Political The two causes of the political influence and activity of the liquor trade are (1) Regulation and (2) the nature of the retail business. There is a unanimous opinion among all parties to the liquor controversy that the traffic cannot be left entirely free. Even those engaged in the trade do not lay claim to the same degree of freedom enjoyed by other lines of business. But regulation is followed inevitably by political activity. In this connection it should not be forgotten that, from an economic standpoint, the liquor trade, like any other business, is primarily concerned with profits. The object is to manufacture and sell a commodity for profit and the moment regulation curtails freedom of trade the profit of the business is affected and it goes into politics either to secure the enactment of less hampering restrictions or to fight the enforcement of those already enacted. In this respect the liquor trade acts very much as would any other business under similar circumstances. The steel trust is in politics to prevent unfavorable changes in the tariff, and the railroads to prevent additional rate legislation just as the liquor trade is in politics to prevent the passage of prohibition and local option laws and restrictive city ordinances. The economic weight of the liquor traffic when drawn into the political arena is not to be scorned. In 1900 the capital invested in manufacture alone amounted to $457,674,087. There were, at the same time, 52,575 persons drawing their livings from that part of the business either as laborers or salaried employees, while the total value of the manufactured product was $340,615,466. This political strength derived from the economic weight of the trade belongs largely to the brewing industry. Of the total capital of $457,764,087 in 1900, $415,284,468 was devoted to the production of malt liquors. The number of salaried officers and laborers in that branch of the business was 46,655 as against a total of 52,575 for the whole trade, while the brewers' share in the value of the total output was $237,264,713 out of a total of $340,264,713. From this it is easy to understand why it is that in the liquor conflict the brewers appear to be the only branch of the traffic on the manufacturing side definitely interested in the outcome. But aside from the greater economic importance of the brewing industry there is another reason which accounts for its superior political power as compared with that Economic of distillers and producers of vinous liquors. Importance of Owing to the greater cost of distributing the Brewing finished product, as against the cost of transporting the raw material used in manufacture, the tendency is to locate breweries with a view to ease in the distribution of the product rather than with regard to convenient supplies of raw material. In the case of the distilling industry the opposite condition prevails. The cost of distributing the finished product being slight, in comparison with that of transporting raw materials, the plants are located, in the main, with regard to convenient supplies of the latter. The result is that, in addition to the greater capital and labor involved, breweries are much more widely distributed than distilleries. There are few cities of considerable size without one or more brewing plants. Breweries are thus, in a sense, local institutions representing investments of local capital and giving employment to local labor. Hence the deleterious economic effects of an anti-liquor crusade or even of an attempt at reasonable regulation is brought home to the community in a very specific way through the local brewer. The possible disturbance of local investments creates more or less sympathy on the part of capital in general and, at the same time, regulation which threatens even remotely the positions of those employed in the plants causes not only their own opposition but to a certain degree that of organized labor as a whole. From the foregoing it may be seen that the opposition to regulation which might be expected from the industry, owing to the large amount of capital and labor involved, is greatly increased by the wide distribution of the manufacturing establishments of its most important branch. However, if those were the only sources of power, the political influence of the liquor traffic exerted against attempted regulation would not be greater than that of any other industry similarly situated. It is the nature of the retail business which contributes the largest measure of political power. With any other industry which attempted opposition to governmental regulation its means of political influence would practically be limited to those already discussed. But the peculiar organization of the retail side of the liquor traffic adds to the means of influence already mentioned the entire capital and personnel connected with that part of the trade. The Retailer's Aside from tobacco the retailer of liquor usually sells one commodity only. Therefore his profits-in other words his living-is dependent upon the sale of that alone. Any regulation which restricts the market for that article in the slightest degree, by just so much affects his means of livelihood. His interests are at all points bound up with those of the manufacturer and consequently any interference with freedom of trade welds into one complete and organized opposition the capital and personnel of the entire business from the largest producer to the smallest retailer. A restriction upon the sale of a necessity of life will not reduce the consumption below a certain standard. For instance, if sales are forbidden at certain hours it can reasonably be expected that increased sales at other hours will make good the loss. On the other hand regulation of the liquor traffic, which makes it impossible or even inconvenient to purchase at times, results in a diminution of trade never entirely made good. Liquor is not a necessity of life and, consequently, sales prohibited for a certain time are, in large measure, sales lost. The organized opposition of liquor dealers to Sunday closing is readily explained upon this ground. Such opposition may be supported by personal liberty organizations and may clothe itself in the garb of political principle, but in reality the retailer is moved almost entirely by a consideration of profits. But for that the saloonkeeper would be glad to close his shop on Sunday and secure the rest so welcome to merchants of other descriptions. A consideration of the ties which bind the liquor traffic into one complete working organization would be incomplete without mention of the more or less direct control often exercised by the manufacturer over the retailer by ownership of the licensed property, ownership of or mortgage on the saloon fixtures, or by acting as bondsman for the licensee. The exact extent of this direct financial control cannot definitely be stated. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that it sometimes affects a large percentage of the saloons in a given city. The Strength of the Trade Enough has been said to indicate why the entire strength of the trade is easily aligned in opposition to any attempt at regulation which threatens to curtail profits. How formidable a political power the entirely legitimate voting strength of the liquor traffic may be is easily shown. Taking the extremely conservative position that each licensed saloon would probably represent five votes the strength of the trade would be 3700 votes for Indianapolis, about 4000 for Pittsburg, 8500 for New Orleans, 9100 for Cleveland, 11,400 for San Francisco, 35,000 for Chicago and 52,700 for New York City. Probably, to most persons conversant with actual conditions, the control of twice the number of votes we have assigned to each establishment would not appear unreasonable. But it is not simply the voting strength estimated as so many individual units which renders the political force of the liquor trade so potent. To the force of numbers is added the strength which comes from the perfect control produced by unanimity of interest. It is a vote which may be turned in any direction with a promptness which gives it a weight far beyond its mere numerical importance. Even with the strength credited to it by the figures just given it is probably safe to say that ordinarily the trade would be able to command the situation. Under the circumstances it is not remarkable that party leaders are anxious to conciliate and win the liquor vote by promises of more or less freedom from control. In addition to the enormous political power which may be wielded by the trade owing to the identity of interest and intimate relations of all its parts it should not be forgotten that the saloon as an institution is peculiarly fitted to become the center of political influence among certain classes. The description of the saloon as "the poor man's club" is not without an element of truth. Among the poor of our larger cities the open saloon is a place of cheer and comfort at once a relief from the monotony of toil and more attractive than the place called home. Besides it is only too often the only place which offers satisfaction for a real social craving. As places for political meetings and conferences saloons are always convenient and available. Because it adds to his trade the proprietor is glad to welcome such gatherings. Moreover the saloonkeeper himself is in a position to become a leader of those who come regularly to his shop. Although the entertainment which he dispenses is paid for he seems the center of hospitality. His establishment is made a place of convenience, checks are cashed, loans made and charity at times dispensed. As the stream of patrons flow in and out he is party to the gossip and discussion constantly in progress. He thus becomes a repertory of information regarding conditions about him and, of all men in the community, knows its life most intimately. Then again, from a financial point of view, he is likely to be the most important personage of the group in which he moves. This, together with the fact that he mingles upon equal terms with his less fortunate neighbors, adds greatly to his political strength. Hence in communities of a certain type the saloonkeeper is in the best position to attain and hold political leadership. In connection with the political influence which seems to flow naturally to the retail liquor dealer there is one fact of great The Political importance. The political power of the saloon varies with the class which it serves. Indeed, taking the saloon which caters mainly to a laboring population as a point of departure, the political power of the institution appears to decline about in proportion as its patrons rise in the scale of well being. The saloon with a high grade patronage is rarely a considerable political factor and its proprietor is seldom found among the political leaders. Politicians of the type of George B. Cox and Michael Kenna are products of the retail liquor traffic of the lower if not of the thoroughly disreputable class. The significance of this condition needs to be grasped. It indicates at once the source of a part of the influence of the trade and at the same time suggests the points at which remedial measures should be applied. |