Rural Wide as the divergence is today between the forms of rural and urban government in America some principles appear to have been carried over from one to the other without regard to their fitness. The needs of a rural community are comparatively simple, and are readily understood by any intelligent man. This was particularly true half a century ago. The care of the roads and of elementary schools, the impounding of stray cattle, the assessment of taxes, were matters within the knowledge of everyone, and could be managed well enough by farmers of good sense chosen by their neighbors to attend to them. They required no special training, no corps of experts; and rotation in office did not seriously interfere with efficiency. But such a custom is quite out of place in the administration of a great modern city, complicated as that must be by a variety of public services, most of which use the results of scientific discovery and mechanical invention. The problems arising in the supply of water, the disposal of sewage, the maintenance of streets, the provision for rapid transit, the elaborate system of public education, and the treatment of disease, pauperism and crime, are not matters with which even the most active-minded citizen is made familiar in the pursuit of his ordinary vocation. They can be mastered only by means of special training or long experience, and they can be handled efficiently only by persons who have mastered them. In spite, moreover, of any professed faith in the doctrine of rotation in office, the principle has by no means been strictly applied in rural government. Anyone familiar with New England towns is aware that there is among the selectmen continuity enough to ensure the transmission of experience; and the same thing is no doubt true of the trustees for townships 1 Legal matters were, indeed, early left to men learned in the law; and although in the trial of cases the courts had the assistance of jurymen, they acted under the guidance of a judge. The lawyers were the first professional experts to win recognition in the public life of America, and they have retained their authority ever since. By them the people were saved from the weakness and unrest caused by committing judicial matters to non-professional bodies in the democratic commonwealth of Greece. and the county commissioners in other parts of the country. Whereas in our cities we have constantly seen the head of a department suddenly replaced by a new man wholly unversed in the business he is called upon to direct. European and American Now the essential difference in the methods of governing European and American cities is to be found in the fact that the former are administered in the main by permanent experts. The way in which this is brought about is not, indeed, the same in all countries. In Germany the participation of a professional class is prescribed by law; while this is not true, as a rule, in England and France. The case of England is especially striking, for there the statutes are almost silent about the qualifications, the tenure and duties of the permanent officials, and yet anyone who has observed closely the working of British municipal government can hardly fail to see that these men supply the mainspring of the whole machinery. The fact is very marked in the great provincial cities that are constantly held up to us as examples for our contrite admiration, and it counts for much in their large measure of success. Shocked by the absurdity of discharging faithful employees in consequence of an election turning on questions with which their duties have no connection, Americans have become convinced of the need of civil service reform; and in order to eliminate politics they have adopted for parts of the national service, and for many states and cities, competitive examinations for appointment. But so far the principle has been applied chiefly to offices of a clerical or mechanical nature. It has not reached positions involving much responsibility or discretion, and requiring real administrative capacity, such as those of postmaster or collector of customs in a large town, and those concerned with the management of city departments. Nor is it clear that the kind of competitive examination most commonly used hitherto, even if followed by careful promotion, would be well adapted to the selection of men for such posts, because the broad intelligence and sound judgment required can hardly be measured by an examination paper designed to test immediate fitness for special duties. But the fact that we have not yet agreed upon a method of recruiting experts of this grade has no tendency to show that we do not need them, or that when the need is generally recognized we shall not find out how to meet it. The Expert and the Overseer At the present day any work of a complex nature, whether public or private, which is carried on without proper assistance from experts is certain to be inefficient. But on the other hand experts acting alone are apt to take disproportionate views. They exaggerate technical difficulties, or they tend to follow precedents and become tied up by red tape, losing touch with the real demands of the public. A government conducted solely by professional officials would be undesirable, even if our people would tolerate the idea. In order, therefore, to achieve good results, and avoid inefficiency on one side and bureaucracy on the other, the administration must contain both experts and men who reflect the general trend of public opinion. The proper relation between these two classes of men is easily stated, although in all probability it cannot be prescribed by statute. The current management, and for the most part the suggestion of improvements, ought to lie with the expert, but he ought to work under the constant supervision and control of unprofessional men representing the community at large. The expert ought to devote his whole time to the business, and receive a salary high enough to pay for the whole time of a man with the capacity required. The person who oversees him ought to be expected to give far less of his time. If he gives much it is because he undertakes to do himself what had better be left to the expert. Ordinarily he ought to do no more than a public-spirited citizen should be willing to do without compensation, for his duty is not to administer, but to supervise and direct the administration. Such a relation between the expert and the layman has grown up spontaneously in the case of our great commercial and educational bodies. The president of a railroad or a bank is today an expert, and on him falls the main work of managing the corporation, but he is controlled by a board of directors taken from the business community. The president of a university Experience of Business Corporations or college is also an expert, under a like supervision by a board of trustees; and one may add that this is approximately the relation that exists between the permanent head of a department in a typical English city and the committee of the council entrusted with the care of that department. Nor is the same thing wholly unknown in American cities, for certain municipal institutions have long been conducted on that principle with marked success. This is true, among other examples, of the City Hospital and Public Library of Boston, both of which are managed by experts working under boards of unpaid commissioners appointed by the mayor. Professor Goodnow, who has treated this subject in a very interesting way, suggests that only by means of boards of commissioners can permanence of tenure and popular non-professional administration be secured; that single-headed departments will fall into the hands either of an official bureaucracy, or of men who make their living out of politics and from lack of adequate training are often not competent to fill these offices.1 But one may doubt whether this is necessarily true. The plan of combining an expert with a non-professional who oversees him, and making a sharp distinction between their positions, would not seem to be inconsistent with any form of municipal organization. A board of lay commissioners may supervise an expert, as in the case of the committees of an English borough council, or a single unprofessional chief may do so, as in the case of an English minister placed over his permanent under-secretary. In a small town the mayor might be the sole non-professional officer supervising the work of a corps of permanent experts, but in a city of any size this would probably be beyond his powers. There is nothing impossible, however, in his having a cabinet of non-professional assistants each of whom superintends the work of one or more permanent experts in charge of departments. The essential point is to distinguish clearly between the expert and the layman; not to prescribe their functions, but to make the distinction itself obvious, for without this the functions will not tend to adjust themselves. 1 "City Government in the United States," 191, et seq. Now the plan for a model charter prepared by the National Municipal League does not do this. Read in the light of the reports which explain it, that scheme is The certainly designed to encourage permanence Municipal of tenure by the heads of departments, and Program yet they are evidently not supposed to devote their lives to public work as a profession. They are treated differently from their subordinates, who are placed under a merit system, have some protection from arbitrary removal for political reasons, and are intended to be for strictly permanent. On the other hand no provision is made placing under them professional administrators of high grade in charge of the various services, and the heads of departments are not treated as if their duties were confined to an oversight and control of the work of such men. In short, it is not clear whether they are meant to be experts or not. It may, indeed, be hard to find either experts or laymen competent to fill these positions, Surely experts will not be anxious to serve unless they have reason to believe that they will remain during good behavior; and men who are not already familiar with the work can hardly learn to do it really well before they are likely to leave the office. Will it not be difficult also in the long run to induce men of firstrate executive capacity to give up their regular occupation and devote their whole time to public work of a different kind for an indefinite period? Under these conditions it would seem, as Professor Goodnow has pointed out in the passage already cited, that the heads of departments will probably be recruited too frequently from professional politicians rather than from professional administrators or men of proved executive talent. To go back a step. If it is wise to combine expert and lay elements in municipal government, it is necessary to draw between them a sharp distinction based upon the essential difference in their positions. The expert is responsible for good service to his non-professional chiefs, the latter for the policy pursued to the public. The expert must carry out efficiently the work which the community has decided to do, and he must keep clear of politics in his office or out of it. He ought to hold his post permanently, being protected so far as possible from |