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the teacher possesses the necessary qualifica- | tions, the issuing of the certificate and the proper dating of the certificate are merely ministerial acts, which he can be required to perform by the writ of mandamus. The prayer of the petition in the case at bar is, not that the appellant as county superintendent of schools shall issue a certificate to the appellee certifying that he possesses the necessary qualifications to teach, but the prayer is merely that he correct the date of a certificate which he had already issued. This he can be compelled by the writ of mandamus to do, as he is thus required to perform merely a ministerial act.

It is not denied that appellant issued to the appellee a certificate, dated July 2, 1900, which was a first-grade certificate, and certified that appellee possessed the necessary statutory qualifications to teach. That certificate was valid for two years, under section 3 of article 7, as above quoted. The two years expired in July or September, 1902. It is not denied that in the summer or fall of 1902 the appellee applied to the appellant for a new certificate, and that such certificate was issued to him. Appellant, however, instead of dating the certificate in September of 1902, when it was issued, dated it back to July 2, 1901. The statute provides that the first-grade certificate shall be valid for two years. It entitles the teacher to teach in a common school for two years. The period of two years begins with the date of the certificate. This is apparent from the fact that the form of the certificate, given by the statute, provides that it shall be valid for the requisite period "from the date hereof." The date of the certificate, therefore, is a material item, as showing the beginning of the period for which the teacher is entitled to exercise his profession in the county. It makes no difference what the motive or object of the appellant was in dating the certificate back for one year. The statute does not authorize any such action on his part, but evidently contemplates that the certificate should be dated as of the date of its issuance. Here it was issued in September, 1902, but was dated back to the month of July, 1901. We are of the opinion that the court had the power by writ of mandamus to compel the appellant, as such superintendent, to correct the date of the certificate by changing it from 1901 to 1902. It made a difference of one year to the appellee, because, as the certificate was valid for only two years, if it was properly dated in 1901, appellee's right to teach under it would expire in 1903, whereas, if it was properly dated in 1902, his right to teach would not expire until September, 1904.

The certificate recites upon its face that it is of the first grade, and also recites that the appellee possesses the necessary qualifications to entitle him to a certificate of the first grade. The appellant is estopped from denying these recitals in the certificate issued

by him to appellee. In Union School District v. Sterricker, 86 Ill. 595, it was held that a school certificate of this kind "is in the nature of a commission, and cannot be attacked collaterally." In that case it was held that such a certificate cannot be invalidated by proof that no personal examination of the teacher was had, or that he did not possess the qualifications mentioned in the certificate. Appellant cannot now be allowed in this collateral attack to contradict and invalidate his own certificate by setting up, as appears to be done here, that the certificate was issued without due examination. It appears from the proof that in 1899 the appellee did submit to a written examination touching his qualifications, and it also appears that the appellant, after such written examination, did not thereafter require an additional examination. It cannot be said that the certificate, issued in September, 1902, and dated back as of July, 1901, was a mere renewal of a former certificate. The certificate could only be renewed in the manner pointed out in the statute. Section 3 of article 7, as above quoted, provides that "the county superintendent may, in his option, renew said certificates at their expiration by his indorsement thereon." The mode provided by the statute for the renewal of the certificate is by indorsement thereon, and in the case at bar there was no such indorsement renewing appellee's certificate; but a new certificate was issued to him, reciting that it was of the first grade, and that appellee possessed the necessary qualifications to teach.

We concur in what is said upon this subject by the Appellate Court in their opinion deciding this case, where the following views are expressed, to wit: "It is not controverted that appellee made application for the certificate on September 1, 1902; that the same was granted, and, as a matter of fact, issued upon that day, and that it was dated back to July 1, 1901. The action of appellant in thus antedating the certificate was without legal justification and unwarranted, no matter what his motive may have been. The certificate in question being the only evidence the appellee possessed or could obtain as to his right to teach, he was entitled to have it show such authority for the full term provided by the statute for a first-grade certificate. By the arbitrary, unauthorized, and illegal act of appellant, appellee was deprived of such evidence, and thereby rendered unable to exercise his profession in Sangamon county for a longer period than nine months from the day upon which he was declared to be qualified to teach. He thereby lost a valuable property right, to regain which the remedy by mandamus was properly invoked. The propositions of law submitted by appellant were in direct conflict with the law governing the questions involved, and hence were properly refused."

We are of the opinion that the judgments | proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the lower courts are correct, and, accordingly the judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming that of the circuit court, is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

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Where notice to the adverse parties of the redocketing of a cause after remand is necessary, the judgment should specifically show the giving of such notice.

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS - ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS – SIGNATURE OF JUDGMENTS.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, p. 1541, c. 120, § 191, requiring a judgment and order of sale in special assessment proceedings to be signed by the county judge, a judgment and order of sale, marked "O. K.," followed by the initials of the county judge is insufficient.

Error to Cook County Court; Orrin N. Carter, Judge.

Application by the people, on the relation of John J. Hanberg, county treasurer, for a judgment in special assessment proceedings against Henry H. Gage. There was a judgment in favor of relator, and Gage brings error. Reversed.

At the June term, 1903, of the county court of Cook county, the county collector applied for judgment against the property of plaintiff in error for the first and second installments of a special assessment levied for paving Turner avenue, in the city of Chicago. The court overruled the objections of plaintiff in error, and judgment and order of sale was entered, which was reversed by this court upon appeal. Gage v. People, 207 III. 61, 69 N. E. 635. Subsequently a transcript of the order reversing and remanding the cause was filed in the county court, and an order entered setting the case for hearing on Thursday, March 24, 1904, at 10 o'clock a. m. At the time set for the hearing an order was entered which recited as follows: "It appearing to the court that the mandate and transcript of the order of the Supreme Court of Illinois reversing the judgment of this court heretofore entered herein as to the property of the objector, represented by F. W. Becker, attorney, and remanding said cause as to the property of said objector, has been filed herein for more than ten days last past, and that due notice has been given that a motion would be made by said petitioner to redocket the cause, and for further

of the Supreme Court, therefore the said cause," etc. Following the judgment was an order of sale against the lots for the amounts as indicated in the schedule attached to the order. The plaintiff in error did not appear in the court below subsequent to the reversal of the cause, and from the order as entered he has prosecuted a writ of error, claiming that the cause was redocketed without statutory notice, that the redocketing order is defective, that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the order, and that there are defects in the form of the judgment and order of sale.

F. W. Becker, for plaintiff in error. Robert Redfield and Frank Johnston, Jr. (Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for defendant in error.

WILKIN, J. (after stating the facts). The body of the judgment and order of sale refers to a schedule attached thereto, which is supposed to indicate the amount due upon each lot. It is insisted that this schedule is fatally defective, for the reason that there is no word, mark, or character to show what the numerals appearing in the various columns stand for. In the cases of Gage v. People, 213 Ill. 347, 410, 72 N. E. 1062, 1084, we reversed the judgments of the county court for the reason that the dollar mark was omitted from in front of the numerals and there was nothing to show what the figures indicated. The judgment at bar is identical with those in the cases referred to. The dollar mark is entirely omitted, and the judgment will have to be reversed for this omission.

Complaint is also made that the recital in the judgment does not sufficiently show that proper notice was given before the case was redocketed. It is insisted that to sustain an order of redocketing the record ought affirmatively to show that due notice of the filing of the transcript of the remanding order was given to the adverse party or his attorney, and that notice should appear in the files, or the order redocketing the case should recite that due notice was given to the respective parties. The remanding order of this court directs the county court to enter judgment in conformity with section 191 of the revenue act. It is contended that, inasmuch as the court below could do no more than enter the judgment as directed, notice would serve no purpose and was unnecessary. The statute seems to contemplate notice of reinstatement or remandment in all cases. But it is said the recitals in the judgment show notice. The recital did not specifically state that notice had been given to the parties interested and was not sufficient.

It is also insisted that the judgment and order of sale does not comply with the requirements of the statute, for the reason that it is not signed by the county judge. The letters "O. K. O. N. O." appear at the end

of the order. The statute expressly provides that the judgment and order of sale shall be signed by the county judge. Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, p. 1541, c. 120, § 191. While we will take judicial notice of the name of the present occupant of the office of county judge of Cook county, yet the initials at the end of the order do not comply with the requirements of the statute.

For the errors indicated the judgment of the county court will be reversed, and the cause remanded, with leave to the attorneys for defendant in error to move the court for, and with directions to the county court too enter, a judgment in conformity with section 191 of the revenue act.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(219 Ill. 123)

MURDOCK et al. v. MURDOCK. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 20, 1905.) 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE-ANTENUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS-FAIRNESS-BURDEN OF PROOF.

Where the provision in an antenuptial contract for the intended wife is disproportionate to the means of the intended husband, a presumption is raised in her favor that the execution of the agreement was brought about by a designed concealment of the amount of his property by the intended husband, and the husband or persons claiming through him have the burden of showing in support of the agree ment that the intended wife, when she executed the same, had full knowledge of the nature, character, and value of the intended husband's property, or that the circumstances were such that she reasonably ought to have had such knowledge.

2. SAME.

An intended husband had, at the time of making an antenuptial agreement, $10,000 worth of personal property and a reserved life estate in certain lands conveyed to his children which amounted to $4,000 a year. By an antenuptial agreement with his intended wife she released all her interests in his estate in case she survived him, except that of homestead and widow's award, and, in addition to the homestead and widow's award, was to receive $1,500 in cash from his estate within 60 days from the date of his death. At the time of his death the husband had about $35,000, and the widow's award was valued at $1,350. Held, that the provision for the wife was disproportionate to the value of the husband's estate.

3. SAME-KNOWLEDGE OF HUSBAND'S MEANS

-EVIDENCE.

The fact that an intended husband and wife, between whom an antenuptial settlement was executed, had lived near to each other for many years and were well acquainted, and that the intended husband was reputed to be a man of wealth, does not show that the intended wife knew, when she executed the antenuptial settlement, the nature and value of the intended husband's property; nor was she charged with such knowledge by the fact that her son-in-law knew the financial standing of her intended husband, when he did not communicate his knowledge to her.

Error to Appellate Court, Third District. Bill by Sarah M. Murdock against Watson Murdock and others. There was a judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming a decree in favor of complainant, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

John H. Chadwick, Thomas W. Roberts, Eckhart & Moore, and P. M. Moore, for plaintiffs in error. I. A. Buckingham and Roy F. Hall, for defendant in error.

HAND, J. This was a bill in chancery filed in the circuit court of Douglas county on the 11th day of September, 1902, by Sarah M. Murdock against the heirs at law of John D. Murdock, deceased, to set aside an antenuptial contract bearing date July 25, 1892, entered into between the said Sarah M. Murdock and John D. Murdock; also certain deeds made by John D. Murdock to the plaintiffs in error, conveying to them, in fee simple, 875 acres of farm lands situated in said county (subject to a life estate reserved therein to said John D. Murdock), bearing date shortly prior to the marriage of the said Sarah M. Murdock and John D. Murdock, and for the assignment of dower in said lands. Answers and replications were filed, and the case was referred to the master in chancery of said county, to take the proofs and report his conclusion as to the law and the facts. The master took the evidence and filed a report recommending that the bill be dismissed for want of equity. The chancellor sustained exceptions to the master's report, in so far as it held the complainant was barred of her distributive share in the personal estate of the said John D. Murdock, deceased, but overruled the same as to his findings and recommendations with reference to the conveyances of the farm lands, and entered a decree sustaining the deeds from John D. Murdock to the plaintiffs in error, and held that the defendant in error was not entitled to dower in said farm lands, but decreed her to be entitled to her distributive share, as widow of said John D. Murdock, in his personal estate, the same as if the said antenuptial agreement had not been executed, from which decree, so far as it was adverse to their interests, the plaintiffs in error prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the Third District, where the decree of the circuit court was affirmed, and a writ of error has been sued out from this court to the Appellate Court to review the judgment of that court.

It appears from the evidence that on the 26th day of July, 1892, John D. Murdock and Sarah M. Bentley were married at Murdock, a small village in Douglas county, where they had both resided and been intimately acquainted with each other for many years. John D. Murdock at the time of the marriage was 76 years of age, and was a widower and had six children, two sons and four daughters, all adults, and who resided in their own homes, and Sarah M. Bentley was 50 years of age, was a widow and had two children, a son and a daughter, both of whom were adults. John D. Murdock died intestate in the said village on February 9, 1902. At the time of the marriage Mrs. Bentley had personal property, consisting of wearing

apparel and household goods, of the value of not to exceed $200, and was possessed of a dower and homestead estate in the house and lot where she lived, which had belonged to her first husband, and which house and lot were not worth to exceed $1,000, and she had no prospects of obtaining any other property, by inheritance or otherwise. At the time of the engagement between John D. Murdock and Mrs. Bentley, which preceded their marriage some two months, Murdock owned 875 acres of farm lands situated in Douglas county, worth at least $60 an acre, and which produced an annual rental of not less than $4,000. He also had personal property, consisting of cattle, horses, grain, farm implements, money, and notes and mortgages, of at least the value of $10,000. His sons and daughters were opposed to Murdock marrying Mrs. Bentley, and Mrs. Bentley advised Murdock to convey his farm lands to his children prior to the marriage, with a view, if possible, to reconcile said children to their marriage, and pursuant to such advice, a few days prior to the marriage, Murdock, by separate deeds, conveyed all of said farm lands to his sons and daughters in substantially equal portions, reserving a life estate to himself in said lands. About the time Murdock executed said deeds to his children he called upon his solicitor, Charles W. Woolverton, who resided in Tuscola, in said county, with a view to have him prepare an antenuptial contract between himself and Mrs. Bentley, and on the 25th of July Murdock and Mrs. Bentley went to Tuscola to execute the said agreement. There is no direct evidence in the record that the execution of an antenuptial agreement was considered or its terms agreed upon by and between Murdock and Mrs. Bentley until they met at the law office of Woolverton on July 25, 1892. Woolverton died in 1895, and, the mouths of Woolverton and Murdock being closed by death and Mrs. Murdock being an incompetent witness, the only evidence as to what took place at the time of the execution of said antenuptial agreement is found in the testimony of J. W. Hamilton, who at the time of the execution of said agreement was a clerk in the law office of Woolverton. He testified that on the 25th day of July, 1892, Murdock and Mrs. Bentley came to Woolverton's office substantially together; that the agreement had been prepared by Woolverton and written out by Hamilton upon the typewriter and was ready for the signatures of the parties; that at the request of Woolverton he read over to Murdock and Mrs. Bentley, in the presence of Woolverton, the agreement, paragraph by paragraph, and that the instrument in all its parts and its legal effect were fully explained to the contracting parties and discussed between themselves and with Woolverton, and after a discussion as to the terms and legal effect of the instrument it was executed by the contracting parties and they left the office. At

the time the agreement was signed, however, nothing was said in regard to the nature, character, or value of Murdock's property, and there is no evidence in this record that Mrs. Bentley had any knowledge of the nature, character, and value of Murdock's property at the time the agreement was executed, or at any time prior to her marriage to Murdock, or that Mrs. Bentley knew that Murdock, in the deeds conveying the real estate to his children, had reserved a life estate to himself, except such knowledge as she may be deemed in law to have had by reason of the fact that she had resided in the same village in which Murdock resided for a number of years prior to their marriage, was well acquainted with Murdock during that time, and that Murdock was reputed to be a wealthy man, and that her son-in-law, with whom she was on friendly terms and who also lived in the village, was well acquainted with Murdock and was familiar with his financial standing. The antenuptial agreement in question is long, and need not be set out in full in this opinion. It will, however, be found incorporated in full in the Appellate Court opinion filed in this case. It in brief provided that John D. Murdock released all his interests in Mrs. Bentley's estate in case he survived her, in consideration that she released all her interests in his estate in case she survived him, except that of homestead and widow's award, in which event, in addition to said homestead and widow's award, she was to receive $1,500 in cash from his estate within 60 days from the date of his death.

The defendant in error, in support of the decree and judgment of the lower courts, makes two contentions: First, that at the time Mrs. Bentley signed said antenuptial agreement she did not understand its legal effect, but supposed that by the terms thereof, upon the death of Murdock, in addition to her homestead and $1,500 in cash, she would receive one-third of his personal property remaining after the payment of his debts, as a widow's award; and, second, that the provision made for her in said agreement, in view of the amount of Murdock's property, was wholly inadequate for her support as his widow, and that, as she was not fully informed by him of the nature, character, and value of his property at the time she executed said agreement or prior to her marriage, it is not binding upon her, and is not a bar to her distributive share of the personal estate of said Murdock, and that, in view of such inadequacy, the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiffs in error to show that she executed said agreement with full knowledge of the character, nature, and value of the property which Murdock had at the time she executed the agreement, and that said plaintiffs in error failed to sustain such burden of proof.

As to the first contention, the proof shows the agreement was read to Mrs. Bentley and fully explained to her at the time she signe(l

it, and, as she is a woman of some education and of apparent intelligence, and there is no claim she was induced to execute the agreement by fraud or circumvention, we think if that contention was all there was in the case, she ought to be held to be bound by the terms of the agreement.

As to the second contention, as has before been said, there is no proof in this record that the defendant in error, at the time she signed the agreement or at any time prior to the marriage, was informed or had any knowledge whatever as to the nature, character, or value of Murdock's personal property or that he had retained a life estate in said farm lands, unless such knowledge is to be imputed to her as a matter of law from the facts that she lived in the same town with and was well acquainted with her intended husband, that he was reputed to be a wealthy man, and that her son-in-law, who lived in the same village and with whom she was on friendly terms, was familiar with his financial condition. The rule in this state is well settled that a man and woman who contemplate marriage may by an antenuptial contract, if there is a full knowledge on the part of the intended wife of all that materially affects the agreement, settle their property rights in each other's estates. Yet it is held, if it appear that the provision made for the intended wife is disproportionate to the means of the intended husband, a presumption is raised in her favor that the execution of the agreement was brought about by a designed concealment of the amount of his property by the intended husband, and that the husband, or persons claiming through him, in order to sustain the agreement, have cast upon them the burden of proof to show that the intended wife, at the time she executed the agreement, had full knowledge of the nature, character, and value of the intended husband's property, or that the circumstances were such that she reasonably ought to have had such knowledge. Achilles v. Achilles, 137 Ill. 589, 28 N. E. 45; Taylor v. Taylor, 144 Ill. 436, 33 N. E. 532; Achilles v. Achilles, 151 Ill. 136, 37 N. E. 693; Hessick v. Hessick, 169 Ill. 486, 48 N. E. 712; Hudnall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486, 56 N. E. 172; Yarde v. Yarde, 187 Ill. 636, 58 N. E. 600. In the Taylor Case, on page 445 of 144 Ill., page 533 of 33 N. E., the court said: "Parties to an antenuptial contract occupy a confidential relation toward each other. Kline's Estate, 64 Pa. 124; Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154, 27 Am. Rep. 22; Rockafellow v. Newcomb, 57 Ill. 186. While they may lawfully contract with each other where there is full knowledge of all that materially affects the contract, yet, where the provision secured for the intended wife is disproportionate to the means of the intended husband, it raises the presumption of designed concealment, and throws the burden upon those claiming in his right to prove that there was full knowledge on her part of all that materially affected the contract.

The burden here was therefore upon appellants to prove, by satisfactory evidence, that the appellee had knowledge of the character and extent of her intended husband's property and of the provisions and effect of this instrument, or, at all events, that the circumstances were such that she reasonably ought to have had such knowledge at the time this instrument was executed."

The foregoing language was quoted with approval in the Achilles and Hessick Cases, and was said to be a correct statement of the settled law of this State. This being the law, the question then arises, was the provision made for the defendant in error by the agreement disproportionate to the estate of the intended husband at the time the agreement was executed and the marriage consummated? The intended husband then owned and possessed, after the payment of all debts, at least $10,000 worth of personal property and retained the use of all of said farm lands during his life, which would produce an annual rental of at least $4,000. He lived about 10 years after his marriage, and died leaving an estate, consisting of personal property, valued at about $35,000. The provision made for the wife gave her a small house in which to live, a widow's award (which was fixed at $1,350), and provided she was to receive $1,500 in cash within 60 days of her husband's death. Had Murdock been possessed only of the $10,000 worth of personal property, it might have been argued with some force that the amount which the defendant in error, in case she survived him, was to receive under the agreement was a reasonable provision for her support in view of the amount of his property. Said personal property did not, however, constitute all his property at the time of said marriage, but, in additon thereto, he possessed said life estate in the said farm lands, which, as it turned out, by reason of the length of time which he lived subsequent to the marriage, was the most valuable asset which he then owned. The said life estate must, we think, therefore be taken into consideration by the court in determining the question whether the provision made by Murdock for his intended wife was disproportionate to the amount of his estate at the time she executed said agreement. From a careful consideration of all the evidence we are of the opinion the chancellor and the Appellate Court properly held the provison made for the defendant in error was disproportionate to the amount of her intended husband's property, and that, owing to the fiduciary relation which is presumed to exist between a woman and the man whom she is about to marry, the presumption obtains the defendant in error executed said agreement by reason of the fact that the nature, character, and value of the husband's property was designedly concealed from her, and properly held that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs in error to show that the intended wife had

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