ex parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638; State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98; State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98; State v. Anderson, id. 247; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; State v. Co. Court, 9 Mo. 237; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606; State v. Donovan, 15 Pac. Rep. 783 (Nev.); Darrow v. People, 8 Col. 417; People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436. And on the general subject see further, Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Rice v. State, 3 Kan. 141; Jackson v. Shaw, 29 Cal. 267 ; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450; People v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; State v. Camden Common Pleas, 41 N. J. 495; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill. 557; Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258; Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254; State v. Monahan, 69 Mo. 556; State v. Clark, 23 Minn. 422; Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 595. As to what differences should underlie a classification, see Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479. So where the legislature, for urgent reasons, may suspend the rules and allow a bill to be read twice on the same day, what constitutes a case of urgency is a question for the legislative discretion. Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503. The legislature's power over its own proceedings cannot be controlled by a statute requiring notice in advance of the session, in case of petition affecting private interests. Opinion of Court, 63 N. H. 625.

41.

1 Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14,