the proofs of their attachment and their zeal for the common good, and that, unshaken by fear or delusive promises, they will tread with firmness the same path in which, under the protection of the laws, and of a mild government, they have hitherto enjoyed tranquillity and undisputed property, and shared in the universal prosperity of the whole empire. Lastly, we are confident that all the children of the land, relying on the help of God, on the valour of our troops, and on the known experience of their leader, will spare no sacrifice, no efforts, which patriotism and the safety of our country may demand.-ST. PETERSBURGH, Nov. 28, 1306.

Miscellaneous.

The notices which have recently arrived from the continent are consolatory, inasmuch as they exhibit the king of Prussia as resigned, and firm in adversity. But, the most gratifying piece of intelligence which hath reached this country, is contained in a multitude of authentic communications concerning the present state of the French army. A great proportion of the felonious brigades, which inundated the electorate of Brandenburgh, are now visited, through the merciful dispensations of heaven, with a malady which has already swept thousands of then from the face of the earth. I trust that this dysentery will rage with devastating fury, and that it will creep into the life blood of every French soldier. Thus human nature will gain more by the assaults of external causes, than by the ravages of the sword. If disease and death stalk through the blood-stained camps of the Corsican, the duty of the Russians will be, to "bury themselves in the interior of their country," and view with complacency the delightful scene of havock. Hitherto, they appear to be acting upon this principle; and if they will not be too impetuous, the bones of their accursed focs will form a splendid mosaic for them to walk over in their march to glory.

Two months ago, I first suggested the propriety of detaining and bringing in all neutual ships, and I have since maintained the principle; ministers have, at length, adopted the measure, under some modifications. It is with unfeigned pleasure that I take this opportunity, although they deserve to be censured on other accounts, to acknowledge my gratitude to them for giving us, at length, one proof of their patriotism.

A proclamation of the king of Prussia, which shall appear in the next number, seems to invalidate much of what I have said respecting the operations of the campaign. But let us hear the defendants, who have been condemned by the king. I have the honour of knowing general Kleist, the commandant at Magdeburgh, and a braver soldier, or a more loyal subject (as I always thought) never lived in the world.

But, in such times as we live in, no trust can be reposed in any man. The king of Prussia's proclamation shews that he has been betrayed; but, let us draw a line of demarkation between the treachery of a minister, and the cowardice of a general.

In answer to many correspondents, respecting an expression, which I used in my last number, about the secession of eight of my subscribers, I answer, that they need not have been so surprized, inasmuch as my statement related only to original subscribers. Where I have lost one of this description, I have gained one hundred elsewhere.

Albert will find a letter for him at the office, on Monday.

C. C. will hear from me this day.

Ministerial economy-the revolution in St. Domingo-the continuation of the Prussian campaign—and John Bowles, esq. in my next.

LONDON: Printed by W. MARCHANT, 3, Greville-Street, Holborn; and published by H. R. YORKE, 412, Strand, opposite the Adelphi.

Mr. REDHEAD YORKE's WEEKLY POLITICAL REVIEW.

Vol. II. N° 3.

Saturday, January 17, 1807.

Price 10d.

33

Sketch of the Operations of the Campaign.

About the middle of last September, the Prussian troops advanced with uncommon rapidity from Berlin, and passing through Saxony, arrived at the frontiers of Franconia, upon nearly the same position which they had occupied previous to the battle of Austerlitz. These positions were judiciously chosen, provided the Prussians had made a prompt and vigorous use of their advantages; for the greatest part of the Prussian army was thus concentrated, and ready to commence operations. But, instead of pushing forward to attack the French forces in detail as they were approaching, they remained immoveable, and calmly suffered the divisions of the French to pursue their route uninterrupted, and even appointed a particular day (Oct. 8,) for a round battle with their enemies. No wonder the French generals should laugh at the absurdity of such conduct, and that Buonaparte should talk of marching into Saxony before he went to bed. Three opportunities were thrown away of crushing the French army: the right division of that army, consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney, and a division of Bavarian troops, advanced by the route of Allberg and Nuremberg, united at Bayreuth on the 7th, and thence proceeded to Hoff, where they arrived on the 9th of October. If the Prussians had marched in force from Saalfeld, instead of halting there, they might have prevented the junction of these two corps, and have frustrated the French plan of operations. But the Prussian generals seem to have forgotten the rapid march of the French a year before, from the coasts of the Atlantic to the walls of Ulm; and to have concluded that a French army marches at the rate calculated by German quartermasters-general. On the 24th of September, the French guards quitted Paris, and on the 6th of October they arrived at Bamberg in Franconia. The second opportunity which the Prussians lost was, by allowing the formation of the centre of the French army. This body was composed of the corps of Bernadotte and Davoust, the imperial guards, and the reserve of Murat, which advanced from Bamberg, where, as has been already stated, it had arrived on the 6th of October, through Cronach, and reached Saalberg on the 8th, whence it pushed onward through Schleitz as far as Gera. It is obvious, that if the Prussians had acted with spirit, the junction of the centre and right wing of the French army might have been prevented; for the corps under the prince of Hohenloe, which formed the left wing of the Prussian army, had arrived at Hoff long before the right of the French had reached Bayreuth; wherefore, it would have been an easy matter for him to have effected the destruction, at least, of Soult's corps, which was half a day's march in advance of the corps under Ney, and the prince of Hohenloe's force was treble that of the French. A slight inspection of the map will satisfy every one of the justice of this remark. Yet the Prussian army, under the disastrous influence of indecisive counsels, was motionless. The third, and last opportunity which the Prussians declined was, in not attempting to prevent the advance of the left of the French army, composed of the corps of Lannes and Augereau, as far as Saalfeld. In consequence of the French having accomplished this movement, their whole army united in one compact mass, and, as will presently appear, were capable of turning the left of the Prussians, which was the great object they wished to avoid. But, it was truly said in the third bulletin of the French, that while the Prussian generals were consulting upon the measures that should be taken, without being able to agree; while they were deliberating, the French army continued its march.

The campaign opened with the battle of Schleitz, which was fought on the 9th of October, between a body of Prussians, consisting, according to the French account, of 10,000 men, and a division of the French centre, under Bernadotte. From this circumstance, we may form some estimate of the velocity with which the French NO. 3.

armies move. The Prussians were defeated, with the loss of 400 men killed, 500 made prisoners, and two pieces of cannon, which last make as loud a noise in a bulletin as they do a rumbling one in the field of battle, and are of equal importance in both. The soldiery, however, entertain a very high opinion of these cumbersome engines, and ignorant men are much in the same predicament. The action of Schleitz, which the French magnified, in their usuai manner, into a battle, was merely an affair of posts; for, we are in possession of the Prussian account of it, by which it appears, that there were not more than 3,000 Prussian troops engaged in the defence of the village. The day after the action, Bernadotte removed his head-quarters to Auma, and, on the following day, Murat arrived at Gera.

While these operations of the centre were carrying on, the left wing of the French army was equally successful. The division of Lannes, which had penetrated without the sinallest interruption (the Prussians being doubtless engaged in deliberations) through Cobourg and Graffenthal, attacked, on the 10th of October, the advanced guard of prince Hohenloe, commanded by prince Lewis of Prussia. This affair, according to the relation of the Prussians, was severely contested; it terminated in the death of prince Lewis, who was killed by a quarter-master of the 10th regiment of French hussars, and in the loss, on the part of the Prussians, of 600 men killed, 1000 made prisoners, and 30 pieces of cannon.

It will be now proper to explain the relative positions of the two hostile armies, in order that the reader may form a more perfect idea of the circumstances which brought on the fatal battle of Auerstadt, or of Jena, as it is sometimes called.

Every one conversant with military affairs must acknowledge, that the most. egregious blunders were committed by the Prussian army at the very outset of the campaign. Led on by an unjustifiable and extravagant opinion of their own valour and strength, the Prussians, high and low, acted as if they were going to certain victory. Their understandings having been bewildered by this delusion, they took no precautions against a reverse of fortune. Hence, their plan of operations, if indeed they may be said to have had one, was inconsiderate and highly impolitic. They sallied forth rather with the view of gaining a battle, than of conducting a campaign; and even under the influence of the policy which they had adopted, they neglected the means of ensuring it. For, as I have already observed, if they had opened the campaign a few days earlier, they must have been successful; instead of this, they suffered the French to accumulate their force in Saxony, while, with a step alternately advancing and retreating, menacing a blow, but afraid to strike, the Prussians lost the opportunity of probable victory, which was never afterwards recovered. Neither Dresden nor Berlin were covered by an army. Turned on its left, after having committed itself to the most hazardous operations, the Prussian army was placed in the most critical situation. On the 12th of October, the Prussians occupied Eisenach, Gotha, Erfurt, and Weimar. The French army occupied Saalfeld and Gera, and was about to advance to Nauemburg and Jena. In the first line of the French, the corps of the army under Davoust was at Nauemburgh; that of Lannes at Jena; and that of Augereau at Kala. Cut off from Dresden, the Prussians remained at Erfurt on the 11th, and endeavoured to collect their columns which had been sent towards Cassel and Wurtzburg, to act upon the offensive. The Weser, upon which they had raised batteries; the Saal, which they attempted to defend, and the other rivers, were all turned much in the same manner as was practised on the Iller the year before; so that the French army lined the banks of the Saal, with their rear towards the Elbe; while the Prussian army had its rear towards the Rhine. In this position the fatal battle of Jena was fought. The history of that battle, given by the French, with its consequences, together with a Prussian account, just arrived in this country, I shall here insert.

"The battle of Jena has wiped away the disgrace of the battle of Rosbach, and in seven days concluded a campaign which has wholly quited all the dreadful preparations for war with which the Prussian heads were so much possessed.

The following was the position of the army on the 13th:

"The grand-duke of Berg and marshal Davoust were with the corps of their army at Naumburg, having a part at Leipzig and Halle.

"The corps of marshal prince Ponte-Corvo was on the march to come up to Naumbents, 4

"The corps of marshal Lannes advanced to Jena; the corps of marshal Augereau was placed in the position of Khala.

"The corps of marshal Ney was at Rotha.

"The head-quarters were at Gera,

"The emperor was on the march to proceed to Jena.

"The corps of marshal Soult was on the march from Gera, to take a more conve nient position upon the straight road from Naumburg to Jena.

"The position of the enemy was the following:

"The king of Prussia wished to commence hostilities on the 9th of October, by bearing down his right wing on Frankfort, with his centre on Wurtzburg, and his left wing on Bamberg. All the divisions of his army were disposed for the accomplishment of this plan; but the French army turning him upon the extremity of his left wing, was found in a tew days at Saalburg, at Lobenstein, at Schleitz, at Gera, and at Naumburg. The Prussian army seeing itself turned, occupied the days of the 9th, 10:h, 11th, and 12th, in calling in their detachments, and on the 13th formed itself in order of battle between Capelsdorff and Auerstadt, being about 150 000 men strong.

"On the 13th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the emperor came to Jena, and on a small elevated flat, beset by our advanced guard, reconnoitred the positions of the enemy, in order to manœuvre in such a way as next day to force the different passes on the Saal, and so to fall on. The enemy made a vigourous opposition, and seemed by their dispositions, on an inaccessible position on the highway between Jena and Weimar, to think that the French could not stretch out upon the plain without previously forcing that passage. It did not appear possible, in fact, to bring the artillery upon the flat, which was so small, that four battalions could scarcely open out their ranks upon it.

"The men were set at work the whole night to make a way over the ruts, and at length succeeded in bringing the artillery upon the height.

"Marshal Davoust received orders to defile near Naumburg, for the purpose of defending the defiles of Koesen, as the enemy wanted to march upon Naumburg, in order to reach Apolda, and fall upon his rear in case he remained in the situation he then was.

"The corps of marshal prince Fonte-Corvo was destined to stretch out by Naumburg, in order to fall upon the rear-guard of the enemy, in case he bent strongly toward Naumburg or Jena.

1

"The heavy cavalry, which had not yet come up with the army, could not be entirely brought on by mid-day. The cavalry of the imperial guard was at the distance of thirty-six hours march, notwithstanding the heavy journey which it had performed since it left Paris; but it was come to that moment of the war, when no single consideration should outweigh to deprive them of the advantage of being the first to meet and fall upon the enemy.

"The emperor placed the whole corps of marshal Lannes in order of battle upon the level height, which the enemy seemed to overlook (they occupied a position over against it). This corps was placed under the care of general Victor; each division formed a wing. Marshal Lefebre ordered the imperial guard into a square battalion upon the highest point. The emperor kept the watch in the midst of his brave men. The night presented a remarkable spectacle: two armies, the one of which extended its front upon a line of six hours march, fired the air with its lights; the other, the lights of which seemed to be brought into one small point; and in the one, as well as in the other, all watchfulness and motion. The lights of the two armies were at half cannon shot distance respectively; the sentinels were almost touching, and there was not a single motion on either side which could not be heard from the other. "The divisions of marshals Ney and Soult took up the whole night in marching. At break of day the whole army was under arms. Gazan's division was disposed in three ranks; the left on the level height; Suchet's division formed the right; the imperial guards occupied the summit of a height. Each of these corps had their artillery in the little spaces between.

"From the town and neighbouring vallies the passes had been discovered by which the troops, which could not be placed upon the level height, might extend

themselves in the easiest manner; and this is surely the first occasion when an army had to defile through so small a pass.

"A thick fog obscured the day. The emperor passed before the different lines: he commanded his soldiers to take care of the Prussian cavalry, which had been described as being so formidable; he bade them remember that a year was not elapsed since Ulm was taken; that the Prussian army, like the Austrian then, was surrounded; had been driven from their line of operations, and lost their magazines; that they at the present moment no longer fought for honour, but for a retreat; that they alone sought to make themselves an opening upon different points, and that the corps of the army which should let them pass, would lose its honour and its glory." "To these inspiring words the soldiers answered with a loud cry of let us onward! The light troops began the action. They opened a very brisk fire. Good as was the position of the enemy, he was nevertheless driven out; and the French army marched out in the plain, and began to form in the order of battle.

"The enemy's army, which on their side had no other view than to fall on whenever the fog should have cleared up, took up their arms. An army of 50,000 men from the left wing posted itself to cover the defiles of Naumburg, and to get possession of the passes of Koesen. But this was already anticipated by marshal Davoust. The two other armies, one amounting to 80,000 men strong, placed themselves before the French army, which was opening out from the level height of Jena. The mist hung over both armies, lasting two hours; but at length was dissipated by the brightness of the sun. The two armies mutually beheld each other at the distance of less than cannon-shot. The left wing of the French army, supporting itself against a village and the woods, was commanded by marshal Augereau. The imperial guard poured their fire upon the centre, which was maintained by marshal Lannes; the right wing was drawn together out of the corps of marshal Soult, who had only a small corps of 3,000 men, purely composed of troops which had arrived of his light corps.

"The enemy's army was numerous, and displayed a fine cavalry; their manœuvres were exactly and rapidly executed. The emperor had chosen to delay coming to an engagement for two hours, in order to watch the positions which the enemy should take after the action of the morning, and to give the necessary orders to the troops, especially the cavalry, which required the greatest care. But the impetuo sity of the French was too ardent for him. Several battalions had begun to engage in the village of Hollstedt. He saw that the enemy was in motion to drive them out; he gave immediate orders to marshal Lannes to march with expedition to the sup port of the village. Marshal Soult had attacked a wood on the right. The enemy having made a movement with his right wing upon our left, marshal Augereau was commanded to repulse them; and in less than an hour the action was general. Two hundred and fifty, or three hundred thousand men, with seven or eight hundred pieces of artillery, scattered death in every direction, and exhibited one of the most awful events ever witnessed on the theatre of history. On one side, as well as on the other, every mano uvre was performed as if it were on a parade.

"Among our troops, there was not for a moment the least disorder; the victory was not uncertain for an instant. The emperor had all along by him, besides his imperial guards, a large body of troops, as a reserve, to act in unforeseen

events.

"Marshal Soult having got possession of the wood, which occupied him two hours, made a movement in advance. At that instant the emperor gave orders that the division of French cavalry in reserve should begin to take post, and that the two new divisions from the army of marshal Ney should take station on the field of battle by the rear. All the troops of the reserve were advanced to the foremost line, which, being thus strengthened, threw the enemy into disorder, and they instantly retired.

"They retrieved themselves during the last hour; but were cast into dreadful confusion, at the moment when our division of dragoons and cuirassiers, having the grand duke of Berg at their head, were able to take a part in the engagement. These brave cavaliers, fearing that the fate of the day would be determined without their assistance, then bore the Prussians down before them, in great confusion, wherever they met them. The Prussian cavalry and infantry could not withstand