2. The next is a capacity to comprehend the particular facts to which he bears testimony.

3. Full opportunity to have observed the facts, together with evidence that adequate attention was given to them at the time.

4. Evidence that the occurrence was of such a nature that the individual was not deceived at the time, and that it sustains such a relation to the individual, as to preclude the reasonable apprehension that his memory has failed him in respect to it.

5. An entire consistency between the statements of the witness and his conduct in respect to the events, the occurrence of which he affirms. If an individual affirms his entire confidence in the veracity of a certain person, and his entire treatment of him is in full harmony with his statements, we are bound to admit the truth of what the witness testifies in relation to his own convictions.

CORROBORATING CIRCUMSTANCES ASIDE FROM THE CHARACTER OF THE WITNESS.

But there are circumstances often attending the testimony of a witness, totally disconnected with the question of his veracity, which demand our confidence. Among these, I specify the following:

1. The entire absence of all motives to give false testimony. This principle is based upon the assumption, that men do not act without some motive, and that consequently they will not ordinarily violate the principles of truth without some temptation to do it.

2. When no assignable motives exist to induce an individual to make a given statement, if he is not convinced of its truth, and when strong motives impel him to deny it, especially if it be false, then we recognize ourselves as obligated to

believe his statements without reference to his moral character at all.

3. Another circumstance which tends strongly to corroborate the statements of a witness is this: When the facts affirmed lie along the line of our own experience in similar circumstances. This, however, is not a safe principle to rely upon, in the absence of other circumstances of strong corroboration. Villains often throw their statements into harmony with experience, for the purpose of covering their dark designs. 4. When, though new, they accord with the known powers of the agent to whom they are ascribed.

5. When these facts stand connected with the development of laws and properties in the agent, before unknown.

Under such circumstances, the further removed from experience the facts are, the greater the probability of their being true. Because the greater the probability that they would, if not true, have been unknown to the witness.

CONCURRENT TESTIMONY.

The confidence which we repose in the affirmations of a witness is greatly strengthened by the concurrent testimony of other individuals. Here the following circumstances should be especially taken into the account:

1. When each witness possesses all the marks of credibility above refered to.

2. When there is an entire concurrence in their statements, or a concurrence in respect to all material facts.

3. When the characters of the several witnesses are widely different, as friends and enemies, &c., and who of course must be influenced by widely different motives, and even by those directly the opposite; especially when their character, motives, and relations to the subject, are so different as to preclude the supposition of a collusion between the witnesses.

4. When one witness states facts omitted by others, and when all the statements together make up a complete account of the whole transaction.

5. When there are apparent contradictions between the statements of the witnesses, which a more enlarged acquaintance with the whole subject fully reconciles. Such occurrences in testimony preclude the supposition of collusion, and present each individual as an independent, honest witness in the case.

6. Coincidences often occur in the statements of witnesses which, from the nature of the case, are manifestly undesigned. When such occurences attend the testimony of various individuals, all affirming the same great leading facts, they tend strongly to confirm the testimony given. This principle is most beautifully illustrated by Dr. Paley, in his Hora Pauli—a work deserving more attention than almost anything else the Doctor ever wrote.

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Great care and sound judgment are requisite in the application of the principles above stated. When they are fulfilled in the case of testimony pertaining to any subject, it would be the height of presumption and moral depravity in us not to act upon it as true. Infinite interests may be safely based upon the validity of such testimony. We are often necessitated to decide and act, however, in the absence of testimony thus full and complete, and often upon testimony failing in many respects of the marks of credibility above laid down. To discern between the valid and the invalid — to determine correctly when to trust and when to withhold confidence, requires stern integrity of heart, and a Judgment, "by reason of use exercised" to distinguish the true from the false.

CHAPTER XVII.

REASONING.

THE distinction between Reasoning and Investigation was made plain in the last Chapter. The former process has nothing to do with the discovery of truth. Its exclusive object is the establishment of truth already discovered. It belongs to Intellectual Philosophy to develop the laws of Reasoning — that is, to develop those laws which control the action of the Intelligence, when drawing conclusions from premises laid down.

THE SYLLOGISM THE UNIVERSAL FORM OF REASONING.

I will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by the following quotation from Whately's Logic:

"In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of argument, either for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted." Again: "In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will be found that every conclusion is deduced in reality from two other propositions (thence called premises), for though one of them may be, and commonly is suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admitted; as may be

made evident by supposing the denial of the suppressed premise, which will at once invalidate the argument."

Hence this author affirms, in opposition to the opinion of some on the subject, that the syllogistic is not a particular kind of reasoning, as distinguished from moral or inductive reasoning, for example, but the sole and universal process.

The above Principle verified.

That this author is correct in the principle above stated, a very few considerations will render evident.

That all reasoning, purely demonstrative, is strictly conformed to the law of the syllogism, none will deny. As an example and illustration of this kind of reasoning, we may take the following: "Things equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. A and B are each equal to C. Therefore they are equal to one another. The major premise, in all such processes, is either an intuition of Reason, or some proposition previously demonstrated.

But inductive Reasoning has by some been supposed to be an exception, because that, in the syllogism, we go from the general to the particular; whereas, in the inductive process, we reason from the particular to the general. This objection, if valid, would equally exclude almost the entire mass of demonstrative reasoning. Here also we do in reality go from the particular to the universal-that is, the minor premise is particular. This objection assumes also what is not true of the syllogism that is, that in all instances, in the syllogistic form, we reason from the general to the particular. All reasoning is strictly conformed to the laws of the syllogism, wherein a conclusion is legitimately drawn from two premises, a major and a minor. In induction, as well as everywhere else, these two premises appear, the major being almost universally suppressed. In no form of reasoning legitimately conducted