knowledge of the nature, character, and value of Murdock's property at the time she executed said agreement.

This being true, and there being no direct proof in the record that defendant in error was advised or had knowledge of the nature, character, and value of her intended husband's property, the next question to be decided is, did the facts that the intended wife lived near the intended husband and had been well acquainted with him for years, and that he was reputed to be a man of wealth, supply such proof? We are of the opinion they did not. This case upon its facts is very similar to the Hessick Case. In that case, as here, the facts that the intended wife had resided near the intended husband for a number of years prior to the marriage, that they, during that time, had been well acquainted with each other, and that the husband was generally reputed to be a wealthy man, were relied upon to bring knowledge home to the intended wife of the nature, character, and value of his property. It was there held such facts were not sufficient to show the intended wife had such knowledge, and on page 492 of 169 Ill., page 714 of 48 N. E., it was said: "Were the circumstances surrounding the parties at the date of this marriage contract, as shown by the evidence, such as that appellee can reasonably be held to have had the requisite knowledge? We are inclined to adopt the conclusion of the court below in holding that they were not. But two facts were proved from which it can be inferred she had any information on the subject of his property, namely, that he was generally reputed to be wealthy, and that she had for years been well acquainted with and resided near him.

The circumstance of his reputed wealth is entitled to but little weight as tending to prove that she knew the nature or value of his property. The reputation of persons as being rich or wealthy is too indefinite and general to charge those who deal with them with knowledge of the kind and amount of property they are possessed of. If it be true, as a general proposition, that appellee, residing in the immediate neighborhood of Hessick, would be supposed to know the size, character, and value of the farm he resided upon, she cannot, from that circumstance alone, be fairly charged with knowledge of other land, money, and chattel property owned by him. Under the qualifications of the rule it is as important that she be held to knowledge of the character of his property as that she knew of its value, and even more so." We are also of the opinion the defendant in error was not bound by the knowledge possessed by her son-in-law with reference to the financial standing of Murdock, unless his knowledge was communicated to her. The evidence fails to show it was, and she was not bound thereby.

The plaintiffs in error rely upon the Yarde Case, supra. That case fully recognizes the

law to have been correctly announced in the Taylor, Achilles, and Hessick Cases, and the proof there showed that the provision made for the intended wife, when the claim of the intended husband's children was taken into consideration, was not disproportionate to the amount of the intended husband's property. It also showed that the intended wife not only fully understood the contract, but that the nature, character, and amount of the property of the intended husband was known to her at the time that she executed the agreement. That case is therefore so far different in its facts from the case at bar that it cannot be held, as is contended by the plaintiffs in error, conclusive of the questions involved in this case.

Finding no reversible error in this record, the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

DICTMENTS-SUFFICIENCY.

An indictment alleging that defendants conspired and agreed together to do an illegal act injurious to the administration of public justice, by soliciting and inducing certain persons to leave the state or secrete themselves so that they could not be produced as witnesses at the trial of a certain person then under indictment in the criminal court, is a sufficient charge of the offense defined by Cr. Code, § 272.

2. OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE-INDICTMENT.

Under Cr. Code, § 272, making it an offense for any person to hire, persuade, or induce a witness in a criminal case to leave the "state," so that he cannot be produced as a witness, an indictment alleging that witnesses were induced to absent themselves from the "jurisdiction" of the court was sufficient, as the word "jurisdiction" is synonymous with the word "state" as used in the statute.

3. SAME INDUCING WITNESSES TO ABSENT THEMSELVES.

Under Cr. Code, § 272, making it an offense to persuade or induce a witness in a criminal case to leave the state, so that he cannot be produced on the trial, it is not necessary, in order to constitute the offense, that the testimony of the witnesses who were induced to leave the state should be material.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 37, Cent. Dig. Obstructing Justice, § 13.] 4. CONSPIRACY-PROOF.

A conspiracy may be proved either by direct or by circumstantial evidence.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 10, Cent. Dig. Conspiracy, § 106.]

judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction. Affirmed.

S. H. Trude, for plaintiff in error Tedford. James T. Bradey, for plaintiff in error Cantwell. William H. Stead, Atty. Gen., John J. Healy, State's Atty., and Harry Olsen, for the People.

HAND, J. The grand jury of Cook county, at the April term, 1903, returned into the criminal court of said county an indictment charging Joshua Tedford, David Dudenhaver, Frank Cantwell, and William Davis with having conspired together to do an illegal act injurious to the administration of public justice, by persuading and inducing Frank Cantwell and Myrtle Lewis to secrete themselves and to depart the state so that they could not be produced as witnesses on behalf of the people upon the trial of William Hickey, who was under indictment in the criminal court of Cook county for the crime of burglary. The defendants filed a plea of not guilty (after a motion to quash the indictment had been overruled), and a trial was had, which resulted in the conviction of all the defendants. William Davis was granted a new trial, Cantwell was fined $100, and Tedford and Dudenhaver were sentenced to the penitentiary. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and Tedford and Cantwell have sued out a writ of error from this court, but Tedford alone has filed brief.

The first contention made is that the trial court erred in overruling the motion to quash the indictment. The indictment, omitting the formal part, is as follows: "That on the 24th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1902, the grand jury of said county duly returned, impaneled, and sworn as such grand jury at and for the July term of said criminal court of said Cook county, in the year of our Lord 1902, returned a certain indictment, in due form of law, against one William Hickey into said criminal court of Cook county, charging the said William Hickey therein with a certain criminal offence, to wit, burglary; that said indictment so returned against the said William Hickey by said grand jury, aforesaid, was pending in said criminal court of Cook county from said 24th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1902, up to, and including the 14th of October, in the year of our Lord 1902; that one David Dudenhaver, one Joshua Tedford, one Frank Cantwell, and one William Davis, late of the county of Cook, on said 14th day of October, in the year of our Lord 1902, in said county of Cook, in the state of Illinois aforesaid, not being ignorant of the pendency of said indictment, as aforesaid, but then and there well know. ing the said premises, as aforesaid, and then and there contriving and intending the due course of justice to obstruct and impede, did then and there, on the said 14th day of October, in said county of Cook, in the state of Illinois aforesaid, unlawfully, feloniously,

fraudulently, maliciously, wrongfully, and wickedly conspire and agree together with the fraudulent and malicious intent then and there wrongfully and wickedly to do a certain illegal act then and there injurious to the administration of public justice, to wit, to then and there solicit, entice, persuade, and induce the said Frank Cantwell and one Myrtle Lewis to absent, keep, and secrete themselves, the said Frank Cantwell and said Myrtle Lewis, out of and away from the jurisdiction of said criminal court of said Cook county, and to leave and depart from said jurisdiction of said criminal court of said Cook county and from said Cook county, and not to appear as witnesses upon the trial of said indictment so pending against the said William Hickey, as aforesaid, when the same should come on for trial in said criminal court of said Cook county; that the said Frank Cantwell and said Myrtle Lewis were then and there witnesses for and in behalf of the said people of the state of Illinois and against said William Hickey in said indictment aganst him so pending in said criminal court, as aforesaid, and that the said Frank Cantwell and said Myrtle Lewis were then and there within said county of Cook; that the testimony of said Frank Cantwell and said Myrtle Lewis was material then and there in said cause of action against said William Hickey upon the trial of said indictment so pending, as aforesaid, when the same should be tried in said criminal court, as the said David Dudenhaver, said Joshua Tedford, said Frank Cantwell, and said William Davis then well knew, contrary to the statute and against the peace and dignity of the same people of the state of Illinois."

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It is first urged the indictment is insufficient, as it is said it does not follow the language of section 46 of the Criminal Code, and that the facts averred are insufficient, in law, to show a crime has been committed. Section 46 of the Criminal Code provides: "If any two or more persons conspire or agree together to do any illegal act injurious to the administration of public justice, they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy." And section 272: "Whoever, by hiring, persuasion, or otherwise, induces any witness in any criminal to leave the state or secrete himself so that he cannot be produced as a witness at any trial of the person * charged, * * shall be fined," etc. And section 408: “Every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offence in the terms and language of the statutes creating the offence, or so plainly that the nature of the offence may be easily understood by the jury." While the offence is not charged in the exact language of the statute creating the offence, it is substantially so charged, and we think the charge that the defendants had conspired and agreed together to do an illegal act injurious to the adminis

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tration of public justice, by soliciting, persuading, enticing, and inducing Frank Cantwell and Myrtle Lewis to leave the state or secrete themselves so that they could not be produced as witnesses at the trial of William Hickey, who was then under indictment in the criminal court of Cook county upon a charge of burglary, is so plain that the nature of the offence with which the defendants were charged could easily be understood by the jury and by defendants, and that is all that the law requires. Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464.

It is next urged that the indictment does not charge that the witnesses were induced to leave the state, and for that reason it is insufficient. The indictment charges the witnesses were induced to absent, keep, and secrete themselves out of and away from the Jurisdiction of the criminal court, and to leave and depart from said jurisdiction and not to appear as witnesses. This was sufficient. The word "jurisdiction," as here used, is synonymous with the word "state," as used in section 272 of the Criminal Code.

It is further urged that there is no averment in the indictment that the witnesses Cantwell and Lewis had any knowledge which, had they been called as witnesses, would have shown the guilt of Hickey, or that said witnesses were known to the state, or that said witnesses were before the grand jury, or that their names were indorsed upon the indictment. The indictment avers that an indictment was pending in the criminal court against Hickey for burglary; that Cantwell and Lewis were witnesses on behalf of the people; that the defendants knew those facts, and that they conspired together to induce Cantwell and Lewis to secrete themselves and to depart from the jurisdiction of the court so that they could not be produced as witnesses against said Hickey upon the trial of said charge. If defendants knew that Cantwell and Lewis were witnesses against Hickey and they conspired together to persuade and induce them to secrete themselves or to depart the state so that they could not be produced as witnesses on the trial of Hickey, they clearly violated the statute, and they cannot excuse themselves upon the ground that the evidence of the witnesses was not important or would not have tended to show Hickey guilty. The materiality of the evidence of the witnesses was not a question for defendants to determine, and that averment in the indictment was properly disregarded as surplusage. The obstructing of the due course of the administration of public justice means not only the prevention of the conviction or acquittal of an accused, but also means the interference with the due course of proceedings in the administration of public justice. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 14 Gray, 87, 74 Am. Dec. 665; State v. Holt, 84 Me. 510, 24 Atl. 951; State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 66, 30 Am. Dec. 450. While the indictment charges the defendant

Frank Cantwell with having conspired with the other defendants to induce himself to secrete himself or to depart from the state, it also charges that he conspired with the other defendants to induce Myrtle Lewis to secrete herself, and to depart from the jurisdiction of the court. We are of the opinion the indictment was sufficient, and that the court properly overruled the motion to quash.

The next contention is that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict. On the evening of the 4th of July, 1902, Thomas Jones made complaint to the police that the flat in which he lived, in the city of Chicago, had been forcibly entered, and a trunk kept therein broken open, and $1,200 in cash taken therefrom. On the 24th day of the same month an indictment was returned by the grand jury charging William Hickey with burglarizing the said flat. Hickey was in Chicago on the evening of the 4th of July and had been there for some weeks; but during that night or the succeeding day he left the city, and returned to New York, where his family resided, and where he claimed his home. In the latter part of the following September, Tedford, who was on the police force of the city of Chicago, went to New York for the purpose of returning Hickey to Illinois as a fugitive from justice, by reason of certain extradition proceedings which had been instituted for that purpose. Hickey was arrested in New York City but declined to return to Chicago voluntarily, and sued out in that city a writ of habeas corpus for his discharge. Upon a hearing he was remanded to the custody of Tedford, and was returned to Chicago and confined in the Cook county jail. On the 5th of October his mother, Mrs. Jane Hickey, arrived in Chicago with a view to render to her son such assistance as she could. Prior to Tedford leaving New York City with her son she asked him when he would leave the city. He informed her he did not know. She said to him she wanted to wire a lawyer in Chicago to meet her son on his arrival, and look after his case. Tedford inquired whom she proposed to wire, and she gave him the lawyer's name. Tedford said to her the lawyer named was not a criminal lawyer, and for her to leave the getting of a lawyer for her son to him. her arrival in Chicago, she employed an attorney to represent her son, and soon met Tedford and Dudenhaver, and within a short time her son was admitted to bail. Tedford objected to the employment of the lawyer whom she had retained and suggested to her the employment of Dudenhaver, and she and her son agreed to discharge the lawyer they had retained and to retain Dudenhaver. Frequent meetings took place between Tedford, Dudenhaver, and Mrs. Hickey and her son during the next few days in Chicago. They met at the court house, and on TwentySecond street, near Michigan avenue, and Mrs. Hickey and her son were at Duden

On

haver's office, and Dudenhaver was at the place where they stayed, on Illinois street. It was suggested by Tedford and Dudenhaver to the Hickeys that the case could be settled out of court. Tedford named $900 as the amount it would require to settle the case out of court. He and Dudenhaver explained to the Hickeys that the material witnesses against William Hickey were Frank Cantwell and Myrtle Lewis, it being claimed by Tedford that Myrtle Lewis lived in the same building with Thomas Jones and wife, and that she would testify she saw Hickey enter their flat, and that by the payment of money the witnesses Cantwell and Lewis could be kept away from court, and that the case could be passed and finally dropped. Tedford stated to the Hickeys that Cantwell would leave the state and take Myrtle Lewis with him if he was paid $200. Mrs. Hickey at the second meeting with Tedford and Dudenhaver on Twenty-Second street, near Michigan avenue, agreed to pay to Tedford $900. When the case against Hickey was called for trial on about the 14th of October, 1902, in the criminal court, Tedford and Dudenhaver were present in court. Tedford then stated to the assistant state's attorney and the presiding judge that he could not get two of the witnesses, and the case was passed until the next morning. On the next morning, when the case was called, the witnesses were not present, and Tedford then stated Myrtle Lewis was in the state of California. The case was again passed, and Tedford and Dudenhaver, as they left the court room, were arrested. The Hickeys, during their negotiations with Tedford and Dudenhaver, informed their attorney, and also the state's attorney, of the proposition of Tedford to settle the case out of court for the sum of $900, and that the witnesses Cantwell and Lewis were to be induced to depart from the state, so that they could not be produced in court to testify against Hickey on the trial. The defendants Tedford, Cantwell, and Davis were sworn as witnesses in their own behalf, and denied all facts which tended to incriminate them and called numerous witnesses to prove their general good character. Dudenhaver did not testify. Davis was a police officer, and while he and Cantwell were present at some of the meetings of the parties they appear to have had but little to say. A conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or it may be established by the proof of facts from which a jury may infer its existence, that is, by circumstantial evidence. Ochs v. People, 124 Ill. 399, 16 N. E. 662. The evidence on behalf of the people, found in this record, if true, establishes that Tedford and Dudenhaver agreed with Mrs. Hickey and her son to induce the witnesses Cantwell and Lewis to leave the state of Illinois so that they could not be produced upon the trial of Hickey. Their object in keeping said witnesses away from the criminal court was that the prosecution of Hickey should fail

for the want of proof, and the motive which prompted them was to obtain money from Mrs. Hickey. While the evidence was conflicting, the jury saw and heard the witnesses, and were in a better position than we to determine which of the witnesses they should believe and what credit to give to the testimony of the defendants, and there being nothing so inherently improbable in the testimony of the witnesses for the people as to justify this court in disregarding their testimony as unworthy of belief, we are unable to say the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court should be set aside for want of evidence.

The defense on the trial sought to show that William Hickey was guilty of burglarizing the Jones flat, that is, the defense sought to try Hickey in this case. This the court declined to permit them to do. In this we think the court did not err, as Hickey was not upon trial, and the defendants could not justify their conduct in causing the witnesses in that case to leave the state, as for the purposes of their trial it was wholly immaterial whether Hickey was guilty or innocent.

The further contention is made that the jury were misdirected as to the law and that the court improperly refused certain instructions offered on behalf of defendants. The instructions presented on behalf of the people, as well as those upon behalf of the defendants, were very numerous. Forty-one instructions were given on behalf of the people and 30 on behalf of the defendants, and 72 offered upon behalf of the defendants were refused. We have examined the instructions given on behalf of the people and those given on behalf of the defendants, as well as those refused which were offered on behalf of the defendants, and are of the opinion the jury. were properly instructed as to the law of the case. The questions raised upon the giving and refusing of instructions are so numerous that we cannot consider each of these questions separately, and it would serve no useful purpose to do so. The court did not commit reversible error in giving or refusing instructions.

Finding no reversible error in this record, the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(219 Ill. 105).

KROELL V. KROELL. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 20, 1905.) 1. COURTS-SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION.

Proceedings to set off a widow's award are not in the nature of an action ex contractu, and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of an appeal from a final judgment of the Appellate Court in such proceedings, although the amount involved is unknown.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 13, Cent. Dig. Courts, § 542.]

2. APPEAL-FINALITY OF DETERMINATION. Where the Appellate Court, in reversing a judgment dismissing a petition in proceedings

to set off a widow's award, holds that the widow's rights were not released by an antenuptial contract which the trial court held to be a bar to the proceedings, and remands the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with such opinion, its judgment is final in such sense as to authorize a review by the Supreme Court on appeal or writ of error. 3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-SURVIVING WIFE-WIDOW'S AWARD.

Marriage, the continuance of the marriage relation until the death of the husband, and the survivorship of the wife are essential to the right to a widow's award. 4. SAME-RELEASE OF RIGHT.

A contract executed by a husband and wife, whereby each releases and conveys to the other all interest in the other's property, and renounces all claims in law or equity of curtesy, dower, homestead, survivorship, or otherwise, constitutes a release by the wife of her right to a widow's award after the death of the husband, and bars the same, provided there are no minor children of the husband living with the widow.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 22, Cent. Dig. Executors and Administrators, § 695.]

Antenuptial agreements between persons contemplating matrimony, determining the rights of each in the property of the other and in their own property during and after marriage, are not against public policy, but are enforceable.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 26, Cent. Dig. Husband and Wife, § 168.]

Error to Appellate Court, Third District. Petition for assignment of widow's award by Elizabeth Kroell against John J. Kroell, administrator of the estate of John Kroell, deceased. There was a judgment of the Appellate Court reversing a decree of dismissal, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Lyman Lacey, Jr., for plaintiff in error. Hardin W. Masters and Thomas D. Masters, for defendant in error.

CARTWRIGHT, J. Defendant in error, Elizabeth Kroell, filed in the county court of Mason county her petition for the appointment of appraisers to set off to her a widow's award out of the estate of her deceased husband, John Kroell, Sr. She annexed to her petition a copy of an antenuptial contract between herself and her said husband, which the county court held to be a good defense. The petition was dismissed, and the petitioner appealed to the circuit court, where, by stipulation, all charges of fraud were eliminated, and the cause was heard upon the question of law as to the sufficiency of the contract to release the award. The circuit court came to the same conclusion as the county court, and dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate

Court for the Third District. That court held that the petitioner did not, by the antenuptial contract, release her right to a widow's award, and reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion then filed. From the judgment of the Appellate Court, the case has been brought here by writ of error sued out by John J. Kroell, administrator.

The antenuptial contract was executed on April 8, 1886, under the hands and seals of the parties, and was acknowledged by them. Each of the parties had been married before. Each one had adult children of the former marriage, and each was possessed of property, both real and personal. The contract recited that they contemplated a marriage with each other, and being each seised in their own right of personal property and real estate, and being desirous that each one should hold his or her undivided property then in possession, or which might thereafter be acquired, separate and apart, without molestation or interference of the other, the same as though no marriage relation existed, they agreed that each of the parties should have full and separate control of his or her property, both real and personal, without molestation from the other. The remainder of the contract was as follows: "It is agreed by and between the said parties that each one shall have full control of their own separate property, both real and personal, to lease, sell, and dispose of the same, and receive all moneys, rents, issues, and

profits thereof, without molestation from the other; that each one shall pay their own debts now contracted or that may be hereafter contracted, and in no case shall the one be held for the debts of the other in any manner whatever. Now, therefore, in consideration of the above agreements, and of the sum of one dollar to me in hand paid, I, the said John Kroell, Sr., do hereby release, convey, and quitclaim to the said Elizabeth Crawford all interest I may ac quire in and to all her property, both real, personal, and mixed, now in possession or that she may hereafter acquire, renouncing forever all claims, in law and in equity, of courtesy, dower, homestead, supervisorship, or otherwise. And I, the said Elizabeth Crawford, in consideration of the above covenants and arguments, and of one dollar to me in hand paid, do hereby release, convey, and quitclaim to said John Kroell, Sr., all interest I may acquire, by virtue of such marriage, in and to all his property, both real, personal, and mixed, now in his possession or that he may hereafter acquire, renouncing forever all claim, in law, equity or courtesy, dower, homestead, supervisorship or otherwise." The parties to the contract were married on May 11, 1886, and on September 9, 1903, the husband, John Kroell, Sr., died intestate. No children were born of the marriage.

A motion has been made by defendant