Stocking v. Hunt. Bussing v. Bushnell, 6 Hill, 382; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; 1 Kent, 419 to 421.) BEARDSLEY, J., after consultation with the other judges, denied the motion. He said they all agreed that the repealing act was valid in reference to this lease, as well as in regard to leases made after its passage. The controversy here, he added, was not between the landlord and his tenant, but between two creditors of the tenant. He owed each of them, and the struggle was for a preference in obtaining payment. Under the statute, (1 R. S. 746, § 12,) the landlord had the vantage ground, but the legislature of last winter thought that unreasonable, and repealed the enactment by which it was conferred. (Laws 1846, p. 369.) But this repealing statute did not impair the obligation of the tenant to pay rent, nor in the slightest degree interfere with it. He might still be sued; and his entire property was as much subject to execution and sale for the payment of this rent, since the repealing act was passed, as before. The agreement of the tenant gave no such preference to the landlord, nor could it be secured in that way. Here was the tenant's property, liable to be taken in execution by any of his creditors. These plaintiffs made such a levy, and so far had made themselves secure. But the revised statutes had given a preference to a landlord, over such execution creditors, and this was an undoubted right until the last session of the legislature. Other views then prevailed, and the repealing statute declared that this preference should exist no longer. We hold that the legislature was fully competent to pass this statute: it did not touch the obligation of the tenant's contract. He was liable on it as before: the legislature only said that this extraordinary remedy, giving a preference to a landlord over an execution creditor, was unreasonable, and should not be continued. In the nature of things, there is a distinction between the change of a contract and a change of the remedy to enforce the performance of the contract. Under the constitution of the United Stocking v. Hunt. States, the former power is denied to the several states, but the latter exists in full force. All the adjudged cases recognize and proceed upon this distinction. The question now before the court has no reference to the contract of the tenant: the statute does not assume to alter or modify that. The landlord may sue and enforce payment by judgment and execution, if property can be found. The repealing statute interposes no obstacle. It has merely deprived him of an advantage given to him by a former st ute over execution creditors of the tenant. It has affected the relative rights of these creditors, but has, in no sense, touched or impaired the obligation of any contract whatever. Motion denied. CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, IN OCTOBER TERM, 1846. BURCKLE VS. ECKART, impleaded with Gibb and others. A bill in chancery must show on its face that the vice chancellor before whom it is filed has jurisdiction of the cause; and if jurisdiction does not so appear the decree will be void. Where a bill is filed to compel an account of the profits of a copartnership transaction in the manufacture and sale of flour, the subject matter of the controversy has no locality within the purview of the statute distributing the jurisdiction of matters in equity among the vice chancellors. Where by a contract executed at Oswego, the complainant was to manufacture flour at that place and deliver it to the defendants in Canada where they resided, who were to dispose of it there and account for the net profits, and a bill was filed before the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, for an account; held that the cause or matter did not arise within the fifth circuit, and that the vice chancellor had no jurisdiction. Where a contract is made at one place and is to be performed at another, the latter is the location of a controversy arising upon the contract. ASSUMPSIT, tried before EDMONDS, C. Judge, at the NewYork circuit in November, 1845. The action was upon a written agreement dated March 2d, 1841, signed by the plaintiff and by James Gibb & Co., which is set forth in the report of this case, [279] Burckle v. Eckart. when formerly before the court, in 1 Denio, 337. It will be seen from the case as reported, that the principal question upon the first trial was, whether the defendant Eckart was a member of the firm of James Gibb & Co., and that a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside because the evidence did not establish that fact. On the second trial the plaintiff, in addition to the proof he had before given, gave in evidence an exemplification of the pleadings and proceedings and the decree in a suit in the court of chancery, before the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, between the parties in this suit, the plaintiff being the complainant. The bill described the plaintiff as a resident of Oswego in this state, and the defendants as residents of Quebec in the province of Lower Canada. It set out the agreement declared on in this suit, which it averred was executed by the defendants, by and under the name, style and firm of James Gibb & Co. The object of the bill was to compel the defendants to account for the profits of a quantity of flour which the plaintiff had delivered at Kingston pursuant to the contract. It was taken as confessed for the want of an' answer, the defendants having appeared by a solicitor. The decree, which was entered on the 20th day of May, 1845, declared that the defendants entered into the contract set out in the bill, at the time of its date, as members of the firm of James Gibb & Co., and that the parties proceeded in the execution of the provisious contained in it until October, 1841, when the defendants refused to receive any more flour or further to perform on their part, the complainant having fully performed on his part and being ready to proceed with the further execution of the contract; and that the defendants were indebted to the complainant in $3539,48, for one third of the net profits of flour delivered under the contract and accepted and sold by the defendants, which sum the defendants were decreed to pay the complainant, together with the costs of the suit. Having given this proof, the plaintiff offered to read the contract in evidence, to which the defendants objected, on the ground that it had not been proved that the defendant Eckart was a partner with the other defendants, or that he was a party to the contract. The judge overruled the objection and the contract |