L

ORATORY AND LITERATURE

ET us review and reconsider the subject of our reading, and as we consign our food to our stomach only when it is masticated and almost dissolved, in order that it may be easier of digestion, so let what we read be committed to the memory and reserved for imitation, not when it is in a crude state, but after being softened, and, as it were, triturated, by frequent repetition.

For a long time, too, none but the best authors must be read, and such as are least likely to mislead him who trusts them; but they must be read with attention, and, indeed, with almost as much care as if we were transcribing them; and every portion must be examined, not merely partially, but a whole book, when read through, must be taken up afresh, and especially any excellent oration, of which the merits are often designedly concealed; for the speaker frequently prepares his audience for what is to follow, dissembles with them, and places ambuscades; and states in the first part of his pleading what is to have its full effect at the conclusion. Hence what is advanced in its proper place often pleases us less than it ought, since we are not aware why it is advanced; and all such passages, accordingly, ought to be perused again after we have read the whole. But one of the most useful exercises is to learn the history of those causes of which we have taken the pleadings in hand for perusal, and, whenever opportunity shall offer, to read speeches delivered on both sides of the same question; as those of Demosthenes and Æschines in opposition to each other; those of Servius Sulpicius and Messala, of whom one spoke for Aufidia, and the other against her; those of Pollio and Cassius when Asprenas was accused; and many others. Even if the pleaders seem unequally matched, yet some of the speeches may be reasonably consulted in order to ascertain the question for decision, as the orations of Tubero against Ligarius, and of Hortensius on behalf of Verres, in opposition to those of Cicero. It will also be of advantage to know how different orators pleaded the same causes; for Calidius delivered a speech concerning the house of Cicero, and Brutus wrote an oration in defense of Milo, merely as an exercise. Cornelius Celsus, indeed, thinks that Brutus spoke it, but he is mistaken. Pollio and Messala, too, defended the same persons; and, when I was a boy, there were in circulation celebrated speeches of Domitius Afer, Crispus Passienus, and Decimus Lælius, in defense of Volusenus Catulus.

Nor must he who reads feel immediately convinced that everything that great authors have said is necessarily perfect; for they sometimes make a false step, or sink under their burden, or give way to the inclination of their genius; nor do they always equally apply their minds, but sometimes grow weary; as Demosthenes seems to Cicero sometimes to nod, and Homer himself appears to Horace to do so. They are great men, indeed, but men nevertheless; and it often happens to those who think that whatever is found in such authors is a law for eloquence, that they imitate what is inferior in them (for it is easier to copy their faults than their excellences), and fancy that they fully resemble great men when they have adopted great men's defects.

Yet students must pronounce with diffidence and circumspection on the merits of such illustrious characters, lest, as is the case with many, they condemn what they do not understand. If they must err on one side or the other, I should prefer that every part of them should please youthful readers rather than that many parts should displease them.

Theophrastus says that the reading of the poets is of the greatest use to the orator. Many others adopt his opinion, and not without reason, for from them is derived animation in relating facts, sublimity in expression, the greatest power

in exciting the feelings, and gracefulness in personifying character; and, what is of the utmost service, the faculties of the orator, worn out, as it were, by daily pleading in the forum, are best recruited by the charms of the works of such authors. Accordingly, Cicero thinks that [relaxation should be sought in that sort of reading. But we must remember that poets are not to be imitated by the orator in every respect: not, for instance, in freedom of language, or unrestrained use of figures; that the style of poets is adapted for display, and, besides, that it aims merely at giving pleasure, and pursues its object by inventing not only what is false, but even sometimes what is incredible; that it enjoys certain privileges, inasmuch as, being confined to the regular requirements of feet, it cannot always use proper terms, but, being driven from the straight road, must necessarily have recourse to certain bypaths of eloquence, and is obliged not only to change words, but to lengthen, shorten, transpose, and divide them; but that we orators stand in arms in a field of battle, contend for concerns of the highest moment, and must struggle only for victory.

Yet I would not wish that the arms of the orator should be squalid from foulness and rust, but that there should be a brightness on them like that of steel, which may dismay opponents, and by which the mind and the eye may at once be dazzled, and not like that of gold or silver, which is unwarlike, and dangerous rather to the wearer than to the enemy.

History also may nourish oratory with a kind of fertilizing and grateful aliment. But it must be read with the conviction that most of its very excellences are to be avoided by the orator; for it borders closely on poetry, and may be said indeed, to be a poem unfettered by the restraints of metre; it is written to relate, not to prove; and its whole nature is suited, not to the pleading of causes, or to instant debate, but to the transmission of events to posterity, and to gain the reputation of ability for its author; and for this reason it relieves the tediousness of narrative by words more remote from common usage, and by a more bold employment of figures. Accordingly, as I observed, neither is the brevity of Sallust, than which nothing can be more perfectly pleasing to the unoccupied and learned ear, to be studied by us in addressing a judge, who is engaged with various thoughts, and often destitute of literature; nor will the milky exuberance of Livy satisfactorily instruct a hearer who looks not for beauty of statement, but for proof of fact. Besides, Cicero thinks that not even Thucydides and Xenophon are of any use to the orator, though he allows that the one sounds the trumpet of war, and that the Muses spoke by the mouth of the other. In digressions, however, we may at times adopt the polished elegance of history, provided we remember that in the parts of our speech on which the question depends, there is need, not of the showy muscles of the athlete, but of the nervous arms of the soldier; and that the variegated robe which Demetrius Phalereus is said to have worn is not adapted to the dust of the forum. There is also, indeed, another advantage to be gained from history, and an advantage of the greatest value, though of no concern with the present part of my subject; I mean that which is to be derived from the knowledge of facts and precedents, with which the orator ought to be extremely well acquainted, that he may not have to seek all his arguments from the parties going to law, but may avail himself of many drawn from an accurrate knowledge of antiquity; arguments the more weighty, as they alone are exempt from the charges of prejudice and partiality.

That we have to derive much from the study of the philosophers has been occasioned by another fault in orators, who have given up to them the better part of their duty; for the philosophers speak copiously of what is just, and honorable, and useful, of what is of a contrary nature, and of divine subjects, and reason

upon all these topics with the utmost acuteness; and the followers of Socrates excellently qualify the future orator for debates and examinations of witnesses. But in studying these writers, too, we must use similar judgment; and, though we may have to speak on the same subjects with them, we must bear in mind that the same manner is not suited for lawsuits as for philosophical disputations, for the forum as for the lecture room, for exercises on rules as for actual trials.

TH

Τ

ON CORRECT STYLE IN PUBLIC SPEAKING

HEY, indeed, are greatly deceived who imagine that a vicious and corrupt style of eloquence, which exults in a licentious kind of diction, wantons in puerile fancies, swells with inordinary tumor, expatiates on empty commonplaces, decks itself with flowers that will fall if they are in the slightest degree shaken, prefers extravagance to sublimity, or raves madly under the pretext of freedom, will be the most gratifying to the people, and most likely to gain applause. That such a style does, however, please many, I do not deny, nor do I wonder; for eloquence of any kind whatsoever is pleasing to the ear, and likely to be favorably heard; all exertion of the human voice naturally draws the mind with a pleasing kind of attraction; it is from no other cause that there are such groups of listeners in market places and causeways; and it is, therefore, the less surprising that for every pleader a ring of the rabble is ready. But when anything more happily expressed than ordinary falls upon the ears of the illiterate, of whatever kind it be, provided that they themselves cannot hope to speak equally well, it gains their admiration, and not without reason, for even to speak just beyond the capacity of the uneducated is not easy. Such moderate excellence, however, fades and dies away when it is compared with anything better; as wool dyed red pleases, says Ovid, in the absence of purple, but if it be contrasted even with the purple of a common riding cloak, it will be thrown into the shade by the presence of something brighter than itself. If, again, we apply the light of a keen judgment to such tasteless eloquence as that of sulphur to inferior dye, it will immediately lose the false lustre, with which it had deceived the eye, and grow pale with an indescribable deformity. Such eloquence will accordingly shine only in the absence of the sun, as certain small animals appear to be little fires in the darkness. In short, many admire what is bad, but none condemn what is good.

But the orator must do all that I have mentioned not only in the best manner, but also with the greatest ease; for the utmost power of eloquence will deserve no admiration if unhappy anxiety perpetually attend it, and harass and wear out the orator, while he is laboriously altering his words, and wasting his life in weighing and putting them together. The true orator, elegant, sublime, and rich, commands copious materials of eloquence pouring in upon him from all sides. He that has reached the summit ceases to struggle up the steep. Difficulty is for him who is making his way and is not far from the bottom; but the more he advances, the easier will be the ascent and the more verdant the soil; and if, with persevering efforts, he pass also these gentler slopes, fruits will spontaneously present themselves, and all kinds of flowers will spring up before him, which, however, unless they are daily plucked, will be sure to wither. Yet even copiousness should be under the control of judgment, without which nothing will be either praiseworthy or beneficial; elegance should have a certain manly air, and good taste should attend on invention. Thus what the orator produces will be great, without extravagance; sublime, without audacity; energetic, without rashness; severe, without repulsive

ness; grave, without dullness; plenteous, without exuberance; pleasing, without meretriciousness; grand, without tumidity. Such judgment will be shown with regard to other qualities; and the path in the middle is generally the safest, because error lies on either side.

T

THE FIVE DIVISIONS OF ORATORICAL ART

HE whole art of oratory, as the most and greatest writers have taught, consists of five parts, invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action; for the last is designated by either of these terms. But every speech, by which any purpose is expressed, must of necessity consist of both matter and words; and if it is short, and included in one sentence, it may perhaps call for no further consideration; but a speech of greater length requires attention to a greater number of particulars, for it is not only of consequence what we say, and how we say it, but also where we say it; there is need, therefore, also for arrangement. But we cannot say everything that our subject demands, nor everything in its proper place, without the assistance of memory, which will accordingly constitute a fourth part. And a delivery which is unbecoming, either as to voice or gesture, vitiates, and almost renders ineffectual, all those other requisites of eloquence; and to delivery, therefore, must necessarily be assigned the fifth place.

Nor are some writers, among whom is Albutius, to be regarded, who admit only the first three parts, because memory, they say, and delivery, come from nature, not from art. Thracymachus, however, was of the same opinion as far as concerns delivery. To these some have added a sixth part, by subjoining judgment to invention, as it is our first business to invent and then to judge. For my part, I do not consider that he who has not judged has invented; for a person is not said to have invented contradictory or foolish arguments, or such as are of equal value to himself and his adversary, but not to have avoided them. Cicero, indeed, in his "Rhetorica," has included judgment under invention; but, to me, judgment appears to be so mingled with the first three parts (for there can neither be arrangement nor expression without it) that I think even delivery greatly indebted to it. This I would the more boldly affirm, as Cicero, in his "Partitiones Oratoriæ,» arrives at the same five divisions of which I have just spoken; for, after first dividing oratory into two parts, invention and expression, he has put matter and arrangement under invention, and words and delivery under expression, and has then made memory a fifth part, having a common influence on all the rest, and being, as it were, the guardian of them. He also says, in his books "De Oratore,” that eloquence consists of five divisions; and the opinions expressed in these books, as they were written at a later period, may be regarded as more settled.

Those authors appear to me to have been not less desirous to introduce something new, who have added order after having previously specified arrangement, as if arrangement were anything else than the disposition of things in the best possible order. Dion has specified only invention and arrangement, but has made each of them of two kinds, relating to matter and to words; so that expression may be included under invention, and delivery under arrangement; to which parts a fifth, memory, must be added. The followers of Theodorus, for the most part, distinguish invention into two sorts, referring to matter and expression; and then add the three other parts. Hermagoras puts judgment, division, order, and whatever relates to expression, under economy, which, being a Greek term, taken from the care of domestic affairs, and used in reference to this subject metaphorically, has no Latin equivalent.

There is also a question about the following point, namely, that, in settling the order of the parts, some have put memory after invention, some after arrangement. To me the fourth place seems most suitable for it; for we must not only retain in mind what we have imagined in order to arrange it, and what we have arranged in order to express it, but we must also commit to memory what we have comprised in words, since it is in the memory that everything that enters into the composition of a speech is deposited.

There have been also many writers inclined to think that these divisions should not be called parts of the art of oratory, but duties of the orator, as it is the business of the orator to invent, arrange, express, etc. But if we coincide in this opinion, we shall leave nothing to art; for to speak well is the duty of the orator, yet skill in speaking well constitutes the art of oratory; or, as others express their notions, it is the duty of the orator to persuade, yet the power of persuading lies in his art. Thus to invent arguments and arrange them are the duties of the orator; yet invention and arrangement may be thought peculiar parts of the art of oratory.

It is a point, too, about which many have disputed, whether these are parts of the art of oratory or works of it, or (as Athenæus thinks) elements of it. But no one can properly call them elements; for in that case they will be merely first principles, as water, or fire, or matter, or indivisible atoms are called the elements of the world; nor can they justly be named works, as they are not performed by others, but perform something themselves. They are, therefore, parts; for as oratory consists of them, and as a whole consists of parts, it is impossible that those things of which the whole is composed can be anything else but parts of that whole. Those who have called them works appear to me to have been moved by this consideration, that they did not like, in making the other division of oratory, to adopt the same term; for the parts of oratory, they said, were the panegyrical, the deliberative, and the judicial. But if these are parts, they are parts of the matter rather than the art; for in each of them is included the whole of oratory, since no one of them can dispense with invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery. Some, therefore, have thought it better to say that there are three kinds of oratory; but those whom Cicero has followed have given the most reasonable opinion, namely, that there are three kinds of subjects for oratory.

I

THE THREE KINDS OF ORATORY

T IS a question whether there are three or more. Certainly almost all writers, at least those of the highest authority among the Ancients, have acquiesced in this tripartite distinction, following the opinion of Aristotle, who merely calls the deliberative by another name, concionalis, "suitable for addresses to public assemblies." But a feeble attempt was made at that time by some of the Greek writers, an attempt which has since been noticed by Cicero in his books "De Oratore," and is now almost forced upon us by the greatest author of our own day, to make it appear that there are not only more kinds, but kinds almost innumerable. Indeed, if we distinguish praising and blaming in the third part of ora tory, in what kind of oratory shall we be said to employ ourselves when we complain, console, appease, excite, alarm, encourage, direct, explain obscure expressions, narrate, entreat, offer thanks, congratulate, reproach, attack, describe, command, retract, express wishes or opinions, and speak in a thousand other ways? So that if I adhere to the opinion of the Ancients, I must, as it were, ask pardon for doing so, and must