THERE is some reason for apprehending that the intelligence of the passage of the Dardanelles by our fleet, and of the subsequent detachment of the Porte from the influence of French councils, is premature. In another part of this week's Review, the reader will find, according to the French official account published in the Hamburgh Correspondenten, that the Othman government is now more rivetted than ever to the interests of France; and if we give credit to every circumstance detailed in that paper, we must acknowledge that our commanders, or our ministers, or both, have been completely outwitted by the superiour dexterity of Sebastiani, the French ambassador. The previous statements in the Vienna Court Gazette were, however, so positive, that it is impossible to reconcile the two accounts. According to the Vienna Gazette of the 21st of March, the British squadron, on the 21st of February, forced the passage of the Dardanelles, burnt a ship of the line, and also destroyed some Turkish frigates in the channel: in consequence of which, the Porte complied with our terms. A dispatch from lord Collingwood, the substance of which was circulated amongst persons connected with government, mentions, that the passage of the Dardanelles was effected two days prior to the day stated in the Vienna gazette; a subsequent Vienna gazette, however, of March 24, assigns the 18th of February as the day of the passage. The exact chronology of this affair is of very little consequence; the result is what we are to investigate. That the Dardanelles were passed there is no doubt, inasmuch as the French official account corroborates every other statement relative to that fact. But what followed is inexplicable. It is said that the terms proposed by admiral Duckworth and our minister were, that the French ambassador should be sent away; that 15 sail of tho line, and as many frigates, stored for six months, should be delivered up to us; that we should be put in possession of the forts in the Dardanelles, and on the canal of the Black Sea; that the treaty of alliance with England should be renewed; and that Russia should remain in possession of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the frontier towns, uatib a general peace. These terms were rejected by the Porte, although our squadron had anchored before Constantinople on the 21st of February. I doubt whether proposals to the extent herein mentioned were made, and for this reason they were too comprehensive to be admitted by any independent power; too much for us to require, and too much for the Porte to yield, especially, if we had not a force adequate to compel a compliance with them. In answer to this, it may be alleged, that it was in the power of the British squadron to have set Constantinople in flames. True: but that measure would not have advanced the negotiation in the least: on the contrary, it would probably have led to a more vigorous spirit of resistance. Though the scite of the city of Constantinople be the most beautiful in the world, the city itself cannot boast either of taste, grandeur, or beauty in its construction. So little indeed are its buildings considered worthy of preservation, that when the people have any subject of complaint which they wish to reach the ears of the grand signor, they always contrive to set fire to it themselves; because, it is only when a great conflagration happens that they are allowed liberty of speech. Unquestionably, this is a queer method of making their complaints known; but, as it is an old custom, and the only resource, they have, we cannot be surprized at their resorting to it frequently. Mr. Dallaway, in his acCount of Constantinople, has given a very accurate explanation of this matter, and to his work I refer the reader. Indeed, the Turks entertain litile dread of a city on fre; for it cannot be forgotten, that when a British squadron threatened to lay Algiers in ashes, the Dey sent a flag of truce to know what sum it would east to accomplish the object; and upon receiving our commander's reply, he affered to

do it himself, if we would give him a quarter of the money. Nothing therefore, could have been derived from an attack of that kind upon the city, but a prodigal waste of human blood, which could not be justified, unless the city had been inha bited by Frenchmen; in which case, indeed, to have dealt promiscuous carnage and devastation would have been mercy to mankind.

But, though such conduct would not have been warranted towards the Turks, how shall we account for the demonstration made by our admiral, in order to give weight and immediate effect to a negotiation which, admitting the truth of the French and foreign journals, was protracted to a most extraordinary length? Mr. Arbuthnot. was placed in one of the proudest situations which a diplomatic mind could have desired. It was a situation of great delicacy, requiring the utmost prudence, combined with vigour and resolution. He had also the model of Algernon Sidney before him, who, when asked by the victorious king of Sweden to shew by what power he insisted that the siege of Copenhagen should be raised, pointed to the British fleet then in sight, under the command of admiral Blake, and by that silent, but significant and impressive attitude, compelled the Swedish monarch to withdraw his forces. This negotiation was thus settled within half-an-hour after his arrival in the Swedish camp; but these were times of old. Mr. Arbuthnot went to work more courteously. From the 21st of February to the 3d of March, a period of eleven days, the British negotiator is said to have spent in negotiations, during which time the Porte was actively engaged in collecting and arming the people; while Sebastiani, and a corps of French engineers, were erecting batteries of de fence, mounted with 600 pieces of heavy ordnance along the coast! Judging merely. by the equivocal representations in the foreign journals, I cannot avoid observing, that, if our force were too small to give weight to Mr. Arbuthnot's proposals, the demonstrations of it ought not to have been made; and if it were adequate to enforce them, the negotiation ought not to have been protracted beyond 24 hours at the furthest. By adopting the system of wavering and hesitation, of the folly of which we have had too much experience, we have compromised our interests, and it will be a question, whether we have not also compromised our glory. The Turks will be brought to consider our menace as a vapour; and by a natural transition, whatever may be the final issue of events, they will be induced to cast upon us a more firm look of defiance than they could have given, if this transaction had been conducted in a different manner. Hitherto my reasonings are formed solely on ex-parte evidence, and upon an hypothesis which may not be realized; but if this evidence should be confirmed, and this hypothesis be found to be true, when admiral Duckworth's dispatches shall arrive; then it will become our duty to weigh the evidence on each side, and to pronounce a verdict upon that conduct which, at this time, appears to have been most vigorous at its outset, most indecisive in its progress, and most lamentably weak at its termination. In justice to the well known skill and gallantry of our admiral, it is right to observe, that his apparent inactivity may have been derived from a remoter source; he may have called to mind the treatment of sir Home Popham; he may have trembled for his own honour at the very instant he was about to vindicate the honour of his country; the penalty of the exercise of a sound discretion, without orders from the Board of Admiralty, may have deterred him; the dread of being traduced by a court-martial for having essenfially promoted the interests of Great Britain, may have constrained him to compress, with reluctance, the thunder which he had in reservation to pour out upon the Turkish fleet. Let the admiral be heard before we presume to censure him: let as not be forgetful of the pernicious ingratitude manifested during the last twelve months of our history: let it be recollected that we are now but just taking breath," and recovering from the pressure of a tyranny which we have indignantly, thrown off Perhaps, his stock of powder was expended; perhaps, the whole squadron under his command had not sufficient ammunition to sustain an action of two hours, as its original destination might have been to a different part, where powder vegetates in abundance, and is the spontaneous produce of the soil; or perhaps," it has been much the custom to speak lightly of the resistance to be expected from the Tarks in Constantinople; and with confidence of the facility which has been given to navst prior knowledge of the sea of Marmara; but the passage of th

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Dardanelles, proves the formet opinion to be erroneous, and experience evi ces, that all the information hitherfo acquired had not prevented the most formidable difficulties."—In a short time the mystery will be unravelled.

Our attention is next called to a more pleasing and consolatory piece of information, which will be found amongst the state papers; namely, the raising the siege of Stralsund, and the subsequent expulsion of the French from Swedish Pomeran a. These events, which had been previously announced in the foreign papers, were offcially communicated to our government, by the Swedish minister at our court, and were published in the Gazette of Tuesday. In the course of the different actions which preceded their expulsion from Pomerania, the French lost a great number of rpen, besides considerable magazines, and their military chest; and the Swedes re covered at Greiswald all the Swedish soldiers who had been wounded or taken pri soners. On the road to Neukahlan, three hussars alone made prisoners 104 Frencht and Dutchmen. The official narrative of these operations is detailed with great modesty and precision by baron D'Essen, the governor-general of Pomerania, and must not be passed over without due attention; for every thing relative to a country governed by so high spirited a monarch, as the king of Sweden, deserves notice. It is not however, the circumstance of the evacuation of Swedish Pomerania only, that excites my joy, for I never felt much anxiety respecting the fate of Stralsund; but I trust, we may now look forward to the immediate commencement of a system of offensive operations on the part of the Swedish forces against the French and their allies. Hitherto, the king of Sweden has been obliged to employ his troops on the defensive only; now, he has an opportunity of marching them into Germany, and of collecting around his standard, after the example of his ancestor Gustavus Adolphus, the oppressed population of the countries evacuated by the French. There never was an occasion, so favourable as the present, in the history of Europe, for the exertions of any enterprising individual; and I cannot refrain from expressing my astonishment, that amidst such scenes of distraction, misery, and suffering, no modern Arminius or Wittikind appears to rescue his native land from the oppression of strangers. This may be considered as a great blank in the history of human affairs; for if we turn over the pages either of antient or modern story, we shall uniformly find, that wherever there has been any great political convulsion, men of extraordinary genius, before unknown to their countrymen, have arisen, and figured upon the stage, who have either retarded the fall of their countries, or avenged their cause. But Germany, at the beginning of the 18th century, smarts beneath the lash of a tyrant, and has no deliverer of its own. If I were a native of Germany, I would most assuredly try the efficacy of a grand insurrection. A few adventurous spirits, with 20,000 muskets, wherewith to arm the patriots who are inclined to resist, would cause more anxiety to Buonaparte, than a regular army advancing upon his rear. The whole German empire lies open, and holds out the strongest encouragement to patriotic adventure. If then, there would exist so great a probability of success from the efforts of the people, under such circumstances, what may we not expect from them, should the example be set them by the Swedes? An army of twenty or thirty thousand Britons, acting in co-operation with the Swedes upon the continent, and summoning around the standard of liberty all the youth of the nor thern parts of the empire, would, in a short time, be in a condition to render the retreat of the French, an impossibility. If it be merely for the sake of keeping up appearances, Great Britain should send a force to the continent, to shew that she is willing to share in the common struggle. The present ministry will, no doubt, make every effort to repair the errors of their predecessors; they will hasten to convince the continental powers, that Britain is always ready to forego the interests of her in sular ambition, when the safety of the civilized world is at stake. I look up to them with confidence for dispatching, without a moment's loss of time, an army to the continent; and if the late administration have so effectually broken up, or scattered our forces so as to render such a measure impracticable, at present, I trust they will expedite as many regiments as can well be spared. At all events, let a single regiment, a company, or even a platoon of soldiers be sent, if it be only to save our honour, and to hold out encouragement to the oppressed natives of Germany. Should we send a body of troops to Germany within the next six weeks, the people

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will be ripe for insurrection; for it does not appear, that the French have obtained the smallest advantage over the allies: on the contrary, they are evidently acting upon the defensive. Indeed, if they were hereafter to advance to a considerable distance beyond the Vistula, the difficulty of their situation would be augmented, by a regular disciplined army in their rear, and constantly occupied in cutting off their convoys and intercourse, while it covered the tormation and contributed towards perfecting the discipline of an armed population. Even France herself is exposed to a bold adventure. Her western shore ought to be kept in perpetual alarm, which might be effected with great ease, and at very little expense, by habituating a few regiments to embarkations and disembarkations, and to rapid marches when landed upon the coast. In truth, I ain not prepared to assert, that the landing of 30,000 men at this time in France, would not change the posture of affairs. Let it be recollected that France is completely stripped of her soldiers; that the only armed men remaining are the gens d'armes, who are employed chiefly as servants of the police, or as guards to accompany the wretched conscripts from one depôt to ano ther; that these gens d'armes do not form a collected army, but are dispersed in small bodies, from two to twenty in number, over the surface of that country; that from the western coast to Paris, there are only seven marches for an army to make; and from the banks of the Vistula there are above siaty-five. Is it altogether a chimera, or a mark of insanity, to suggest that if a well directed army were landed, and advanced by rapid strides towards Paris, proclaiming on its march, the restoration of the legitimate monarch, Lewis XVIII and the guaranty of property as it is now vested, that the legitimate monarch would be restored; and that the people would cordially unite in opposing the usurper? Events far more improbable, and under less favoura ble opportunities, have frequently occurred in the history of mankind.

No movement of any importance had taken place between the hostile armies in the north, when the last accounts were brought from the continent; but the French, as well as the Russians and Prussians, were making prodigious efforts for the renewal of the contest upon a very extended scale. It is the wish, and the avowed object of the French to bring on a general action; for which reason, it should be the business of the Russians to avoid one, however confident their general may be in the strength and courage of his army. But, after general Bennigsen has given so many proofs of his great talents, it will appear impertinent to make any anticipations relative to the line of conduct which he should adopt. Amongst the state papers in this week's Review, are a narrative of the operations of the Russians, and the report of general Bennigsen concerning the battle of Eylaus The plainness, simplicity, and obvious truth of this report, form striking contrasts with the ribaldry, bombast, and falsehood of the French bulletin. Nothing can be more terrible to the French, than the mode of warfare pursued by the Kozaks, under their Hetinan Platow. These irregular troops keep them in a state of constant alarm by night as well as by day, and it appears from the Konigsberg gazette of March 28th, that when the Kozaks are ordered to dismount, and to fire on foot, no men can execute this duty with better skill. We are furnished in this gazette, with an entertaining account of an action fought by the Kozaks and French, between Peterswalde and Altkirch, which evinces the zeal, courage, and enthusiasm of the former. When ordered to charge the enemy, they first blessed themselves, each man exclaiming in a loud voice," God have mercy upon me," and making, at the same time, the sign of the cross upon his breast, according to the custom of the Greek church. "The close of this short, but very solemn and religious ceremony, was the signal for the attack. In a moment the regiment set of full speed, expanding like a swarm of bees, exclaiming Hurrah! and took up directly the whole troop of Frenchmen opposed to them, each Kozak seizing his man by the collar. It was a pity that the enemy were not sufficiently numerous, as several Kozaks returned slow, and with an empty hand."

There is a primitive, patriarchal, simplicity, in this method of collaring and unhorsing an enemy, which cannot be too much admired.. I can enter fully into the feelings of those Kozaks, who slowly returned to their quarters empty handed. Poor lambs! methinks I see their dejected countenances, and the tears trickling down their beards, while lamenting their ill-fortune in not being able to hook and trail a bleeding Frenchman after them. The devastations which they have occasioned in

the ranks of the tyrant's army, are sufficiently perceptible from the call which he has made, by anticipation, upon the conscripts who were not to have been summoned into the field until the next year. From the correspondence and decrees amongst the state papers from Frances, it is evident, that the army of Buonaparte has been so thinned, that he rests his safety solely on the enforcement of a measure, for which the wretched country, over which he tyrannizes, must bleed at every pore. The Spaniards are also upon the march to sustain his tottering fortune; and, as they are not so nimble as their allies, it is probable that the greatest part of them will be hozaned. General Bennigsen's army has received a reinforcement of above 90,000 men; and the king of Prussia's army increases daily, but the soldiers are said to be in want of muskets; but this want, the activity of our present ministers will soon supply.

The violent measure of calling out the conscripts for 1808, shews that the situa tion of Buonaparte is desperate, and that he is resolved to put all his fortunes on a single stake. He has carried too his tyranny to such an extent as to order the pressing of Hanoverian soldiers, who are actually dragged to the French army, and forced to fight against their sovereign, whose rights they have never disclaimed, and, eventually against their own brethren who are actually in the British service. In all the conquered countries of the north, recruits are to be raised by force, and, under all the terrors of military law, compelled to join the grand army in Poland. It is thus that the tyrant hopes to obtain his ends. Italy, Swisserland, the north, and the south of Germany, are all forced alike to give their unwilling aid in sup port of projects, whose ultimate success would be no less ruinous to themselves than to every other civilized state. Even the semi-barbarians of the cast, the Turk and the Persian, are in the rear of this mighty design. By what illusion, or by what power, are such things effected? By what acquiescence, on the part of the yet unconquered states, are such things suffered? Hitherto Austria has not dared to express her genuine feelings. Prussia is calling forth the last remains of her exhausted strength. Sweeden manifests a generous sensibility to the evils and necessities of the age. The mighty plan of ambition, conceived by Buonaparte, comprehends even China; but he failed in seducing the emperor to become his ally. It is stated in a foreign journal, that the last intelligence from Gjacka mentions, that on the invitation of the French commissaries to the emperor of China, to make war on Russia, after a deliberation of six days, he gave for answer, "WE MAINTAIN OURSELVES HONESTLY, AND STAY AT HOME.”

LORD MELVILLE.

Injustice and cruelty are nearly allied; lience, we cannot wonder, after the disgusting example of cruelty, which we have all witnessed in the case of lord Melville, that his persecutors should continue to act unjustly towards him. Upon this principle, worthy only of the jurors of a French revolutionary tribunal, those who took an active part in the accusation of his lordship, have not failed to cast insidious aspersions against him, since his acquittal, whenever an occasion allowed them to indulge in their savage dispositions. It is not also without great regret, that I feel myself called upon to reproach the public for quietly permitting such infamous behaviour to be carried on, without its experiencing soine marks of their disappro bation. The treatment of lord Melville has been repugnant to every principle of natural equity, as well as to the practice of our laws; for throughout the whole conduct of his prosecution, the late house of commons departed from all those sa lutary maxims which characterized the jurisprudence of this country. From the manner in which they proceeded, it was but too evident, that they went to work less with a view to promote the public good, than to serve the objects of party ambi tion. First, they prejudged the case of lord Melville, and pronounced him guilty before he had been tried; next, they passed a string of resolutions, imputing against him a violation of law, from corrupt motives, and obtained his removal from the privy council; by which means, he was punished without being heard; and lastly, they brought him to trial, when, after the most ample and solemn investigation, he was fully acquitted of all the charges brought against him! What was the natu