it would seem not to be essential. And if, by the constitution of the State, the governor is a component part of the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for his approval.

Approval of Laws.

The qualified veto power of the governor is regulated by the constitutions of those States which allow it, and little need be said here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for information concerning them. It has been held that if the governor, by statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the adjournment of the legislature, for the examination and approval of laws, this is to be understood as a full day of twenty-four hours, before the hour of the final adjournment. It has also been held that, in the approval of laws, the governor is a component part of the legislature, and that unless the constitution allows further time for the purpose, he must exercise his power of approval before the two houses adjourn, or his act will be void.s

Wis. 252, where the error was in publication. And so should accidental but immaterial changes in the transmission of the bill from one house to the other. Larrison v. Railroad Co., 77 Ill. 11; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683. See Wenner v. Thornton, 98 Ill. 156. When a mistake in enrolment made an approval void, signatures and approval on a correct roll after the adjournment were held to make the act valid. Dow v. Beidelman, 49 Ark. 325. In Maryland the governor may refuse to consider any bill sent him not authenticated by the Great Seal. Hamilton v. State, 61 Md. 14.

2

Neither house can, without the consent of the other, recall a bill after its transmission to the governor. People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269. In Colorado the legislature may request the return of a bill in the governor's hands, but he may respond or not as he likes. If he sends back the bill, it may be reconsidered and amended. Re Recalling Bills, 9 Col. 630. But in Virginia no such recall is authorized. Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876.

The delivery of a bill passed by the two houses to the secretary of the commonwealth according to custom, is not a presentation to the governor for his ap

1 Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. proval, within the meaning of the constiSt. 376.

2 Hyde v. White, 24 Tex. 137. The five days allowed in New Hampshire for the governor to return bills which have not received his assent, include days on which the legislature is not in session, if it has not finally adjourned. Opinions of Judges, 45 N. H. 607. But the day of presenting the bill to the governor should be excluded. Opinions of Judges, 45 N. H. 607; Iron Mountain Co. v. Haight, 39 Cal. 540; In re Senate Resolution, 21 Pac. Rep. 475 (Col.). And if the last day falls on Sunday he may return the bill on Monday, id. As to the power of the governor, derived from long usage, to approve and sign bills after the adjourn ment of the legislature, see Solomon v. Cartersville, 41 Ga. 157.

tutional clause which limits him to a certain number of days after the presentation of the bill to veto it. Opinions of the Justices, 99 Mass. 636.

3 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165. The court also held in this case that, notwithstanding an act purported to have been approved before the actual adjournment, it was competent to show by parol evidence that the actual approval was not until the next day. In support of this ruling, People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was cited, where it was held that the court might go behind the statute-book and inquire whether an act to which a twothirds vote was essential had constitutionally passed. That, however, would not be in direct contradiction of the record, but it would be inquiring into a fact con

But under a provision of the Constitution of Minnesota, that the governor may approve and sign "within three days of the adjournment of the legislature any act passed during the last three days of the session," it has been held that Sundays were not to be included as a part of the prescribed time;1 and under the Constitution of New York, which provided that, "if any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law," 2 it was held that the governor might sign a bill after the adjournment, at any time within the ten days. The governor's approval is not complete until the bill has passed beyond his control by the constitutional and customary mode of legislation; and at any time prior to that he may reconsider and retract any approval previously made. His dis

cerning which the statute was silent, and other records supplied the needed information. In Indiana it is held that the courts cannot look beyond the enrolled act to ascertain whether there has been compliance with the requirement of the constitution that no bill shall be presented to the governor within two days next previous to the final adjournment. Bender r. State, 53 Ind. 254.

a time- in this case two months- the governor must act upon the bill within the specified number of days. Miller v. Hurford, 11 Neb. 377. Where on the tenth day the governor sent a bill with his objections to the house with which it originated, but the messenger, finding the house had adjourned for the day, returned it to the governor, who retained it, it was held that to prevent the bill be1 Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366. See coming a law it should have been left also Corwin . Comptroller, 6 Rich. 390, with the proper officer of the house inIn South Carolina a bill sent to the gov- stead of being retained by the governor. ernor on the last day of the first session Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189. In may be signed by him on the first day of response to an unauthorized request, the the next regular session, notwithstanding governor returned a bill without objecan adjourned session has intervened. Ar- tions. The constitution provided that a nold v. McKellur, 9 S. C. 335. In Mis- bill, if not returned in five days, became sissippi if a bill is presented within ten law without his signature. Held, that his days of the adjournment, it may be ap- return was not covered by the provision, proved at any time before the third day of and that the bill became a law notwiththe next session. State v. Coahoma Co., standing. Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876. 64 Miss. 358. 4 People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283. An act apportioning the representatives was passed by the legislature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his approval thereon by mistake, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his official attention; his private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent, but merely in his usual routine of customary duty, the governor not being conscious

2 See McNiel ». Commonwealth, 12 Bush, 727. In computing the ten days, the first day should be excluded. Beaudeau v. Cape Girardeau, 71 Mo. 392.

3 People ". Bowen, 30 Barb. 24, and 21 N. Y. 517. See also State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; Solomon v. Commissioners, 41 Ga. 157; Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa, 702; Seven Hickory v. Ellery, 103 U. S. 423. It seems that in Nebraska, in a similar provision, by "adjourn ment" is meant the final adjournment; and if the same session is adjourned for

approval of a bill is communicated to the house in which it originated, with his reasons; and it is there reconsidered, and may be again passed over the veto by such vote as the constitution prescribes.1

Other Powers of the Governor.

The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative department is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills. As executive, he communicates to the two houses information concerning the condition of the State, and may recommend measures to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills. He may convene the legislature in extra session whenever extraordinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their powers when convened are not confined to a consideration of the subjects to which their attention is called by his proclamation or his message, and they may legislate on any subject as at the regular sessions. An exception to this statement exists in those States where, by the express terms of the constitution, it is provided that when convened in extra session the legislature shall consider no subject except that for which they were specially called together, or which may have been submitted to them by special message of the governor.2

When Acts are to take Effect.

The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took effect from the first day of the session on which they were passed; but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon no good reason, and frequently working very serious injustice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the time when the formalities of enactment are actually complete under the constitution, unless it

1 The Constitution of Iowa, art. 4, § 11, provides that the governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclamation, and shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they have been convened." It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General Assembly, when thus convened, were not confined in their legislation to the purposes specified in the message. "When lawfully convened, whether in virtue of the provision in the constitution or the governor's proclamation, it is the General Assembly' of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of the State is vested. Where its business at such session is not restricted by some constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or extra session that it might at a regular session. Its powers, not being de

rived from the governor's proclamation, are not confined to the special purpose for which it may have been convened by him."

2 Provisions to this effect will be found in the Constitutions of Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others. As to what matters are held embraced in such call, see State v. Shores, 7 S. E. Rep. 413 (W. Va.); Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 591. Confirmation of appointment by the Senate may be made. The limitation is upon legislation. People v. Blanding, 63 Cal. 333.

31 Lev. 91; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660; Smith v. Smith, Mart. (N. C.) 26; Hamlet v. Taylor, 5 Jones L. 36. This is changed by 33 Geo. III. c. 13, by which statutes since passed take effect from the day when they receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein.

is otherwise ordered, or unless there is some constitutional or statutory rule on the subject which prescribes otherwise.1 By the Constitution of Mississippi,2 "no law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof." By the Constitution of Illinois, no act of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passage, unless in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act) the General Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, otherwise direct. By the Constitution of Michigan, no public act shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of ninety days from the end of the session at which the same is passed, unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. These and similar provisions are designed to secure, as far as possible, the public promulgation of the law before parties are bound to take notice of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a rule which should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a law of which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have heard; they give to all parties the full constitutional period in which to become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which are passed, except when the legislature has otherwise directed; and no one is bound to govern his conduct by the new law until that period has elapsed. And the fact that, by the

1 Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. 164; Rathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala. 312; Branch Bank of Mobile v. Murphy, 8 Ala. 119; Heard v. Heard, 8 Ga. 380; Goodsell v Boynton, 2 Ill. 555; Dyer v. State, Meigs, 237; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Freeman v. Gaither, 76 Ga. 741. An early Virginia case decides that "from and after the passing of this act" would exclude the day on which it was passed. King v. Moore, Jefferson, 9. Same ruling in Parkinson v. Brandenberg, 35 Minn. 294. On the other hand, it is held in some cases that a statute which takes effect from and after its passage, has relation to the first moment of that day. In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653; Mallory v. Hiles, 4 Met. (Ky.) 53; Wood v. Fort, 42 Ala. 641; Hill v. State, 5 Lea, 725. Others hold that it has effect from the moment of its approval by the governor. People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406. See In re Wynne, Chase Dec. 227.

8 Art. 3, § 23. The intention that an act shall take effect sooner must be expressed clearly and unequivocally; it is not to be gathered by intendment and inference. Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361. See Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 13.

Where an act is by its express terms to take effect after publication in a specified newspaper, every one is bound to take notice of this fact; and if before such publication negotiable paper is issued under it, the purchasers of such paper can acquire no rights thereby. McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429; following George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72.

4 Art. 4, § 20.

5 Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. A provision that "subsequent to the pas sage of this act" the law should be as declared, does not come into force till after ninety days. Andrews v. St. Louis Tunnel Co., 16 Mo. App. 299. See, how

2 Art. 7, § 6. See State v. Coahoma ever, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Co., 64 Miss. 358.

Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Compare