the party claiming had quitted possession before the passing of the act. Thus, where a party was let into possession of land, in 1807, as tenant at will, and continued in possession till 1831, without making any acknowledgment of tenancy or paying rent, and then quitted possession, held, that he had acquired no right in the land, so as to enable his heir at law to maintain ejectment under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, even against a stranger; because, as he had quitted the possession before the act passed, his case was not within it. Patteson, J., observed, the case would have been quite different, if the tenant at will had continued in possession. But here, after the possession had been long determined, it is contended that a fee-simple arises by the passing of the act. That cannot be.1

*

Where there is an estate tail, and the tenant in tail bars the remainders over, and creates out of his estate tail new estates, [* xxxi] the parties who take such estates have the same time which the tenant in tail had within which to bring an ejectment. Thus, where estates settled to the wife for life, remainder to her issue in tail, and in 1818, the husband, wife, and R. G., the only son, by deed and a recovery, limited the same estates to the husband for life, remainder to the wife for life, remainder to R. G., the son, for life, remainder to his issue in tail, remainder to J. F., his sister, for life, with remainders over; the husband died in 1819, the wife in 1822, and R. G. in 1828; it was held, that, as the estate of J. F. was raised out of the estate tail of R. G., she had the same period for bringing an ejectment in respect of any of the estates comprised in the above deeds as R. G. would have had, had he remained alive, namely, twenty years from 1822, when his remainder came in possession.2

Where premises are in lease, the lessor is a reversioner within the latter part of the 3d section; and, therefore, if he simply discontinue the receipt of the rent for more than twenty years, he is not barred, but may recover the premises at any time within twenty years from the determination of the lease; if, however, the rents were received adversely by a third party, then no such right accrues on the determination of the lease.3 And by simply discontinuing the receipt of rent for more than twenty years, the lessor does not forfeit his right to the arrears of rent, as the second section does not apply to rent on a demise, but the lessor may recover twenty years' arrears, or six years' arrears, according to the nature of the demise, namely, whether under seal or by parol.4

Where a person is entitled, under a will, to an annuity charged upon

1 Doe d. Thompson v. Thompson, 2 N. & P. 656 ; s. c. 6 A. & E. 721.

2 Doe d. Curzon and Others v. Edmonds, 6 M. & W. 295.

3 Doe d. Davey v. Oxenham, 7 M. & W. 131. This case does not, of course, apply to a tenancy at will, or from year to year, so as to give the lessor any other right than from the end of the first year.

* Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113.

land, his right is barred under the second section of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, though he has never received any part of the annuity, at the end of twenty years from the time when his right to make a distress first accrued; for though the third section of the act excepts the case of a will, in mentioning the periods from which the statute shall be deemed to run, yet the second section of the act is not governed and controlled by the third, but simply explained and construed; the object of that section being to explain and give a construction to the enactment contained in the second clause, as to the time at which the right to make a distress for any rent shall be deemed to have accrued, in those cases only in which doubt or difficulty might occur, leaving every case which plainly falls within the general words [*xxxii] of the second section, but is not included amongst the instances given by the third, to be governed by the operation of the second.1

It is no answer to a prima facie title of twenty years' possession, that such possession was in continuation of that of a sister, who died more than twenty years before action, and who entered by abatement into the land to which her elder brother (whose issue was alive) was entitled as heir, and held, that the onus of explaining the character of the possession is upon the agent, against whom the presumption from possession arises.2

The statute of limitations bars the lord of the manor from entering for a forfeiture after twenty years.3

When a lease is granted to a woman living apart from her husband, possession adverse to her is also adverse to him.4

The king can never, in point of law, be put out of possession by the wrongful entry of a subject, yet there may be an adverse possession in fact against the crown. After such a possession of twenty years, ejectment will not lie by the grantee of the crown, as the crown could only recover the land by an information of intrusion."

Where a party claiming land enters, and obtains from the tenants payment of a shilling, and their signature to an instrument acknowledging his title; held, that it is an attornment, and does not require a stamp, and that it is an act of ownership, and strong evidence of ownership at the time of the attornment against future occupiers, though they did not claim through the parties who attorned."

1 James v. Salter, 4 Scott, 168; s. c. 3 Bing. N. C. 544 (Hil. 1837). The intimation thrown out on the motion for a new trial, in the case reported (2 Scott, 750; 2 Bing. N. C. 505), that the 2d section was controlled by the 3d, was expressly abandoned. See Tindal's, C. J., observations.

2 Doe d. Draper v. Lawley, 2 N. & M. 331.

8 Whitton v. Peacock, 3 Mylne & K. 325.

4 Doe d. Wilkins v. Wilkins, 5 N. & M. 434; s. c. 4 A. & E. 86.

Doe d. Watt v. Morris, 2 Scott, 276; s. c. Bing. N. C. 189 (Trin. 1835).

6 Doe d. Linsey v. Edwards, 6 N. & M. 633 ; s. c. 5 A. & E. 95. This case was before the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27; nothing, therefore, turned upon that act.

A party in possession, dealing with property as his own, was evidence of adverse possession, under the 21 Jas. 1.1

A replication of a life estate, under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 71, must show that the plaintiff is the person entitled to the reversion expectant thereon.2

1 Ibid.

2 Wright v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 77.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

NEW ENGLAND STATES.

[*xxxiii]

MAINE.

Personal Actions. (Revised Statutes, Ch. 146.)

* SECTION 1. The following actions shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterwards, namely: —

First. All actions of debt, founded upon any contract or liability not under seal, except such as are brought upon the judgment or decree of some court of record of the United States, or of this, or some other of the United States, or of some justice of the peace in this State;

Second. All actions upon judgments, rendered in any court, not being a court of record, except justices of the peace in this State;

Third. All actions for arrears of rent;

Fourth. All actions of assumpsit, or upon the case, founded on any contract or liability, expressed or implied;

Fifth. All actions for waste, and all actions of trespass on land, and all actions of trespass, except those of trespass for assault, battery, and false imprisonment;

Sixth. All actions of replevin, and other actions for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels ;

Seventh. All other actions on the case, except actions for slanderous words, and for libels.

SECT. 2. All actions against a sheriff, except for escape of prisoners committed on execution, for the negligence or misconduct of his deputies, shall be commenced within four years next after the cause of the action shall accrue.

SECT. 3. All actions of assault and battery and for false imprisonment, and all actions for slanderous words and for libels, shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action shall accrue.

SECT. 4. All actions for the escape of prisoners committed on execution shall be actions on the case, and shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall accrue.

* SECT. 5. No scire facias shall be served on bail, unless [*xxxiv] within one year next after judgment rendered against the principal.

SECT. 6. All actions against an indorser of a writ must be commenced within one year next after judgment entered in the original action.

SECT. 7. None of the foregoing provisions shall apply to any action brought upon a promissory note, which is signed in the presence of an attesting witness, nor to an action brought upon any bills, notes, or other evidences of debt, issued by any bank.

SECT. 8. Nor shall any of the provisions in this chapter be construed to apply to any case or suit, which, by any particular statute, is limited to be commenced within a different specified time, but such suits may be commenced within such time.

SECT. 9. In all actions of debt or assumpsit, brought to recover the balance due upon a mutual and open account current, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the last item proved in such account.

SECT. 10. If any person, entitled to bring any of the before-mentioned actions, shall, at the time when the cause of action accrues, be within the age of twenty-one years, a married woman, insane, imprisoned, or without the limits of the United States, such person may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after the disability shall be removed.

.

SECT. 11. All personal actions on any contract, not limited by any of the foregoing sections, or any other law of the State, shall be brought within twenty years after the accruing of the cause of action.

SECT. 12. When a writ shall fail of a sufficient service or return by any unavoidable accident, or by the default or negligence of any officer, to whom it was delivered or directed; or when such writ shall be abated, or the action otherwise avoided and defeated, for any matter of form, or by the death of either party; or, if a judgment for the plaintiff shall be reversed on a writ of error; in such cases, the plaintiff may commence a new action, on the same demand, within six months after the abatement or determination of the original suit, or reversal of the judgment in the same; and if the cause of action by law survives, his executor or administrator, in case of his death, may commence such new action, within said six months.

SECT. 13. If any person, entitled to bring any of the actions before mentioned, or liable to any such action, shall die before the expiration of the time herein limited therefor, or within thirty days after the expiration of said term, and, if the cause of action survives by law, the action may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any time within two years after administration or letters testamentary granted, and not afterwards if barred by this chapter.