whereupon the bell was rung, the train stopped, and the plaintiff required to leave. Before the train came to a halt, the plaintiff found his ticket and offered it to the conductor, who nevertheless compelled him to get off. The court say, Merwin J., speaking for all the members: "If the ticket of the plaintiff was mislaid and he in good faith was trying to find it, he was entitled to reasonable time to enable him to do so if he could; and if, in case of failure to find it after such reasonable opportunty, he was willing and ready to pay his fare, the conductor had no right to put him off." See Railroad v. Garrett, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 438; s. c. 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 416. It is contended, however, that the short distance to be run over by the train before reaching the station at which the plaintiff was to debark, did not admit of delay and rendered necessary prompt action on the part of the conductor, and it was plaintiff's own fault to enter the coach without a ticket or the means of payment when the fare was required of him. It does not appear in the case that prepayment of fare was necessary, and it is obvious that no appreciable time would have been lost in giving the plaintiff opportunity to call on Braswell and get the money to pay his fare. If this was a mere pretense, and such seems to have been the assumption on which this precipitate action of the officer was taken, a moment would have revealed it, and then the ejectment would have been fully warranted. The defense set up is an assertion of the right to remove from the train any passenger who may not be ready at once to exhibit a ticket or pay his fare, notwithstanding he has the means at hand by passing into an adjoining coach, and only asks time to do so. This rigid rule, enforced, would require every one to have possession of his own ticket or the friend who has it to be near by, at the hazard of expulsion if he did not. In all cases a reasonable indulgence should be shown a passenger in his effort to comply with the rules of the company, and what is reasonable must be determined in connection with the surrounding circumstances and in view of the facts of each case. We think the plaintiff's request was reasonable, and that the hasty and precipitate action of the conductor was in excess of the authority with which the law armed him. The exceptions to the evidence are not tenable, for its only office was to show that the plaintiff had provided means to pay his fare, and did not intend to trespass upon the rights of the company. In some of the States the right to eject for non-payment is restricted, so far as to require it to be at some station, and not capriciously at any point, which might be at some very inhospitable spot, endangering health if not life. There is no error, and the judgment must be affirmed. 18 A. & E. R. Cas.-24. Passenger Entitled to Reasonable Delay to Procure Fare.-A passenger failing to produce his ticket or pay his fare is eutitled to a reasonable delay to find his ticket if lost, or procure his fare from some one else if he has no money. If expelled before he has had such reasonable time, he is entitled to recover damages. Maples v. New York, tr., R. Co., 38 Conn. 557; Curtis v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 12 Upp. Can. C. P. 89; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 438; South Carolina R. R. Co. v. Nix, 65 Ga. 572; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Fire, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R, Cas. 109; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Fleming, supra; Hayes v. New York Central R. Co., supra. CARPENTER 7'. WASHINGTON & GEORGETOWN R. R. Co. (Advance Case, District of Columbia, April 14, 1884.) Plaintiff having received a wrong transfer ticket on changing cars was expelled from the car into which he changed for failing to produce a proper ticket. In an action to recover damages, the court charged that if the mistake was owing to the negligence of the transfer agent, the plaintiff was entitled to damages; that if the wrong transfer ticket was given to him maliciously or wantonly, and he was ejected maliciously and wantonly, he was entitled to vindictive damages; and further, that if the conduct of defendant was wanton, the negligence of plaintiff would be no defence. Held, that the instructions were all that the plaintiff could ask. Where the instructions of the court in its charge to the jury states the law fully and properly, it is not cause for reversal that the points of either side have been declined. THE case is stated in the opinion. B. J. Darnielle and John E. Latimer, for plaintiff. Cox, J.-The case of James N. Carpenter against the Washington & Georgetown Railroad Co. is an action for trespass by ejecting the plaintiff from the cars of the defendant. The case made by the plaintiff in his evidence was, that he entered one of the cars of the company on Seventh street, going south towards Pennsylvania avenue, and at the junction of Seventh street and the avenue he applied for a transfer ticket for the purpose of going down the avenue towards the Capitol. When he entered the avenue car, or shortly afterwards, he discovered that his ticket was a ticket for the Seventh street track, which he had just left, and upon presenting it to the conductor, the latter refused to acknowledge it, and required him to pay an additional fare, and upon his refusal to do so, he was violently forced out of the car. That is the trespass complained of. For the defendant, the proof tended to show that the plaintiff, instead of getting off the Seventh street car, approached the agent from the rear of an avenue car going west, together with other passengers manifestly leaving that car, and that they were receiving transfer tickets from him, and he supposed this plaintiff to be one of that company, and delivered this transfer ticket to go on the Seventh street car to him as he did to the others, and the plaintiff took it without objection, and therefore it was the plaintiff's own negligence that led to this result. The only question before us relates to certain instructions that were asked and refused. At the trial, several instructions were granted at the instance of the plaintiff, and then the following were refused: "That if the jury shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff paid his fare on the Seventh street car, and, on arriving at Pennsylvania avenue, the Pennsylvania avenue car of the defendant was then stopping at the crossing of the two lines (Pennsylvania avenue and Seventh street), and plaintiff immediately on arriving at Pennsylvania avenue went to the transfer ticket agent of said defendant there stationed, and asked for and received a transfer ticket, and that then and there the transfer ticket agent gave him a transfer ticket; that thereupon the plaintiff went immediately with said transfer ticket on board the said Pennsylvania avenue car, and, after the car started, offered it when called on in the usual way to the conductor, who refused to receive it, but together with the driver of the car forcibly put plaintiff off the car, then they shall find for the plaintiff, even if they should also find that the transfer ticket agent had given plaintiff a wrong ticket, either intentionally or by mistake." And again: "That if the jury shall believe from the evidence that the ejection of the plaintiff from the Pennsylvania avenue car resulted from the slightest neglect or misconduct of the transfer ticket agent, or the conductor of the Pennsylvania avenue car, then they shall find for the plaintiff." And again: "That if the injury complained of could have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care by defendant, the defendant is liable even if the plaintiff was at fault." And again: "That if the jury shall believe from the evidence that the conduct of the defendant was wanton, then the negligence of plaintiff, even if proved, would be no defence." These several instructions were refused in the form in which they were applied for, and an exception taken to each refusal. But in the final charge which the court gave to the jury, they were instructed as follows: "That if they believed from the evidence that the agents of the defendant had made a mistake in giving to the plaintiff a transfer ticket, and, instead of giving him a Pennsylvania avenue transfer, had given him a Seventh street transfer, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and that, in assessing the damages, the plaintiff was entitled to have reasonable damages, compensatory for the treatment which he had received, and that the defendant company was bound to see to it that the plaintiff was provided with a proper transfer, and that if the mistake had been made, the responsibility therefor rested upon the company and not upon the plaintiff. "And the court further instructed the jury that if, upon the other hand, they believed that the conduct of the agents of the company was wanton and malicious, and that they had purposely given him the wrong transfer, and that they had maliciously and wantonly ejected him from the car because of a personal dislike or animosity, that then the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and in assessing damages in that view of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to recover not only compensatory but vindictive damages.' We are of opinion that the instruction given in the charge covered all the ground claimed by the plaintiff himself, and was all the instruction he was entitled to ask, and I believe that was virtually conceded by the counsel in argument. But it is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that the court is not to look at the charge given by the court below, but only at the instructions that were proposed, refused and excepted to. It is perfectly true that we do not revise for the purpose of correcting, as error, anything that is not excepted to below. But we are not looking at it in that view, but only to ascertain whether, on the whole, the instruction given by the court below was correct. It was the practice of the late chief justice Taney, in his circuit, always to refuse all instructions prayed for by either party, and then to give the law in his own words. That is also the practice of other courts, and we consider it to be in the discretion of the court to reject all prayers and state the law in its own language. That was the practice pursued in this case to some extent. Some of the prayers of the plaintiff were granted, but the substance of those that were refused was given in this charge. It is a very common thing to except to a part of the charge, but the court must look at the whole charge, and if they see that, in the very next paragraph, an apparent error in one part is corrected, then no injury on the whole is done to the plaintiff, or defendant, as the case may be. We consider it to be perfectly proper for the court to announce the law in its own language, and if it gives the law correctly, although it may have refused the instructions, asserting it in another shape than that asked by the counsel, there is nothing that can justify us in reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial, and that is precisely this case. On the whole, we think the court instructed the jury very liberally, if not too liberally, in favor of the plaintiff, and we see no ground, therefore, for reversing the judgment below, which was for the defendant. PHILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON & BALTIMORE R. R. Co. v. HOEFLICH. (Advance Case, Maryland, 1884.) A young woman was seated in a train, in the same seat with her sister, a girl of eleven years. The father of both of these parties was on the train, but seated elsewhere. Upon the conductor asking the young woman for tickets, she produced two, one for herself and one for her father. She had, however, no ticket for the little girl, and refused to pay any fare for her, though several times requested to do so. She admitted, in answer to the conductor's questions, that the little girl was with her. At the next station the conductor ejected both the young woman and the girl. It appeared in evidence that he knew there was a man accompanying them on the train, viz., the father, but did not know of his relationship to them. The father interfered to endeavor to prevent the expulsion, and himself got off the train with the expelled parties. In an action against the company by the young woman for expelling her, Held, that if the jury was of opinion that the conductor could reasonably infer from the circumstances that the plaintiff's younger sister was under her charge, and that therefore she was responsible for the younger sister's presence in the car and for her fare, the conductor was justified in expelling her as well as her younger sister. Held, however, that as the father of the child was the party really responsible for the child's presence and fare, it was for the jury to say whether it was not the conductor's duty, under the circumstances, knowing there was a man in the party, to ascertain the relationship of that man to the child, and in case the jury found that such was his duty and that he failed to perform it, he was not justified in expelling the plaintiff, and the company was liable accordingly. The fact that the expulsion in the above case was forcible and deliberate, did not entitle the plaintiff to recover damages unless the conductor acted with malice, oppression or evil intent. The opinion states the facts. J. J. Donaldson, for plaintiff in error. W. A. Hammond and Charles Brandaw, for defendant in error. The female plaintiff, with her father and younger sister, eleven years of age, got upon the defendant's train at Baltimore for the purpose of going to Magnolia station. When the conductor came around she handed him two tickets, one for herself and the other for her father, who was in another part of the car. The younger sister was sitting beside her, and the conductor asked, "Is this girl with you?" She answered, "Yes." Thereupon he said he must collect half fare for the girl, which the plaintiff refused to pay. In a few minutes the conductor returned and again demanded payment of the child's fare, and which was again refused by the |