was a matter of the most perfect notoriety. Lord North, and his predecessors, Lord Grenville and Charles Townshend, had nothing to learn with respect to the influence of posts and places on the minds of men; and it was known very well, that the crown had no very extensive or effective influence, arising from its patronage in North America. It was clear, therefore, that the precise merit of every measure, and its agreeableness to the notions, habits, and interests of the people, were points of the utmost consequence. These ministers were aware, or might have been, that this right of taxation was the particular point on which the Americans were sensitive. Fanaticism, as it was well known, made a part of the national character of America. Its transition from religious to civil liberty was very intelligible; it was part of the instruction even of our own history, in the times of Charles the First. It was known that a state of independence from the mother country was (at least might very possibly be) the ambition of many bolder spirits in America again, that this was even the state to which the prosperity of large and distant colonies naturally tends. Every one was aware, that different opinions existed in America on the justice of the claims of Great Britain; it was, therefore, the obvious policy of the rulers of Great Britain so to deport themselves, that those, who in America undertook their defence, should have as good a case as possible against the opposite party. All these things were or might have been known and understood, and when all that was requested by the petitions from America was, in a word, only the renewal of their situation at the peace in 1763, only a return to the old system; what are we to say, when we see these petitions disregarded, troops sent to Boston, soldiers hired from Germany to force into submission such an immense continent as America, situated on the other side of the Atlantic !

There is a progress in these things, but it is from mistake to folly, from folly to fault, from fault to crime; it is at least from fault, to the shedding of blood in a quarrel, of which the theoretical justice must have been confessed by every one to have been a matter of some debate, but of which the issue, whatever direction it might take, could not have been well expected by any one to be favorable to the real interests of the

mother country, if the question was once reduced to a question of arms.*

* I had observed in the above Lecture, "that for Lord North there could be no excuse; what excuse there is, I have lately, many years after, had an opportunity of ascertaining. ́I have seen papers which show, that Lord North, after the affair at Saratoga, from the beginning of the year 1778, made every effort to procure from the king permission to resign. These ef forts were continually repeated for a long period, but in vain: the king could not give up the idea of coercing America, and therefore could not part with the only man who was, he thought, fit to manage the House of Commons,

LECTURE XXXIV.

AMERICAN WAR.

In my last lecture I endeavoured to exhibit to you the different views that were taken of the same measures and events by the Americans on the one side, and by the British ministers and people on the other. I alluded to passages in the account given by Ramsay, and to passages in the Annual Register; these I recommended to your study. I did so because men fail in the management of a dispute, whether as statesmen or individuals, chiefly because they never enter into the particular views and feelings of those to whom they are opposed. Of this fault in mankind no instances can be produced more strong than those which I yesterday exhibited. Paine, the popular writer of America, considered the English nation as one with which no terms were to be kept, as a "hellish nation," and her soldiers as "murderers," yet were these soldiers sent to enforce the measures of Lord North, the most amiable of men, who thought the sovereignty lay in the parent state; that in the rights of sovereignty was included the right of taxation, and as far as the moral part of the case was concerned, believed himself perfectly justified in asserting the supremacy of Great Britain. In this opinion he was supported by a decided majority of the English nation in and out of parliament, while the pamphlet of Paine, whatever may be justly thought of the coarseness and fury of such terms as I have mentioned, was universally read and admired in America, and is said to have contributed most materially to the vote of independence passed by congress in 1776. Again, the representations of Ramsay, as well as the known facts, display the violence, with which the Americans reasoned and felt, while the pages of the Annual Register show how indifferent or how ignorant were in the mean time the generality of the English people. These are edifying

examples of the nature of the human mind to those who will reflect upon them, and as such I yesterday recommended them to your attention refer to which ever side of the Atlantic you choose, the instruction will be found. I am, however, not speaking to Americans, and it is more fit that I should dwell upon the faults which we ourselves exhibited, more particularly as they lost us half our empire. Certainly there was in England and in her statesmen a total inattention to the particular character, feelings, and opinions of the American people; and to direct your reflection to this particular part, and most important part of the subject, was, as I have already mentioned, the business of the lecture of yesterday. But I meant you also to see at the same time what I conceive to be the great political lesson of the American dispute, the impolicy of harsh government; and this, which is the lesson of the American dispute, is also the great lesson of history. I have never failed to point it out to you. There is an instance of this kind very memorable in the annals of Europe, to which I called your attention in a former lecture, as it bears a certain resemblance in many important points to the case before us. I will now again allude to it, and again request you to consider it; it is the instance of the Low Countries and Spain. It can scarcely be necessary to say that no comparison is intended between the project of introducing the Inquisition in the one case and the Stamp Act in the other; but there is a certain analogy in the want of policy in the two cabinets at these different periods, which is sufficiently strong to be worth your observation; in each case the great question was coercion or not, harsh government or mild.

The lessons of history are neglected by those who are too intemperate to listen to any admonition, from whatever quarter it may come, and by those who have not philosophy enough either to relish historical inquiries, or to separate principles from the particular circumstances by which they may be surrounded.

To mark, however, the common appearance of any great principles in the case that is past, and in the case before us, is to read history with proper advantage; and to see, or not to see, instruction of this kind, is the great distinction between the statesman who may be trusted in critical times, and the

mere man of office, who, in all such critical times, is more likely to injure than to serve his country.

In a former lecture, when alluding to the great struggle between Spain and the Low Countries, as I have already said, I mentioned the analogy in many important points between this great contest and our own American dispute. I have since found, on examining the debates in the commons, that the instance of the Flemings, and their successful resistance to the Spanish monarchy, was not overlooked; it was alluded to by Governor Johnstone, and it is probable that he insisted upon it at some length. I shall make a short reference to the historian Bentivoglio, and take the common translation, that you may not be listening to any representations of mine. You will see the leading points of similarity, I doubt not, without any assistance from me.

"The council of Spain," says Bentivoglio, "was full of eminent personages; among the rest, the Duke of Alva and the Duke of Feria were in great esteem both with the king and council; these two were of different opinions. Upon a certain day, then, when the king himself was in council to resolve what was to be done, the Duke of Feria spake thus - To provide for the evils with which Flanders is afflicted, it is very necessary first to know the causes, and these without doubt ought chiefly to be attributed to the terror which the inquisition and other edicts have infused into that country. The Flemish have apprehended, and do apprehend now more than ever, to have their consciences violated by such ways, and to undergo all other greater affliction and misery; and this is what has made them fall at last into so many and so heinous outrages. Flanders at present labors under a frenzy of fear, if I may so call it. If the bare name of inquisition hath put Flanders into such commotions, what will that nation do when they shall see themselves threatened with the forces of a foreign army? What fear, what horror, will they thereat conceive! They will believe that the government of Spain will be by force brought into Flanders; that their privileges will be violated, their institutions overthrown, their faults severely punished, their liberties oppressed by governors, and finally be buried under citadels.

"People's fear doth ofttimes degenerate into desperation;