tions then existing, and those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their rights while the artificial existence continues. The obligation of the contract by no means extends so far; but, on the contrary, the rights and privileges which come into exist ence under it are placed upon the same footing with other legal rights and privileges of the citizen, and subject in like manner to proper rules for their due regulation, protection, and enjoyment.

The limit to the exercise of the police power in these cases must be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety, or welfare of society; they must not be in conflict with any of the provisions of the charter; and they must not, under pretence of regulation, take from the corporation any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter confers. In short, they must be police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in curtailment of the corporate franchise.1

The maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, is that which lies at the foundation of the power; and to whatever enactment affecting the management and business of private corporations it cannot fairly be applied, the power itself will not extend. It has accordingly been held that where a corporation was chartered with the right to take toll from passengers over their road, a subsequent statute authorizing a certain class of persons to go toll free was void. This was not a regulation of existing rights, but it took from the corporation that which they before possessed,

1 Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53; Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264; Miller v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 21 Barb. 513; People v. Jackson & Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285, 307; Sloan v. Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 24; Attorney-General v. Chicago &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425. In Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 223, 245, it is said, in considering a ferry right granted to a city: "Franchises of this description are partly of a public and partly of a private nature.

So far as the accommodation of passengers is concerned, they are publici juris; so far as they require capital and produce revenue, they are privati juris. Certain duties and burdens are imposed upon the grantees, who are compensated therefor by the privilege of levying ferriage, and security from spoliation arising from the irrevocable nature of the grant. The State may legislate touching them, so far as they are publici juris. Thus, laws

may be passed to punish neglect or misconduct in conducting the ferries, to secure the safety of passengers from danger and imposition, &c. But the State cannot take away the ferries themselves, nor deprive the city of their legitimate rents and profits." And see People v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 32 Barb. 102, 116; Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Pa. St. 41; Hegeman v. Western R. R., 13 N. Y. 9. After the organization of a company for electric communication, it may be required to obtain the approval of its plans by city commissioners before laying wires in the streets. People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593. A provision that an insurance policy referring to the application shall not be received in evidence unless such application is attached to it, is valid as to policies issued thereafter by an existing company. New Era Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 120 Pa. St. 384.

2 Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264. Of course the charter reserved no right to make such an amendment.

namely, the right to tolls, and conferred upon individuals that which before they had not, namely, the privilege to pass over the road free of toll. "Powers," it is said in another case, "which can only be justified on this specific ground [that they are police regulations], and which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the Constitution, can be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety, comfort, and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by the public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory conclusion that the framers of the Constitution could not, as men of ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of the prohibition would otherwise include it." And it was therefore held that an act subsequent to the charter of a plank-road company, and not assented to by the corporators, which subjected them to a total forfeiture of their franchises for that which by the charter was cause for partial forfeiture only, was void as impairing the obligation of contracts. And even a provision in a corporate charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pretence of amendment, or of a police regulation, would have the effect to appropriate a portion of the corporate property to the public use. And where by its charter the corporation was em

1 Christiancy, J., in People v. Jackson, & Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285, 307. Compare Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Pa. St. 41. Where the corporation by its charter has the right to fix its own tolls for a specified period, the legislature is without the power to regulate them till that period has expired. Sloan v. Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 24; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 397.

2 Ibid. And see State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189.

Detroit v. Plank Road Co., 43 Mich. 140. It has been held that the reservation of a right to amend or appeal would not justify an act requiring a railroad company to cause a proposed new street or highway to be taken across their track, and to cause the necessary embankments, excavations, and other work to be done for that purpose at their own expense; thus not only appropriating a part of their property to another public use, but compelling them to fit it for such use: Miller v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 21 Barb. 513; People v. Lake Shore, &c. Ry. Co., 52 Mich. 277; Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Hough, 61 Mich. 507.

Contra, Portland & R. R. R. Co. v. Deering, 78 Me. 61; even if there is no reservation in the charter of the right to alter, &c. Boston & M. R. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 79 Me. 386. Companies may be compelled to put in farm crossings at their own expense. Ill. Centr. R. R. Co. v. Willenborg, 117 Ill. 203. See also Montclair v. New York, &c. Ry. Co., 45 N. J. Eq. 436. This, however, can scarcely be a more severe exercise of the power than is the amendment to the charter of a railroad corporation which limits the rates of fare and freight which may be charged; for the exercise of this might be carried to an extent which would annihilate the whole value of railroad property. The power, however, is very fully sustained, where the right to amend is reserved in the charter. Attorney-General v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425; Blake v. Winona, &c. R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 418; 8. c. 18 Am. Rep. 345; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Piek v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 177. See a like rule applied to a ferry company in Parker v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 506. A requirement that rates of

powered to construct over a river a certain bridge, which must necessarily constitute an obstruction to the navigation of the river, a subsequent amendment making the corporation liable for such obstruction was held void, as in effect depriving the corporation of the very right which the charter assured to it. So where the charter reserved to the legislature the right of modification after the corporators had been reimbursed their expenses in constructing the bridge, with twelve per cent interest thereon, an amendment before such reimbursement, requiring the construction of a fifty-foot draw for the passage of vessels, in place of one of thirtytwo feet, was held unconstitutional and void.2 So it has been held that a power to a municipal corporation to regulate the speed of railway carriages would not authorize such regulation, except in the streets and public grounds of the city; such being the fair construction of the power, and the necessity for this police regulation not extending further. But there are decisions on this point which are the other way.

On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad corporations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all beasts killed by going upon it, has been sustained on two grounds: first, as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprietors, and in that view being but a reasonable provision for the

fare and freight shall be annually fixed and published is legitimate as an exercise of the police power. Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560. For discussion of the right of the State to fix rates, see post, pp. 736, 737, notes. It is no impairment of the obligation of the charter of a railroad company to pass laws to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. People, 95 Ill. 313; s. c. 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 188. That the issuing and taking up of tickets and coupons of tickets by common carriers may be regulated by statute, see Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552.

1 Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389. Compare Commonwealth v. Pa. Canal Co., 66 Pa. St. 41; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 329.

within the corporate limits would justify an ordinance entirely prohibiting the use of steam for propelling cars through any part of the city. And see Great Western R. R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 Ill. 381; Branson v. Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. 329; Whitson v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392. Affirming the general right to permit the municipalities to regulate the speed of trains, see Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Haggerty, 67 Ill. 113; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. St. 33; Haas v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 44. That the legislature may compel railroad companies to carry impartially for all, see Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; Cincinnati, &c. R. R. Co. v. Cook (Ohio), 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 317; Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662; but an

2 Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 act abrogating the requirement of imConn. 53.

3 State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. 170.

4 Crowley v. Burlington, &c. Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 658. See Merz v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 88 Mo. 672. In Buffalo & Niagara Falls R. R. Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it was held that a statutory power in a city to regulate the running of cars

partial carriage is void as to inter-state transportation. The Sue, 22 Fed. Rep. 843. But if the carriage is of persons from State to State, the State has no such control. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485. See Carton v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 148; s. c. 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 305. See cases, post, pp. 717, 737.

protection of domestic animals; and second, and chiefly, as essential to the protection of persons being transported in the railway, carriages.1 Having this double purpose in view, the owner of beasts killed or injured may maintain an action for the damage suffered, notwithstanding he may not himself be free from negligence.2 But it would, perhaps, require an express legislative

declaration that the corporation should be liable for the beasts thus destroyed to create so great an innovation in the common law. The general rule, where a corporation has failed to obey the police regulations established for its government, would not make the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence contributed with that of the corporation in producing the injury.1

The State may also regulate the grade of railways, and prescribe how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each other and it may apportion the expense of making the necessary crossings between the corporations owning the roads. And it may establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring the bell or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before passing highways at grade, or other places where their approach might be dangerous to travel,3 or to station flagmen at such or

Co., 35 N. H. 169; O'Bannon v. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co., 8 Bush, 348; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Arnold, 47 Ill. 173; Hinman v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 28 Iowa, 491; Quackenbush v. Wisconsin, &c. R. R. Co., 62 Wis. 411; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Webb, 18 Neb. 215.

1 Jackson v. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150. And see Marsh v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 14 Barb. 364; Joliet & N. I. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 20 Ill. 221; Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255, and 4 N. Y. 349; Price v. New Jersey R. R. Co., 31 N. J. 229; Drake v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 240. In Indianapolis & Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84, it was held that a clause in the charter of a railroad corporation which declared that when the corporators should have procured a right of way as therein provided, they should be seised in fee-simple of the right to the land, and should have the sole use and occupation of the same, and no person, body corporate or politic, should in any way interfere therewith, molest, disturb, or injure any of the rights and privileges thereby granted, &c., would not take from the State the power to establish a police regulation making the corporation liable for cattle killed by their cars.

2 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Grand Junction R. R. Co., 1 Allen, 552, and 4 Allen, 198; Pittsburgh, &c. R. R. Co. v. S. W. Pa. R. R. Co., 77 Pa. St. 173. They may be required to put up depots at railroad junctions. State v. Wabash, &c. Ry. Co.,

83 Mo. 144. Part of the expense of changing grade to overhead crossings may be laid upon a town. Appeal of Westbrook, 57 Conn. 95. The legisla ture may regulate the speed at highway and other crossings. Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hillmer, 72 Ill. 235. "While the franchise of a railroad company licenses generally unlimited speed, power is reserved to the legislature to regulate the exercise of the franchise for public security." Ryan, Ch. J., in Horn v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 463. The regulation is in favorem vitæ. Haas v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 44. But running at unlawful speed does not impose an absolute liability. Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Caster, 5 Sou. Rep. 388 (Miss.).

"The legislature has the power, by general laws, from time to time, as the public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in their franchises, so as to provide for the public safety. The provision in question is a mere police regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the public, and in no manner interferes with or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of incorporation." Galena & Chicago U. R. R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548. And see Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 Cow. 588; Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 223; Bulkley v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 27 Conn. 486; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; s. c. 49 Me. 156; Galena & Chicago U. R. R. Co. v.