and consequently extending the circulation, of the paper of the bank." 1 That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of marriage are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution under discussion, has been many times affirmed. It has been intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned, the contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that a law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of contracts. But certainly there is no such contract embraced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had already become vested in the husband, it would be protected in him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than the one here indicated. "The obligation of a contract," it is said, "consists in its binding force on the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty or to impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any law which in its operations amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the pro 1 Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. See Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44. A law which makes coupons on State bonds receivable for all taxes and dues is a contract, the obligation of which no subsequent law can impair. Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 833; Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270. Compare Cornwall v. Com., 82 Va. 644; Com. v. Jones, 82 Va. 789; Ellett v. Com., 8 S. E. Rep. 246 (Va.). So of county warrants. People v. Hall, 8 Col. 485. An act, changing after issue the place of pay. ment of municipal bonds, is bad. Dil lingham v. Hook, 32 Kan. 185. So one requiring bonds payable to bearer to be registered. Priestly v. Watkins, 62 Miss. 798. See People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. But compare Gurnee v. Speer, 68 Ga. 711. 2 Per Marshall, Ch. J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190; Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. clxv.; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me 480. 8 Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295. hibition of the Constitution."1 "It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the Constitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation which is recognized by, and results from, the law of the State in which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when made is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation; because the law in such cases forbids its having any binding efficacy or force. It confers no legal right on the one party, and no correspondent legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed or recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. But when it does not fall within the predicament of being either illegal or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its stipulations." 2 1 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; 612. "The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then, which has this binding obligation must govern and control the contract, in every shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, construction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State whether that be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its performance is sought to be enforced." Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 257, 259. "As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation." Thompson, J., ibid. 302. "The obligation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy of the law which applies to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obligation does not inhere and subsist in the contract itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Constitution uses the term 'obligation.'" Trimble, J., ibid. 318. And see Van Baumbach . Bade, 9 Wis. 559; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1. Requirement of a license tax for permission to do what a contract with the city gives authority to do, without "let, molestation, or hindrance," is void. Stein. Mobile, 49 Ala. 362; 20 Am. Rep. 283. But licenses in general are subject to the taxing power. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116; Reed v. The Beall, 42 Miss. 472; Cooley on Taxation, 3c6, and cases cited. A law taxing a debt to the debtor and making him pay the tax and deduct the amount from the debt is valid. Lehigh V. R. R. Co. v. Com., 18 Atl. Rep. 410 (Pa.). So where the debtor, a foreign corporation, has paid for the privilege of being exempt from taxation. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Com., id. 412. A law giving interest on debts, which bore none when contracted, was held void in Goggans v. Turnispeed, 1 S. C. N. s. 40; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 23. legislature cannot authorize the compulsory extinction of ground rents, on pay. ment of a sum in gross. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 450. A State law, discontinuing a public work, does not impair the obligation of contracts, the contractor having his just claim for damages. Lord v. Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107. A law giving an abutter a right to damages when a railroad is laid in the street is valid as to changes thereafter made by a railroad, though a city ordinance had given it the right to use the street. Drady v. Des Moines, &c. Co., 57 Iowa, 393. See also Mulholland v. Des Moines, &c. Co., 60 Iowa, 740. A statute providing for reversion of land condemned for railroad purposes if work on the road has ceased for eight years is valid. The property right does not attach to the land independent of its use for public purposes. Skillman v. Chicago, &c. Ry., Co. 43 N. W. Rep. 275 (Iowa). 2 Story on Const. § 1380. Slave contracts, which were legal when made, are not rendered invalid by the abolition of slavery; nor can the States make them Such being the obligation of a contract, it is obvious that the rights of the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been the intention of the constitutional provision to preclude. "There are few laws which concern the general police of a State, or the government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other or with strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form. For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds, and perjuries, laws of registration, and those which affect landlord and tenant, sales at auction, acts of limitation, and those which limit the fees of professional men, and the charges of tavern-keepers, and a multitude of others which crowd the codes of every State, but laws which may affect the validity, construction, or duration, or discharge of contracts?"1 But the changes in these laws are not regarded as necessarily affecting the obligation of contracts. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract; 2 and it does not impair it, provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy, according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was made.3 void by their constitutions, or deny remedies for their enforcement. White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654; Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 641. An act of indemnity held not to relieve a sheriff from his obligation on his official bond to account for moneys which had been paid away under military compulsion. State v. Gatzweiler, 49 Mo. 17; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 119. The settled judicial construction of a statute, so far as contract rights are thereunder acquired, is to be deemed a part of the statute itself, and enters into and becomes a part of the obligation of the contract; and no subsequent change in construction can be suffered to defeat or impair the contracts already entered into. Doug lass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677, and cases cited. Levy v. Hitsche, 40 La. Ann. 500. But such construction is not "settled" by a single decision. McLure v. Melton, 24 S. C. 559. The same rule applies to the settled construction of a constitution. Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278. 1 Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 259. As to the indirect modification of contracts by the operation of police laws, see ante, 340, 341, notes; post, pp. 706–720. 2 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 316, per Taney, Ch. J. 3 Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299; Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214; Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483; Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. 116; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369; Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68; Litchfield v. McComber, 42 Barb. 288; Paschal v. Perez, 7 Tex. 348; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135; Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Pa. St. 179; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. St. 299; Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Oliver v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; Holland v. Dickerson, 41 Iowa, 367; Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor, 101 Ill. 82; Wales v. Changes in Remedies. It has accordingly been held that laws changing remedies for the enforcement of legal contracts, or abolishing one remedy where two or more existed, may be perfectly valid, even though the new or the remaining remedy be less convenient than that which was abolished, or less prompt and speedy.1 "Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct." To take a strong instance: although the law at the 2 Wales, 119 Mass. 89; Sanders v. Hillsborough Insurance Co., 44 N. H. 238; Huntzinger v. Brock, 3 Grant's Cases, 243; Mechanics', &c. Bank Appeal, 31 Conn. 63; Garland v. Brown's Adm'r, 23 Gratt. 173; Chattaroi Ry. Co. v. Kinner, 81 Ky. 221. A requirement that before a mandamus shall issue to compel the receipt in accordance with contract of coupons for taxes, the petitioner shall pay the tax, and on proving the genuineness of the coupons shall have it refunded, is valid, though adopted after the formation of the contract. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769; Moore v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 338. See Rousseau v. New Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 557. A statute providing for a review of judgments does not enter into contracts so that it may not be changed. Rupert v. Martz, 116 Ind. 72. See United Cos. v. Weldon, 47 N. J. L. 59; State v. Slevin, 16 Mo. App. 541. But the collection of a special tax cannot be hindered by requiring, after it is voted, a special collection bond with local sureties: Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145; or a new and cumbrous mode of collection. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284. 1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat, 213; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69; Bumgardner v. Circuit Court, 4 Mo. 50; Tarpley v. Hamer, 17 Miss. 310; Danks v. Quackenbush, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38; Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Evans v. Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Porter v. Mariner, 50 Mo. 364; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. St. 46; Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527; Coosa River St. B. Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. 158; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. 203; Newark Savings Bank v. Forman, 33 N. J. Eq. 436; Simpson v. Savings Bank, 56 N. H. 466. 2 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593. A statute allowing the defence of want of consideration in a sealed instrument previously given does not violate the obligation of contracts. Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251. See further Parsons v. Casey, 28 Iowa, 431; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439. Right accruing under stipulation in a note to waive process and confess judgment may be taken away. Worsham v. Stevens, 66 Tex. 89. A statutory judgment lien may be taken away. Watson v. New York Central R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes, 1 Col. 100. Contra, Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610. The law may be so changed that a judgment lien shall not attach before a levy. Moore v. Holland, 16 S. C. 15. It may be extended before it has expired. Ellis v. Jones, 51 Mo. 180. The mode of perfecting a lien may be changed before it has actually attached. Whitehead v. Latham, 83 N. C. 232. The value of a mechanic's lien may not be materially affected by a statute making consummate a previously inchoate right of dower. Buser v. Shepard, 107 Ind. 417. The obligation of the contract is not impaired if a substantial remedy remains. Richmond v. Richmond, &c. R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 611. See Mabry v. Baxter, 11 Heisk. 682; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. 158; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; Thistle v. Frostbury Coal Co., 10 Md. 129. It is competent to provide by law that all mortgages not recorded by a day specified shall be void. Vance v. time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body of his debtor in execution, there can be no doubt of the right to abolish all laws for this purpose, leaving the creditor to his remedy against property alone. "Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means, and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair the obligation." Nor is there any constitutional objection to such a modification of those laws which exempt certain portions of a debtor's property from execution as shall increase the exemptions to any such extent as shall not take away or substantially impair the remedy, nor to the modifications being made applicable to contracts previously entered into. The State "may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing-apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and humanity. It must reside in every State to enable it to secure its citizens from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every community." 2 But a homestead exemption law, where none existed Vance, 32 La. Ann. 186; s. c. 108 U. S. 514. See Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401; Gurnee v. Speer, 68 Ga. 711. Where the individual liability of officers or stockholders in a corporation is a part of the contract itself, it cannot be changed or abrogated as to existing debts. Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10; Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47; Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214; Norris v. Wrenshall, 34 Md. 494; Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667; Providence Savings Institute v. Skating Rink, 52 Mo. 452; St. Louis, &c. Co. v. Harbine, 2 Mo. App. 134. But where it is imposed as a penalty for failure to perform some corporate or stat utory duty, it stands on the footing of all other penalties, and may be revoked in the discretion of the legislature. Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327: Bay City, &c. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich. 390; Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217; Gregory v. Denver Bank, 3 Col. 332. See Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; Weidenger v. Spruance, 101 Ill. 278. 1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329; Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714; Sommers v. Johnson, 4 Vt. 278; s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 604; Ware v. Miller, 9 S. C. 13; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Ga. 531. A special act admitting a party imprisoned on a judgment for tort to take the poor debtors' oath was sustained in Matter of Nichols, 8 R. I. 50. 2 Bronson v. Kinzie. 1 How. 311, 315, per Taney, Ch. J.; Rockwell ». Hubbell's Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Morse v. Goold. 11 N. Y. 281; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kan. 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Ga. 531; Hardeman v. Downer, |