A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or information which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his deliverance.

said to be thus charged when they have been impanelled and sworn.2 The defendant then becomes entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new prosecution; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a nolle prosequi entered by the prosecuting officer against his will, or by a discharge of the jury and continuance of the cause.3

If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the cause, or if the indictment was so far defective that no valid judgment could be rendered upon it,5 or if by any overruling necessity the jury

are discharged without a verdict,1 which might happen from the sickness or death of the judge holding the court,2 or of a juror,3 or the inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict after reasonable time for deliberation and effort; or if the term of the court as fixed by law comes to an end before the trial is finished; 5 or the jury are discharged with the consent of the defendant expressed or implied; or if, after verdict against the accused, it has been set aside on his motion for a new trial, or on writ of error, or the judgment thereon been arrested,8 — in any of these

ett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; People v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 93; People v. McNealy, 17 Cal. 333; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548; State v. Kason, 20 La. Ann. 48; Black v. State, 36 Ga. 447; Commonwealth v. Bakeman, 105 Mass. 53; State v. Ward, 48 Ark. 36; People v. Clark, 67 Cal. 99; Garvey's Case, 7 Col. 384.

1 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; State v. Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat. 166; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 620; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 205; Commonwealth v. Bowden, 9 Mass. 194; Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425; Price v. State, 36 Miss. 533. In State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C. 203, the officer in charge of the jury was found to have been conversing with them in a way calculated to influence them unfavorably towards the evidence of the prosecution, and it was held that this was such a case of necessity as authorized the judge to permit a juror to be withdrawn, and that it did not operate as an acquittal. See also State v. Washington, 89 N. C. 535. If an indictment is nol. prossed after the jury is sworn, because it is found that the person alleged to have been murdered is misnamed, this is no bar to a new indictment which shall give the name correctly. Taylor v. State, 35 Tex. 97.

2 Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. 72. 8 Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166; State v. Curtis, 5 Humph. 601; Mahala v. State, 10 Yerg. 532; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Doles v. State, 97 Ind. 555; State v. Emery, 59 Vt. 84.

4 People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187; Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Lit. 140; Dobbins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 493; Miller v. State, 8 Ind. 325; State v. Walker, 26 Ind. 346; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Winsor v. The Queen, L. R.

1 Q. B. 289; State v. Prince, 63 N. C. 529; Moseley v. State, 33 Tex. 671; Lester v. State, 33 Ga. 329; Ex parte, Mc. Laughlin, 41 Cal. 211; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 272; People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 481; Conklin v. State, 41 N. W. Rep. 788 (Neb.); Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 345; State v. Sutfin, 22 W. Va. 771.

5 State v. Brooks, 3 Humph. 70; State v. Battle, 7 Ala. 259; Mahala v. State, 10 Yerg. 532; State v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491; Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 290. See Whitten v. State, 61 Miss. 717.

6 State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676; Elijah v. State, 1 Humph. 103; Commonwealth v. Stowell, 9 Met. 572; People v. Curtis, 76 Cal. 57; People v. White, 68 Mich. 648; State v. Parker, 66 Iowa, 586. As to the effect of jury's separation by defendant's consent, see State v. Ward, 48 Ark. 36; Hilands v. Com., 111 Pa. St. 1.

v.

7 Kendall v. State, 65 Ala. 492; State Blaisdell, 59 N. H. 328; Gannon v. People, 127 Ill. 507; State v. Brecht, 42 N. W. Rep. 602 (Minn.); People v. Hardisson, 61 Cal. 378. See Com. v. Downing, 22 N. E. Rep. 912 (Mass.). And it seems, if the verdict is so defective that no judgment can be rendered upon it, it may be set aside even against the defendant's objection, and a new trial had. State v. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329.

8 Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. 351; State v. Clark, 69 Iowa, 196. But where the indictment was good, and the judg ment was erroneously arrested, the ver dict was held to be a bar. State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24. See People v. Webb, 28 Cal. 467. So if the error was in the judgment and not in the prior proceedings, if the judgment is reversed, the prisoner must be discharged. See post, p. 403. But it is competent for the legislature to provide that on reversing the erroneous judgment in such case, the

cases the accused may again be put upon trial upon the same facts before charged against him, and the proceedings had will constitute no protection. But where the legal bar has once attached, the government cannot avoid it by varying the form of the charge in a new accusation: if the first indictment or information were such that the accused might have been convicted under it on proof of the facts by which the second is sought to be sustained, then the jeopardy which attached on the first must constitute a protection against a trial on the second. And if a prisoner is acquitted on some of the counts in an indictment, and convicted on others, and a new trial is obtained on his motion, he can be put upon trial a second time on those counts only on which he was before convicted, and is forever discharged from the others.2

Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments. It is also a constitutional requirement that excessive bail shall not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Within such bounds as may be prescribed by law, the question. what fine shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of the court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised; and there may be cases in which a punishment, though not beyond any limit fixed by statute, is nevertheless so clearly excessive as to be erroneous in law. A fine should have some reference

court, if the prior proceedings are regular, shall remand the case for the proper sentence. McKee v. People, 32 N. Y. 239. It is also competent, by statute, in the absence of express constitutional prohibition, to allow an appeal or writ of error to the prosecution, in criminal cases. See cases p. 394, note 1.

1 State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. 360; Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 504; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Leslie v. State, 18 Ohio St. 395; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414. See Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 383; Williams v. Com., 78 Ky. 93; Sims v. State, 5 Sou. Rep. 525 (Miss.).

2 Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333; State v. Kettle, 2 Tyler, 475; Morris v. State, 8 S. & M. 762; Esmon v. State, 1 Swan, 14; Guenther v. People, 24 N. Y. 100; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 105; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 39; State v. Martin, 30 Wis. 216; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 567; United States v. Davenport, Deady, 264; s. c. 1 Green, Cr. R. 429; Stuart v. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. 950; Johnson v. State, 29 Ark. 31;

Barnett v. People, 54 Ill. 331; contra, State v. Behimer, 20 Ohio St. 572. A nolle prosequi on one count of an indictment after a jury is called and sworn, is a bar to a new indictment for the offence charged therein. Baker v. State, 12 Ohio St. 214; Murphy v. State, 41 N. W. Rep. 792 (Neb.). See Com. v. Dunster, 145 Mass. 101.

8 The subject of cruel and unusual punishments was somewhat considered in Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, where the opinion was expressed by Chancellor Sanford that a forfeiture of fundamental rights-e. g. the right to jury trialcould not be imposed as a punishment, but that a forfeiture of the right to hold office might be. But such a forfeiture could not be imposed without giving a right to trial in the usual mode. Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush, 725. In Done v. People, 5 Park. 364, the cruel punishments of color al times, such as burning alive and bre: king on the wheel, were enumerated by . W. Campbell, J., who was of opinion that they must be

to the party's ability to pay it. By Magna Charta a freeman was not to be amerced for a small fault, but according to the degree of the fault, and for a great crime in proportion to the heinousness of it, saving to him his contenement; and after the same manner a merchant, saving to him his merchandise. And a villein was to be amerced after the same manner, saving to him his wainage. The merciful spirit of these provisions addresses itself to 'he criminal courts of the American States through the provisions of their constitutions.

It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut that it was not competent in the punishment of a common-law offence to inflict fine and imprisonment without limitation. The precedent, it was said, cited by counsel contending for the opposite doctrine, of the punishment for a libel upon Lord Chancellor Bacon, was deprived of all force of authority by the circumstances attending it; the extravagance of the punishment being clearly referable to the temper of the times. "The common law can never require a fine to the extent of the offender's goods and chattels, or sentence of imprisonment for life. The punishment is both uncertain and unnecessary. It is no more difficult to limit the imprisonment of an atrocious offender to an adequate number of years than to prescribe a limited punishment for minor offences. And when there exists no firmly established practice, and public necessity or convenience does not imperiously demand the principle contended for, it cannot be justified by the common law, as it wants the main ingredients on which that law is founded. Indefinite punishments are fraught with danger, and ought not to be admitted unless the written law should authorize them." 1

It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment declared by statute for an offence which was punishable in the same way at the common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense. And probably any new statutory offence may be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted by the common law for offences of similar nature. But those degrading punishments which in any State had become obsolete before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual. We may well

regarded as "cruel" if not "unusual," of cases in which perpetual imprisonment and therefore as being now forbidden.

1 Per Hosmer, Ch. J., in State v. Dan forth, 3 Conn. 112-116. Peters, J., in the same case, pp. 122-124, collects a number

was awarded at the common law, but, as his associates believed, unwarrantably. Compare Blydenburg v. Miles, 39 Conn. 484.

doubt the right to establish the whipping-post and the pillory in States where they were never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in States whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual punishment. In such States the public sentiment must be regarded as having condemned them as "cruel," and any punishment which if ever employed at all, has become altogether obsolete, must certainly be looked upon as "unusual.”1

A defendant, however, in any case is entitled to have the precise punishment meted out to him which the law provides, and no other. A different punishment cannot be substituted on the ground of its being less in severity. Sentence to transportation for a capital offence would be void; and as the error in such a case would be in the judgment itself, the prisoner would be entitled to his discharge, and could not be tried again. If, however, the legal punishment consists of two distinct and severable things, as fine and imprisonment, the imposition of either is legal, and the defendant cannot be heard to complain that the other was not imposed also.3

The Right to Counsel.

Perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.

1 In New Mexico it has been decided that flogging may be made the punishment for horse-stealing: Garcia v. Territory, 1 New Mex. 415; so for wife-beating. Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264. For the non-payment of fine for unlicensed liquor selling, street labor may be imposed. Ex parte Bedell, 20 Mo. App. 125. See further as to unusual punishments, Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo. 44; People v. Haug, 37 N. W. Rep. 21 (Mich.).

The power in prison keepers to inflict corporal punishment for the misconduct of convicts cannot be delegated to contractors for convict labor or their managers. Cornell v. State, 6 Lea, 624. The keeper of a workhouse may not be authorized to inflict such punishment at his discretion. Smith v. State, 8 Lea, 744. A jailer may not chain up a prisoner for several hours by the neck so he cannot lie or sit. In re Birdsong, 39 Fed. Rep. 599. 2 Bourne . The King, 7 Ad. & El. 58; Lowenberg . People, 27 N. Y. 336; Hartung v. People, 26 N. Y. 167; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365; Ex parte Page, 49 Mo. 291; Christian v. Commonwealth, 5

Me 530; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163;. McDonald v. State, 45 Md. 90. See also Whitebread v. The Queen, 7 Q. B. 582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry. 58. It is competent, however, to provide by statute that on setting aside an erroneous sentence the court shall proceed to impose the sentence which the law required. Wilson v. People, 24 Mich. 410; McDonald v. State, 45 Md. 90.

8 See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203. When one has been convicted and sentenced to confinement, it is not compe tent, after the period of his sentence has expired, to detain him longer in punishment for misbehavior in prison; and a statute to that effect is unwarranted. Gross v. Rice, 71 Me. 241. The whole measure of punishment must be imposed at once. The judgment cannot be split up. People v. Felker, 61 Mich. 110. mulative punishment may be imposed: Lillard v. State, 17 Tex. App. 114; State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140; so may increased punishment for second offence. Kelly e. People, 115 Ill. 583; Chenowith v. Com., 12 S. W. Rep. 585 (Ky.).

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