sians have most unexpectedly broken the treaties which they had concluded with us, inasmuch as they have taken possession of the fortresses of Bender and Choczim, by which they have given a demonstrative proof that the malicious and perfidious designs which they have long cherished, and on various occasions manifested towards the mussulman people, have not ceased to actuate them.

"The law, and the purport of the resolution adopted by the Divan, therefore impose upon me the indispensable duty to issue a declaration of hostilities against this faithless race, which accords also with the unanimous sentiments of the divan and the nation. Having, therefore, in the first place, invoked the assistance of God the Almighty, who has from non-entity called us into existence, and the protection of the prophet Mahomet, the object of our praises and the founder of our law, we have given orders to delare war against the Russians, placing our whole reliance in the favour and providence of God. For the rest, every one is sufficiently acquainted with the ancient enmity of the Russians towards the mussulmen.

. "The instances of perfidy and treachery which they have so recently displayed, enjoins it as a duty upon every subject of the Porte, whether civil or military, who professes the mussulman faith, to take a part in this religious war; and as, egreeably to the resolution already taken, every preparation has been made for the speedy march of my army, under the happy shade of the Sangiak Kherg (the standard of, Mahomet), I hereby appoint you generalissimo thereof, with unlimited powers.

"Under these circumstances, you will confide all your proceedings to the providence of God the Almighty, in like manner as I wholly entrust to the Divine hand the protection of your person, and those of all the viziers, ullemas, janissaries, high and low; and also all the faithful warriors who accompany you in this religious contest.

My renowned ancestors, supported by the ardent zeal of their viziers, ministers, janissaries, and other warriors, and by means of the skilful measures with which they opposed the enemy, re-conquered and took possession of these provinces.

"I therefore entertain a confident expectation, that at the present juncture you will manifest the same zeal, and collect the necessary troops and supplies, in order to hasten to the assistance of our brethren in religion, who are already engaged in hostilities with the enemy, in the fortresses situated near the enemy's frontier provinces.

"You must reinforce our fortresses, and deliver my subjects from all oppression.

"In what respects the supplies of ammunition and other military stores, you will concert measures ouly with the chiefs of the provinces.

"You will occupy yourself day and night, with every object of attention which may be necessary, and expedite the departure for the army, of all my viziers, janissaries, and others thereto belonging.

"Finally, you will, in your capacity of minister, with unlimitted powers, also provide for the wants of the fleet, both in respect to men and stores. It will be your province to bestow adequate rewards on such as shall distinguish themselves, as well as to punish those who may forget their duty.

66

May the Almighty God guard and protect you in all your undertakings!"

NOTICE.

VINDEX will find, by referring to page 106, No.6 of this volume, that the subject to which he alludes has been already mentioned nearly in his own words.

The article upon the Norfolk Election I have been obliged to postpone, on account of my having mislaid an important paper connected with it. But it shall certainly appear next week, when I hope to sing an Io triumphe!

LONDON: Printed by W.MARCHANT, 3, Greville-Street, Holborn; and published by H. R. YORKE, 412, Strand opposite the Adelphi.

Mr. REDHEAD YORKE's WEEKLY POLITICAL REVIEW.

Vol. II. N° 11.

Saturday, March 14, 1807.

Price 10d.

193

DEFENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD WELLESLEY. The first charge against lord Wellesley, which I shall here examine and refute, is, a systematic plan of territorial acquisition in India, inconsistent with the policy prescribed by the act of 1793.

The act of 1793 states, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy, of this nation." This declaratory resolution introduced the regulation for preventing the commencement of hostilities in India, or the conclusion of treaties of guarantee involving the contingency of war, without the express command and authority of the court of directors, or of the secret committee. It is to be observed, that resolutions to the same effect were introduced into the acts of 1782 and 1784, for regulating the affairs of India; hence, that we may be competent to understand the precise meaning of this declaration, we should look to the history of the times, and the circumstances of our Eastern empire, at the periods when those laws were enacted. By this examination we shall see into what gross errors the opponents of lord Wellesley have fallen, from the wrong construction which they have given to the resolution of the legislature. At the time of the passing of these resolutions, the condition of our affairs in India was such, as to make it impossible to suppose that the intention of the legislature could have been to preclude any extension of the territory of the company, or of their civil and military authority over territories which we were already bound by treaty, or by positive interest, to defend. In the year 1784, the power of Tippoo, of the Marhatta states, and of the Nizam, afforded just apprehen sion that war might arise in India, on grounds of justice and necessity, which might compel the company to seek for security in a reduction of the resources and power of some of those states; and, therefore, it cannot be supposed that parliament intended to fix the exact limits of the dominion of the company, excluding all refe rence to the conduct and policy of the native states of India, to the changes of power and interest which might occur on the continent of India, or to the advantage which might be derived from the success of our arms in any contest in which we might be engaged in the course of events. To forbid war absolutely, was impracticable, whilst we were surrounded with powerful military states, whose policy might compel us to resort to arms; and to forbid any reduction of the resources and dominions of any state which we might defeat in war, or any additional strength which we might be enabled to found upon favourable conditions of peace, would not have been consistent with the wisdom of parliament. Upon this principle Mr. Pitt always interpreted this resolution of the legislature; and, in his speech on the 5th of April, 1805, against Mr. Francis's motion for passing a resolution reciting the one which I have already mentioned, he observed, that "no one could object to the motion in the abstract, because it was a principle, expressed upon our statute-book, and founded upon natural justice, that we should not make war for the sake of extending territory; but, it did not thence follow, that, if we were forced into a just and necessary war, we were not to conquer, and that, after conquest, an extent of dominion might become the result of it, for that was the natural effect of superiority in contest: our security might require it, or we might take by way of indemnity. If it were not so, we should, by pusillanimity, unite all the world to attack us. The resolution, therefore, as it had an aspect hostile to that principle, was unjust to the noble marquis, because it was a general censure on the whole of his administration, by now putting the whole of that administration together, and following up the historical account of it with a resolution, which either meant to censure that administration altogether-an administration, as full of excellent achievement as any that ever preceded it, and in which the noblé marquis had done as many and as glorious deeds as ever were done by any

No. 11.

man-or else the resolution was only a repetition of what was on the statute-book a realy, and meant nothing but an unnecessary repetition of an undisputed truth. This resolution, taken as one that censured extension of territory, in all events, was unjus', not only for the reason he had stated already, but unjust to lord Cornwallis himself, who was that night so highly and justly praised; for even he had extended our territory in India after the conclusion of a war. The grand policy of this country, in India, was to keep down the power of France. On the great leading features of lord Wellesley's administration, there could exist no doubt on the merits of the transactions, by which he had conferred such benefits on his country, had secured her interest, upheld her honour, and exalted her glory. He had dispelled a danger the most formidable and menacing, which he never could have done on the principle of the hon. gentlemen opposite;" (meaning the strict and literal interpretation of the resolution)" and dispelled it, during a war in which France wished, through India, to strike a fatal blow against British commerce and greatness. The wisdom of the noble lord had been evinced in adopting the highest, most important, and fundamental policy of the British interests in India; he had procured, in the issue of his brilliant campaigns, INDEMNITY and SECURITY; he had gained a great extent of caluable sea-coast, a matter of great consideration with a view to preventing the designs of the enemy. He must object, therefore, most decidedly, to a motion which cast a slur upon the justice, the magnanimity, and the good faith, of the British go

vernment."

What can be more conclusive than these words of our ever-to-be-lamented minister! It is obvious that Mr. Pitt did not consider the resolution introduced into the acts of 1782, 1784, and 1793, as a bar to the extension of our Indian territory, when our own security, or the protection of our tributaries and dependencies, rendered such a measure indispensable. By referring also to the debates in both houses of parliament, at the time of the discussion of these acts, it will appear, that the evii against which the resolution was directed, had been of long standing, and had grown to a dangerous maturity, under the mismanagement, irregular ambition, and rapacity of the servants of the East-India company. It was to controul their spirit of dominion, and to restrain their inordinate lust of power, that the legislature was finally compelled to guard the native states of India, by imposing this restrictive prohibition on them, and by taking into its own hands, the general superintendance of our government in India. But, it never was in the contemplation of the legislature, to make our means of security be limited to a mere defensive policy; it was never intended, that we were to reject the indemnities to which we were entitled, after having victoriously repelled the aggressions of powers inimical to our interests. Nothing can more unequivocally demonstrate the real intention of the legislature, than the congratulations which it has repeatedly expressed for territorial acquisitions in India, subsequent to the insertion of this clause; and no inference can be drawn from the letter or spirit of the resolution which precludes the extension of territory by negociation or by other just and legitimate means unconnected with schemes of conquest and ambitious aggrandizement. This opinion respecting the principle of the resolution, has been repeatedly argued and maintained in both houses of parliament; so that the only construction which can be put upon it, is, that the legislature formally condemned the preceding transactions in India which had originated in violations of public faith, and an exorbitant spirit of aggrandizement, uncontrouled by justice, and unsupported by sound policy; but, that it never meant to censure any acquisitions of territory, which might be the results of future necessary wars in which we might be involved, and by which, our power in India might become more consolidated. This mode of construction is warranted and indeed sanctified by the practice of our government abroad, the orders of the government at home, and the conduct of parliament from the time of passing this resolution to the present moment. If, however, we consider the resolution as a positive prohibition against any extension of territory, how shall we reconcile to it the conduct of the Fast-India company, and of parliament itself, during the administration of lord Cornwallis? By the treaty of peace in 1792, after the war against Tippoo Sultaun, the territory of the company was considerably extended; yet, parliament

did not consider that event as a violation of its rule; on the contrary, it fully ap proved of that war, and all its consequences in the extension of territory-so that if we receive this resolution upon the principles maintained by the persecutors of lord Wellesley, we shall find that parliament has acted in direct opposition to its own prescription. In whatever light, therefore, the adversaries of lord Wellesley choose to consider the meaning of the rule, it will only tend to his exculpation.

It appears from lord Cornwallis's letter of the 7th of July, 1789, that he obtained, in that year, in virtue of the treaty of 1768 with the Nizam, the cession of the Guntor Circar to the company. This transaction, as a mere accession of territory, would have been censurable upon the doctrine now maintained, but it was approved under the circumstances of the case. The same observation applies to the arrangement concluded with the rajah of Benares in 1795, by Mr. Duncan, under the or ders of lord. Teignmouth, by which arrangement, the company's authority was cr tended over the province of Benares. The state of the Carnatic, of Oude, and of other possessions of our tributaries and dependants, had been a subject of complaint and alarm, as far back as the years 1784 and 1793. The company had, in fact, supported their tributaries in their respective countries, and they owed the existence of their power, and must have owed the continuance of it entirely to the company's assistance. The administration of these countries was grossly abusive, and injurious to the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants, as well as to their general prosperity internal disorder and external weakness, accompanied by a rapid decay of their resources, were the consequences of these evils. The company was bound by positive interest, and, in many cases, by treaty, to protect and to defend them, and was entitled to derive the means of defending them from the resources of the same countries. But, under the mismanagement and corruption of the native governments, the means of supplying the defence of the country were declining, while the people suffered the utmost extremity of misery. To extend the authority of the company over these countries, was, therefore, no extension of territory; but an augmentation of power, within territories which we were already bound to defend. Such an augmentation of power, so far from weakening, would tend greatly to secure and consolidate the strength of our empire in the east. Nor is it rational to suppose, that our means of protecting those countries could be diminished by the introduction of the civil and military authority of the company into their respective governments. It is evident, the opinion of the government at home has ever been, that the company was bound to provide effectually for the good government of the possessions of our tributaries and dependants, and even to interfere directly for that purpose in cases of exigency. The extension of the company's authority over the Carnatic, was always considered as a measure essential to our security in the event of war; it was accordingly assumed both by lord Macartney and lord Cornwallis in time of war; which assumption of the Carnatic, in time of war, afterwards became a formal article of the treaty concluded by lord Cornwallis with the Nabob in 1792. In the short war of 1799, lord Wellesley did not assume the Carnatic, as he might have done, under the article of that treaty; but, to shew the sense entertained by the court of directors of the necessity of this assumption, and, to exhibit their mode of interpreting the law, he received orders from the secret committee, in expectation that he would have assumed it, not to restore it to the Nabob, until a new, arrangement for its government should be concluded! In this case, we are furnished with an instance on the part of the court of directors, of extension of authority, and internal interference in the administration of other countries, both of which are prohibited and renounced, according to the acceptation of the clause, in the acts of the legislature, by the opponents of lord Wellesley. The court of directors cannot get over this inculpation, nor can they refuse to acknowledge, that what is considered as sufficient to justify their own acts, is a justification, according to the same rule, oi lord Wellesley's conduct. The expediency of extending the company's authority over the territories of our dependants or subsidiary tributaries, whom we were bound

↑ See printed papers relative to the arrangements in the Carnatic.

by treaty or interest to defend, is thus completely established by the act of the court of directors, with whom the shrewd proposition, "not to restore the Carnatic to the Nahob" originated. Yet, these are the men who complain of lord Wellesley's ambition and injustice!

Subsidiary treaties had been concluded in 1792 by lord Cornwallis with the nabob of the Carnatic, and with the rajah of Tanjore, in which it was stipulated that a considerable extension of the authority of the company should take place over the territory of those princes, in the contingency of ultimate failure in the regular payment of the subsidy. But it never yet has been contended, that, in the event of such a failure, it would have been repugnant to the policy of the act of 1793 to have insisted upon the right of the company to demand the execution of those articles of the respective subsidiary treaties, which, in direct terms, or by manifest implication, entitled the company to an extension of territory in commu tation of the subsidiary payments. The following extract from the 39th and 40th George III. cap. 79, (July 28th, 1800) will explain the opinion of the legislature upon the subject at that time: "Whereas the territorial possessions of the united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies, in the peninsula of India, have become so much extended as to require further regulations to be made for the government of the same." According to this passage, the intention of the legis lature, when the acts of 1784 and 1793 were framed, is fully explained. When it treats of the extension of the company's territory, it does not express any condemnation of the measure, neither does it inculpate the conduct of those by whose policy that extension was effected: on the contrary, it sanctions and legitimates the measure, by the admission that the territories so acquired, demanded further regulations to be made for their government. If, therefore, the acts of 1784 and 1793 had been intended to constitute positive prohibitions of any extension of territory in India, the preamble inserted above would have been improper; it is evident, from the words of this preamble, that the legislature admitted the propriety of extending the company's territory in India, under certain circumstances, and in certain cases, notwithstanding the declaration of the law concerning" schemes of conquest and extension of dominion."

In the 20th chapter of this act of 1800 it is stated, " And whereas the province or district of Benares has been ceded to the said united company, and been annexed to the said presidency of Fort-William in Bengal, since the establishment of the said supreme court of judicature at Fort-William aforesaid; and it is expedient that the same should be subject to the jurisdiction of the said court, in like manner as the kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa; and that the said province or district, AND ALL OTHER PROVINCES OR DISTRICTS, WHICH MAY HEREAFTER BE AT ANY TIME ANNEXED AND MADE SUBJECT to the said presidency, should be subject to such regulations as the governor-general and council of Fort-William aforesaid have framed, or may frame, for the better administration of justice among "the native inhabitants and others within the same respectively; be it therefore further enacted, that from and after the first day of March, which will be in the year of Our Lord 1801, the power and authority of the said supreme court of judicature, in and for the said presidency of Fort-William aforesaid, as now and by virtue of this act established, and all such regulations as have been or may be hereafter, according to the powers and authorities, and subject to the provisions and restric tions before enacted, framed, and provided, shall extend to and over the said province or district of Benares, and to and over all the factories, districts, and places which now are or hereafter shall be made subordinate thereto, and to and over all such provinces and districts as may at any time hereafter be annexed and made subject to the said presidency of Fort-William aforesaid." In these words, we obtain a further explanation of the intention of the legislature concerning any extension of territory. This act of 1800 not only supposes the possibility of such a case, but stamps it with the sanction of law, by providing for the good government of other provinces and districts which may hereafter be annexed and made subject to Bengal. In fact, a part of the cessions from Oude was annexed to the district of Benares, and the remaining cessions from Oude, together with the cessions from the Marhattas, were