palestra; the action of the hand not restlessly redundant, the fingers clinching the word, not indicating it; the arm thrown forward to the full extent, as if brandishing the bolt of eloquence, and the foot brought forcibly to the ground at the beginning or end of any impassioned burst of energy. But the face is the great focus of expression, and there presides and dominates the eye. It is not without reason, therefore, that our oldest and most experienced judges could scarcely tolerate even Roscius himself with his features buried in a mask: for all expression is from the mind, and the image of the mind is the countenance — its indices the eyes. This is the only part of the body which can supply expression for all the complex and subtle evolutions of the mind; motionless and riveted to one object, it can express no variety of feeling. We are told by Theophrastus that a certain Tauriscus used to say of an actor, who was in the habit of declaiming without moving his eyes, that he spoke with his back to the audience. The discipline of the eye, then, is most important; for any violent change of the features is apt to partake of distortion and grimace. It is the eye which, by its diversified expression, intent or languid, now drooping in despondency, now lighted up with animation, reflects an accurate image of every varying shade of thought and feeling to which we are giving utterance; for action is the language of the body, and all the more incumbent, therefore, is it on us to keep it in harmony with the movements of the mind. To man nature has given the eye for the great vehicle of expression, as the mane, the tail, and the ears to the horse and lion. In all human expression, accordingly, the countenance, as an exponent of thought, is secondary only to the voice; and the dominant power of the countenance is the eye. Action has an inherent force derived from nature, and exerting, therefore, a resistless influence over the most illiterate and uncultivated, and even the most barbarous of mankind. Language affects those only who speak the particular dialect in which they are addressed - the most forcible terms do not invariably arrest the attention of the more obtuse; but action which carries with it its own interpretation is the universal language of humanity, by it all are equally affected, by it we at once express our own feelings and recognize the feelings of others.

To all that is most useful and admirable in expression the voice undoubtedly brings the largest contingent. The natural gift of a fine voice is most desirable for the speaker, but no voice, whatever may be its quality, can dispense with cultivation; the precise nature of that cultivation it does not come within our province to treat of now; in my opinion, however, it cannot be too intense and unremitting. But it may not be out of place to repeat here what I mentioned a little while ago, that in most things there is a mysterious connection between the useful and agreeable; nothing, for instance, conduces more to the improvement of the voice than variety of modulation, as nothing, on the other hand, is more injurious to it than prolonged and vehement vociferation; and what more agreeable to the ear or more conducive to harmony than alternation, variety, and change! Accordingly it was the custom of Caius Gracchus (as you may learn from your literary client, and his former amanuensis, Licinius) to have concealed behind him, when speaking, a skillful person with an ivory pitch pipe to sound the correct note the moment his voice became too sharp or too flat in tone. I have heard, indeed, of the practice, said Catulus, and have always admired the industry as well as the knowledge and learning of that man. And I also, added Crassus, and deeply does it grieve me that two such men should have lapsed into that deadly treason against the republic; although such is the strange contexture of society at present, and such the kind of life, both encouraged now, and held out as an example to posterity, that we now glory in the very men who were held in utter detestation by our forefathers. Dis

miss this subject, I beg of you, said Julius, and let us revert to Gracchus and his pitch pipe, of which I do not yet clearly understand the use.

Every voice, then, continued Crassus, has a certain middle key, peculiar to itself, from which it is both useful and agreeable to ascend in a graduated scale; for not only is there something rude in a vociferous commencement, but the opposite practice is salutary in strengthening the voice. There is also an extremely high key, though not reaching to a discordant scream, and it is the office of the pipe, not only to prevent the voice from breaking into this shrill dissonance of tone, but also from straining too long on the notes approaching to it; and lastly, there is the lowest or bass note, to which we descend by a regular scale of sound. This variety, and this practice of running the voice through all its compass, will tend both to give it strength and to preserve its sweetness. But you may leave the piper at home, and carry with you to the forum the valuable lesson suggested by the practice.

I have now said all that I can on this subject, not so fully, indeed, as I could have wished, but as much as the time to which I am restricted would allow; for it is good policy to lay the blame on the time when you have nothing more to add. Inasmuch as I am able to judge, said Catulus, your survey has been so admirably comprehensive, that, so far from regarding you as a mere pupil of the Greek rhetoricians, I consider you fully qualified to be their master. I am delighted to have had the privilege of being present at this discussion, and only regret that the same advantage has not been enjoyed by my son-in-law and your companion Hortensius, in whom I confidently expect to see realized that picture of the perfect orator which you have portrayed. You expect to see realized! exclaimed Crassus; in my opinion it is so already; such, indeed, was my impression when I heard him plead, in my consulship, the cause of Africa, and which has since been fully confirmed by his splendid oration for the Bithynian king. Your judgment, therefore, Catulus, is perfectly correct; for I see nothing wanting in this young man which either nature or discipline could impart. And, therefore, doubly is it incumbent on you, Cotta, and also on you, Sulpicius, to look well to your laurels, and to exert every energy; for this is no secondary orator feebly struggling up under the shade of your maturer years, but an aspirant of most searching genius, of ardent enthusiasm, consummate learning, and singularly tenacious memory; and, although I am partial to him, and desirous to see him surpass those of his own age, it concerns your honor not to be distanced in the race by one so much your junior. But let us now rise, said he, to partake of some refreshment, and relieve our minds at length from the severe strain which has been imposed upon them by this discussion.

All the foregoing extracts from Cicero's "De Oratore »

were translated by F. B. Calvert, M. A.

QUINTILIAN

(MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS)

(c. 35-c. 95 A. D.)

UINTILIAN, Cicero, and Aristotle are the three great classical authorities on oratory and everything which belongs to the artistic expression of thought through language. Both Cicero and Aristotle were philosophers, while no such dignity of intellect can be claimed for Quintilian, but he was a highly educated man, a keen observer, and a master of the subject of which he treats. If he is less philosophical than Cicero, he is more practical in his treatment of detail. It does not overestimate his importance to say that a knowledge of his views and maxims is indispensable to the student of oratory as an art.

He was born at Calagurris, in Spain, about 35 A. D. After completing his education at Rome, he returned to Spain as a teacher of oratory, but in 68 A. D. he located permanently in Rome, conducting a school of oratory there for more than twenty years. He died about 95 A. D. For a long time his "Institutes of Oratory" survived only in fragments, but in the fifteenth century an almost perfect copy was found "under a heap of long-neglected lumber" in an Italian monastery.

L

THE SECRET OF THE HIGHEST ELOQUENCE

ET the orator, whom I propose to form, be such a one as is characterized by the definition of Marcus Cato, a good man skilled in speaking.

But the requisite which Cato has placed first in this definition, that an orator should be a good man, is naturally of more estimation and importance than the other. It is of importance that an orator should be good, because, should the power of speaking be a support to evil, nothing would be more pernicious than eloquence alike to public concerns and private, and I myself, who, as far as is in my power, strive to contribute something to the faculty of the orator, should deserve very ill of the world, since I should furnish arms, not for soldiers, but for robbers. May I not draw an argument from the condition of mankind? Nature herself, in bestowing on man that which she seems to have granted him pre-eminently, and by which she appears to have distinguished us from all other animals, would have acted, not as a parent, but as a stepmother, if she had designed the faculty of speech to be the promoter of crime, the oppressor of innocence, and the enemy of truth; for it would have been better for us to have been born dumb, and to have been left destitute of reasoning powers, than to have received endowments from Providence only to turn them to the destruction of one another.

My judgment carries me still further; for I not only say that he who would answer my idea of an orator must be a good man, but that no man, unless he be good, can ever be an orator. To an orator discernment and prudence are necessary; but we can certainly not allow discernment to those, who, when the ways of virtue and vice are set before them, prefer to follow that of vice; nor can we allow them prudence, since they subject themselves, by the unforeseen consequences of their actions, often to the heaviest penalty of the law, and always to that of an evil conscience. But if it be not only truly said by the wise, but always justly believed by the vulgar, that no man is vicious who is not also foolish, a fool, assuredly, will never become an orator.

It is to be further considered that the mind cannot be in a condition for pursuing the most noble of studies, unless it be entirely free from vice; not only because there can be no communion of good and evil in the same breast, and to meditate at once on the best things and the worst is no more in the power of the same mind than it is possible for the same man to be at once virtuous and vicious; but also, because a mind intent on so arduous a study should be exempt from all other cares, even such as are unconnected with vice; for then, and then only, when it is free and master of itself, and when no other object harasses and distracts its attention, will it be able to keep in view the end to which it is devoted. But if an inordinate attention to an estate, a too anxious pursuit of wealth, indulgence in the pleasures of the chase, and the devotion of our days to public spectacles, rob our studies of much of our time (for whatever time is given to one thing is lost to another), what effect must we suppose that ambition, avarice, and envy will produce, whose excitements are so violent as even to disturb our sleep and our dreams? Nothing, indeed, is so preoccupied, so unsettled, so torn and lacerated with such numerous and various passions as a bad mind; for when it intends evil, it is agitated with hope, care, and anxiety, and when it has attained the object of its wickedness, it is tormented with uneasiness, repentance, and the dread of every kind of punishment. Among such disquietudes, what place is there for study, or any rational pursuit ? No more certainly than there is for corn in a field overrun with thorns and brambles.

To enable us to sustain the toil of study, is not temperance necessary? What expectations are to be formed, then, from him who is abandoned to licentiousness and luxury? Is not the love of praise one of the greatest incitements to the pursuit of literature? But can we suppose that the love of praise is an object of regard with the unprincipled? Who does not know that a principal part of oratory consists in discoursing on justice and virtue ? But will the unjust man and the vicious treat of such subjects with the respect that is due to them?

But though we should even concede a great part of the question, and grant, what can by no means be the case, that there is the same portion of ability, diligence, and attainments, in the worst man as in the best, which of the two, even under that supposition, will prove the better orator? He, doubtless, who is the better man. The same person, therefore, can never be a bad man and a perfect orator, for that cannot be perfect to which something else is superior.

That I may not seem, however, like the writers of Socratic dialogues, to frame answers to suit my own purpose, let us admit that there exists a person so unmoved by the force of truth, as boldly to maintain that a bad man, possessed of the same portion of ability, application, and learning, as a good man, will be an equally good orator, and let us convince even such a person of his folly.

No man, certainly, will doubt that it is the object of all oratory, that what is stated to the judge may appear to him to be true and just; and which of the two, let me ask, will produce such a conviction with the greater ease, the good

man or the bad? A good man, doubtless, will speak of what is true and honest with greater frequency; but even if, from being influenced by some call of duty, he endeavors to support what is fallacious (a case which, as I shall show, may sometimes occur), he must still be heard with greater credit than a bad man. But with bad men, on the other hand, dissimulation sometimes fails, as well through their contempt for the opinion of mankind, as through their ignorance of what is right; hence they assert without modesty, and maintain their assertions without shame; and, in attempting what evidently cannot be accomplished, there appears in them a repulsive obstinacy and useless perseverance; for bad men, as well in their pleadings as in their lives, entertain dishonest expectations; and it often happens, that even when they speak the truth, belief is not accorded them, and the employment of advocates of such a character is regarded as a proof of the badness of a cause.

I must, however, notice those objections to my opinion, which appear to be clamored forth, as it were, by the general consent of the multitude. Was not then Demosthenes, they ask, a great orator? Yet we have heard that he was not a good man. Was not Cicero a great orator? Yet many have thrown censure upon his character. To such questions how shall I answer? Great displeasure is likely to be shown at any reply whatever; and the ears of my audience require first to be propitiated. The character of Demosthenes, let me say, does not appear to me deserving of such severe reprehension that I should believe all the calumnies that are heaped upon him by his enemies, especially when I read his excellent plans for the benefit of his country and the honorable termination of his life. Nor do I see that the feeling of an upright citizen was, in any respect, wanting to Cicero. As proofs of his integrity, may be mentioned his consulship, in which he conducted himself with so much honor; his honorable administration of his province; his refusal to be one of the twenty commissioners; and, during the civil wars, which fell with great severity on his times, his uprightness of mind, which was never swayed, either by hope or by fear, from adhering to the better party, or the supporters of the commonwealth. He is thought by some to have been deficient in courage, but he has given an excellent reply to this charge, when he says that he was timid, not in encountering dangers, but in taking precautions against them; an assertion of which he proved the truth at his death, to which he submitted with the noblest fortitude. But even should the height of virtue have been wanting to these eminent men, I shall reply to those who ask me whether they were orators, as the Stoics reply when they are asked whether Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, were wise men; they say that they were great and deserving of veneration, but that they did not attain the highest excellence of which human nature is susceptible.

Pythagoras desired to be called, not wise, like those who preceded him, but a lover of wisdom. I, however, in speaking of Cicero, have often said, according to the common mode of speech, and shall continue to say, that he was a perfect orator, as we term our friends, in ordinary discourse, good and prudent men, though such epithets can be justly given only to the perfectly wise. But when I have to speak precisely, and in conformity with the exactness of truth, I shall express myself as longing to see such an orator as he himself also longed to see; for though I acknowledge that Cicero stood at the head of eloquence, and that I can scarcely find a passage in his speeches to which anything can be added, however many I might find which I may imagine that he would have pruned (for the learned have in general been of opinion that he had numerous excellences and some faults, and he himself says that he had cut off most of his juvenile exuberance), yet, since he did not claim to himself, though he had no mean opinion of his merits, the praise of perfection, and since he might certainly have spoken better if a longer life had