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is individual liberty (der individuelle Rechtszweck). The state must lay out a realm of free action for the individual, and not only defend it against violation from every other quarter, but hold it sacred against encroachment by itself. And the third is the general welfare (der gesellschaftliche Culturzweck). The state must stand over against the private associations and combinations of its subjects as independent power, preventing any one or more of them from seizing and exercising the power of the state against the others. It must prevent the rivalries between different associations from coming to a breach of the peace. It must protect the rights of the individual member of any association against the tyranny of the association. It must hold all associations to their primary public purpose, if such they have, and aid them, if strictly necessary, in its accomplishment. Finally, it must direct the education of its subjects.
This appears to me to be a confused and an incomplete statement of the ends of the state. In the first place, it is confused. Why, for example, should the duty of the state to hold itself in a position of independent power over against the attempts of any association to seize and employ the power of the state for its own advantage, or to keep the peace of the public in the midst of the rivalries of associations, be classed under the end of the general welfare, rather than under the end of power? Why, again, should the duty of the state to protect the rights of an individual member of an association against the tyranny of the association be classed under the end of the general welfare rather than under the end of individual liberty? In the second place, the proposition is incomplete. It takes no account of the world-purpose of the state. It makes no place in its political science for the body of customs and agreements which we term, rather prematurely indeed, international law. While Hegel, in his doctrine that morality (Sittlichkeit) is the end of the state, lost sight of the proximate ends in the ultimate end, von Holtzendorff, on the other hand, loses sight of the ultimate end in the proximate ends. Moreover, neither he, nor any other publicist who has yet written, indicates any other means employed by the state in the attainment of its ends than government. This topic requires, therefore, a new and an independent examination and statement; and the fundamental principle of the new proposition must be that it shall include both the proximate and ultimate ends of the state, in their proper relation, and shall distinguish clearly state from government in the account of the forces employed in the attainment of these ends. Unless these requirements be fulfilled, no advance in the better comprehension of this cardinal subject can be hoped for.
First, then, as to state ends. An exhaustive examination of this subject will reveal the fact that there are three natural points of division. There is a primary, a secondary, and an ultimate purpose of the state; and, proceeding from the primary to the ultimate, the one end or class of ends is means to the attainment of the next following. Let us regard the ultimate end first. This is the universal human purpose of the state. We may call it the perfection of humanity; the civilization of the world; the perfect development of the human reason, and its attainment to universal command over individualism ; the apotheosis of man. This end is wholly spiritual; and in it mankind, as spirit, triumphs over all fleshly weakness, error, and sin. This is what Hegel meant by his doctrine that morality (Sittlichkeit) is the end of the state ; and the criticism that this doctrine confounds the domain of the individual with that of the state, so freely indulged in by most publicists, is a crude view, a narrow conception of the meaning of the term morality. The true criticism is, that Hegel takes the third step without resting upon the first and second, and mankind is not strong enough of foot to follow him.
The state cannot, however, be organized from the beginning as world-state. Mankind cannot yet act through so extended and ponderous an organization, and many must be the centuries, and probably cycles, before it can. Mankind must first be organized politically by portions, before it can be organized as a whole. I have already pointed out the natural conditions and forces which direct the political apportionment of mankind. I have demonstrated that they work towards the establishment of the national state. The national state is the most perfect organ which has as yet been attained in the civilization of the world for the interpretation of the human consciousness of right. It furnishes the best vantage-ground as yet reached for the contemplation of the purpose of the sojourn of mankind upon earth. The national state must be developed everywhere before the world-state can appear. Therefore I would say that the secondary purpose of the state is the perfecting of its nationality, the development of the peculiar principle of its nationality. I think this is what Bluntschli means when he says the end of the state is the development of the popular genius, the perfection of the popular life.1
But now, how shall the state accomplish this end? The answer to this question gives us finally the proximate ends of the state. These are government and liberty. The primary activity of the state must be directed to the creation and the perfecting of these. When this shall have been fairly accomplished, it may then, through these as means, work out the national civilization, and then the civilization of the world. First of all, the state must establish the reign of peace and of law; i.e. it must establish government, and vest it with sufficient power to defend the state against external attack or internal disorder. This is the first step out of barbarism, and until it shall have been substantially taken every other consideration must remain in abeyance. If it be necessary that the whole power of the state shall be exercised by the government in order to secure this result, there should be no hesitation in authorizing or approving it. This latter status must not, however, be regarded as permanent. It cannot secure the development of the national genius. If continued beyond the period of strict necessity, it will rather suppress and smother that genius. So soon as, through its disciplinary influence, the disposition to obey law and observe order shall have been established, it must, therefore, suffer change. The state must then address itself to the establishment of its sys. tem of individual liberty. It must mark out, in its constitution, a sphere of individual autonomy; and it must command the government both to refrain from encroachment thereon itself and to repel encroachment from every other quarter. At first this domain must necessarily be narrow, and the subjects of the state be permitted to act therein only as separate individuals. As the people of the state advance in civilization, the domain of liberty must be widened, and individuals permitted to form private combinations and associations for the accomplishment of purposes which are beyond the powers of the single individual, and which could be otherwise fulfilled only by the power of the government. Of course the state must define with distinctness the sphere of free action accorded to these associations, and vest government with such control over them as will prevent them from an abuse of their privileges and powers and hold them to the fulfilment of their public purpose. It may, also, be good policy for the state to aid them in the accomplishment of work which they could not, without such aid, perform, instead of authorizing the government itself to undertake and execute such enterprises. This all signifies, however, only a readjustment by the state, from time to time, of the relation of government to liberty, and does not require the conception of a third immediate end of the state. In the modern age, the state works, thus, through government and liberty, and accomplishes many of its fairest and most important results for civilization through the latter. It is often said that the state does nothing for certain causes, as, for instance, religion or the higher education, when the government does not exercise its powers in their behalf. This does not at all follow. If the state guarantees the liberty of conscience and of thought and expression, and permits the association of individuals for the purposes of religion and education, and protects such associations in the exercise of their rights, it does a vast deal for religion and education; vastly more, under certain social conditions, than if it should authorize the government to interfere in these domains. The confusion of thought upon this subject arises from the erroneous assumptions that the state does nothing except what it does through the government; that the state is not the creator of liberty; that liberty is natural right, and that the state only imposes à certain necessary restraint upon the same. This doctrine of natural rights or anti- or extra-state rights, which led to the revolutions of the eighteenth century, still exercises a sort of traditional power over popular thinking ; but the publicists and the jurists have, most largely, abandoned it as unscientific, erroneous and harmful. The theory did its practical work. when the state was a single person, or a few persons, indistinguishable from the government, and, in its formulation of rights, was acting in utter disregard of the popular ethical feeling. Where the state is the people in ultimate organization, the theory can only mean that the state should act rationally in its construction of the principles of liberty; but of their rationality, the state, again, is the final interpreter. In fact, this is the only scientific value which the proposition ever had. There never was, and there never can be, any liberty upon this earth and among human beings outside of state organization. Barbaric self-help produces tyranny and slavery, and has nothing in common with the self-help created by the state and controlled by law. Mankind does not begin with liberty. Mankind acquires liberty through civilization. Liberty is as truly a creation of the state as is government; and
1“ Entwickelung der Volksanlage, Vervollkommnung des Volkslebens.” Lehre vom modernen Stat, Bd. I, S. 361.