been as well off, if he had kept the mortgage deeds. He is preferred, quoad the bankrupt's intention; and though the motive for giving that preference was ultimate advantage to the bankrupt and his own family, and not to the creditor, we think the preference fraudulent and the payment void.

HARVEY V. WATSON. 8 Scott N. C. 379.

Pleading. Separation Deed.

This was an action for crim. con. with the plaintiff's wife, and on the part of the defendant a motion was made that, in addition to Not guilty, he might be at liberty to plead that "before and at the time of the committing of the trespass, the plaintiff had relinquished and renounced the comfort and fellowship of his wife, and had finally separated himself by deed from, and was living apart from her." Weedon v. Timbrell1 was relied upon, where the Court of King's Bench held that no action can be brought for any act of adultery after a separation between husband and wife. [Tindal C.J. Does Weedon v. Trimbrell still remain a case?] A rule nisi was granted, and on cause being shown, the Court made the rule absolute. Tindal C. J. We ought not to interfere too rigorously with the defendant's right to put his defence upon the record. If there be any fair and reasonable doubt, the plaintiff should be left to demur. After the deliberate judgment of the Court of King's Bench in Weedon v. Timbrell, I think it would be too much to say this is so bad a plea that it ought not to be allowed.

This was a motion for payment into Court of the balance in an executor's hands, grounded on admissions in the answer, and resisted on the ground of want of sufficient distinctness in the admissions.

The Vice-Chancellor pronounced the practice of the Court now to be, that where a party charged himself with the receipt of a fund, he was bound by that charge until he had relieved himself from it by shewing a proper application of the money, and that it was not enough for a party whose duty it was to know the truth and be ready with information, to leave the application in doubt by merely expressing ignorance with regard to the charges to which the fund was liable. He therefore made an order for the payment into Court.

15 T. R. 357.

GALWAY V. GRAYDON. 1 Jones & Latouche, 526.

This cause having been set down to be heard upon an objection for want of parties under the 47th Order of the Irish Court of Chancery, corresponding with Lord Cottenham's 39th Order of August, 1841, Lord Chancellor Sugden ruled that the party taking the objection had the right to begin, and that he would hear only one counsel on each side. We notice this decision because in Bradstock v. Whatley1 Lord Langdale, M. R., was of the contrary opinion, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to begin the argument, and so ruled.

CURLING V. ROBERTSON. 8 Scott, N. C. 288.

Practice at Common Law. Costs.

In this case the captain of a ship on the point of sailing had been examined upon interrogatories on the part of the defendant. At the trial the examination had not been used: but the defendant obtained a verdict. Upon the taxation of costs the Master disallowed the expenses of the examination, and the Court refused a rule requiring him to review his taxation on this ground, notwithstanding the practice of allowing the costs of an ordinary witness subpoenaed but not examined. Tindal C. J. "I have no doubt that you bonâ fide examined the witness, and that his examination was bonâ fide rejected by you: but I do not think the Master has done wrong in refusing you the costs of the experiment." Cresswell J. "You get the examination of this man by the compulsory process of the Court, and when you have obtained it, you find that it will not avail you. What right have you to charge this to the other side?"

1 6 Beav. 451.

LIST OF CASES.

VISCOUNT CANTERBURY.

THE sudden death of this learned and excellent person has occasioned much grief in the circles both of Parliament and the profession. He had for eighteen years filled the high office of Speaker of the Commons, and filled it with universal approval for his dignity, his impartiality, and his splendid hospitality, — filled it, too, in times of extreme excitement, and when the moderating powers of the Chair were in a peculiar manner required to be exercised; for he was Speaker when the great changes of the Reform Bill were introduced into the constitution of the House of Commons, and during the kind of crisis, almost revolution, which preceded the passing of that Act. When the Ministers resigned in Spring, 1832, on account of the opposition to the Bill in the Lords, Lord Canterbury was called upon to form a Government, but found the task impossible, and the Reform Ministry continued to govern the country.

In 1835 he was defeated as a candidate for again filling the Chair, by the Whig Opposition, although that party, while in office, had supported him as their Speaker after the Reform Bill was carried. In the untried state of being into which that great change threw the House, his temper, his firmness, his readiness, and his knowledge of business, were universally praised; and the determination of the Whig party, or rather their leader, was well justified, in preferring him to a friend of their own, who must have been wholly without experience to perform the difficult functions of Speaker.

Being born of a Tory family, and the son of an Archbishop, his principles were always those of the Conservative party; and on their regaining office, in 1835, when he was raised to the peerage, his appointment as Governor of Canada had been resolved on, but this was prevented by the change of ministry, 8th April, 1835, on the very day thirty years that Mr. Whitbread's celebrated resolution had been carried against Lord Melville by the casting vote of Lord Canterbury's predecessor. He remained out of office accordingly till his decease in July of the present year. But he took occasionally a useful part in the discussion of constitutional and parliamentary questions, although he resided a good deal at Paris with his family.

He was bred to the Bar, and attended the western circuit until he became Judge Advocate in 1808, and afterwards in 1817 he was raised to the Chair on Mr. Abbot's resignation. He was a sound and practical lawyer, and loved legal society, often attending the Bench at Lincoln's Inn, where he was a Bencher. He ever maintained the just privileges of Parliament, but was a firm enemy of their unjust and exaggerated assertion, and he deserves great praise for having obtained some relaxation of the pretensions, as absurd as they are mischievous, by which the Commons insist on certain Bills originating with them, and reject all amendments on money clauses, whereby the Lords are regularly left without any thing to do for the first half of each session, and overworked with business at the end, and whereby also a Bill containing any money clauses to which they cannot agree is necessarily thrown out for a whole year. Lord Canterbury was a man of high honour in public and in private life, of amiable disposition, and of undeviating sincerity as well as constancy in his friendships.