improved by a series of gradual changes, to the most important of which we have adverted, and which have been adopted as convenience dictated to suit the exigencies of justice, it must not be supposed that the institution is not capable of improvement, or even that it does not contain some considerable imperfections. The consideration of these does not fall within the scope of our present design; we will, however, allude to one, which may also be cited as a strong instance to show the danger of leaving legal improvements to the slow process of gradual change arising out of circumstances: we allude to the rule which requires jurors to be unanimous in their verdict. In the case of a popular tribunal consisting of a body or class of persons, of indefinite number, to require unanimity in their verdict would of course be absurd; where a peer is at this day tried before the House of Lords on a charge of felony, a bare majority is sufficient to support a conviction. It has been seen that formerly, where jurors could not agree in their verdict upon an assise, they were afforced; that is, an addition was made to their knowledge and means of judging by adding to their number others acquainted with the fact; this was a reasonable practice: in other cases it is probable that the juries were either afforced, or that the decision of the original juries depended on the opinion of the majority. The practice of afforcement being inconvenient, fell into disuse, and it became a settled rule that the verdict should be the unanimous verdict of the original twelve jurors; and that in case of disagreement means should be used to compel them by confining them together without allowing food or fire, or communication with others, until they had agreed; and if not before agreed, by conveying them in carts after the judge in his progress on the circuit to the border of the county.1 This practice, so contrary to reason, appears to have been introduced simply to get rid of a practice which, though reasonable in itself, was found to be attended with trouble. The principle of the rule concerning the unanimity of 41. Ass. pl. 11. Et nota que les justice disent quils duissent aver cariè l'assise ovesque eux en charr tanqe ils fuissent accord, &c. It was also decided there that the taking the verdict of eleven, and committing the twelfth juror because he dissented from the verdict of the others, was illegal. 2 That is, when jurors were mere recognitors. jurors consists in establishing an artificial test of truth, such that a party, on whom the onus of proving the affirmative is thrown must fail, unless twelve jurors agree in finding the truth of that affirmative upon oath. This is in itself an unreasonable test, which must often exclude the truth, even where there is great preponderance of probability in its favour; it gives far too great a weight to the probable error of a single individual who differs in his judgment from the rest, and enables a dishonest juror to commit gross injustice. The law proposes to remedy the defect, not by compelling the jurors to agree, for that is impossible, but by forcing them to say that they agree; the test, therefore, is in truth abandoned not only so, but another, and that, a strange one, is substituted; the verdict is to depend on the juror who can longest endure cold, hunger, thirst, confinement, and want of rest. : We have no room at present to expatiate upon the numerous objections which array themselves against such a merely artificial, peremptory, and indiscriminating rule, which applies equally to cases where the issue of life or death is involved, as it does to mere cases of civil right, which ought to be governed by little, if any thing, more than a mere preponderance of opinion. Whilst many beneficial changes have been introduced, as we have seen, in more enlightened ages, this rule has descended to us in a state of unmitigated barbarism. Intending to resume our observations at a future opportunity, we shall have attained our present object if, by any of our details or remarks, we may have succeeded in stimulating inquiry upon so important a subject as that of the Trial by Jury. ART. XI.-CONVEYANCING REFORM. 1. LORD BROUGHAM'S Speech on Law Reform. May 19th, 1845. Ridgway. 2. An Act to amend the Law of Real Property. Session 1845. 3. An Act to facilitate the Conveyance of Real Property. Session 1845. 4. An Act to facilitate the granting of certain Leases. Session 1845. 4. Report on the Plans for shortening Legal Instruments, presented to the Society for promoting the Amendment of the Law by the Committee on the Law of Property. 1845. WE are now desirous of introducing to our readers an alteration in the practice of the law for which we believe the profession is ripe. Like other great changes, for it must doubtless when fully worked out be a great change, it has been announced by various significant warnings proceeding from a common feeling, but from quarters entirely distinct and unconnected with each other. The days of omens and portents are past. In former times we should no doubt have heard of, if not seen them. But so far as our own information reaches, no star has shone forth at noon day; no triple sun has affrighted Lincoln's Inn with a portentous glare; no belated conveyancer, wending his solitary steps from Stone Buildings, has seen a bloody moon in an unclouded sky; comets indeed there have been, but they no longer "Fire the length of Ophiuchus huge In th' arctic sky, and from their horrid hair But although nothing miraculous has heralded the approaching change, although no conveyancer has left his grave to warn his brethren that common forms shall cease to exist, yet assuredly their days are numbered, and it needs no spirit of prophecy to enable us to predict that the present practice of conveyancing is doomed. The mutterings which have so long been heard are now becoming loud, and not to be mistaken. Although the black art may still be practised by a few, although a knot of three or four may huddle together, and attempt to laugh at all alteration as a passing clamour not to be regarded in practice, — although some of the outlying strongholds may still set up a cry of no surrender, yet is it certain that the victory is already gained, and the citadel delivered up. We have already shown', that during the last twenty years there has been a strong and increasing current of opinion that the length of deeds "had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished;" that while all other parts of the law had been touched with no gentle hand, deeds had remained almost unapproached; that although many men of the first eminence in this peculiar department of the profession had declared their opinion that a great change was both necessary and practicable, yet that none worthy the name had been made. But it is the peculiar advantage of truth, that once uttered it wins its way perhaps slowly, but always surely; that although apparently buried in the earth, it is engendering therein, and rises in fourfold strength to blossom and fructify. And thus has it been with the opinions which have been expressed on this subject. They have carried conviction with them, the rather that in most instances they have been decidedly against the present interest of those that have uttered them; and although often drowned in the shouting of those who "sold the silver shrines of the great goddess which brought no small gain to the craftsmen," yet eventually the true opinion has prevailed. Let us then shortly trace the progress which has been made in this important question since we last adverted to it, and we think we cannot put our readers more completely in possession of its present state than by making a rather long but valuable extract from the Report on this subject of the Law of Property Committee of the Law Amendment Society, of which we have obtained permission to avail ourselves. 1 1 Law Rev., 158. 382. 21 Law Rev., 404. "To discover some method by which the legal instruments now employed, in dealing with property, to express or carry into effect the intention of private persons may be shortened, without lessening the certainty and precision of their operation, has for some time been an object with those who have turned their attention to plans of legal reform. The labour, and consequent expense, which would be saved by such a method are indeed so considerable, that the desire to discover and introduce it is by no means surprising. In the immediate transaction out of which any instrument arises, a considerable amount of expense is indeed in most cases unavoidable. In one form or other, such payment must be made as shall be sufficient to ensure that each instrument is properly framed. And yet, even here, the expense caused by the extreme length of legal instruments, as at present constructed, is sometimes a just cause of complaint. But this original length continually begets subsequent length and cost, in the ratio of a geometrical progression. Abstracts must be furnished, attested copies may be required; or the instrument may form a part of a declaration, or a plea, a bill, or an answer, a report, or other judicial proceeding. In these and other analogous cases, the mere mechanical labour arising out of the length of the documents adds to the expense of what is to be done, without contributing to its being done better. "Now there are, as appears to this committee, some cases in which a complete cure may be found for this grievance, by dispensing with the use of any instrument at all: as, for instance, was done by the Act dispensing with the necessity of the lease for a year, in a lease and release. But such cases must be comparatively few. In the great majority of transactions there is no instrument used which could be dispensed with; and the only question is, how can the instruments employed be shortened without being made insecure ? "For the better examination of this question, it seems desirable briefly to consider the parts of which a deed usually consists. These parts appear reducible to two heads. We have first the recitals of the circumstances under which the instrument is made, and then we have the formal statement of the intention of the parties, and various covenants or declarations intended to express it with due precision, or secure its execution without the possibility of evasion. "Now it is clear that the recitals cannot be directly shortened otherwise than by the discretion of the framer of the instrument containing them, because they must vary indefinitely in each case. Although, indirectly, the shortening of the instruments by which |