and is therefore not broad enough to cover the present contention of appellants. If treated as sufficient, the objection is not tenable, as we read the statute. Section 38 requires the superintendent to make the assessment, and section 39 points out how the assessment shall be made. Section 41 relates to the making up and return of the assessment roll and the giving of certain notices to the property holders. There is no provision in the statute requiring any affidavit that sections 38 and 39 have been complied with. Section 41 contains this provision: "An affidavit shall be filed before the final hearing showing a compliance with the requirements of this section, and also showing that the affiant (either the officer making the said return, or some one acting under his direction) made a careful examination of the collector's books showing the payments of general taxes during the last preceding year in which the taxes were paid thereon, to ascertain the person or persons who last paid the taxes on said respective parcels, and a diligent search for their residences, and that the report correctly states the same as ascertained by the affiant; and said report and affidavit shall be conclusive evidence, for the purpose of said proceeding, of the correctness of the assessment roll in said particulars." Laws 1901, p. 107 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 24, § 547). Appellants insist that this court should so construe the above language as to require the affidavit to cover the duties provided for in sections 38 and 39, and that unless the act be so construed the same is incongruous and incomplete, as it does not cover all the duties to be performed by the officer spreading the assessment. The proceeding is a statutory one, and the point is one of practice, and, where the statute points out a particular practice and declares the effect of following it, we can see no reason for enlarging upon the statute. The first part of section 41, supra, after specifying what the assessment roll shall contain, proceeds: "And the officer making such roll shall certify under oath that he verily believes that the amounts assessed against the public and each parcel of property are just and equitable, and do not exceed the benefit which will in each case be derived from said improvement, and that no lot, block, tract, or parcel of land has been assessed more than its proportionate share of the cost of said improvement." As to the making of the assessment, it would seem that the Legislature had clearly pointed out all that was requisite for the affidavit to contain, and that the provision later contained in the same section and hereinabove first set out was not intended to apply to the making up of the assessment roll, but to the matters of notice and of ascertaining the names and residences of the persons who paid the general taxes for the preceding year. The superintendent of special assessments did make an affidavit in strict compliance with, and liter76 N.E.-25 ally following, the provision of section 41 last above quoted, and James M. Grimm made an affidavit that, at the request of the superintendent of special assessments, he had made a careful examination of the books of the collector showing the payment of general tax. es during the last preceding year in which the taxes were paid thereon to ascertain the per son who last paid the general taxes for the last preceding year in which the taxes were paid thereon, and also made a diligent search for the residence of such persons, and that said report correctly states the names of such person or persons and their residence, as so ascertained by affiant. And, in addition to these affidavits, John A. May, the superintendent of special assessments, and other affiants, made affidavits as to the mailing, posting, and publishing of notices. From a careful examination of the record we are satisfied that the proceeding was not subject to the objection so urged. Appellants offered to prove that in the first and original resolution for the improvement, passed prior to the passage of the first ordinance, there was no itemized estimate of the cost of the improvement incorporated therein. Objection was interposed, and the offered evidence was excluded. To justify the introduction of this evidence, the appellants relied upon City of Chicago v. Noonan, 210 Ill. 18, 71 N. E. 32, wherein it is said (page 21 of 210 Ill., and page 33 of 71 N. E.): "The additional assessment sought to be levied in this case is not a new assessment, but a supplemental one, as authorized by said section 59, and can in no sense be deemed a de novo proceeding." The point that was under consideration in that case and being discussed was whether the property owners were entitled to a public hearing before the board of local improvements upon the resolution for the additional or supplemental assessment and the report of the engineer concerning the same, and the effect of the holding was that, inasmuch as the work was all completed before the supplemental assessment was levied, such assessment could properly originate by petition to the court without a public hearing or other preliminary steps required in the original assessment. And although we there said, in effect, that the proceeding for the supplemental assessment was a continuation of the original proceeding, and not a de novo proceeding, the question here presented, whether defects or irregularities that might have availed the property owner in the original proceeding can be taken advantage of in a proceeding under the new ordinance for a supplemental assessment, was not raised or considered. We held in that case and others that the supplemental assessment ought not, and could not, properly be made until the completion of the work, when the deficit was definitely known, and, as the supplemental assessment can only be made upon the new and additional ordinance specially providing for it, it would seem reasonably to follow that upon mere matters of objection to the sufficiency of the ordinance the property owners should be confined to the ordinance then being proceeded under, and not be permitted to attack the prior ordinance, which had been not only adjudicated upon but fully acted under. To hold otherwise would be to jeopardize the interests of the public and make uncertain the rights of contractors, who, on the faith of the confirmation of the original assessment, had proceeded with the work. So far as the sufficiency of the original ordinance is concerned, we think the property holders should be concluded by the proceedings under it, and should not be permitted to attack it in a proceeding under the ordinance for the supplemental assessment. Appellants having objected that the original judgment was res judicata upon the question of benefits, the petitioner introduced two witnesses who testified that the property of the objectors would be benefited the full amount of the assessment, and two witnesses testified for the objectors that their property would not be benefited by the proposed improvement more than the original assessment; and it is urged on authority of Broughton v. Smart, 59 Ill. 440, that, as two witnesses testified one way and two the other, there was no preponderance of the evidence in favor of the petitioner, and that, as it was held in City of Chicago v. Noonan, supra, that the former judgment was prima facie evidence that the property was assessed as much as it would be benefited, the court erred in holding a preponderance in favor of the petitioner and rendering judgment of confirmation. We do not agree to the contention that because two witnesses testified one way upon the main fact and two witnesses another there was not, or could not be, a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence is weighed and not counted, and, where the court has before it witnesses testifying in a cause, there are many things that enter into consideration in determining the weight of the testimony and reaching the conclusion upon the question of a preponderance. A jury was waived and the cause heard by the court, and we are unable to say from the record before us that the court erred in its finding in that behalf. The ordinance for the supplemental assessment recites the passage of the original ordinance for the paving and grading of Seventy-Fourth street, from Yates avenue to Bond avenue, and the original estimate of the cost of $12,500, and the confirmation and collection of the original assessment of $12,160.70, and the letting of the contract and the completion of the work at a cost of $15,600, and finds a deficiency of $3,439.30, and ordains that a supplemental assessment be made to pay such deficiency. Section 4 of the ordinance provides "that the supplemental | special assessment herein provided for shall be payable and shall be collected in one installment, and shall bear interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, according to the law, until paid." It is urged by appellants that the provision in regard to interest renders the ordinance void. Appellee suggests that the ordinance is valid for the reason that it appears by the original ordinance that the assessment levied under it was made payable in installments, and that being so the law authorized the issuance of interest-bearing bonds to be liquidated by the installments, and that it was proper in this case to require that the assessment bear interest to meet the interest on the outstanding bonds. The only provision of the act in regard to local improvements applicable to the question before us is found in section 42 of the act. We had that section before us and considered it in connection with an assessment payable in one installment in the case of McChesney v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 592, 73 N. E. 368, and we there said (page 593, of 213 Ill., and page 369, of 73 N. E.): "That section applies only to assessments which are divided into installments, and an assessment payable in a single payment cannot be regarded as an installment of an assessment or within the language of the statute. There is no other provision that an assessment shall draw interest, and in the absence of statutory authority the city council had no right to require the payment of interest, which is never allowed unless given by statute." What was said in that case we deem applicable to the case at bar and decisive of the question of the power of the city council to provide that the assessment should bear interest. Counsel for appellee urge that in the McChesney Case the assessment or installment was a flat installment, in which the vouchers would bear no interest, and therefore the holding there is not applicable to the case at bar. The question is one of power, and the power must be found in the statute, if at all, and what we have said in the McChesney Case goes directly to the vital phase of it. It remains to determine whether the act must be held void because of the provision for interest on the assessment, or whether that provision may be disregarded and the remainder of the ordinance sustained. We have examined the ordinance for the assessment in question, and it nowhere contains any statement that there were outstanding interest-drawing bonds to be paid or that it would be necessary to levy an assessment that should draw interest. We think the levy for the deficit was explicit, and are not embar| rassed at all in determining what portion of the ordinance, if any, may be determined to be invalid or what portion might be held to be valid, as the two matters, under the provisions of the ordinance, are entirely severable. The usual test in determining whether a part of a statute or ordinance may be rejected and a part sustained, where they are severable, is to ascertain whether the legislative branch enacting the statute or ordinance would have enacted the main provision with out the subsidiary or void portion. So far as appears from the ordinance itself, there is no reason to believe that the city council would not have as readily passed the ordinance without the provision for interest as with it. If the claim for interest was valid at all, the city council could have provided in the ordinance for the levy of a sum sufficient to cover the principal of the bonds and the interest without providing that the assessment should bear interest. We are of opinion that the ordinance for the main deficit can be sustained, and that portion of it providing for the payment of interest on the assessment can be and ought to be rejected. The objection that the ordinance for this assessment should have provided that it should be paid in installments, as was the original assessment, has recently been before us in Goodrich v. City of Chicago, 75 N. E. 805, and Noyes v. City of Chicago, 75 N. E. 807, where in the former case it was fully considered and the contention of appellants denied. The judgment must be reversed, for the reason that the ordinance provides for interest on the assessment, and it will be remanded, with directions to the county court to affirm the assessment, with an order that the same shall not bear interest as provided in the ordinance. Reversed and remanded, with directions. Laws 1899, p. 276, § 9, provides that any person practicing medicine in the state without a certificate from the state board of health shall forfeit a certain sum, but that the section shall not apply to physicians holding unrevoked certificates from such board issued before the taking effect of the act. Held, that a person practicing medicine before the law took effect, and continuing to practice without obtaining a certificate under the act or without holding an unrevoked certificate issued before the taking effect of the act, is within its terms. Appeal from Appellate Court, Second District. Action by the people, for the use of the State Board of Health, against Peter R. Langdon. Judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Appellate Court, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed. Rehearing denied February 7, 1906. W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and J. Bert Miller, State's Atty., for the People. Truman W. Shields, for appellee. CARTWRIGHT, C. J. This is an action of debt, brought by the people of the state of Illinois, for the use of the State Board of Health, against Peter R. Langdon, to recover the penalty for practicing medicine without a license from the State Board of Health, imposed by section 9 of an act entitled "An act to regulate the practice of medicine in the state of Illinois, and to repeal an act therein named," in force July 1, 1899. Laws 1899, p. 276. The circuit court sustained the demurrer of defendant to the declaration, and, the plaintiff having elected to stand by the declaration, there was judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District the judgment was affirmed, and from the judgment of the Appellate Court this further appeal was prosecuted. The act regulating the practice of medicine provides for the organization of the State Board of Health, and the granting by said board of licenses to practice medicine in this state. There were two previous acts regulating the practice of medicine, the first in force July 1, 1877, and the second July 1, 1887, each of which provided for the granting of licenses or certificates from the State Board of Health, and prohibited the practice of medicine without such license or certificate, with an exception in the first act in favor of those who had been practicing 10 years before the passage of the act. Both of the previous acts made it a penal offense to practice medicine without a license or certificate. Section 9 of the present act, under which this suit was instituted, contains the following provisions: "Any person practicing medicine or surgery or treating human ailments in the state without a certificate issued by this board in compliance with the provisions of this act * shall, for each and every instance of such practice or violation, forfeit and pay to the people of the state of Illinois, for the use of the said board of health," certain penalties therein mentioned; and the section concludes with this proviso: "Provided, that this section shall not apply to physicians who hold unrevoked certificates from the State Board of Health issued prior to the time of the taking effect of this act." There were six counts of the declaration, in each of which it was charged that at the respective dates therein named, in the year 1903, the defendant unlawfully practiced medicine and surgery, and treated human ailments without a license or certificate from the State Board of Health, and three of the counts contained the additional averment that he was, on July 1, 1899, illegally engaged in the practice of medicine. None of the counts averred that he began the practice of medicine after July 1, 1899, and it is contended that without that averment the declaration stated no cause of action. The question raised is whether a person who has no license to practice medicine, who began such practice before July 1, 1899, when the present act took effect, and continued such practice thereafter without a license, is subject to the penalties named in section 9. It is clear that such a person comes within the express language of that section. He is a person who is practicing medicine without a certificate issued by the State Board of Health in compliance with the provisions of the act, and who does not hold an unrevoked certificate from the State Board of Health issued prior to the taking effect of the act. Having no license at all to practice medicine, he is within the terms of the statute and subject to its penalties. But counsel say that because section 2 (page 274) only provides for the granting of licenses to persons entering upon the practice of medicine after July 1, 1899, when the act took effect, the only persons subject to the penalties imposed by section 9 are those who began the practice after that date. We do not see how that position can be maintained. The provision of section 2 relied upon is as follows: "No person shall hereafter begin the practice of medicine or any of the branches thereof, or midwifery in this state without first applying for and obtaining a license from the State Board of Health to do so." Taking that section and the other provisions of the act together, they amount to this: Any person desiring to enter upon the practice of medicine after the act took effect could only do so after first applying for and obtaining a license from the State Board of Health in compliance with the provisions of the act, and any person practicing medicine without a certificate issued under said act, or an unrevoked certificate issued under previous acts, was subject to certain penalties specified in section 9. The act is penal in character, and is to be strictly construed, but not with such technicality as to defeat its purpose. When the true meaning and intent of the act are apparent, the act is to be given effect in accordance therewith. Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 303, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447; Hamer v. People, 205 Ill. 570, 68 N. E. 1061. The proviso excluding persons practicing medicine who hold unrevoked licenses issued by the State Board of Health prior to the taking effect of the present act cannot be ignored in interpreting the act, and the proviso would be useless and senseless, if the Legislature intended the act to apply only to persons who began the practice of medicine after the act took effect. To say that the Legislature intended to grant immunity from prosecution to persons who were unlawfully practicing medicine at the time the act took effect would be wholly unwarranted.. On the contrary, an unrevoked license or certificate issued under some previous act was required by the proviso. In the case of State Board of Health v. Ross, 191 Ill. 87, 60 N. E. 811, the question whether the State Board of Health could revoke certificates issued under a previous act was considered, and it was held that it could not. That decision was in accordance with the language of the act which provided for issuing licenses, and in one sentence provided that the board might refuse to issue a license for certain reasons, and might revoke such license for like causes. The provisions for granting, refusing to grant, or revoking a license under the present act relate only to persons entering upon the practice of medicine after the act took effect. But that is an entirely different proposition from the one involved in this case. It does not follow from that decision that one who has no license under the present act or any former act may practice medicine without being subject to the penalties prescribed by section 9. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer. The judgments of the Appellate Court and circuit court are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court, with directions to overrule the demurrer. Reversed and remanded. (219 I11. 200) PEOPLE ex rel. HANBERG, County Treasurer, v. COHEN et al. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 20, 1905.) 1. JUDGMENT-RES JUDICAta-JudgmenTS OF REVERSAL. A judgment of the Supreme Court, reversing generally a judgment of sale for the first installment of a special assessment, is not res judicata on an application for a judgment of sale for the second installment, as to which the record is different from the one on which the judgment was reversed. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Section 84 of the local improvement act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 24, § 590), providing that property owners shall be notified of the filing of the certificate of the board of local improvements showing the cost of the improvement, etc., and of the time and place of hearing the same by publication and posting of notices, and authorizing the filing of objections to the approval of the certificate within a specified time and a trial in which the court shall judicially hear and determine the issues and conclusively determine the case, affords due process of law to persons interested therein, although it gives no right of appeal. 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS PROVEMENTS LOCAL ASSESSMENTS FIRMATION-CONCLUSIVENESS. PUBLIC IM-CON Under section 84 of the local improvement act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 24, § 590), providing for the trial of objections to the ap proval of the certificate of the board of local improvements showing the cost of the improvement, etc., and providing that the order of the court shall be conclusive on all parties, an order of the county court approving a certificate, which recites the completion of the improvement in substantial compliance with the terms of the ordinance, is conclusive on that question in a subsequent proceeding to collect the assessment. Appeal from Cook County Court; Orrin N. Carter, Judge. Application by the people, on the relation of John J. Hanberg, county treasurer, for a judgment and order of sale of a delinquent installment of a special assessment; H. Cohen and others, objectors. From a judgment sustaining the objections, relator appeals. Reversed. Rehearing denied February 7, 1906. Robert Redfield and Frank Johnston, Jr. (James Hamilton Lewis, Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for appellant. George W. Wilbur, for appellees. BOGGS, J. This was an application of the county treasurer and ex officio county collector of Cook county for a judgment and order of sale for a delinquent second installment of a special assessment for curbing, grading, and paving with granite blocks South Canal street from West Harrison street to the north line of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad on Lumber street, warrant No. 31,183. The appellees objected to the application on the grounds, among others: (1) That the county court had no jurisdiction herein, for the reason that the subject-matter of the said application has been fully and finally determined by this court against the petitioner; and (2) that the improvement as constructed is other and different from the one described in the ordinance which is the basis of this application. Upon the hearing the court admitted in evidence, over the objection of the appellees, the certificate of the board of local improvements, showing a statement of the cost of the improvement and that the improvement had been completed in substantial compliance with the ordinance, and also an order entered in the county court, after giving the notice required by the statute, approving and confirming such certificate. The court permitted the appellees, over the objection of the appellant, to introduce evidence tending to show a variation between the improvement as completed and the provisions of the ordinance. Over the objection of the appellees the appellant introduced evidence for the purpose of showing a substantial compliance with the ordinance. After the hearing the court entered an order sustaining the objections interposed by the appellees, and this is an appeal from such order and judgment. The appellees urge in support of their first objection that the question whether the improvement as completed was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the ordinance was res judicata, having been finally determined by the decision of this court in Eustace v. People, 213 III. 424, 72 N. E. 1089, which involved the collection of the first installment of the assessment for the same improvement. In that case we held that, upon the record then before us, in making the improvement there had not been a substantial compliance with the terms of the ordinance, but the judgment in the case was reversed and the cause remanded generally. We do not agree with the contention of appellees that the decision in said case is res judicata. An order of this court reversing a judgment and remanding the cause generally has the effect only of a final judgment upon the facts then in the record, but the parties are not estopped thereby from introducing further evidence tending to prove or disprove the issues as joined after the reinstatement of the cause. In re Estate of Maher, 204 Ill. 25, 68 N. E. 159; Illinois State Trust Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co., 217 Ill. 504, 75 N. E. 562. The record now before us is not the same as was the record in the Eustace Case, supra. In the Eustace Case the record did not contain a certificate of the board of local improvements certifying that the improvement had been completed in substantial compliance with the requirements of the ordinance or the order of the county court approving and confirming the same after a hearing in that court, as does the record in the case at bar. See opinion on rehearing in Eustace Case. Under the view we take of this case it will not be necessary to consider the second ground of objection urged by appellees-that it appeared from the testimony introduced herein that the improvement was not constructed in substantial compliance with the provisions of the ordinance. This brings us to the consideraton of the contention of the appellant that the certificate of the board of local improvements showing the cost of the improvement and a recitation that the ordinance had been substantially complied with in making the improvement, and the order of the court approving and confirming the same, entered after notice and a hearing, are res judicata of the question of fact approved and confirmed by said order. The appellees intimate in their brief that section 84 of the local improvement act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 24, 590), authorizing the action of the board of local improvements and that of the county court in approving and confirming the same, is unconstitutional, in that, as they contend, it deprives the property owners of their property without due process of law. This section 84 provides that the property owners shall be notified of the filing of the certificate, and of the time and place of hearing the same, by publication and posting of notices; that objections may be filed to the approval of the certificate of the board of local improvements by such improvements by such property owners within a time spécified in the act; that a trial shall be had before the court, and that the court shall judicially hear and determine the issues in a summary manner; and that the order of the court shall be conclusive on all parties. An orderly proceeding, where a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights before a court having power to hear and judicially determine such case, is due process of law. 8 Cyc. 1082. The denial of the right of appeal or of the right to sue out a writ of error in a statutory proceeding cannot affect the validity of the statute. The right to prosecute an appeal from the judgment of a trial court is purely statutory (Lingle v. City of Chicago, 210 Ill. 600, 71 N. E. 590), and in statutory proceedings, such as the case at bar, a writ of error is not a writ of right, where the Legislature has seen fit to provide otherwise. Hart |