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tice or comity of nations. () The opinion in the case of Holmes v. Remsen was also questioned by one of the judges of the

Supreme Court of New York, in a suit at law between the *408 same parties. (a) And still more recently, in the Supreme Court of the United States, (b) the English doctrine (for it is there admitted to be the established English doctrine) was peremptorily disclaimed, in the opinion delivered on behalf of the majority of the court. (c) 1

(j) See, also, to the same point, Borden v. Sumner, 4 Pick. 265; Blake v. Williams, 6 Ibid. 286; Fall River Iron Works v. Croade, 15 Ibid. 11; Fox v. Adams, 5 Green. 245; Olivier v. Townes, 14 Martin (Louis.) 93; Norris v. Mumford, 4 Ibid. 20; The Brig Watchman, in the District Court of Maine, Ware, 232; Saunders v. Williams, 5 N. Hamp. 213; Mitchel v. M'Millan, 3 Martin (Louis.) 676, to the same point. But in Goodwin v. Jones, 3 Mass. 517, C. J. Parsons held to the English doctrine; and in Bohlen v. Cleaveland, 5 Mason, 174, an assignment was held to prevail over a trustee or attachment process, as against creditors living in the same state with the debtor. It is likewise held, in Rogers v. Allen, 3 Ohio, 488, that an assignment by an insolvent debtor in one state will not affect the title to lands in another state in derogation of the lex rei sita. In South Carolina, a bonâ fide foreign assignment in trust for creditors, takes precedence of a subsequent attachment levied within the state, but not if executed under the operation of a statute of bankruptcy. Green v. Mowry, 2 Bailey, 163.2 (a) Platt J., in 20 Johns. 254.

(b) Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 213. In Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289, the Supreme Court of the United States had long previously held that the bankrupt law of a foreign country could not operate a legal transfer of property in this country. The doctrine rests on the same footing between one state and another. An assignment in invitum under the law of one state or nation, has no operation in another, even with respect to its own citizens. Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wendell, 538. Johnson v. Hunt, 23 Ibid. 90, 91.

(c) It was the received doctrine in England, according to the opinion of counsel, as early as 1715, that the English creditors of an insolvent debtor residing in Holland,

2 See Larrabee v. Talbott, 5 Gill, 426; M'Carty v. Gibson, 5 Gratt. 307; Moore v. Willett, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 663; Willits v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577; Forbes v. Scannell, 13 Cal. 242; Dalton v. Currier, 40 N. Hamp. 237. An assignment to a receiver under the compulsory order of a court of equity acting in personam, is to be treated in other states as having the full effect of a voluntary act of transfer. Graydon v. Church, 7 Mich. 36.

In Louisiana, a voluntary assignment giving preferences executed in New York, where such an instrument was lawful, was held to have taken effect on a vessel then at sea, and an attachment levied on the vessel on its arrival in port in Louisiana, was held inoperative to defeat the assignee's title. Southern Bank v. Wood, 14 La. Ann. 554.

In Vermont, the operation of an attachment is prevented by a voluntary foreign assignment, where an actual change of possession has taken place. Hanford v. Paine, 32 Vermont, 442. But where the change had not taken place the attachment was held to be effective. Rice v. Courtis, Ibid. 460.

1 As the effect of foreign bankrupt laws is admitted only from a principle of comity, they can be allowed no operation with us, where they were intended to be local, or where they secure privileges to local over foreign creditors. Very v. McHenry, 29 Maine, 206.

IV. By intestacy.

The last instance which was mentioned of acquiring title to goods and chattels by act of law, was the case of intestacy.2 This is when a person dies,3 leaving personal property undisposed of by will; and, in such case, the personal estate, after the debts are paid, is distributed to the widow, and among the next of kin.

To avoid repetition and confusion, I shall be obliged to * 409 confine myself essentially to the discussion of the * leading principles of the English law, and assume them to be the law of the several states, in all those cases in which some material departure from them in essential points cannot be clearly ascertained.

This title will be best explained by examining-1. To whom the administration of such property belongs, and to whom granted; 2. The power and duty of the administration; and, 3. The persons who succeed to the personal estate by right of succession.

could attach and recover by execution levied on his effects in England, without being responsible to the curator in Holland, who had entered upon his trust prior to the attachment in England. See opinions of R. Raymond, J. Jekyll, and others, in the Appendix, 254-256, of Mr. Henry's Treatise on Foreign Law. In Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286, Lord v. The Brig Watchman, in the District Court of Maine, Ware, 232, Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wendell, 538, and Johnson v. Hunt, 23 Idem. 87, the question was again discussed, and the decisions made in entire conformity with the general doctrine now prevalent in the United States. The authorities for the contrary and more liberal doctrine in the English, Scottish, and Irish courts, are collected in Bell's Commentaries, vol. ii. pp. 681-687, as well as in the case of Holmes v. Remsen, supra, 405. Mr. Bell says, that the rule giving effect to conveyances, made for the purpose of collecting and distributing among creditors the funds and estate of the debtor, according to the law of his residence and seat of trade, does not rest in any legislative enactment, but upon those principles of international law which guide the connection between states, and prescribe the authority which is to be allowed by each to the institution and laws of another. The whole doctrine of the international effect of bankruptcy is a consequence of the general principle of universal jurisprudence, that personal property, wherever situated, is regulated by the law of the bankrupt's domicil; while, on the other hand, real property is governed by the law of the territory in which it is situated. The law on this vexed subject of the effect to be given to foreign assignments is examined, and all the authorities and arguments pro and con collected and reviewed in Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, pp. 336-357.

Intestacy is to be determined by the law of the domicil of the decedent. Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Story C. C. 755. Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394.

A person sentenced to imprisonment for life is declared civilly dead in New York. 2 R. S. (3d edit.) sec. 23. In Ohio, it has been held that letters of administration cannot be granted on the estate of such a person. Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio, 260.

(1.) Of granting administration.

When a person died intestate, in the early periods of the English history, his goods went to the king as the general trustee or guardian of the state. This right was afterwards transferred by the crown to the popish clergy; and, we are told, it was so flagrantly abused that Parliament was obliged to interfere and take the power of administration entirely from the church, and confer it upon those who were more disposed to a faithful execution of the trust. This produced the statutes of 31 Edw. III. ch. 11, and 21 Hen. VIII. ch. 5, from which we have copied the law of granting administrations in this country. (a) The power of granting administration, and of superintending the conduct of the administration, was still left in the hands of the bishop or ordinary in each diocese. In our American law we have assigned this, as well as other secular matters, to the courts and magistrates of civil jurisdiction. (b) Before the Revolution, the power of grant

In Canada, an English commission of bankruptcy operates as a voluntary assign ment by the bankrupt, but rights and privileges acquired by the provincial creditors are not affected by the commission or assignment. Bruce v. Anderson, Stuart's Lower Canada, 127.

(a) Hensloe's case, 9 Co. 38 b. 2 Blacks. Com. 494-496.

(b) In some of the states the jurisdiction concerning the probate of wills and the administration of testators' and intestates' estates is vested in the county courts. In others, it is confided to courts of special jurisdiction, under the various names of the court of probate, the register's court, the orphan's court, the court of the ordinary, and the surrogate's court. The county courts of Alabama, when sitting as courts of probate, are denominated Orphan's Courts, and they have a very extensive jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons. In Indiana, by Act of February 17th, 1838, the court of probates in each county consists of one judge, elected by the people septennially, and the court has exclusive jurisdiction in matters of probate of wills, and administration, and guardianship, and the settlement of decedents' estates, and concurrent jurisdiction in all suits at law and in equity in favor of and against heirs, executors, administrators, and guardians, where the amount in controversy exceeds $50, and in partition and dower, and it may authorize guardians to sell real estate to pay debts, and support infants, lunatics, &c. It may command jury trials in proper cases. The probate jurisdiction is plenary and highly important, and the statute conferring the powers is very comprehensive and seems to be well digested. Revised Statutes of Indiana, 1838, pp. 172, 459. A court of probates in Mississippi is established in each county, and has the like enlarged and discretionary jurisdiction in all matters of wills and of administration, and of sales and distribution of the estates of decedents; and, as far as the jurisdiction extends, it is exclusive, and has powers as ample as a court of chancery. 2 Smedes & Marsh 326, 330, 333. Farve v. Graves, 4 Ibid. 707. The Act in Missouri, concerning executors and administrators, is comprehensive and their powers and duties are well defined. The jurisdiction resides in the county courts. Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1835, p. 40. So in Kentucky and North Carolina, the county courts have exclusive

ing letters testamentary and letters of administration resided in New York, in the colonial governor, as judge of the prerogative court, or court of probates of the colony. It was afterwards vested in the court of probates, consisting of a single judge, and so continued until 1787, when surrogates were authorized to grant letters testamentary and letters of administration of the estates

of persons dying within their respective counties. If the *410 person died out of the state, or within the state, not being an inhabitant thereof, the granting of administration was still reserved to the court of probates. (a) This practice continued until the Act of March 21, 1823, (b) when the court of probates was abolished, and all the original powers of that court were transferred to the surrogates; and each surrogate has now jurisdiction, exclusive of every other surrogate, within his county, when the testator or intestate was at his death an inhabitant of the county, in whatever place he may have died; or not being an inhabitant of the state, died in the county, leaving assets therein; or not being an inhabitant of the state, died abroad, leaving assets in the county of the surrogate; or not being an inhabitant of the state, and dying out of it, assets of such testator or intestate should thereafter come into the county; or when no jurisdiction is gained in either of the above cases, real estate, devised by the testator, is situated in the county. (c) The first judge of the

jurisdiction to establish wills of real and personal estates. Hunt v. Hamilton, 9 Dana, 91. 1 N. C. Revised Statutes, 1837, pp. 620, 621. The Revised Statutes of each state, and especially where the revisions have been recent, contain a special detail of the jurisdiction and power of probate courts. We can only allude occasionally and by way of illustration, to the local statutes. The law of Maryland on Statutory Testamentary Law is collected by Judge Dorsey, and the volume is enriched by a reference to the decisions of the courts on the subject. In New Jersey, the governor, by the constitution, until 1844, was ex officio the ordinary as well as the chancellor of the state, and he consequently had jurisdiction to take proof of wills and to grant letters testamentary, and letters of administration. But by the constitution of 1844, the chancellor is declared to be the ordinary or surrogate-general and judge of the prerogative court.

(a) L. N. Y. sess. 1, ch. 12, and sess. 10, ch. 38. Goodrich v. Pendleton, 4 Johns. Ch. 552.

(b) Sess. 46, ch. 70.

(c) N. Y. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. p. 73, sec. 23. N. Y. Act, 60th sess. ch. 460, sec. 1. In England, generally speaking, all ecclesiastical testamentary jurisdictions are limited in their authority to property locally situated within their district. Crosley v. Archdeacon of Sudbury, 3 Hagg. E. R. 199. In Tennessee, letters of administration granted not in the county of the decedent's residence and domicil are void. Wilson v Frazier, 2 Humph. 30.

county acts in cases in which the surrogate is disqualified to act;1 and the county treasurer in each county acts as a public administrator in special cases. There is likewise a public administrator in the city of New York, with enlarged jurisdiction in special cases of intestates' estates. He is authorized to act as public administrator in cases where there are effects in the city, of persons dying intestate, and leaving no widow or next of kin competent and willing to administer. (d) 2

*

Administration is directed, by the New York Revised Statutes, to be granted to the husband on the wife's personal estate, and in other cases to the widow and next of kin, or to some one of them, if they, or any of them, will accept, in the following order: first, to the widow; second, to the children; third, to the father; fourth, to the brothers; fifth, to the sisters; sixth, to the grandchildren; seventh, to any other of the next of kin who would be entitled to a share in the distribution of the estate. (a) *411 Under the English law, (and the law of New York, and it is presumed the law of the other states is the same,) (b) the surrogate has the discretion to elect among the next of kin, any one in equal degree, in exclusion of the rest, and to grant to such person sole administration.1 So, under the English law, he may grant administration to the widow or next of kin, or to both jointly, at his discretion. (c) To guard against imposition

(d) N. Y. R. S. vol. ii. p. 79. Ibid. vol. ii. p. 117–133. By the Act of April 20th, 1830, in amendment of the Revised Statutes, further provision is made for the case in which the first judge of the county cannot act as surrogate. The trust devolves on the district attorney of the county, and eventually on the chancellor. In New Jersey, if the intestate leaves no relations to administer, the ordinary grants administration on due security to any proper applicant. R. S. N. J. 1847, p. 345.

(a) N. Y. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. p. 74, secs. 27, 29. The rule in England is to grant administration to the husband on the wife's estate, and in other cases to the widow or next of kin, or both, at discretion. The nearest of kin to the intestate has preference; and of persons in equal degree, the ordinary may take which he pleases. The nearness of kin is computed according to the civil law. 2 Blacks. Com. 504.

(b) N. Y. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. p. 74, sec. 28.

(c) Fawtry v. Fawtry, 1 Salk. 36. Anon. Str. 552. Case of Williams, 3 Hagg. E.

1 By the constitution of 1846, the county judge performs the duties of surrogate where the population of the county does not exceed 40,000.

The city is directly liable for a devastavit by the public administrator, and for the costs in a suit wantonly brought by him. Matthews v. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Sandf. (Law) 132.

1 See Sheldon v. Wright, 1 Seld. 497.

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