"resident," as employed in different constitutions to define the qualifications of electors, mean substantially the same thing; and one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where he has his domicile or home. Every person at all times must be considered as having a domicile somewhere, and that which he has acquired at one place is considered as continuing until another is acquired at a different place. It has been held that a student in an institution of learning, who has residence there for purposes of instruction, may vote at such place, provided he is emancipated from his father's family, and for the time has no home elsewhere.3 Sturgeon v. Korte, 34 Ohio St. 525; Story, Confl. Laws, § 43. As to what residence is sufficient, see Kellogg v. Hickman, 21 Pac. Rep. 325 (Col.); Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141. That one should vote where he eats, not where he lodges, if at different places, see Warren v. Board Registration, 40 N. W. Rep. 553 (Mich.). 1 Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 36; State v. Aldrich, 14 R. I. 171. 2 That it is not a necessary consequence of this doctrine that one must always be entitled to vote somewhere, see Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141. & Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Wilbraham v. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587; Perry v. Reynolds, 53 Conn. 527. Compare Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170. A different conclusion is arrived at in Pennsylvania. Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. St. 302; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 698. And in Iowa, Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 216. "The questions of residence, inhabitancy, or domicile,— for although not in all respects precisely the same, they are nearly so, and depend much upon the same evidence, are attended with more difficulty than almost any other which are presented for adjudication. No exact definition can be given of domicile; it depends upon no one fact or combination of circumstances; but, from the whole taken together, it must be determined in each particular case. It is a maxim that every man must have a domicile somewhere, and also that he can have but one. Of course it follows that his existing domicile continues until he acquires another; and vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes his former one. From this view it is manifest that very slight cir cumstances must often decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance of the evidence in favor of two or more places; and it may often occur that the evidence of facts tending to establish the domicile in one place would be entirely conclusive, were it not for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive and decisive character, which fix it beyond question in another. So, on the contrary, very slight circumstances may fix one's domicile, if not controlled by more conclusive facts fixing it in another place. If a seaman, without family or property, sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicile of origin, although he may return only at long intervals, or even be absent many years, yet if he does not by some actual residence or other means acquire a domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin." Shaw, Ch. J., Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242, 245. And see Alston v. Newcomer, 42 Miss. 186; Johnson v. People, 94 Ill. 505. In Inhabitants of Abington v. Inhabitants of North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170, it appeared that a town line ran through the house occupied by a party, leaving a portion on one side sufficient to form a habitation, and a portion on the other not sufficient for that purpose. Held, that the domicile must be deemed to be on the side first mentioned. It was intimated also that where a house was thus divided, and the party slept habitually on one side, that circumstance should be regarded as a preponderating one to fix his residence there, in the absence of other proof. And see Rex v. St. Olave's, 1 Strange, 51. By the constitutions of several of the States, it is provided, in substance, t no person shall be deemed to have ga Temporary absence from one's home, with continuous intention to return, will not deprive one of his residence, even though it extend through a series of years.1 Conditions to the Exercise of the Elective Franchise. While it is true that the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of electors, it must nevertheless devolve upon that body to establish such regulations as will enable all persons entitled to the privilege to exercise it freely and securely, and exclude all who are not entitled from improper participation therein. For this purpose the times of holding elections, the manner of conducting them and of ascertaining the result, are prescribed, and heavy penalties are imposed upon those who shall vote illegally, or instigate others to do so, or who shall attempt to preclude a fair election or to falsify the result. The propriety, and indeed the necessity, of such regulations are undisputed. In some of the States it has also been regarded as important that lists of voters should be prepared before the day of election, in which should be registered the name of every person qualified to vote. Under such a regulation, the officers whose duty it is to administer the election laws are enabled to proceed with more deliberation in the discharge of their duties, and to avoid the haste and confusion that must attend the determination upon election day of the various and sometimes difficult questions concerning the right of individuals to exercise this important fran or lost a residence by reason of his pres- the place of an institution of learning, the fact of his entering it as a student will not preclude his acquiring a legal residence there: Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158; Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148; but if he is domiciled at the place for the purposes of instruction only, it is deemed proper and right that he should neither lose his former residence nor gain a new one in consequence thereof. Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 216. That persons residing upon lands within a State, but set apart for some national purpose, and subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, are not voters, see Opinions of Judges, 1 Met. 580; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306; McCrary, Law of Elections, § 29. 1 Harbaugh v. Cicott, 33 Mich. 241; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. St. 802; s. c. 10 Am. Rep. 698; Dennis v. State, 17 Fla. 389; Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 266. chise. Electors, also, by means of this registry, are notified in advance what persons claim the right to vote, and are enabled to make the necessary examination to determine whether the claim is well founded, and to exercise the right of challenge if satisfied any person registered is unqualified. When the constitution has established no such rule, and is entirely silent on the subject, it has sometimes been claimed that the statute requiring voters to be registered before the day of election, and excluding from the right all whose names do not appear upon the list, was unconstitutional and void, as adding another test to the qualifications of electors which the constitution has prescribed, and as having the effect, where electors are not registered, to exclude from voting persons who have an absolute right to that franchise by the fundamental law. This position, however, has not been generally accepted as sound by the courts. The provision for a registry deprives no one of his right, but is only a reasonable regulation under which the right may be exercised. Such regulations must always have been within the power of the legislature, unless forbidden. Many resting upon the same principle are always prescribed, and have never been supposed to be open to objection. Although the constitution provides that all male citizens twentyone years of age and upwards shall be entitled to vote, it would. not be seriously contended that a statute which should require all such citizens to go to the established place for holding the polls, and there deposit their ballots, and not elsewhere, was a violation of the constitution, because prescribing an additional qualification, namely, the presence of the elector at the polls. All such reasonable regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legislature important to the preservation of order in elections, to 1 See Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338. And compare Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 498; Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555; s.c. 35 Am. Rep. 786; White v. Multnomah Co., 13 Oreg. 317. In State v. Corner, 22 Neb. 265, it is said the voter has the right to prove himself an elector, register, and vote at any time before the polls close. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania laid down a rule in conflict with these cases, in Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St. 54, which case is in harmony with those cited in the next note. 2 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; s. c. 23 Am. Dec. 632; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; State v. Bond, 38 Mo. 425; State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Byler v. Asher, 47 Ill. 101; Monroe . Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 267; guard against fraud, undue influence, and oppression, and to preserve the purity of the ballot-box, are not only within the constitutional power of the legislature, but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essential. And where the law requires such a registry, and forbids the reception of votes from any persons not registered, an election in a township where no such registry has ever been made will be void, and cannot be sustained by making proof that none in fact but duly qualified electors have voted. It is no answer that such a rule may enable the registry officers, by neglecting their duty, to disfranchise the electors altogether; the remedy of the electors is by proceedings to compel the performance of the duty; and the statute, being imperative and mandatory, cannot be disregarded. The danger, however, of any such misconduct on the part of officers is comparatively small, when the duty is entrusted to those who are chosen in the locality where the registry is to be made, and who are consequently immediately responsible to those who are interested in being registered. All regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be reasonable, uniform, and impartial; they must not have for their purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise; if they do, they must be declared void.2 1 People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; Zeiler v. Chapman, 54 Mo. 502; Nefzger v. Davenport, &c. R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 642; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Mallory, 101 Ill. 583. It has nevertheless been held that if the ballots of unregistered voters are received, they should not be rejected in a contest. Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170; Kuykendall v. Harker, 89 Ill. 126. The law does not become unconstitutional because of the fact that, by the neglect of the officers to attend to the registry, voters may be disfranchised. Ibid. Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450. But informalities in a registry will not vitiate it, and canvassers cannot reject votes because of them. State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71. Compare Barnes v. Supervisors, 51 Miss. 305; Newsom v. Earnheart, 86 N. C. 391; De Berry v. Nicholson, 102 N. C. 465. That a board of registration has judicial functions, see Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 431. Such board may be civilly liable for wrongful and malicious refusal to register a person. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15. 2 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; s. c. 23 Am. Dec. 632; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665. All male citizens resident in the State a year and the town six months being electors, an act is void which forbids to a naturalized person the right to be registered within thirty days of nat uralization. Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497. Under the Constitution of Ohio, the right of suffrage is guaranteed to "white male citizens," and by a long series of decisions it was settled that persons having a preponderance of white blood were white" within its meaning. It was also settled that judges of election were liable to an action for refusing to receive the vote of a qualified elector. A legislature unfriendly to the construction of the constitution above stated passed an act which, while prescribing penalties against judges of election who should refuse to receive or sanction the rejection of a ballot from any person, knowing him to have the qualifications of an elector, concluded with a proviso that the act and the penalties thereto " shall not apply to clerks or judges of election for refusing to receive the votes of persons having a In some other cases preliminary action by the public authorities may be requisite before any legal election can be held. If an election is one which a municipality may hold or not at its option, and the proper municipal authority decides against holding it, it is evident that individual citizens must acquiesce, and that any votes which may be cast by them on the assumption of right must be altogether nugatory. The same would be true of an election to be held after proclamation for that purpose, and which must fail if no such proclamation has been made.? Where, however, both the time and the place of an election are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed, notwithstanding the officer, whose duty it is to give notice of the election, has failed in that duty. The notice to be thus given is only additional to that which the statute itself gives, and is prescribed for the purpose of greater publicity; but the right to hold the election comes from the statute, and not from the official notice. It has therefore been frequently held that when a vacancy exists in an office, which the law requires shall be filled at the next general election, the time and place of which are fixed, and that notice of the general election shall also specify the vacancy to be filled, an election at that time and place to fill the vacancy will be valid, notwithstanding the notice is not given; and such election cannot be defeated by showing that a small portion only of the electors were actually aware of the vacancy, or cast their votes to fill it. But this would not be the case if either the time or the distinct and visible admixture of African blood, nor shall they be liable to damages by reason of such rejection." Other provisions of the act plainly discriminated against the class of voters mentioned, and it was held to be clearly unreasonable, partial, calculated to subvert or impede the exercise of the right of suffrage by this class, and therefore void. Monroe v. Collins, supra. vote as usual. Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 266. 3 People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477; State v. Jones, 19 Ind. 356; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; State v. Goetze, 22 Wis. 363; State v. Skirving, 19 Neb. 497. The case of Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio St. 532, would seem 1 Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 523; to be contra. A general election was to Opinions of Judges, 15 Mass. 537. 2 People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; People v. Martin, 12 Cal. 409; Jones v. State, 1 Kan. 273; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold. 588; Stephens v. People, 89 Ill. 337. So if notice is given but not as the law requires: State v. Echols, 20 Pac. Rep. 523 (Kan.); or if it fails to specify time and place. Morgan v. Gloucester, 44 N. J. L. 137. But such informalities will not vitiate, if as many be held, at which by law an existing vacancy in the office of judge of probate was required to be filled. The sheriff, however, omitted all mention of this of fice in his notice of election, and the voters generally were not aware that a vacancy was to be filled. Nominations were made for the other offices, but none for this, but a candidate presented himself for whom less than a fourth of the voters taking part in the election cas |