Index-Digest. the refund was made similarly dependent on the "loyalty" of his consignee to vessels of the combination. The hold thus gained on shippers, through the accumulation of their deposits, enabled the coalition to maintain its tariff and custom, in general, while cutting rates with competitors in particular cases by means of “fighting ships." Several important rivals were gathered into the combination from time to time, and a virtual monopoly was effected. Held, that the combination violated the Sherman Law. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S., 85. 6-727 2. Combinations, contracts, etc., eliminating competition in bidding. 109. Combination of Manufacturers-Dividing Territory and Allotting Contracts by Pretended Bids.-The formation of a combination by a number of companies manufacturing iron pipe in different States, whereby the territory in which they operate (comprising a large part of the United States) is divided into "reserved" cities and " pay " territory, the reserved cities being allotted to particular members of the combination, free of competition from the others, though provision is made for pretended bids by the latter at prices previously arranged, and when all offers to purchase pipe in the pay territory are submitted to a committee, which determines the price, and then awards the contract to that member of the combination which agrees to pay the largest "bonus," to be divided among the others, is unlawful, both at common law and under the Sherman Law. U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F., 271. 1-772 (Reversing, 78 Fed., 712 (1—631). 110. Combinations to Enter into Public Bidding for Contracts, but Where only One of the Combination Really Bids, the Others, Being Required to Bid Above Him.-An agreement or combination between corporations engaged in the manufacture, sale, and transportation of iron pipe, under which they enter into public bidding for contracts, not in truth as competitors, but under an arrangement which eliminates all competition between them for the contract and permits one of their number to make his own bid, while the others are required to bid over him, is in violation of the Sherman Law, so far as it applies to sales for delivery beyond the State in which the sale is made. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S., 211. 1-1009 Affirming, 85 F., 271 (1-772). 111. Same.-A combination may illegally restrain trade by preventing competition for contracts and enhancing prices, although it does not prevent the letting of any particular contract. Ib. Index-Digest. 112. Same.-Where Goods are to be Delivered in the State.-A combination to restrain competition in proposals for contracts for the sale of certain articles which are to be delivered in the State in which some of the parties to the combination reside and carry on business is not, so far as those members are concerned, in violation of the Sherman Law, although the contract may be awarded to some party outside the State as the lowest bidder. Ib. 1-1041 113. Same.-Any agreement or combination which directly operates, not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation, and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or restricting its sale, thereby regulates interstate commerce to that extent, and thus trenches upon the power of the national legislation, and violates the statute. Ib. 1-1036 114. Same. When the direct, immediate, and intended effect of a contract or combination among dealers in a commodity is the enhancement of its price, it amounts to a restraint of trade in the commodity, even though contracts to buy it at the enhanced price are being made. Ib. 1-1038 115. Same.-The contracts considered in this case, set forth in the statement of facts and in the opinion of the court, relate to the sale and transportation to other States of specific articles, not incidentally or collaterally, but as a direct and immediate result of the combination entered into by the defendants; and they restrain the manufacturing, purchase, sale, or exchange of the manufactured articles among the several States, and enhance their value, and thus come within the provisions of the "act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." Ib. 1-1036 116. Same. The judgment of the court below, which perpetually enjoined the defendants in the court below from maintaining the combination in cast-iron pipe as described in the petition, and from doing any business under such combination, is too broad, as it applies equally to commerce which is wholly within a State as well as to that which is interstate or international only. Ib. 1-1041 117. Agreement Between Live-Stock Buyers not to Bid Against Each Other, Etc.-An agreement between corporations and individuals, etc., engaged in buying live stock at divers points throughout the United States, to refrain from bidding against each other in the purchase of cattle is a combination in restraint of trade; so also their agreement to bid up prices to stimulate shipments, intending to cease from bidding when the shipments have arrived, and the same result follows from the combination of defendants to fix prices upon and restrict the quantities of meat shipped to their agents or their customers. Being restriction upon competition such Index-Digest. agreements are a combination in restraint of trade. U. S. v. Swift & Co., 122 F., 529. 2-237 118. Same.-Restraint of trade is not dependent upon any consideration of reasonableness or unreasonableness in the combination averred, nor is it to be tested by the prices that result from the combination. The statute has no concern with prices, but looks solely to competition and to the giving of competition full play by making illegal any effort at restriction upon competition. Ib. 2-244 119. Same.-A combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meats throughout the United States not to bid against, or only in conjunction with, each other in order to regulate prices in and induce shipments to the live-stock markets in other States, to restrict shipments, establish uniform rules of credit, make uniform and improper rules of cartage, and to get less than lawful rates from railroads to the exclusion of competitors with intent to monopolize commerce among the States, is an illegal combination within the meaning and prohibition of the Sherman Law, and can be restrained and enjoined in an action by the United States. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S., 375. 2-641 120. Same.-It does not matter that a combination of this nature embraces restraint and monopoly of trade within a single State if it also embraces and is directed against commerce among the States. Ib. 121. Same. The effect of such a combination upon interstate commerce is direct and not accidental, secondary, or remote as in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S., 1. Ib. 122. Same. Even if the separate elements of such a scheme are lawful, when they are bound together by a common intent as parts of an unlawful scheme to monopolize interstate commerce the plan may make the parts unlawful. Ib. 123. Same.-When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation they will end their transit, after purchase, in another State, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a constantly recurring course, it constitutes interstate commerce, and the purchase of the cattle is an incident of such commerce. Ib. 3. Contracts, etc., in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. 124. Contracts, Combinations, etc., Against Public Policy and Void Under the Common Law.-The contracts, combinations in the form of trust or otherwise, and conspiracies in restraint of trade declared to be illegal in the Sherman Law, are the contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade that had been declared by the courts to be against Index-Digest. public policy and void under the common law before the passage of that act. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 58 F., 58. 1-186 Case reversed, 166 U. S., 290 (1-648). 125. Same.-The test of the validity of such contracts or combinations is not the existence of restriction upon competition imposed thereby, but the reasonableness of that restriction under the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Public welfare is first considered, and, if the contract or combination appears to have been made for a just and honest purpose, and the restraint upon trade is not specially injurious to the public, and is not greater than the protection of the legitimate interests of the party in whose favor the restraint is imposed reasonably requires, the contract or combination is not illegal. Shiras, district judge, dissenting on the ground that this rule is not applicable to corporations charged with public duties. 1-205 126. Agreements Legal When Made Which Violate Act of 1890.-The agreement of the Trans-Missouri Freight Association, in regard to establishing and maintaining railroad rates, though legal when made, became illegal on the passage of the Sherman Law, and acts done under it after that statute became operative were done in violation of it. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 166 U. S., 290. 1-648 127. Contracts in Restraint of Trade-At Common Law.-Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal, or as giving rise to an action for damages to one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void and not enforceable. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F., 271. U. S. v. 1-772 128. Same. The effect of the Sherman Law is to render such contracts, as applied to interstate commerce, unlawful in an affirmative or positive sense, and punishable as a misdemeanor, and also to create a right of civil action for damages in favor of persons injured thereby, and a remedy by injunction in favor both of private persons and the public against the execution of such contracts and the maintenance of such trade restraints. Ib. 1-781 129. Contracts or combinations which impose any restraints whatever upon interstate commerce are unlawful under the Sherman Law; and it is immaterial whether or not the restraint is a fair and reasonable one or whether it has actually resulted in increasing the price of the commodity dealt in. U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Assn. of Cal., 85 F., 252. 1-749 130. Contracts which operate as a restraint upon the soliciting of orders for, and the sale of, goods in one State, to be delivered from another, are contracts in restraint of interstate commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Law. U. S. v. Index-Digest. 1-772 E. C. Knight Co., 15 Sup. Ct., 249; 156 U. S., 1, distinguished. U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F., 271. 131. To render a combination unlawful under the Sherman Law, it need not be one which by its terms refers to interstate commerce, but it is sufficient if its purpose and effect are necessarily to restrain interstate trade. Gibbs v. McNeeley, 118 F., 120. 2-194 132. Every Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy, in Whatever Form, of Whatever Nature, and Whoever May be Parties to it, which Directly or Necessarily Operates in Restraint of Interstate Trade or Commerce.-Although the act of Congress known as the Sherman Law has no reference to the mere manufacture or production of articles or commodities within the limits of the several States, it embraces and declares to be illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S., 330 (Harlan, Brown, McKenna, Day). 2-461 133. Same.-The act is not limited to restraints of interstate and international trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature, but embraces all direct restraints, reasonable or unreasonable, imposed by any combination, conspiracy, or monopoly upon such trade or commerce. Ib. 2--461 134. Railroad carriers engaged in interstate or international trade or commerce are embraced by the act. Ib. 2-461 135. Combinations, even among private manufacturers or dealers, whereby interstate or international commerce is restrained, or commerce are embraced by the act. Ib. 2-461 136. Every combination or conspiracy which would extinguish competition between otherwise competing railroads, engaged in interstate trade or commerce, and which would in that way restrain such trade or commerce, is made illegal by the act. Ib. 2--462 137. The natural effect of competition is to increase commerce, and an agreement whose direct effect is to prevent this play of competition restrains instead of promotes trade and commerce. Ib. 2-462 138. The Northern Securities Company combination is a "trust " within the meaning of the Sherman Law; but if not, it is a combination in restraint of interstate and international commerce, and that is enough to bring it under the condemnation of the act. Ib. 2-458 139. Every contract, combination, or conspiracy, the necessary effect of which is to stifle or to directly and substantially restrict competition in commerce among the States, is in restraint |