since the time of the making of the award. The award constitutes a final adjudication upon all matters in dispute up to the time of the hearing at which the award is made. Upon a review under said paragraph (h) the parties are bound by the proof made as to the injuries received and the disability which ensued on the hearing which resulted in making the award. It would not be proper upon such review to again go into the facts as to the injury and the disability which ensued, as those matters have been finally adjudicated. The board must consider the proof made on review as to whether the disability resulting from the injury has recurred, increased, diminished or ended, in connection with the proof made at the time the award was made. Section 16 of the act requires the board, at its own expense, to provide a stenographer to take the testimony and record all proceedings at the hearing before an arbitrator or committee of arbitration, and requires such stenographer to furnish a transcript of such testimony or proceedings to any person requesting it, upon payment to the stenographer of five cents per one hundred words for the original and three cents per one hundred words for each copy. A review of the award of the committee of arbitration could not properly be had without the board having before it an agreed statement of the facts proven on the original hearing or an authenticated report of the evidence, and it devolved upon Parks to introduce such statement or report in evidence on this hearing before the Industrial Board. The circuit court erred in refusing to set aside the award of the Industrial Board for lack of necessary proof.

On the hearing before the board Parks was permitted to prove his condition from the time of the injury until the hearing. From his testimony it appears that he was in the same condition at the time of this hearing as he was at the time of the hearing before the committee of arbitration and that he had grown no worse since that time. In that state of the record, even had the transcript of the proceedings

before the committee of arbitration been introduced in evidence, the Industrial Board should have dismissed the petition upon the motion of plaintiff in error, for the reason that Parks did not show that his disability had recurred since the hearing which resulted in the decision of July 3, 1915. Simpson Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 366.

For the errors indicated the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to set aside the award of the Industrial Board.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 10955.)

BLANCHE E. LITTLE et al. Appellants, vs. SARAH A. BowMAN et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed December 21, 1916.

1. WILLS-chancellor is presumed to have disregarded incompetent evidence in construing a will. It is presumed that a chancellor in construing a will disregarded incompetent evidence which was heard subject to objection, and although his conclusion conforms to incompetent testimony as to the testator's intention, derived from his declarations which were inadmissible, the presumption is that such testimony was disregarded.

2. SAME a testator's intention, if capable of being ascertained, will be given effect if not in violation of law. In finding the intention of a testator much allowance is made for the ignorance of persons who write wills and are unskillful and imperfectly acquainted with the accurate meaning of language, and if the intention can be ascertained from a consideration of the will in the light of the surrounding circumstances, without resort to the declarations of the testator, such intention will be given effect if not contrary to a rule of law.

3. SAME when attempt to express intention must be regarded as abortive and the disposition void. If the court is unable to determine from the language used in the will, in the light of surrounding circumstances, what the testator intended, his effort to express an intention must be regarded as abortive and the attempted disposition of his property as void.

4. SAME when valid portion of will may be sustained although the rest is invalid. Where there are invalid provisions in a will but the valid and invalid parts may be separated the will may be sustained in so far as it is valid, provided the general intent of the testator is not defeated thereby.

5. SAME a limitation repugnant to the estate devised is void. A clause in a will limiting or qualifying a fee simple estate devised in a preceding clause by attempting to restrain the devisee from alienating the estate is repugnant to the interest devised and is void, but the devise of the estate will be sustained.

6. SAME-language qualifying a fee simple previously devised must be clear and unequivocal. Where a fee simple estate is devised by will it may be reduced, qualified or cut down by subsequent language used in the will, but the language relied upon for that purpose must be clear and unequivocal.

7. SAME when subsequent language qualifying the fee devised will be rejected. Where a testator devises an estate in fee to his two daughters with subsequent language attempting to qualify the estate as to one, but the court is unable to determine as to which one the qualification was intended or what the intention of the testator was with reference to limiting or cutting down the estate devised, the attempted qualification will be disregarded and the two daughters will take the absolute fee.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. F. D. RAMSAY, Judge, presiding.

J. T. & S. R. KENWORTHY, for appellants.

JACKSON, HURST & STAFFORD, and OAKLEAF & OAKLEAF, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

This appeal is from a decree of the circuit court of Rock Island county construing the will of Edward H. Bowman in a suit brought for that purpose by the appellants, Blanche E. Little and her two children, Alice T. Johnson and Andrew W. Little, against the appellees, Sarah A. Bowman and Edward M. Rogers, owner of a mortgage made by her.

The testator, Edward H. Bowman, died on November 30, 1893, and by his will, after stating that he was moved. thereto by just regard for the future welfare, peace and comfort of his wife and their two daughters, provided as follows:

"I hereby bequeath to my wife Elizabeth Ann (all my estate real and personal) to have and to hold with all the rents, fees and profits thereof during her life, if she so elects, and (at her decease to be equally divided between our two daughters, Sarah Annette and Blanche Elizabeth.) The real estate called Oakland, containing two hundred and eighty acres, to be appraised, previous to division, by three appraisers to be mutually agreed upon by my two daughters aforesaid. If either of my daughters prefers to live on the place she is to have the privilege of purchasing the other share at the appraisement on such terms, as to the time of payment, as may be mutually agreed. Should my wife so elect during her lifetime (the division may be made at any time) she sees fit, (and I hereby appoint my son Samuel C. Bowman, trustee, to have and to hold the interest of his sister for her benefit and profit during her life and at her decease to be conveyed to the children of his sister Blanche Elizabeth,) and it is expressly stipulated that my daughter Blanche shall not have the right or power to use or alienate any of said real estate or the proceeds if sold, but only to use the rents, issues or profits thereof during her lifetime."

The widow, Elizabeth Ann, made no election concerning the devise to her or a division before her death, and she died on April 2, 1898. The bill alleged the true construction of the will to be that Sarah took no estate in the land devised by the will but only an equitable right to an undivided half of the net income during her life; that the legal title would have vested in the trustee named in the will if he had not refused to accept the trust; that the remainder after the life estate of Sarah vested in the children of

Blanche on the death of the testator; that Blanche took an absolute estate of inheritance in fee simple in one undivided half of the real estate and the attempt of the testator to restrain alienation of the same was void; and that Sarah had no estate in the land that she could mortgage, and the mortgage was a cloud upon the title to the remainder in the children of Blanche. The prayer was that the court should construe the will accordingly, appoint a trustee in place of Samuel C. Bowman, who had refused to accept the trust, and set aside the mortgage as a cloud upon the title. The defendants severally answered the bill, disputing the construction claimed by the complainants and alleging that Sarah acquired title in fee simple to an undivided half of the lands; that the trustee never acquired any title or interest and the mortgage was valid, and that by the terms of the will Blanche was given a life estate, and her children, Alice T. Johnson and Andrew W. Little, were vested with the remainder, subject to her life estate. The chancellor heard the evidence and construed the will as vesting a fee in Sarah in an undivided half of the lands and devising a life estate in the other undivided half to Blanche, with the right only to use the income of the lands, or the proceeds in case of sale, during her lifetime, and with remainder to Alice T. Johnson and Andrew W. Little. The decree sustained the mortgage as a valid lien on the interest of Sarah.

The complainants submitted the will to be construed from the language employed by the testator, who wrote it to give expression to his intention. The defendants offered considerable testimony, to the competency of which frequent objections were made. The chancellor upon each objection admitted the evidence subject to the objection, and after hearing the evidence rejected that which was incompetent. The rulings were in accordance with a practice. which is quite common, growing out of the rule of this. court that a decree will be affirmed if there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to sustain it, regardless of im