In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant, information in relation to the course of practice in respect to the settlement of public accounts and the drawing of requisitions therefor by the Secretary of War upon the treasury, prior to the passage of the late act respecting the prompt settlement of public accounts. APRIL 7, 1868.-Read, ordered to lie on the table and be printed. WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, April 6, 1868. SIR: In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 6th instant, inquiring what was the course of practice in respect to the settlement of public accounts and the drawing of requisitions therefor by the Secretary of War upon the treasury, prior to the passage of the late act respecting the prompt settlement of public accounts, and what, if any, evils exist under the present law in that respect, I have the honor to state that, prior to the passage of the late act respecting the prompt settlement of public accounts, claims originating in the respective bureaus of the War Department were first adjusted by the chief of the bureau having charge of the subject, and then transmitted, with the vouchers, evidence, and explanatory papers, to the proper accounting officers of the treasary, by whom the accounts were re-examined, and the amount due, if any, adjudicated and stated; and the account as allowed by the Treasury was returned to the proper bureau, and, on the request of the chief of such bureau, a requisition in the prescribed form was made out and signed by the Secretary of War, transmitted to the accounting officers, viz., the Comptroller and Auditor of the Treasary, for their examination, and if found to correspond with the settlement made by them, received their signature and was laid before the Secretary of the Treasury for his warrant, upon which warrant the money was paid in cash, or by draft or check on a government depository. Since the war it has sometimes happened that war claims, or claims for army supplies allowed by the Quartermaster General, have been largely increased by the accounting officers of the treasury, viz, the Comptroller and Auditor, and sums allowed which in the judgment of the chief of the quartermaster department were not honest or just. Such cases of conflict were submitted to the Secretary of War, and if upon examination he was satisfied that a larger sum had been allowed by the accounting officers of the treasury, or that claims were passed by them unauthorized by the law and the facts, the Secretary of War declined to make a requisition for a sum larger than appeared to be warranted by the report of the Quartermaster General or the facts in the case, leaving the claimant to pursue his remedy for the residue before the Court of Claims or before Congress; the authority of the Secretary of War to reduce the amount settled by the Auditor and Comptroller being disputed by them and by claimants, they insisting that the decision of the Auditor and Comptroller was, by law, final and conclusive. On the other hand, the Secretary of War held that such decision was conclusive only to the extent that no more could be paid than was allowed by the accounting officers, but that the Secretary was not bound to draw upon the treasury and pay a sum that he believed not to be due. This question of conflict of authority was submitted to the Attorney General for his opinion. He decided that: My predecessors in this office have settled the question again and again in favor of the right of a head of department to refuse his assent to the action of accounting officers of the treasury upon claims arising in his department. It would be a weary task to recapitulate all these opinions, and I will content myself with an extract from the opinion of Mr. Bates, the last opinion which I find on the question. I have further to say that my own consideration has led me to the same conclusion: "I am accordingly of opinion that you are authorized to withhold your signature for an amount which you believe not properly due, though certified to by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department." A copy of the Attorney General's opinion is herewith transmitted. This was the condition of things at the time of the passage of the late act, approved March 30, referred to in the Senate's resolution. That act declares the account stated by the Auditor and Comptroller to be final and conclusive upon all points; and if it was the design of Congress to deprive the head of a department of all power of revision and compel him to pay claims that he is satisfied are unreasonable or dishonest, he ought to be relieved from the obligation of making requisitions for such claims, and the authority vested in some other officer to make the requisition; as in the case of adjudications by the Third Auditor, under the act of March 3, 1849, (Statutes at Large, volume 9, p. 414,) the 4th section of which act makes the amount payable out of the treasury on production of a copy of the adjudication of the Auditor. It does not seem fair to compel the head of a department to be responsible for requisitions and payments which he believes to be contrary to the evidence and the facts. No requisitions have yet been drawn under the act, but some claims under it are pending which must be paid if Congress deems it expedient to leave the settlement of all accounts to accounting officers of the treasury without revision or check by the head of a department, or by the Court of Claims, or by Congress itself, and making the decision of such accounting officers final and conclusive A printed abstract of decisions by the Supreme Court and the law department of the government bearing upon this subject, and a detailed statement of the practice of the government at different periods, made by General Canby when presiding over the claims commission, are herewith submitted for the information of the Senate. The question is one that relates to the precautions to be taken on the settlement of claims of great amount, and properly rests on the judgment of Congress. It will therefore be the aim of this department to execute promptly any provisions prescribed by Congress. Your obedient servant, Hon. B. F. WADE, President of the Senate. EDWIN M. STANTON, WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, August 24, 1866. SIR: I have the honor to herewith submit a report of the 17th instant, and its accompaniments, submitted by the Quartermaster General in pursuance of my instructions, and referring to cases wherein certificates of settlement having been given by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department for larger amounts than were admitted to be due by the War Department, requisitions for the amounts thus certified to have not been signed. It is believed that this action is in accordance with law, and is sustained by the opinions of several of your predecessors. But in view of the larger number of cases now involved in the determination of the question, and with a disposition to have due satisfaction afforded to the parties interested, I have the honor to request your opinion as to whether the Secretary of War is authorized to withhold his signature from a requisition for an amount which he believes to be not properly due, though certified to by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. HENRY STANBERY, EDWIN M. STANTON, Attorney General. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have considered the question submitted for my opinion in your letter of the 24th ultimo, "whether the Secretary of War is authorized to withhold his signature from a requisition for an amount which he believes to be not properly due, though certified to by the accounting officers of the Treasury Depart ment." My predecessors in this office have settled this question again and again in favor of the right of the head of a department to refuse his assent to the action of the accounting officers of the treasury upon claims arising in his department. It would be a weary task to recapitulate all these opinions, and I will therefore content myself with an extract from the opinion of Mr. Bates, the last opinion which I find on the question, delivered on the 25th of April, 1862 : The important question of the authority of the heads of departments to interfere with the action of the accounting officers upon accounts arising within their respective departments, has been so frequently and thoroughly considered by my predecessors, that, so far as this office is concerned, I may well regard it as settled. In an elaborate opinion furnished to the President, Attorney General Crittenden (5 Op. 636) announced his conclusion as follows: "Upon the authority of the opinions of my predecessors in office, and upon principle and practice, the rightful authority of the head of the department to interfere a priori or a posteriori is well established as binding on the Auditor and Comptroller." And he cites, in support of that conclusion, the opinions of Attorney General Wirt, (1 Op. 678,) Attorney General Berrien, (2 Op. 303,) Attorney General Taney, (2 Op. 463, 786,) Attorney General Butler, (2 Op. 625, 652,) and Attorney General Johnston, (5 Op. 87.) To these may be added the opinions of Attorney General Cushing in Whitman's case (7 Op. 724) and in Benham's case, (8 Op. 297,) where he says, “And although doubts were at one time raised upon the point, yet the law is now settled, according to the ruling of one of my predecessors, (Mr. Crittenden,) that in all such cases the auditing and comptrolling are subject to the superior supervision of some appropriate head of department and to the President." And these anthorities fully cover cases referred by special acts of Congress to one or more of the accountnting officers, as well as cases arising in the ordinary routine of the accounting bureaus. I have further to say, that my own consideration of this question has led me to the same conclusion. I am accordingly of opinion that you are authorized to withhold your signa ture from a requisition for an amount which you believe to be not properly due, though certified to by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. HENRY STANBERY, Attorney General. Jurisdiction of accounting officers-Decision of the Supreme Court-The United States, plaintiffs in error, vs. Catesby Ap Rogers Jones. Where an officer of the navy was detached on special duty in France, and a sum of money was transmitted to him by the Secretary of the Navy to be disbursed for medical attendance, the propriety of this act was peculiarly within the jurisdiction and discretion of the head of the department; and the officer cannot be charged with the amount so transmitted by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Cushing (Attorney General) for the United States, and by Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Jones for the defendant. Mr. Cushing's points were: 1. The expenses incurred by Lieutenant Jones while in France, on leave of absence, were not chargeable to the United States. The act of 3d of March, 1835, (4 Statutes at Large, 755, 757,) fixed the annual compensation of officers, and prohibited all other allowances. absent on leave the government is not bound to provide medical attendance. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury was not authorized to advance the money in question to Lieutenant Jones. The act of January 31, 1823, (3 Statutes at Large, 723,) only allows advances to officers employed on distant stations. This was when they received emoluments, which were cut off by the act of 1835. 3. The accounting officers are not bound to allow, in a settlement of an account with an officer, a credit for money unlawfully received or expended without authority of law. The act of 3d March, 1849, (9 Statutes at Large, 419,) applies to pursers and storekeepers only, and the disbursement must be made in pursuance of an order from an officer in command. The opinions of the following Attorneys General do not apply to the case: Mr. Berrien, Parker's case, (Opinions Attorney General, 679,) Mr. Butler, Parker's case, (Opinion Attorney General, 913,) Mr. Taney, Thorp's case, (Opinions Attorney General, 785,) Mr. Johnson's (Miami claim) Lassel's case, (2 Opinions Attorney General, 1998,) Mr. Crittenden, commissioner of customs, November 13, 1852, MS. 4. Money belonging to the government, which has been wrongfully received, can be recovered back in an action at law. 5. The President is not authorized to expend marine hospital money in a foreign country. The counsel for defendant in error contended that the above opinions of Attorneys General were applicable, and 1. That the payment of the medical attendance of an officer is not such an allowance to the officer as was contemplated in the prohibitions of the act of 1835. 2. That the act of 1823 provides "that the President of the United States may direct such advances as he may deem necessary and proper to such per |