to the State governments, and more provocative of conflicts between the general government and the States, and less likely to have been what the framers of the Constitution intended, it would be difficult to imagine. We find no provisions in any of the sections of the statute under consideration, the object and purpose of which are to exert the jurisdiction of the State over persons or property or transactions within the limits of other States; or to act upon intoxicating liquors as exports, or while they are in process of exportation or importation. Its avowed object is to prevent, not the carrying of intoxicating liquors out of the State, but to prevent their manufacture, except for specified purposes, within the State. It is true, that notwithstanding its purposes and ends are restricted to the jurisdictional limits of the State of Iowa, and apply to transactions wholly internal and between its own citizens, its effects may reach beyond the State, by lessening the amount of intoxicating liquors exported. But it does not follow, that because the products of a domestic manufacture may ultimately become the subjects of inter-State commerce, at the pleasure of the manufacturer, the legislation of the State respecting such manufacture is an attempted exercise of the power to regulate commerce exclusively conferred upon Congress. Can it be said that a refusal of a State to allow articles to be manufactured within her borders (for export) any more directly or materially affects her external commerce than does her action in forbidding the retail within her borders of the same articles after they have left the hands of the importers? That the latter could be done was decided years ago, and we think there is no practical difference in principle between the two cases. "As has been often said, legislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and persons engaging in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution," unless under the guise of police regulations, it imposes a direct burden upon inter-State commerce, or directly interferes with its freedom. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 487, Chief Justice Waite delivering the opinion of the court in that case, citing Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Railroad Co. v. Iowa, id. 155; Willson v. Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, and Cooley v. Board, etc., 12 How. 299. We have seen that whether a State, in the exercise of its indisputed power of local administration, can enact a statute prohibiting within its limits the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, except for certain purposes, is not any longer an open question before this court. Is that right to be overthrown by the fact that the manufacturer intends to export the liquors when made? Does the statute, in omitting to except from its operation the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within the limits of the State for export, constitute an unauthorized interference with the power given to Congress to regulate commerce? These questions are well answered in the language of the court in the License Tax Cases, 5 Wall, 470: "Over this commerce and trade [the internal commerce and domestic trade of the States] Congress has no power of regulation, nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the Legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject." The manufacture of intoxicating liquors in a State is none the less business within that State because the manufacturer intends at his convenience to export such liquors to foreign countries or to other States. This court has already decided that the fact that an article was manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of inter-State commerce within the meaning of section 8, article 1, of the Constitution, and that the intent of the manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the control of the State and belongs to commerce. We refer to the case of Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517. In that case certain logs cut at a place in New Hampshire had been hauled to the towIL of Errol, on the Androscoggin river, in that State, for the purpose of transportation beyond the limits of that State to Lewiston, Me.; and were held at Errol for a convenient opportunity for such transportation. The selectmen of the town assessed on the logs State, county, town and school taxes; and the question before the court was whether these logs were liable to be taxed like other property in the State of New Hampshire. The court held them to be so liable, and said, Mr. Justice Bradley delivering the opinion: “Do the owner's state of mind in relation to the goods, that is, his intent to export them, and his partial preparation to do so, exempt them from taxation? This is the precise question for solution. * There must be * * a point of time when they cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law and begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose, in which they commence their final movement for transportation from the State of their origin to that of their destination. When the products of the farm or the forest are collected and brought in from the surrounding country to a town or station serving as an entrepot for that particular region, whether on a river or line of railroad, such products are not yet exports, nor are they in process of exportation, nor is exportation begun until they are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the State to the State of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that State. Until then it is reasonable to regard them as not only within the State of their origin, but as a part of the general mass of property of that State, subject to its jurisdiction, and liable to taxation there, if not taxed by reason of their being intended for exportation, but taxed without any discrimination, in the usual way and manner in which such property is taxed in the State. ** The point of time when State jurisdiction over the commodities of commerce begins and ends is not an easy matter to designate or define, and yet it is highly important, both to the shipper and to the State, that it should be clearly defined, so as to avoid all ambiguity or question. * * But no definite rule has been adopted with regard to the point of time at which the taxing power of the State ceases as to goods exported to a foreign country or to another State. What we have already said however in relation to the products of a State intended for exportation to another State, will indicate the view which seems to us the sound one on that subject, namely, that such goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject as such to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey. * It is true, it was said in the case of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall, 557, 565: Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced.' But * * * this movement does not begin until the articles have been shipped or started for transportation from the one State to the other." The application of the principles above announced to the case under consideration leads to a conclusion against the contention of the plaintiff in error. The police power of a State is as broad and plenary as its taxing power, and property within the State is subject to the operations of the former so long as it is within the regulating restrictions of the latter. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is affirmed. thorizing such leases to be made. Oct. 26, 1888. Kingsland v. Mayor. Opinion by Finch, J.; Ruger, C. J., and Gray, J., dissenting. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ACTION BY ONE ADMINISTRATOR ON JOINT AND SEVERAL BOND.-The letters of one administrator had been revoked, and on an accounting he was ordered to pay to the remaining administrator the sum found due and not paid over by him. The decree having been properly docketed, and executions returned unsatisfied, the surrogate or dered that his bond be assigned to the remaining administrator, and that he be permitted to sue on it. Held, that though the bond was by both administrators and the sureties, jointly and severally, the remaining administrator might sue under the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 2607, providing for suit on the official bond of an administrator, etc., against whose property an execution on a surrogate's decree has been returned unsatisfied, by and in the name of the person aggrieved, to recover the sum uncollected. Boyle v. St. John, 28 Hun, 454. Oct. 26, 1888. Sperb v. McCoun. Opinion by Earl, J. LICENSE- PAROL· ACQUIESCENCE.-(1) An oral agreement by which one gives to another the privilege to take from a spring of the former sufficient water for domestic purposes, through a pipe from the spring, is a mere license, which is revoked by a subsequent deed from the licensor granting to a third person the privilege of bringing from the spring sufficient water to fill a pipe of a size drawing all the water that there is in the spring. Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31, and Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 id. 323. (2) The use by the licensee after this revocation of sufficient water from the spring for his domestic purposes, under a claim of right, is an adverse user as against the grantee in the deed, though both of them use the same pipe from the spring, and the licensee taps it on his own land, and such a user for more than twenty years by the licensee and his REVOCATION-ADVERSE USER APPEAL STATE LANDS UNDER NAVIGABLE WATERS -COMMISSIONERS' RIGHT OF APPEAL.-(1) On reversal by the Supreme Court of a decision of the land commissioners as to the title to certain land under the waters of Lake Ontario, the proceedings being instituted under the Revised Statutes of New York, part 1, chapter 9, article 4, section 67, as amended by Laws of 1850, chapter 283, section 1, giving the commissioners power to grant so much land under navigable waters as they should deem necessary to promote commerce, etc., the commissioners may appeal to the Court of Appeals, and may be either appellants or respondents on such appeals. While they did not have any property or pecuniary interest in the matter in controversy, they were nevertheless, we think, in a legal sense, aggrieved by the decision appealed from. That officers thus situated may be both appellants and respondents upon appeals to this court is shown by the uniform practice for many years. Allen v. Commissioners, 38 N. Y. 312; People v. Commissioners, 99 id. 618; People v. McCarthy, 102 id. 630; People v. Chapin, 104 id. 96; People v. Chapin, 104 id. 369; People v. Chapin, 106 id. 265. The case of People v. Lawrence, 107 id. 607, is not an authority for this motion. (2) The successful party under the commissioners' decis-grantees, the grantee in the deed and those claiming ion, not having been made a party to the certiorari proceedings before the Supreme Court, as authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 2137, cannot appeal to the Court of Appeals, but such court may permit its counsel to be heard on the appeal of the commissioners. Oct. 9, 1888. People, ex rel. Burnham, v. Jones. Opinion by Earl, J. EMINENT DOMAIN-DESTRUCTION OF WHARF-RIGHTS -COMPENSATION-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-(1) Under the Acts of New York, 1871, chapter 574, providing a new dock system for New York harbor, by which the wharves of private owners were to be purchased by the city, or acquired by eminent domain, the owner of a bulk-head may recover damages against the city for the construction of a bulk-head in front of his, thereby destroying his wharf-rights. Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129, and Williams v. Same, 105 N. Y. 419. (2) Though the city has granted plaintiff's lessees a revocable license to build a shed on a platform in front of the bulk-head, greatly increasing its value, in violation of statutory provisions, and the act of 1875, known as the "Shedding Act," authorizing the city dock department to grant permits for the construction of sheds on piers and bulk-heads, neither the additional revenue from such improvement, nor any prospective continuance of the license, should be considered in measuring plaintiff's damages, as said act applies only to sheds built on and not in front of bulkheads, and at most only legalizes the license, which still remains revocable. (3) Such damages are not measured solely by the loss of legal wharfage and cranage, but may be based on the increased rental derived from leasing it exclusively to steamship compamies, under the act of New York, 1858, chapter 261, au under him acquiescing, gives a right to its continuance. Oct. 26, 1888. Eckerson v. Crippen. Opinion by Peckham J.; Andrews, J., dissenting. WILLS-ATTESTATION-FAILURE TO SEE SIGNATURE. -The attesting witnesses must see the testator's signature at the time of the attestation, and it is not sufficient that at his request they sign an attestation clause to a will so folded that they can neither see whether it is signed or sealed, although he tells them that it is his will, and that it is ready for their signatures. In Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 221, where the alleged will was not subscribed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and when they signed their names to it it was so folded that they could not see whether it was signed by him or not, and the only acknowledgment or declaration made by him to them, or in their presence, as to the instrument, was, "I declare the within to be my will and deed," it was held that this was not a sufficient acknowledgment of his subscription to the witnesses within the statute. In that case Allen, J., writing the opinion, said: "A signature neither seen, identified, or in any manner referred to as a separate and distinct thing, cannot in any just sense be said to be acknowledged by a refer ence to the entire instrument by name to which the signature may or may not be at the time subscribed." In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 16 Hun, 97, affirmed in this court in 77 N. Y. 596, the deceased came into a store where two persons were, and produced a paper, and said: "I have a paper which I want you to sign." One of the persons took the paper and saw what it was and the signature of the deceased. The testator then said: This is my will; I want you to witness it." Both of the persons thereupon signed the paper as witnesses, under the attestation clause. The deceased then took the paper and said: "I declare this to be my last will and testament," and delivered it to one of the witnesses for safe-keeping. At the time when this took place the paper had the name of the deceased at the end thereof. It was held that the will was not properly executed, for the reason that one of the witnesses did not see the testator's signature, and as to that witness there was not a sufficient acknowledgment of the signature or a proper attestation. It is true that in Willis v. Mott, 36 N. Y. 486, 491, Davies, C. J., writing the opinion of the court, said that "the statute does not require that the testator shall exhibit his subscription to the will at the time he makes the acknowledgment, It would therefore follow that when the subscription is acknowledged to an attesting witness it is not essential that the signature be exhibited to the witness." This is a mere dictum, unnecessary to the decision in that case, and therefore cannot have weight as authority. The formalities prescribed by the statute are safeguards thrown around the testator to prevent fraud and imposition. To this end the witnesses should either see the testator subscribe his name, or he should, the signature being visible to him and to them, acknowledge it to be his signature. Otherwise imposition might be possible, and sometimes the purpose of the statute might be frustrated. Oct. 26, 1888. In re Mackay's Will. Opinion by Earl, J. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MASTER AND SERVANT-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCESCONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-Plaintiff, a brakeman on defendant's freight train, while making a trip on a very cold, stormy night, discovered that a step was missing from one of the cars between his post and the caboose, and at once notified the conductor, who promised to drop the car at a certain point if he found it did not contain perishable freight. Before reaching that point the train stopped at a station, and plaintiff went back to the caboose, as was the custom, to eat breakfast and warm himself. The train suddenly started, and plaintiff hastily ran out over the cars to resume his post, as was his duty. When he reached the defective car he forgot about the missing step,and in attempting to let himself down, fell and was injured. Held, that the question of contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury, and the court erred in granting a nonsuit on that ground. Oct. 22, 1888. Kane v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co. Opinion by Harlan, J. PARTITION -PROBATE JURISDICTION CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PETITION BY WIDOW AS "ADMINISTRATRIX "-PARTITION IN PROCEEDINGS FOR SETTLEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION-ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE-MINORS -REPRESENTATIVE.-(1) By article 6, section 6, of the Constitution of California, 1862, the District courts have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property. Article 6, section 8, of the Constitution of California, after conferring upon the county courts original jurisdiction in certain cases, provides that "the county judges shall also hold in their several counties probate courts, and perform such duties as probate judges as may be prescribed by law." Held, that a suit for partition among heirs, after distribution in the probate court defining their undivided interests, neither the title of the decedent nor the fact of heirship being disputed, is a matter which may be committed to probate courts according to the jurisdiction usually pertaining to them; and hence that the provisions of the California Code of -Civil Procedure (sections 1581, 1634, 1665, 1666, 1668, 1675, et seq.), conferring jurisdiction of partition in such cases upon probate courts, are not in conflict with the constitutional provisions as to the original jurisdiction of district courts. (2) The fact that a petition for partition of the estate of the decedent is signed by the widow "as administratrix," the petition embracing her claim as widow and heir to a share in the estate, and containing a distinct prayer that partition be had between herself and children, does not invalidate the proceedings as being instituted by a person having no interest in the partition. (3) Nor does the fact that the partition was asked for in the same proceeding by which the administratrix sought for final settlement and distribution render the decree of partition void; the record showing that the question of partition was not considered until after the decree of final settlement and distribution. (4) The omission of the names of the minor children from the order to show cause why there should not be a final settlement, distribution and partition, did not affect the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties, where the petition and order appointing an attorney to represent the minors contained the names of all interested in the proceedings. (5) A suit for partition in a probate court is a "special proceeding," and minors may be represented by an attorney appointed by the court, under section 1718 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, providing that "at or before the hearing of the petitions and contests for * ** settlements, partitions and distributions of estates, *"the court must appoint some competent attorney to represent the parties interested who are minors, and have no general guardian in the county. Oct. 22, 1888. Robinson v. Fair. Opinion by Harlan, J. * * * * * 66 RAILROADS-CONSOLIDATION-MUNICIPAL AID-ESTOPPEL TO DENY REGULARITY.-(1) The Missouri act of March 2, 1869, provides that any railroad company organized under the laws of that State, whose track shall at the line of the State connect with the track of the railroad of any company organized under the laws of any adjoining State," may consolidate with such company. Held, that this statute authorized a consolidation of an existing domestic company with a foreign one, although the former had not then constructed its road. (2) The township of C., in L. county, Mo., voted bonds in aid of the C. & O. Ry. Co., whose road was not then built, and whose articles of association declared that its object was to construct and operate a railroad from C. to such point' on the line between Missouri and Iowa as should be deemed the best route for operating a road between C. and Omaha, Neb. Before the bonds were issued by the County Court the C. & O. consolidated with an Iowa company, and the consolidated company proceeded to construct and operate a road from St. Louis, by way of C., to Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha. The bonds were issued to the consolidated company. Held, that as the purpose for which the C. & O. company was organized could not have been carried out except by the consolidation, the existing statutory provision therefor became a part of the contract with the township, and the issuance of bonds to the consolidated company was valid. (3) The County Court having been designated by the statute as the proper authority to determine the existence of the conditions requisite to authorize the subscription by the township to the railroad company's stock, and the consequent issuance of bonds, the fact of the issue thereof by the County Court under its seal, with the recital that all the necessary steps have been taken, and the fact that the county has for several years paid the interest accruing on the bonds, estop the county from urging, as against a bona fide holder, the existence of any mere irregularity in making the subscription or issuing the BAILMENT -FOR HIRE- NEGLIGENCE OF BAILEEBURDEN OF PROOF.—In an action on the case for negligence against the bailee of a horse for hire, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove negligence, and it is not shifted by merely showing that the horse was sound when delivered to the bailee, and when returned that it was injured in a way that does not ordinarily occur without negligence. The facts may have been true, and the defendant guiltless of any improper conduct in respect to the horse. The injuries may have arisen from some cause wholly disconnected with the care or use of the horse. However patent the facts tending to establish the defendant's guilt may be, there is no time during the trial that the plaintiffs are entitled to have them withdrawn from the consideration of the jury, and a verdict ordered, upon a simple showing that the horse, when returned, was not in the condition it was in at the time of the bailment, as stated in the request. This case should be distinguished from those where the defendant is under an obligation to return or deliver property in the condition that it was in when he received it. In suits against common carriers, innkeepers, and perhaps some others, a different rule may apply. The cases mainly relied upon by the plaintiffs do not aid them. Collins v. Bennett, 46 N. Y. 490, was an action of trover, and a conversion of the horse, as the court said, was clearly proved, and no question could therefore arise as to the burden of proof." The discussion of Peckham, J., of a question which he says was not in the case is not law. The cases cited by him in support of his views are mainly those against common carriers and innkeepers. Logan v. Mathews, 6 Penn. St. 417, is a case very similar to this in its facts; but the instructions of the trial court, which were sustained, were: "When the bailee returns the property in a damaged condition, and fails, either at the time or subsequently, to give any account of the matter, in order to explain how it occurred, the law will authorize the presumption of negligence on his part. But when he gives an account, although it may be a general one, of the cause, and shows the occasion of the injury, it then devolves on the plaintiff to prove negligence, unskillfulness or misconduct." We by no means concede this charge to be law; but if it is, the plaintiffs' case is not within it, as it does not appear that the defendant failed to give an account of his expedition, and his testimony tended to deny and disprove every claim and contention of plaintiffs tending to fix any liability upon him "-in which contingency, as the rule is laid down in that case, it devolved on the plaintiffs to show negligence. Neither is the case cited of Rowell v. Fuller's Estate, 59 Vt. 688, in point. That action was assumpsit to enforce a contract obligation to return notes on demand. If the defendant did not fulfill his contract, and failed to return the notes, he was liable, and the burden was upon him to show the cause of his failure, if he wished to be relieved from it. We understand our ruling upon this question has always been the doctrine of the English courts, applied in some instances even to common carriers. Cooper v. Barton, 3 Camp. 5, note, "was an action of assumpsit for not taking proper care of a horse hired by defendant of plaintiff. The plaintiff proved the hiring of the horse; that it was returned to him with its knees broken, in consequence of a fall, whilst used by the defendant; and that the horse had before that time been often let out to hire, and had never fallen down. The plaintiff contended that this was a sufficient case to go to the jury, although he had given no evidence of negligence, because, as he had shown that the horse was a good horse, and not in the habit of falling, it must be presumed that the fall was occasioned by negligence, and it was for the defendant to prove the contrary, if he could. Lé Blanc, J., however, said that the plaintiff must give some evidence of negligence; and as he had given none in this case, the plaintiff must be nonsuited." The same rule applies to the case of a warehouseman, whose duty is to keep goods intrusted to him with due care. Willett v. Rich (Mass.), 7 N. E. Rep. 776. Bearing in mind the liability of the bailee in a case like the one at bar, there need be no difficulty in arriving at a correct result, and reconciling the cases that apparently are in conflict. Vt. Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1888. Malaney v. Taft. Opinion by Taft, J. WRONG CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS - ·EJECTION TICKET-RECEIVERS.—Plaintiff intending to take passage from N. to C., purchased a ticket which by mistake purported to entitle the holder to passage from C. to N. The road was then in the hands of a receiver, but was subsequently restored to the defendant company. Thereafter, and about four months after purchasing the ticket, defendant's conductor refused to receive it in payment of plaintiff's fare from N. to C., and ejected him. Held, that a verdict was properly directed for defendant, as it was not liable for the mistakes or negligence of the receiver or his agents, and was not bound in the absence of an agree ment to redeem tickets issued by the receiver, and as by retaining the ticket with knowledge of its purport plaintiff ratified the contract according to its terms. (1) There was no evidence tending to show any mistake or negligence on the part of the railway company in the sale of the ticket. The plaintiff purchased the ticket on which he insisted upon being carried, of the receiver, more than four months before he attempted to use it. The mistake in delivering the wrong ticket was the mistake or negligence of the agent of the receiver. The railway company could not be held responsible for injuries resulting from the omissions or mistakes of those who had possession and control of its property without its consent and in opposition to its will. It is settled beyond question that a railroad company, in the absence of a statute imposing liability, is not answerable for injuries resulting from the mistakes or negligence of a receiver or his agents while operating the road. Railroad Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind. 553; Bell v. Railroad Co., 53 id. 57; State v. Railway Co., 17 N. E. Rep. 909 (present term); High Rec., § 396. It is true that the ticket in a sense was evidence of a contract, at least so far as to indicate that the holder thereof had paid his fare from C. to N., but it was a contract made by the plaintiff with the receiver, and in the absence of an express agreement to do so, the railway company was under no obligation to redeem tickets issued by the receiver while he was operating the road. The bond executed by the company to the receiver was to indemnify the latter against all debts and liabilities incurred by him, but these were plainly such debts and liabilities as should be presented to the court within sixty days, and which the court should allow and order paid. ?) Over and above the considerations already me tioned, it is quite clear that the plaintiff had no right of action, and that the jury were properly directed to return a verdict for the defendant. As has been seen, the plaintiff purchased the ticket upon which he insisted he was entitled to ride, and which had been delivered to him by mistake more than four months be fore he presented it for use. He discovered the mistake within a few minutes after receiving the ticket and taking his seat on the car. It is quite probable if the plaintiff, without having ample opportunity to correct the mistake after discovering it, had offered the ticket on the first trip, and had been refused passage, he would have been entitled to recover for any injury in case he had been ejected after having done all he reasonably could to rectify the mistake. The case would then have fallen within the principles declared in Railway Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381, and cases of that class. But having retained the ticket, with full knowledge of its purport, without disclosing the mistake to any one connected with the management of the road, the plaintiff must be regarded as having ratified the contract according to in its terms. Ind. Sup. Ct., Oct. 9, 1888. Godfrey v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co. Opinion by Mitchell, J. * CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSES-STATEMENTS AS TO CREDIT.--Section 532 of the California Penal Code provides that "every person who knowingly and designedly, by false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any person of money or property, * * is punishable," etc. Held, that a statement by defendant that he had credit with the firm on which the draft was drawn for its amount, and that the firm would honor the draft, when he knew that he had no credit with the firm, and that the draft would not be honored or paid, was within the statute. It is true, that to come within the statute, a representation must be of some fact, past or present; but the statement of defendant that he had credit with the firm named for the amount of the draft, and that the firm would honor the draft, when he knew that he had no credit with the firm, and that the draft would not be honored or paid, was sufficient. Among the definitions of the word "credit" are the following: "Credit is confidence or trust reposed in one's ability to pay what he may promise." Abb. Law Dict. "The ability to borrow on the opinion conceived by the lender that he will be repaid." Bouv. Law Dict. "Credit is the capacity of being trusted." Bank v. Trust Co., 3 N. Y., 356. And a false pretense has been defined to be "a representation of some fact or circumstance, calculated to mislead, which is not true." Com. v. Drew, 19 Pick. 184. After quoting this definition, Mr. Bishop says a fuller and practically better one would be: "A false pretense is such a fraudulent representation of an existing or past fact, by one who knows it not to be true, as is adapted to induce the person to whom it is made to part with something of value." 2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 415; and see People v. Jordan, 66 Cal. 10. Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 28, 1888. People v. Wasservogle. Opinion by Belcher, Ch. C. ELECTIONS-QUALIFICATION OF VOTERS-MORMONS -CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Section 1 of article 2 of the Constitution provides that "every male citizen of the United States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution) of the age of twenty-one years and upward, who shall have actually, and not constructively, resided in the State six months, aud in the district or county thirty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that are or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at such election; provided that no person who has been or may be convicted of treason or felony in any State or Territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights, and no person, who after arriving at the age of eighteen years, shall have voluntarily borne arms against the United States, or held civil or military office under the so-called Confederate States, or either of them, unless an amnesty be granted to such by the Federal government; and no idiot or insane person shall be entitled to the privilege of elector." Any citizen possessing the qualifications of an elector, as * defined and declared in this provision of the Constitution, and who is not disqualified by any of the provisions thereof, is entitled to the right of suffrage. It is not within the power of the Legislature to deny, abridge, extend or change the qualifications of a voter as prescribed by the Constitution of the State. Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; Clayton v. Harris, 7 id. 64; State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; State v. Baker, 38 id. 86; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 490; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 685; McCaffrey v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 111; Kiuneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497; Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 162; State v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 222. The Legislature by the act of 1887 adopted additional disqualifications to those mentioned in the Constitution, by declaring in positive terms that "no person shall be allowed to vote at any election in this State * * * who is a member of or belongs to the 'Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,' commonly called the 'Mormon Church,' * (Stat. 1887, p. 107, § 1); and in the same act sought to amend the oath to be administered to the elector by the registry agent, under the provisions of the registration law, by adding thereto that the elector was not a member of nor belonged to "the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, commonly called the Mormon Church.'" Section 2. The act was a direct attempt, in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, to disfranchise the members of the Mormon Church; to deny them the right of suffrage regardless of the question whether or not they possessed the qualifications of an elector as defined in the Constitution. It was sug gested by respondent's counsel that the act of 1887 was perhaps authorized by the provisions of section 6, article 2, of the Constitution which declares that "provision shall be made by law for the registration of the names of the electors within the counties of which they may be residents, and for the ascertainment, by proper proofs, of the persons who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage, as hereby established, to preserve the purity of elections, and to regulate the manner of holding and making returns of the same; and the Legislature shall have power to prescribe by law any other or further rules or oaths as may be deemed necessary, as a test of electoral qualifications." The other or further rules or oaths which the Legislature may prescribe are such as may be deemed necessary "for the ascertainment, by proper proofs, of the persons who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage," as established by the provisions of section 1 of article 2 of the Constitution. Having adopted a provision for the registration of voters, the framers of the Constitution deemed it proper to give the Legislature the power to enact such rules and prescribe such oaths as might be necessary in order to determine who was entitled to be registered; and this could only be done by ascertaining in advance, by proper and reasonable proofs, the persons who would on the day of election, under the provisions of the Constitution, be entitled to vote. If the views suggested by respondent's counsel, that the Legislature has the power, under the guise of adopting further rules or oaths as a test of electoral qualifications, to declare, as set forth in the preamble to the act of 1887, that "it is deemed necessary for the peace and safety of the people of this State to exclude from participation in the electoral franchise all persons belonging to the self-styled 'Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,' commonly called the Mormon Church,'" then of course it could by like methods exclude from the elective franchise all persons belonging to any other church, or members of any particular political party, social organization or benevolent order. In brief, the rights of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution, and of which we boast so much, would be placed entirely at the mercy, will or caprice of the Legislature. The Legislature has |