delay exposed them to seizure. For this the defendant is not liablė. The injury complained of must be shown to be the direct consequence of the defendant's negligence. It is not enough that the negligence of the defendant contributed as a remote cause to the loss which happened. The failure to ship promptly and the detention at Cerillos, at most, was the remote cause of the loss. Hoadley v. Transportation Co., 115 Mass. 304; Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176. Nor is it considered that the delay occurring after the 16th of March, the action of the deputy sheriff lacking as it did some of the technical essentials of a valid levy, and although it might have been reasonably anticipated that it might be followed by a more formal proceeding, was changed into the class of proximate as distinguished from remote causes. Besides, it is not altogether certain, under the circumstances, whether the obligation even of the common carrier imposed the duty of secretly or openly removing these goods beyond the reach of the sheriff of Santa Fe county, for the mere purpose of avoiding service of writ of attachment. A decent respect for the law, and the process by which it is enforced, whatever may be the character or station to whom it may be applied, is always commendable, and to pursue a course of sharp practice with it under any circumstances cannot be too severely reprehended. It is contended that there was no valid seizure of the goods. In addition to what transpired on the 16th of March, the evidence shows that the deputy sheriff kept a sort of surveillance over these goods until the morning of the 19th day of April, when he again went to the defendant's agent at Cerillos, as deputy sheriff, and demanded possession of the goods, to which demand the agent opposed a refusal, saying that he wanted to see the sheriff and get his receipt. A few days prior to this, Laughlin had been appointed receiver of Richards & Co. On that same day, and a few hours after, the sheriff, in person, together with Laughlin, went to the agent and demanded possession of the goods, paid the freight, and, turning to Laughlin, told him to go and get the goods. The agent went with the deputy, opened the car, and said to him, "Here are the goods." Laughlin obtained permission to leave the goods in the car, went away, and, for want of a team that day, came back the next and took away the goods. There is no color for saying these acts did not constitute a valid seizure under the writs of attachment. The most scrupulous precaution had been taken by the agent to deliver these goods to Laughlin in his character of deputy sheriff. That the sheriff should permit him (Laughlin) to take the goods as receiver, cannot alter the situation of the defendant so as to make it liable for a wrongful delivery in obedience to legal process. A more difficult question to be decided is as to the notice which plaintiffs had or ought to have had of the seizure of these goods under the attachment. In Stiles v. Davis, 1 Black, 107, a leading case in this branch of the law, nothing is said about the necessity of giving the owner notice of the seizure. The court decides that seizure under legal process of goods or the property of a third person constitutes a good defence to an action by the true owner, and says that the remedy pursued in that case, an action of trover, was a mistaken one; that the officer or the plaintiffs in the attachment suits directing the levy were the proper parties to have been sued. The language of the court is so broad and sweeping in its declaration of legal principles applicable to this class of cases, that there seems to have been left no room for introducing a lack of notice to the owner of the seizure, as a fact that would modify the principle therein announced; and were it not that courts of the highest respectability have confined the rulings in that case as applying only to actions of trover, and not when the suit is brought on the contract of carriage, we should be inclined to hold, upon that decision, that seizure under legal process constituted a valid defence, with or without notice thereof to the owner. But it must be admitted there are strong reasons for requiring prompt notice to be given of the seizure of his goods to the owner, especially in a proceeding to which he is not a party, and of which he could have no notice; reasons so cogent, that sound law seems imperatively to require that the owner should have such notice, or that he should be in possession of such knowledge of the danger menacing his property, and under such circumstances as that a mere technical performance of the requirements of the law by the common carrier would not place him in any better situation in relation to his property than the knowledge already possessed by him enabled him to occupy. If property has been seized under legal process, and the owner has timely knowledge thereof, and was as much in a position, by the exercise of ordinary and proper diligence, to protect it as if formal notice had been given, the common carrier may well presume that such diligence will be employed, and thus be excused from the refined and technical observance of the rule as to the notice and kind of notice which, by some decisions, seem to be required. In such case, the negligence and laches of the owner, if it do not occasion the loss, so contributes towards it that he should bear the burden of it, and not be heard to attribute it to the fault of another. The rule laid down in Robinson v. Railroad Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 57, is a very stringent one, but, as applied to the facts of that case, none too much so; nor is there anything said by the court in that case which conflicts with the views herein expressed. Knowledge, under certain circumstances, is recognized as fully taking the place of formal notice. In this case, the first steps towards an attachment had been taken on the 16th day of March. That the agent regarded these goods as attached is quite manifest, and so held the goods subject thereto. On the 4th of April, in answer to an inquiry from Pea body, defendant's agent at Atchison, he informed him by letter that the goods were attached by the sheriff. This letter, in the usual course of railroad communication, was transmitted to the various offices along the lines over which the goods had been shipped until it reached Chicago, when it was sent, as it seems from the indorsement thereon by Ripley, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy agent, to the plaintiffs, who received it not later than the 11th day of April. In contemplation of law, notice is nothing more than the knowledge of a fact, state of facts, or condition of things communicated by one whose duty it is so to do to another, who has the right to receive it, or some interest in receiving it. In this case, the fact which plaintiffs were interested to know was that writs of attachment were in the hands of the sheriff, and their property was menaced or affected in a hostile manner thereby. The question is, were they not, by this letter, coming from defendant's agent, written in the regular line of his duty, transmitted through the proper channels, and which reached them eight or nine days before the final act, dispossessing the defendant of the goods, duly and timely admonished of their jeopardy? Certainly, they were thereby placed in a much better position for the purpose of exercising the proper and necessary care to protect and rescue their property than if, upon the seizure of the same on the 19th of April, the most prompt and formal notice had been given. If these facts do not satisfy the technical requirements of the law of notice as applicable to common carriers in cases of this kind, they do make out such a full and timely knowledge on the part of the plaintiffs of the situation of their goods with reference to the attachment proceedings, and under such circumstances as call for prompt and immediate action in their own behalf, a failure to give which can be designated as negligence and laches on their part, and, if loss resulted, to them must attach the blame and consequences. No error appearing in the record, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. Wilson, J., concurs. Seizure of Goods under Legal Process Valid Excuse for Non-Delivery. --When goods in the possession of a railroad company are seized by the sheriff in pursuance of due legal process, this will constitute a sufficient excuse for non-delivery. Bliven v. Railroad, 36 N. Y. 403; Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186; Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Wilcox, 48 Ga. 432; Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Yohe, 51 Ind. 181; The Idaho," 93 U. S. 575; Van Winkle v. Steamship Co., 37 Barb. 122; Stiles v. Davis, 1 Black, 101; Furman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 230. 66 When Seizure is Under Illegal Process, it Constitutes no Excuse for Non-Delivery.-When the process is on any account invalid, the seizure constitutes no excuse for non-delivery. Edwards v. White Line Transit Co., 104 Mass. 159; Kiff v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co., 117 Mass. 591; Faust v. South Carolina R. Co., 8 S. C. 118. General References.-For a full collection of authorities relative to the right of stoppage in transitu, and for authorities holding that such right is not interfered with by the attachment of the goods as the property of the consignee, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Painter & Sons, and note, infra. INDEX. THE mode of citing the American and English Railroad Cases is as follows: ACTIONS. Passenger injured tnrough fault of company may sue in tort and may re- ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS. SEE DEATH. AGENCY AND AGENTS. When company sells ticket to point beyond its own line, the coupons AMENDMENT. Date of summons is not conclusive as to when suit has been brought, as In action against railroad company for non-delivery of cotton shipped in APPEALS. Question whether damages are excessive or not is in Illinois question for Court will not reverse for error in giving or refusing instructions when it Writ of error will not lie to Supreme Court of U. S. from decision of When record shows that pleading was found to be untrue, appellate court Unless there is motion for judgment on jury's answers to interrogatories, 18 A. & E. R. Cas.-49. APPEALS—Continued. The particular error upon which granting of new trial in appellate court Transcript of record must show matters at issue. These cannot be sup- BAGGAGE. Check was issued jointly to two passengers for chest which was lost. When party sues for money shipped in baggage, and also for baggage lost Party may place money in trunk shipped as baggage without communi- Possession of baggage check is evidence against company of receipt of BELLS. See SIGNALS. BILLS OF LADING. Contract by which carrier undertakes to relieve itself from liability for Railroad company contracting with circus proprietor to transport special When complaint against common carrier for failure to deliver goods Carrier may, by contract, limit his liability, except for the negligence of When shipper of live-stock assumed, by special contract, all risk of delay When, by terms of bill of lading, undertaking of company is only to |