ment would fall upon the State at large; it could not lawfully be imposed upon a single town or district, or upon the commerce of a single town or district. The burden must be borne by those upon whom it justly rests, and to recognize in the State a power to compel some single district to assume and discharge a State debt would be to recognize its power to make an obnoxious district or an obnoxious class bear the whole burden of the State government. An act to that effect would not be taxation, nor would it be the exercise of any legitimate legislative authority. And it may be said of such an act, that, so far as it would operate to make those who would pay the tolls pay more than their proportion of the State obligation, it was in effect taking their property for the private benefit of other citizens of the State, and was obnoxious to all the objections against the appropriation of private property for private purposes which could exist in any other case.

And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: "If there be such a flagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden imposed; if it be imposed for the benefit of others, or for purposes

1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See also People v. Springwells, 25 Mich. 153; Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477. "Uniformity in taxation implies equality in the burden of taxation." Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 15. "This equality in the burden constitutes the very substance designed to be secured by the rule." Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, 258. See also Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660. The reasoning of these cases seems not to have been satisfactory to the New York Court of Appeals. See Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, in which an act was sustained which authorized "and required" the village of Brockport to levy a tax for the erection of a State Normal School building at that place. No recent case, we think, has gone so far as this. Compare State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 622; Mayor of Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310; Livingston County v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427; Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455. "There can be no doubt that, as a general rule, where an expenditure is to be made for a public object, the execution of which will be substantially beneficial to every portion of the Commonwealth alike, and in the benefits and advantages of which all the people will equally participate, if the money is to be raised by taxation, the assessment would

...

be deemed to come within that class which was laid to defray one of the general charges of government, and ought therefore to be imposed as nearly as possible with equality upon all persons resident and estates lying within the Commonwealth. . . An assessment for such a purpose, if laid in any other manner, could not in any just or proper sense be regarded as 'proportional' within the meaning of the Constitution." Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, 504, per Bigelow, Ch. J. This case holds that local taxation for a State purpose may be permitted in consideration of local benefits, and only differs in principle from Gordon v. Cornes, in that the one permitted what the other required. The case of Marks v. Trustees of Purdue University, 37 Ind. 155, follows Merrick v. Amherst, and Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455; Hensley Township v. People, 84 Ill. 544, and Livingston County v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407, are to the same effect. Taxation not levied according to the principles upon which the right to tax is based is an unlawful appropriation of private property to public uses. City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491; People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Tide Water Co. v. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; Hammett v. Philadel phia, 65 Pa. St. 146; s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 615.

in which those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not bound to contribute, it is no matter in what form the power is exercised, whether in the unequal levy of the tax, or in the regulation of the boundaries of the local government, which results in subjecting the party unjustly to local taxes, it must be regarded as coming within the prohibition of the constitution designed to protect private rights against aggression however made, and whether under color of recognized power or not." 1

When, therefore, the legislature assumes to impose a pecuniary burden upon the citizen in the form of a tax, two questions may always be raised: First, whether the purpose of such burden. may properly be considered public on any of the grounds above indicated;2 and second, if public, then whether the burden is one which should properly be borne by the district upon which it is imposed. If either of these questions is answered in the negative, the legislature must be held to have assumed an authority not conferred in the general grant of legislative power, and which is therefore unconstitutional and void. "The power of taxation," says an eminent writer, "is a great governmental attribute, with which the courts have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to interfere; but if abused, the abuse should share the fate of all other usurpations." In the case of burdens thus assumed by the legislature on behalf of the State, it is not always that a speedy and safe remedy can properly be afforded in the courts. It would certainly be a very dangerous exercise of power for a court to attempt to stay the collection of State taxes because an illegal demand was included in the levy; and indeed, as State taxes are not usually levied for the purpose of satisfying specific demands, but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be sufficient for the wants of the year, the question is not usually one of the unconstitutionality of taxation, but of the misappropriation. of moneys which have been raised by taxation. But if the State should order a city, township, or village to raise money by taxation to establish one of its citizens in business, or for any other object equally removed from the proper sphere of government, or should undertake to impose the whole burden of the govern

1 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, 92. See Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa, 194.

2 Though the legislature first decides that the use is public, the decision is not conclusive. They cannot make that a public purpose which is not so in fact. Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H. 539; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124; s. c.

ment upon a fraction of the State, the usurpation of authority would not only be plain and palpable, but the proper remedy would also be plain, and no court of competent jurisdiction could feel at liberty to decline to enforce the paramount law.1

In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, that there should be some system of apportionment.2 Where the burden is

1 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 the tax list: McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Wall. 655.

common, there should be common contribution to discharge it.1 Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government affords to the persons and property of its citizens; and as all are alike protected, so all alike should bear the burden, in proportion to the interests secured. Taxes by the poll are justly regarded as odious and are seldom resorted to for the collection of revenue; and when taxes are levied upon property there must be an apportionment with reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate into mere arbitrary exactions. In this particular the State constitutions have been very specific, though in providing for equality and uniformity they have done little more than to state in concise language a principle of constitutional law which, whether declared or not, would inhere in the power to tax.

Taxes may assume the form of duties, imposts, and excises; and those collected by the national government are very largely of this character. They may also assume the form of license fees, for permission to carry on particular occupations, or to enjoy special franchises.3 They may be specific; such as are often

Estabrook, 3 Neb. 173; Murray v. Lehman, 61 Miss. 283; Graham v. Com'rs Chautauqua Co., 31 Kan. 473; Dunham v. Cox, 44 N. J. Eq. 273.

The following are special cases: A tax on drays, &c., proportioned to the number of animals employed in drawing them, contravenes the constitutional requirement of uniformity in license taxes. State v. Endom, 23 La. Ann. 663. See New Orleans v. Home Ins. Co., 23 La. An. 449. A railroad company cannot be taxed according to the length of its road. State v. South Car. R. R. Co., 4 S. C. 376. A tax on cotton cannot be proportioned to the weight regardless of grades. Sims v. Jackson, 22 La. Ann. 440. Income is not property for the purposes of taxation. Waring Savannah 60 Ga. 93. A collateral inheritance tax is not a property

tax.

Schoolfield's Exec. v. Lynchburg 78 Va. 366. A tax on the franchises of a coal company may be proportioned to the coal mined. Kittanning Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. St. 100. The keepers of private markets may be charged a license tax though none is imposed on those who sell in the public markets. New Orleans v. Dubarry, 33 La. Ann. 481; s. c. 89 Am. Rep. 273.

12 Kent, 231; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich.

269; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tidewater Co. v. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq. 518.

2 A tax on negro polls and negroes' property alone, to be applied to the education of negro children alone, is bad. Puitt v. Com'rs Gaston Co., 94 N. C. 709.

3 As to taxes on business and franchises, see Cooley on Taxation, c. 18. Offices, posts of profit, and occupations are proper subjects of taxation. Brown's App., 111 Pa. St. 72. That all occupations may be taxed when no restraints are imposed by the Constitution, see State v. Hayne, 4 Rich. 403; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 139; Commonwealth v. Moore, 25 Gratt. 951; Cousins v. State, 50 Ala. 113; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 290; Stewart v. Potts, 49 Miss. 749; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 12; Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. 216; s. c. 34 Am. Rep. 787; Young v. Thomas, 17 Fla. 169; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 93; Richmond & D. R. R. Co. v. Reidsville, 101 N. C. 404. Such a tax may be based on the average amount of a merchant's stock. Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151. See Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325. A city may be empowered to impose a license upon the business of a foreign insurance company, as well as a tax upon its net income: St.

levied upon corporations, in reference to the amount of capital stock, or to the business done, or profits earned by them. - Or they may be direct; upon property, in proportion to its value, or upon some other basis of apportionment which the legislature shall regard as just, and which shall keep in view the general idea of uniformity. The taxes collected by the States are mostly