travelers are of use with a view to legislation; for hence we are able to ascertain what the laws of other nations are; and with a view to debates on matters of state, the researches of those who write on human conduct are useful: all these points, however, form part, not of rhetoric, but of the science of social life.

So many, then, are the questions of highest concern touching which the deliberative orator must be in possession of propositions. We will, however, again discuss the elements out of which it is proper to exhort and dissuade, as well on these as on other questions.

N

OBJECTS TO BE AIMED AT IN PUBLIC SPEAKING

EARLY every one individually, and all men in general, have some object, at which, directing every aim, they both choose and avoid; and this, to speak summarily, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, for the sake of getting at a received standard, ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is; and what are its constituents; for on the subject of it, and what conduces to it, and of its opposites, exhortation or dissuasion is always conversant; and this, because we need do the things which procure it or any of its constituents, or which render it greater from having been less, and refrain from doing the things which destroy or impede it, or produce its opposites.

Let happiness, then, be defined to be good fortune in conjunction with virtue, or independency of life,-or the life which is most pleasant, accompanied by security, or abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it; for mankind allow either one or more of these things to amount nearly to happiness. If, then, happiness be such as I have described, its constituents must necessarily be: 1. noble birth, many and excellent friends, wealth, a good and numerous offspring, a good old age; and, moreover, personal excellencies, -as health, comeliness, strength, stature, ability in the games; character; 2. honor, good fortune; 3. virtue, and its constituents,—prudence, courage, justice, temperance. Thus furnished, one would be most independent, were both external and internal goods his own; for besides these there are no others. But the internal goods are mental and personal; the external, noble birth, friends, wealth, and distinction. We deem, moreover, that power and good fortune ought to be present, for thus would life be most independent.

Since the expedient is the object proposed to the deliberative orator, and as all form their conclusions, not about the end itself, but about the means conducive to that end; as, moreover, these are all things which are expedient in reference to human conduct (now everything expedient is a good), we shall have to ascertain certain elementary propositions on the subjects of the good and the expedient in general. Let good, then, be defined to be: 1. Whatever is an object of choice independently, for its own sake; 2. and for the sake of which we choose something else. 3. What everything aims at, or everything which has perception, or which has intelligence; or everything would aim at, were it possessed of intelligence. 4. Whatever intelligence would award to each. 5. Whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each individual is his good. 6. That which being present, one is well disposed and independent. 7. Independency. 8. Whatever produces or preserves such advantages; 9. and that on which they are consequent. 10. Whatever, too, has a tendency to prevent or destroy their opposites. Now, things are consequent in two ways; for either they may be consequent simultaneously or subsequently. Knowledge, for instance, is a consequent on learning

1

subsequently; life is so on health simultaneously. Again, things are productive in three ways; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of health; or as food is so of health; or as exercise is, because usually it does produce health.

These things being laid down, it must be, of course, that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the nonpossession of evil simultaneously; on the other, the possession of good subsequently.

And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this becomes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the greater above the less. The virtues, also, must, of course, be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, must be distinctly treated. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally desire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honorable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure; while, of things honorable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves objects of choice on their own account. So that to speak of them severally, it must be that the following things are good.- Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it we choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that sort; for they are excellencies of the soul; -and health and comeliness, and things of that sort, for they are excellencies of the body, and productive of many things; health, for instance, both of pleasure and of life; and it seems, on this account, to be the very best possession, because it is the cause of two things, which the generality of men value most, viz., of pleasure and life: - Wealth; because it is an excellence of possession, and productive of many things. A friend and friendship; for a friend is an object of choice independently, and productive of many advantages. Honor, character; for they are pleasant, and productive of much; and there is usually consequent on them the actual possession of the qualities, on account of which the subject is honored. Ability, in speaking and acting; for all such powers are productive of good. Again, high genius, memory, readiness in learning, quickness of thought, and all such qualities; for these faculties are productive of good; and in the same way all the arts and sciences. And life; for were no other good consequent on it, of itself it is an object of choice. And that which is just, for it is a kind of general advantage. Such, then, are the things which are good, as it were confessedly.

In a word, all objects of determined choice are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to foes and good to friends; and those which are possible—these are varied in two ways, such as may be done and such as may easily be done. Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time; for difficulty is defined in reference either to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they wish; and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the punishment either escapes notice or is trifling: and such actions as are peculiar; as no one has done; or which are extraordinary, for thus is their value greater: and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family and power. Things, too, which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else; for be they ever so trifling, they in no less degree determine on putting them in execution: and things easily brought about; for they are possible, inasmuch as they are easy: but things easily brought about are such as every one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gratifies one's friends, or will be disliked by one's foes. Everything, too, which they

whom we admire deliberately set about. Things toward which men are well fitted by nature, and about which they have experience; for they suppose they shall more easily succeed in them. Things, too, which no bad man does; for they are the rather commendable. What people happen to be desirous of; for not only does it appear pleasant, but it is viewed in the more favorable light. And men more particularly choose on deliberation the things in reference to which they severally are of a certain disposition; the ambitious, for instance, if the object be victory; the avaricious, if it be money; and other characters in the same way.

On questions, then, of good and of expediency, we must deduce our means of persuading from hence.

IT

PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE

T WILL be for me next to speak of the number and nature of the sources out of which the orator must construct his reasonings, touching accusation and defense. Now we must ascertain three points: one, what and how many are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly; the second, how themselves are disposed; and the third, towards persons of what character and of what disposition they do

so act.

Let us then, after defining the acting unjustly, speak in order of the rest. Let the acting unjustly be defined to be the voluntary commission of hurt in contravention of law. Now law is either general or peculiar. The peculiar law I call that, by whose written enactments men direct their polity; the general, whatever unwritten rules appear to be recognized among all men. Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly, and without compulsion. Men, therefore, do not everything on fixed principle, which they do wittingly; but whatever they do on fixed principle, that they do wittingly; because no one is ignorant of that which he chooses on principle. Now, the principles by whose motion men deliberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention of law are depravity and moral weakness; for if any are depraved either in one or more respects, it is in reference to that point, on which they are so depraved, that they are guilty of injustice. The illiberal man, for instance, on the subject of money; the intemperate, touching the pleasure of the body; and the effeminate, respecting objects of ease; and the coward, respecting danger (for it is by reason of fear that men abandon their comrades in danger): the ambitious man, on the score of honor; the hasty man, by reason of anger; the man eager to excel, on account of victory; the vindictive, for the sake of revenge; a silly man, owing to his being mistaken on points of right and wrong; a man of effrontery, from his contempt of character. And in other characters in the same way each [goes wrong] respecting his own particular weakness. But my meaning on these matters will be evident from what has been already said on the subject of the virtues, and from what hereafter will be stated on the subject of the passions. It merely remains, for me to state on what account, how effected, and toward whom, men do commit injustice.

First, then, let us distinctly enumerate the objects, which desiring, or which avoiding, we set about injustice: because it evidently should be considered by the plaintiff how many, and what sort of those things, from a desire of which men wrong their neighbors, have an existence on the side of his adversary; and by the defendant again, what, and what number of these things do not so exist. Now all men do all things either of themselves, or not of themselves. The things which they do not of themselves, they do either by chance or from necessity; and the things done by necessity, they do either by compulsion or by nature. So that all

things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through custom, and others through natural desire; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it devoid of reason. Now, the act of wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for anything other than what he conceives to be a good. The desires devoid of reason are anger and appetite. So that all things whatever which men do, they necessarily do from seven causes; by chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, or whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were superfluous. For, granting that it happens to young men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their youth that they act thus, but by motion of anger and appetite; neither is it by motion either of wealth or poverty simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on account of their neediness that it happens that they cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on account of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appetite. And in exactly the same way, the just and unjust, and all such as are said to act conformably to habits, will in reality act, under all circumstances, by motion of these principles; for they act on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this particular character, principles of action the same in character are consequent; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, are attendant good opinions and appetites respecting pleasures; but on the intemperate, the contrary on these same subjects. For which reason we must waive distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider on what conditions, what principles of conduct are wont to follow: for it is not ordained (in the nature of things), that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circumstances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man's seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some essential difference. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let us now treat first of the remaining points. Things proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My meaning on these subjects will be plain from the definition of chance. All those things exist naturally whose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate inquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, too, that chance is the cause of such results. All things originate in compulsion, which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves, contrary to their inclination and reason. In habit originates everything which men do because they have often done it before. From will proceed whatever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are realized in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their usefulness, but on account of pleasure. Through the medium of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a difference; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflict

ing it, in order that he may be satiated. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists will therefore be plain in my treatise of the passions. But all such things as appear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of appetite. But that which is familiar and has become habitual is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant naturally, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to speak in one word comprehending the whole, everything whatsoever which men do of their own proper motion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily in whatever they do of their own motion, and involuntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily will be either good or apparently good; pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And, among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things less so, in exchange for such as are so in greater degree.

We have, therefore, to ascertain the number of things pleasant and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose] if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.

T

ON PLEASING THE JUDGES

HE materials, then, from which we must exhort and dissuade, praise and blame, accuse and defend, the notions also and propositions, useful in order to render these points credible, are those which we have discussed: for respecting these questions, and out of these sources, are enthymemes deduced, so that an orator, thus provided, may speak on each separate department of questions. But as rhetoric has in view the coming to a decision (for in deliberative oratory the assembly arrive at decisions; and the sentence of a court of justice is ipso facto a decision); it is necessary to look not only to your speech, in what way that will be of a character to convince and persuade, but also to invest yourself with a certain kind of character, and the judge with a certain kind of feeling. For it is a point of great consequence, particularly in deliberative cases; and, next to these, in judicial; as well that the speaker seem to be a man of a certain character as that his audience conceive him to be of a certain disposition toward themselves; moreover, it is of consequence if your audience chance to be themselves also disposed in a certain way. Now, as to a speaker's appearing to be himself of a certain character, this point is more available in deliberations: but the disposing the auditor in a certain way, in judicial cases; for things do not show themselves in the same light to persons affected by love and by hatred, nor to those under emotions of anger, as to those who are disposed to placability; but they appear either utterly different in character, or at least different in degree. For to a judge who is affected by love toward the party respecting whom he pronounces his decision, that party appears either not at all to be unjust, or to be so in a very trivial degree. To a judge, however, who is affected by hatred, the case has a contrary appearance. So also to a person who is eager and sanguine, the proposed object, if pleasant, takes the appearance, as well of being