him. The fact that two or more states make use of the same person, or even of the same institution, in their governmental organization, does not make these states a compound state. Its influence towards the consolidation of the states is favorable; but that is another thing.

The states

The con

Again, the confederacy is no compound state. forming the same remain separate, simple states. federate organization has no power to bind any one of the states entering into the same without its own separate and express consent; i.e. it has no sovereignty; it is no state at all; it is only government. The confederate constitution is a treaty, an interstate agreement. It differs from the usual treaty in two points, vis; it creates a sort of governmental organization, or rather a council of advisers, and contains the general agreement on the part of the different states to execute the recommendations of this body; and it has, generally, no limitation as to duration. These are circumstances favorable to the consolidation of the separate states into one state. The very fact of the confederacy is the best of proof that there are natural forces at work conspiring to secure such consolidation. After this consolidation shall have been accomplished, however, there is no compound state as the result; i.e. no state in which the sovereignty is partly in the new state and partly in the old states, but there is a simple state of wider organization.

This last reflection leads to the consideration of the final species of compound state cited by Bluntschli, viz; the federal. I take the ground here, again, that this is no compound state; that there is no such thing as a federal state; and that what is really meant by the phrase is a dual system of government under a common sovereignty. If we put this case to a rigid scientific test, we shall find that the so-called federal state is a state which extends over a territory and

1 Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht, S. 92.

comprehends a population previously divided into several independent states; that physical, ethnical, economic, and social harmony, conspiring to produce political unity, existed throughout the several states; that consolidation was resisted by the governments of some of the states, possibly by some of the states themselves; that, consequently, the consolidation was produced by violence, and the first organization of the new state was therefore revolutionary, i.e. was not created according to the prescripts of existing law; that the new state under its revolutionary organization has framed a constitution in which it has constructed a government for the general affairs of the whole state, and has left to the old bodies, whose former sovereignty it has destroyed, the residuary powers of government, to be exercised by them, under certain general limitations, as they will, so long as the new state may not see fit to make other disposition in reference to them. Exactly the same result, regarding the position of the old states in the new system, is effected as in the case of the transition of the sovereignty from the monarch to the aristocracy, and from the aristocracy to the democracy, when the preceding form in which the sovereignty was organized is not entirely abolished; i.e. the old states become parts of the government in the new state, and nothing more. It is no longer proper to call them states at all. It is in fact only a title of honor, without any corresponding substance. Confusion and inertia of thought support it for a long time. When new things proceed out of old ones, it is a long time before we invent the new names rightly describing the new character.

It is possible, of course, that several states may consolidate to form a single state, with a federal or dual system of gov ernment, peaceably and in accordance with the forms of existing law. It is also possible that a single state may, as a matter of fact, construct its governmental system upon the federal or dual principle. Neither of these processes, however,

is very likely to be followed. It is rather fortunate for political science that they are not, at least that the first is not. Should it be followed, it would be far more difficult to clear away the appearances of the confederacy from the new state. In the latter case this difficulty would not, indeed, be felt; but a state which has already attained a consolidated government has probably passed beyond that period of its political civilization which requires the dual form; and the re-establishment of it would, therefore, be rather an evidence of retrogression in social conditions.

My contention is, therefore, that the classification of states, as to form, into monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, is both correct and exhaustive; that no additional forms can be made out of a combination of these, or out of a union of several states; and that the notion that there can be proceeds from the confounding of state and government in the treatment of the subject.

There remains now but a single point further to be touched under this topic. What we call the modern states are those based upon the principle of popular sovereignty; i.e. they are democracies. Not all of them appear to be such, but a close scrutiny of the facts will reveal the truth of the proposition that they are. The reason of the deceptive appearance in

such cases will be found to be the fact that the state has but recently taken on its new form, and has not perfected its organization; while the old state-form, remaining as government, is still clad in the habiliments of sovereignty, shabby and threadbare perhaps, but still recognizable. It will be highly instructive to consider, for a moment, the social conditions which precede, and make possible, the existence of the democratic state. They may be expressed in a single phrase, viz; national harmony. There can be no democratic state unless the mass of the population of a given state shall have attained a consensus of opinion in reference to rights and wrongs, in reference to government and liberty.

This implies, in the first place, that they shall understand each other; i.e. that they shall have a common language and a common psychologic standpoint and habit. It implies, in the second place, that they shall have a common interest, in greater or less degree, over against the populations of other states. It implies, finally, that they shall have risen, in their mental development, to the consciousness of the state, in its essence, means and purposes; that is, the democratic state must be a national state, and the state whose population has become truly national will inevitably become democratic. There is a natural and an indissoluble connection between this condition of society and this form of state. It is this connection which has led to the interchangeable use of the terms state and nation. We must not forget, however, that they belong primarily to different sciences, and should not be used interchangeably without explanatory qualifications.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ENDS OF THE STATE.

UPON this topic, also, we have a most copious literature. It is, however, exceedingly inharmonious, and generally unsatisfactory. The most elaborate and advanced treatment of the subject which has yet appeared is to be found in von Holtzendorff's Principien der Politik. A critical analysis of his propositions will, however, reveal the fact that he does not clearly distinguish state from government, and that he loses sight of the ultimate end of the state in contemplating the immediate ends, which, from the standpoint of the ultimate end, are but means. The great value of his work consists in the fact that he points out the stages of advance in the attainment of the ultimate end, and warns against attempting to take the third step before the first and second shall have been successfully completed. After an exhaustive review and criticism of the theories which have prevailed, at different periods of history, in the literature of this topic, von Holtzendorff advances his own doctrine under the title of the actual purposes of the state (die realen Staatszwecke).1 He holds that the state has a triple end, the elements of which are interdependent and harmonious. Of these the first is power (der nationale Machtzweck). The state must constitute itself in sufficient power to preserve its existence and proper advantage against other states, and to give itself a universally commanding position over against its own subjects, either as individuals or associations of individuals. The second

1 Seite, 219 ff.