franchises, except in certain special cases, and the reasons are well stated in the following quotation from a report of the railroad commission: It has been more or less seriously proposed to make the ordinary use of the surface of the street for railway purposes a source of revenue or relief to the municipal treasury, either by sale of the railway location, or by an excise on cars, or a tax on earnings, or by requiring the railway company to pave or otherwise maintain the surface of the entire roadway. There is no reason why the railway company should not pay a tax on its corporate franchise and property, such as other similar corporations pay. It is also proper that it construct at its own cost the tramway specially adapted to its use and keep the portions of the roadway adjacent thereto in safe condition for other travel, as is now required by statute. These charges are a part of the cost of transportation which the passenger must expect to pay. Beyond this, it is not easy to see why one who carries passengers for hire in a car should be subjected to a tax for the use of the street, any more than one who carries passengers for hire in an omnibus, or who carries merchandise for hire in a dray. The radical objection to the proposed impost is not, however, that it is a burden on the railway company, but that it is a tax on the travelers. A tax on the carrier is a tax on the passenger. Whatever fare the railway passenger might otherwise have to pay, he must pay in addition to that fare his proportion of the tax, and the possibility of the reduction of his fare is to that extent postponed. Nothing has hitherto been more free than the use of the roadway, for all persons, and for all purposes of travel or transportation. There is no good reason why the person who travels in a street car should pay, directly or indirectly, for the privilege of traveling on the highway, any more than the person who travels in a public coach or in his private carriage. The two questions, therefore, in regard to the regulation of public-service corporations, which have been a source of great and unmixed trouble to city authorities in other parts of the country, namely, the length of franchise grants and the amount of compensation, are settled in Massachusetts by a uniform rule embodied in the general law. For the rest, the field of regulation is divided between the commissions and the local authorities. But the latter are given a free hand only in matters of purely local concern which cannot be handled to better advantage by the commissions, and only so far as they do not inflict indirect injury on other parts of the State. Home Rule There is very little feeling in Massachusetts that this division of labor is a violation of the principle of "home rule." Nor is there any likelihood that power will be taken from the commissions and placed in the hands of the cities and towns. On the contrary, the commissions are generally accepted as necessary and desirable, and have established their right to a permanent place in the State system of government. It is a question of expediency. Chicago may be able to regulate her public-service corporations effectively without interference from the State, but the ordinary small city cannot command the expert knowledge or the general ability necessary to handle questions of rates and service. It is therefore right and proper that all cities should delegate such duties to a central board which can devote its entire time and attention to these questions and establish a wise and uniform policy for the entire State. But there is another and a stronger reason for regulation by State commissions, which is this: There is hardly a publicservice corporation in Massachusetts, at least, which does not spread beyond the boundaries of a single city or town. street railway system of Boston extends out into the suburbs for miles, and the electric light company of the same city supplies towns as far away as the Rhode Island boundary. These are only typical examples. The public-service corporations of the present have lost their local characteristics and have become distinctly interurban. To leave their regulation to the separate cities and towns would be as unwise as it would be to attempt to regulate interstate commerce through the efforts of the several States. If one city should place too harsh restrictions upon a company, others would suffer in consequence. This is the reason for the instances of commission supervision over the action of municipal authorities in Massachusetts which seem at first sight unwarranted. For example, the local authorities may grant locations to street railway companies when and where they please, and may surround the grant with such conditions and restrictions as they see fit to make; but the railroad commission may review the grant and withhold its approval if it seems to be at all inconsistent with the public interest. This power was not given to the commission on mere theoretical grounds, but as the result of actual experience. Grasping towns had acquired the habit of holding up new street railways, compelling them to widen, regrade or pave the streets or make some other extraordinary expenditure before locations would be granted. Whereever such action was short-sighted and unwise, the other towns on the line shared in the unfortunate results. The personal liberty of the individual is limited by his duty not to injure others, and the same thing applies to cities and towns. The public utilities commissions of Massachusetts do no violence to "home rule;" rather, they protect the equal rights of the various communities and keep them from harming each other. It may safely be said, then, that these commissions are a permanent feature of Massachusetts government. It by no means follows, however, that they will not be changed in form or otherwise improved. The State is watching with great interest the new commissions in New York and Wisconsin. Of course a system of regulation which is admirably adapted to one part of the country may be quite out of place in another. Still, it is quite possible that the experience of the next few years will show beyond question that the Massachusetts system may be improved materially in important respects. The Consolidation of the Commissions Looking into the future, it seems hardly likely that the three present commissions will be consolidated into one. Such a union has certain advantages. It should make it easier to secure good men, and it focuses public attention, which is always desirable. On the other hand, there is danger that the commissioners would be overburdened with work; that they would be able to give too little personal attention to the separate cases which they are called upon to decide. In such an event, the actual work of regulation would fall more and more upon subordinates, who might be exceedingly "efficient," as the modern expression goes, but who usually lack the broad qualities of statesmanship which such work really needs. The people of Massachusetts like to have the commissioners themselves accessible to the public, and are not likely to approve any system which will involve a much greater use of red tape. The railroad and the gas and electric light commissions have existed apart for a long time and have their records and traditions of office. They are not likely to consolidate, but the work now done by the highway commission will probably be assumed, sooner or later, by one of these two boards, or transferred to an independent commission. Force of When it comes to the question of more drastic powers, prophecy is difficult. Up to the present time, the recommendations of the railroad commission have been quite as effective as the orders of the board of gas and electric light commissioners. Public opinion in Massachusetts has a tremendous force, and the corporations are inclined to be reasonable, so it may never be necessary to adopt a very drastic form of regulation. Still, conditions are changing rapidly. At the time when the railroad board was created, and for a long time afterward, there was no dominating influence among the railroads. On the contrary, the companies were numerous and small, managed by residents of the State who generally had some inbred respect for law and decency. It is interesting to speculate as to what might have happened if the State had contained such a dominant personality as Commodore Vanderbilt, with his contempt for any other law than the dictates of his own will and his tremendous grip on the railroad situation. Fortunately Massachusetts has never bred such a man. But New England is now nearing the end of a period of railroad reconstruction. The control of Massachusetts railroads is passing out of the State and into the hands of men not so easily influenced by local public opinion, men stronger and harder to curb. The control of the Boston and Albany some time ago went to the New York Central, and now the Boston and Maine seems to be slipping into the control of interests affiliated with the New York, New Haven and Hartford. What effect this will have upon the efficiency of the commission remains to be seen. The only evidence we have upon the point is the somewhat encouraging fact that the board, backed by the force of an outraged and thoroughly aroused public, did succeed by recommendation alone in overturning the management of the Boston and Albany and changing its administrative policy. Massachusetts has never desired to treat its public-service corporations with a high hand, or to antagonize them unduly. So long, then, as the friendly and peaceful recommendation continues to serve the purpose as well as it has up to the present time, it is not likely to be displaced by the more rigorous order. In certain other respects, it seems probable, even on present evidence, that the New York and Wisconsin commissions have improved on Massachusetts practice. They are organized with a view to systematic and scientific investigation, and have at their command highly paid engineers and a large and adequate staff of inspectors. Massachusetts, fortunately, has not had to deal with many complicated rate questions, for the State is small, and all the important freight rates are interstate. At the same time, the expenses of the commissions have been kept down to a somewhat parsimonious level. The law which established the railroad commission provides that its annual report shall "include such statements, facts and explanations as will disclose the actual working of the system of railroad and railway transportation in its bearing upon the business and prosperity of the Commonwealth," and "such suggestions as to its general railroad and railway policy, or any part thereof, or the condition, affairs or conduct of any corporation or company, as may seem to it appropriate." The laws in regard to the other commissions contain somewhat similar provisions. The tendency, as noted above, has been to interpret this part of the law rather narrowly. While this reflects no discredit upon the commissions, there is good reason to believe that the time has now come when a more positive attitude should be taken. It would seem that a State commission ought to have enough resources at its command so that it can keep thoroughly posted in regard to the best modern practice all over the world among public-service corporations of the kind which it supervises, so that it can have an intimate knowledge of the actual conditions in |