sustified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, the reasons address themselves exclusively to the legislative wisdom. Taxing Forbidden Occupations. Questions have arisen in regard to these laws, and other State regulations, arising out of the imposition of burdens on various occupations by Congress, with a view to raising revenue for the national government. These burdens are imposed in the form of what are called license fees; and it has been claimed that, when the party paid the fee, he was thereby licensed to carry on the business, despite the regulations which the State government might make upon the subject. This view, however, has not been taken by the courts, who have regarded the congressional legislation imposing a license fee as only a species of taxation, without the payment of which the business could not lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did not propose to make any business lawful which was not lawful before, or to relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by the regulations of the State. The licenses give no authority, and are mere receipts for taxes.1 Other Regulations affecting Commerce. Numerous other illustrations might be given of the power in the States to make regulations affecting commerce, which are sustainable as regulations of police. Among these, quarantine regulations and health laws of every description will readily suggest themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the extent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected with disease or otherwise dangerous. These regulations have generally passed Cases, 5 How. 504, 632; Meeker v. Van Rennselaer, 15 Wend. 397. A liquor law may annul a previous license, and not be invalid on that ground. See ante, p. 341, note. Under the police power, the dealing in liquors even for lawful purposes may be restricted to persons approved for moral character. In re Ruth, 32 Iowa, 250. Compare People v. Haug, 37 N. W. Rep. 21 (Mich.). 1 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 Ill. 301; Terr. v. O'Connor, 41 N. W. Rep. 746 (Dak.). They are not contracts. Martin v. State, 36 N.W. Rep. 554 (Neb.) Nor does their pay. ment preclude enforcement of penalties for selling in the Indian country. United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U. S. 491. A State may tax a business notwithstanding the State constitution forbids its being licensed. Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; s. c. 20 3 It is usual, either by general law or Am. Rep. 654. As to when license fees by municipal charters, to confer very are taxes, see ante, p. 243 and note. State extensive powers upon local boards of taxation does not forbid further municipal health, under which, when acting in good taxation for regulation. Wolf v. Lansing, faith, they may justify themselves in tak53 Mich. 367; Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 ing possession of, purifying, or even deInd. 77. stroying the buildings or other property See remarks of Grier, J., in License of the citizen, when the public health or 2 As to the right to fix rates for railroad transportation, see cases, pp. 787, 738, post. unchallenged. The right to pass inspection laws, and to levy duties so far as may be necessary to render them effectual, is also undoubted, and is expressly recognized by the Constitution.1 But certain powers which still more directly affect commerce may sometimes be exercised where the purpose is not to interfere with congressional legislation, but merely to regulate the times and manner of transacting business with a view to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent confusion. An act of the State of New York declared that the harbormasters appointed under the State laws should have authority to regulate and station all ships and vessels in the stream of the East and North rivers, within the limits of the city of New York, and the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels as were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes to make room for such others as required to be more comfort demands such strong measures. They may forbid offensive trades being carried on in populous districts. Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; LiveStock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 36; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; Coe v. Shultz, 47 Barb. 64; Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush, 139; Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 95; Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 458. See State v. Board of Health, 16 Mo. App. 8. The disinfection of all imported rags at the expense of the shipper may be required. Train v. Boston Disinfecting Co., 144 Mass. 523. That the business is lawful in itself, and proper to be carried on somewhere, is no objection to the regulation. Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. If they forbid the keeping of swine in certain parts of a city, their regulations will be presumed reasonable and needful. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221, citing with approval Pierce v. Bartrum, Cowp. 269. And though they cannot be vested with authority to decide finally upon one's right to property when they proceed to interfere with it as constituting a danger to health, yet they are vested with quasi judicial power in decid ing upon what constitutes a nuisance, and all presumptions favor their actions. See Van Wormer v. Albany, 15 Wend. 262; Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. Ann. 227; Metropolitan Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80. And they may unquestionably be vested with very large power to establish pesthouses, and make very stringent regulations to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. As to the power of the public authorities to establish a public slaughterhouse, or to require all slaughtering of beasts to be done at one establishment, see Milwaukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 241; Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 36. Compare, as to right to establish monopolies, Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344. The license of a board of health is not a defence to an indictment for a nuisance. Garrett v. State, 49 N. J. L. 94. A regulation forbidding the growing of rice within a city, on the ground of injurious effect upon health, was held valid in Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1. 1 Art. 1, § 10, clause 2. See Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38; Hospes v. O'Brien, 24 Fed. Rep. 145. A prohibition of the sale of meat unless inspected by State officers twenty-four hours before the slaughter of the animal is void as excluding dressed beef brought from other States. Minnesota v. Barber, U. S. Sup. Ct., May, 1890. Swift v. Sutphin, 39 Fed. Rep. 630; In re Christian, Id. 636; Ex parte Kieffer, 40 Fed. Rep. 399. immediately accommodated, for the purpose of receiving and discharging theirs; and that the harbor-masters or either of them should have authority to determine how far and in what instances it was the duty of the masters and others, having charge of ships or vessels, to accommodate each other in their respective situations; and it imposed a penalty for refusing or neglecting to obey the directions of the harbor-masters or either of them. In a suit brought against the master of a steam vessel, who had refused to move his vessel a certain distance as directed by one of the harbor-masters, in order to accommodate a new arrival, it was insisted on the defence that the act was an unconstitutional invasion of the power of Congress over commerce, but it was sustained as being merely a regulation prescribing the manner of exercising individual rights over property employed in commerce.1 The line of distinction between that which constitutes an interference with commerce, and that which is a mere police regulation, is sometimes, exceedingly dim and shadowy, and it is not to be wondered at that learned jurists differ when endeavoring to classify the cases which arise. It is not doubted that Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to the most 1 Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 351. Woodworth, J., in this case, states very clearly the principle on which police regulations, in such cases, are sustainable: "It seems to me the power exercised in this case is essentially necessary for the purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned. It is not, in the legitimate sense of the term, a violation of any right, but the exercise of a power indispensably necessary, where an extensive commerce is carried on. If the harbor is crowded with vessels arriving daily from foreign parts, the power is incident to such a state of things. Disorder and confusion would be the consequence, if there was no control.... The right assumed under the law would not be upheld, if exerted beyond what may be considered a necessary police regulation. The line between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one hand, and regulations not lessening the value of the right, and calculated for the benefit of all, must be distinctly marked. . . . Police regulations are legal and binding, because for the general benefit, and do not proceed to the length of impairing any right, in the proper sense of that term. The sover eign power in a community, therefore, may and ought to prescribe the manner of exercising individual rights over property. It is for the better protection and enjoyment of that absolute dominion which the individual claims. The power rests on the implied right and duty of the supreme power to protect all by statutory regulations; so that, on the whole, the benefit of all is promoted. Every public regulation in a city may, and does in some sense, limit and restrict the absolute right that existed previously. But this is not considered as an injury. So far from it, the individual, as well as others, is supposed to be benefited. It may, then, be said that such a power is incident to every well-regulated society, and without which it could not well exist." See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Owners of the James Gray v. Owners of the John Frazer, 21 How. 184; Benedict v. Vanderbilt, 1 Robertson, 194; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572; Port Wardens v. The Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 731; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292. minute directions, if it shall be deemed advisable;1 and that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions, the exercise of State power is excluded. Congress may establish police regulations, as well as the States; confining their operation to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitútion. But as the general police power can better be exercised under the supervision of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in the national courts, the regulations which are made by Congress do not often exclude the establishment of others by the State covering very many particulars. Moreover, the regulations of commerce are usually, and in some cases must be, general and uniform for the whole country; while in some localities, State and local policy will demand peculiar regulations with reference to special and peculiar circumstances. The State of Maryland passed an act requiring all importers of foreign goods, by the bale or package, &c., to take out a license, for which they should pay fifty dollars, and, in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, subjected them to certain forfeitures and penalties. License laws are of two kinds: those which require the payment of a license fee by way of raising a revenue, and are therefore the exercise of the power of taxation; and those which are mere police regulations, and require the payment only of such license fee as will cover the expense of the license and of enforcing the regulation.3 The Maryland act seems to fall properly within the former of these classes, and it was held void as in conflict with that provision of the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying any impost, &c., and also with the clause which declares that Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce. The reasoning of the court was this: Sale is the object of all importation of goods, and the power to allow importation 1 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl- 465. The same principle applies to an vania, 114 U. S. 215. 2 See, for the distinction between the general regulation of commerce, which is under the exclusive control of Congress, and the local regulations which are mere aids to commerce, and are generally left to the States, Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, per Field, J., and cases, pp. 595, 596, ante. A State law may require all locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed, even those engaged in inter-state transportation. Such a law imposes no burden upon inter-state commerce, and is valid in the absence of congressional regulation. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. act requiring an examination of railroad employees for color blindness, to be paid for by the railroad company. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96. Contra, as to payment by the company. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 5 Sou. Rep. 311 (Ala.). Sunday trains may be forbidden by a State. State v. Railroad Co., 24 W. Va. 783. See also W. U. Tel. Co. v. Mayor, 38 Fed. Rep. 552. 3 Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347. See ante, p. 243. Also Dillon. Mun. Corp. §§ 291-294 and notes. must therefore imply the power to authorize the sale of the thing imported; that consequently a penalty inflicted for selling an article in the character of importer was in opposition to the act of Congress, which authorized importation; that a power to tax an article in the hands of the importer the instant it was landed was the same in effect as a power to tax it whilst entering the port; that consequently the law of Maryland was obnoxious to the charge of unconstitutionality, on the ground of its violating the two provisions referred to. And a State law which required the master of every vessel engaged in foreign commerce to pay a certain sum to a State officer, on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State, or before landing any alien passenger, was held void for similar reasons.2 Nor can a State forbid the conduction from it of natural gas in pipes." On the other hand, a law of the State of New York was sustained which required, under a penalty, that the master of every vessel arriving from a foreign port should report to the mayor or recorder of the city of New York an account of his passengers; the object being to prevent New York from being burdened by an influx of persons brought thither in ships from foreign countries and the other States, and to that end to require a report of the names, places of birth, &c., of all passengers, that the necessary steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent them from becoming chargeable as paupers.4 And a State regulation of pilots and pilotage was held unobjectionable, though it was conceded that Congress had full power to make regulations on the same subject, which, however, it had not exercised.5 These several cases, and the elaborate discussions with which the decisions in 1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. See Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, and cases pp. 595, 596, 717, ante. A State cannot enforce a penalty upon a telegraph company for failure to deliver a message sent from it to another State. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347. That a penalty may be imposed upon one selling from the original package oleomargarine colored to deceive, though brought from another State, such sale being prohibited by local law, Waterbury v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534. see 2 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; People v. Compagnie Gén., 107 U. S. 59; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580. See also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, where a State law imposing a special tax on every Chinese person over eighteen years of age for each month of his resi dence in the State was held unconstitutional, as in conflict with the power of Congress over commerce. In Canada, provincial legislation on commerce is void; the authority being with the Dominion Parliament. Severn v. The Queen, 2 Sup. Ct. R. (Ont.) 70. 8 State v. Indiana & O. G. & M. Co., 22 N. E. Rep. 778 (Ind.). 4 City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 192. See also State v. The Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. 5 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. See Barnaby v. State, 21 Ind. 450; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572. As to State control of harbors, see Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. |