Co. agree to furnish the material for, and to print and bind, on paper and in character and quality of binding equal to volume 1, Ohio State Reports, in the manner in all respects, and with the expedition as provided by law, a sufficient number of copies of volume 38, and of the next succeeding volume or volumes, if any, of the Ohio State Reports, that might be ready for publication within two years from and after June 23, 1882; to supply the State with a specified number of copies of each volume, when bound, at a specified price per volume; to supply the public with like copies at a specified, limited price; and to set up the matter furnished them in forms of sixteen pages, and furnish to the secretary of state printed copies of such forms. The State agreed that Derby & Co. "shall have the sole and exclusive right to publish the reports aforesaid, so far as the said State of Ohio can confer the same, for and during the said period of two years, commencing with said 23d day of June, 1882, and that they shall moreover be furnished with all the manuscript thereof, to be printed, as provided by law."

Derby & Co. assigned all their right and interest in the contract to Banks & Brothers of New York city. The bill of complaint in the present case was filed by David Banks and A. Bleecker Banks, composing the firm of Banks & Brothers, against G. L. Manchester, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. It sets forth the matters above stated, and avers that Banks & Brothers have proeeeded to carry out all the terms and conditions of the contract, aud that they and the State of Ohio are complying with its conditions; that the Supreme Court of Ohio has decreed that volumes 41 and 42 of the Ohio State Reports shall be published under, and are included in, the terms of the contract, and that no other persons have any right to publish the decisions which are to be contained in said volumes 41 and 42, except as authorized by Banks & Brothers; that the contract was made in pursuance of sections 436 and 43% of the Revised Statutes of Ohio; that the plaintiffs, on October 1, 1884, entered into an arrangement with "The Capital Printing and Publishing Company" of Columbus, Ohio, by which that company was authorized to publish the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, aud of the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio, which were to be contained in, aud to constitute what would be, the 41st and 42d Ohio State Reports, the same to be published in the Ohio Law Journal, a publication owned by said company; that under such arrangement that company, on the 14th of October, 1884, issued its No. 9 of volume 6 of the Ohio Law Journal, and at the same time issued, as a supplement to that number, a certain book or publication, containing among other cases one entitled "The Scioto Valley Railway Company v. McCoy," decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and which would appear as a part of volume 42 of Ohio State Reports, and one entitled "Bierce et al. v. Bierce et al.," decided by the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio, and which would appear as a part of volume 41 of Ohio State Reports, and that before said book was issued, and on the 13th of October, 1884, E. L. De Witt, "reporter for the Supreme Court of Ohio and of the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio, in pursuance of the duties of his office, and for the benefit of the State of Ohio," entered in the office of the librarian of Congress, at Washington, a printed copy of the title of said work, containing the said decisions, and did within ten days thereafter deposit in the said office, at Washington, two complete copies of said book. A copy of the said number of the Ohio Law Journal, with the book as a supplement, containing sixteen printed pages is attached to the bill. It shows the title of the book, or supplement, as entered in the office of the librarian of Congress, and as afterward is

sued, namely, "Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commission of Ohio; " and below the title and table on contents, and on the first page of the book, which is page 17, is printed the following: "Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year eighteen hundred and eightyfour, by E. L. De Witt, for the State of Ohio, in the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. [All rights reserved.]"

The bill avers that that title was printed on each copy of the book issued by the Capital Printing & Publishing Company, as was also the above notice of copyright; that the defendant, on November 5, 1884, issued Nos. 22 and 23 of volume 1 of a book entitled

The American Law Journal," in one of which uumbers he printed and published the said case of Bierce et al. v. Bierce et al., and in the other of which he printed and published the said case of Scioto Valley Ry. Co. v. McCoy; that prior to the said publication by defendant neither of said cases had been published except in the hook so issued on the 14th of October by the Capital Printing & Publishing Company, and that those cases were copied by the defendant from the book so copyrighted by De Witt for the State of Ohio. Copies of such publications of the defendant are annexed to the bill.

It further avers that defendant has declared to the plaintiff, in writing, his intention to disregard their rights, and to continue the publication of the American Law Jouraal of the decisions of the Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.

The prayer of the bill is for an injunction perpetually restraining the defendant from priuting and pub. lishing the decisions which will appear in volumes 41 and 42, Ohio State Reports, and for an injunction to that effect pendente lite.

The defendant answered the bill. The auswer denies that the Supreme Court of Ohio has decreed that volumes 41 and 42 of the Ohio State Reports shall be published under and are included in the terms of the contract with Derby & Co., and that no other persons have the right to publish the decisions which are to be contained in said volumes 41 and 42, except as authorized by the plaintiffs. It also denies that the attempt on the part of Mr. De Witt, the reporter, to obtain a copyright on the book and printed matter described in the bill, and published by the Capital Printing & Publishing Company, was in pursuance of his duties as reporter; and denies that the attempted copyright by the reporter was for the benefit of the State of Ohio, and denies that the contract referred to was made in pursuance of section 436 of the Revised Statutes, but avers that it was made under section 437 and the joint resolution referred to. It also avers that the opinions and decisions of the Supreme Court and Supreme Court Commission of Ohio, referred to in the bill as having been published by the defendant in the American Law Journal, were exclusively the work of the judges composing those courts: that the reporter performed no work in preparing the said opinions and decisions; that it is the universal custom and practice of those courts that the judge to whom is assigned the preparing of the opinion prepares not only the opinion, but also the statement of the case and the syllabus, the latter being subject to revision by the judges concurring in the opinion; that the reporter takes no part and performs no labor in preparing the syllabus, the statement of the case and the opinion; that the duty of the reporter consists in preparing abstracts of arguments of counsel, tables of cases, indexes, reading proof and arranging the cases in their proper order in the volumes of reports; and that the reporter is paid a stated annual salary out of the treasury of the State, fixed by law, and has no pecuniary interest in the publication of the reports. The plaintiffs filed a

here repeated: "Wherever power is lodged it may be abused. But this forms no solid objection against its exercise. Confidence must be reposed somewhere; and if there should be an abuse, it will be a public grievance, for which a remedy may be applied by the Legislature, and is not to be devised by courts of justice." It results from what has been said that it was competent for the Circuit Court, immediately upon the commission, in its presence, of the contempt recited in the order of September 3, to proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts, and punish the offender, without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form. It was not bound to hear any explanation of his motives, if it was satisfied-and we must conclusively presume, from the record before us, that it was satisfied, from what occurred under its own eye and within its hearing-that the ends of justice demanded immediate action, and that no explanation could mitigate his offense, or disprove the fact that he had committed such contempt of its authority and dignity as deserved instant punishment. Whether the facts justified such punishment was for that court to determine under its solemn responsibility to do justice, and to maintain its own dignity and authority. In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 168. Its conclusion upon such facts, we repeat, is not, under the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of this court, open to inquiry or review in this collateral proceeding. Jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner attached instantly upon the contempt being committed in the presence of the court. That jurisdiction was neither surrendered nor lost by delay on the part of the Circuit Court in exercising its power to proceed, without notice and proof, and upon its own view of what occurred, to immediate punishment. The departure of the petitioner from the court-room to another room, near by, in the same building, was his voluntary act. And his departure, without making some apology for or explanation of his conduct, might justly be held to aggravate his offense, and to make it plain that consistently with the public interests there should be no delay upon the part of the court in exerting its power to punish. If in order to avoid punishment he had absconded or fled from the building immediately after his conflict with the marshal, the court in its discretion, and as the circumstances rendered proper, could have ordered process for his arrest, and give him an opportunity, before sending him to jail, to answer the charge of having committed a contempt. But in such a case the failure to order his arrest, and to give him such opportunity or defense, would not affect its power to inflict instant punishment. Jurisdiction to inflict such punishment having attached while he was in the presence of the court, it would not have been defeated or lost by his flight and voluntary absence. Upon this point the decision in Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 268, is instructive. That was a case of contempt committed by a gross assault upon another in open court. The offender immediately left the courthouse and the State. The court made reasonable efforts to procure his personal attendance, and those failing, a judgment was entered in his absence, sentencing him to pay a fine and to be imprisoned for contempt of court. One of the questions presented for determination was whether there was jurisdiction of the person of the absent offender. The court said: The offense was intentionally committed in the presence of the court. When the first blow was struck, that instant the contempt was complete, and jurisdiction attached. It did not depend upon the arrest of the offender, nor upon his being in actual custody, nor even upon his remaining in the presence of the court. When the offense was committed he was in the presence, and constructively at least, in the power of the court. He may by flight escape merited punishment;

but that cannot otherwise affect the right or the power of the court. Before the court could exert its power, the offender, taking advantage of the confusion, absented himself and went beyond the reach of the court; but nevertheless the jurisdiction remained, and it was competent for the court to take such action as might be deemed advisable, leaving the action to be enforced, and the sentence carried into execution, whenever there might be an opportunity to do So. If it was necessary that the judgment should be preceded by a trial, and the facts found upon a judicial hearing, as with ordinary criminal cases, it would be otherwise. But in this proceeding nothing of the kind was required. The judicial eye witnessed the act, and the judicial mind comprehended all the cir cumstances of aggrevation, provocation or mitigation, and the fact being thus judicially established, it only remained for the judicial arm to inflict proper punishment." It is true that the present case differs from the one just cited in that the offender did not attempt by flight to escape punishment for his offense; but that circumstance could not affect the power of the Circuit Court, without trial or further proof, to inflict instant punishment upon the petitioner for the contempt committed in its presence. It was within the discretion of that court, whose dignity he had insulted, and whose authority he had openly defied, to determine whether it should, upon its own view of what occurred, proceed at once to punish him, or postpone action until he was arrested upon process, brought back into its presence, and permitted to make defense. Any abuse of that discretion would be at most an irregularity or error, not affecting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. We have seen that it is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of Eugland and this country, never supposed to be in conflict with the liberty of the citizen, that for direct contempts committed in the face of the court, at least one of superior jurisdiction, the offender may in its discretion be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and without other proof of its actual knowledge of what occurred; and that according to an unbroken chain of authorities, reaching back to the earliest times, such power, although arbitrary in its nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of their functions. Without it judicial tribunals would be at the mercy of the disorderly and violent, who respect neither the laws enacted for the vindication of public and private rights, nor the officers charged with the duty of administering them. To say in case of a contempt such as recited in the or der below that the offender was accused, tried, adjudged to be guilty and imprisoned, without previous notice of the accusation against him and without an opportunity to be heard, is nothing more than an argument or protest against investing any court, how. ever exalted, or however extensive its general jurisdiction, with the power of proceeding summarily, without further proof or trial, for direct contempts committed in its presence. Nor in our judgment is it an accurate characterization of the present case to say that the petitioner's offense was committed "at a time preceding and separate from the commencement of his prosecutiou." His misbehavior in the presence of the court, his voluntary departure from the courtroom without apology for the indignity he put upon the court, his going a few steps, and under the circumstances detailed by him, into the marshal's room in the same building where the court was held, and the making of the order of the commitment, took place substantially on the same occasion, and constituted,in legal effect, one continuous, complete transaction, occurring on the same day, and at the same session of the court. The jurisdiction therefore of the Circuit

Court to enter an order for the offender's arrest and imprisonment was as full and complete as when he was in the court-room in the immediate presence of the judges. Nov. 12, 1888. In re Terry. Opinion by Harlan, J.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-WHAT CONSTITUTES CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.-A preferential assignment by an insolvent firm of a stock of goods for the benefit of creditors, which provides that the assignors shall remain in possession and continue the business, which is not recorded or made known to third parties until an unpreferred creditor is about to obtain judgment, and under which the assignors are allowed to continue the business the same as before until they are declared bankrupts, is void, as being intended to hinder and delay creditors, though no actual fraudulent intent is shown. The principles, if not the exact language, of the statute of 13 Elizabeth, have been accepted in the equitable jurisprudence of nearly all the States of common-law origin, and they are the law of North Carolina, with a modification which is attempted to be applied to this case; that is, that where the question of the validity of an instrument of this kind, or any other conveyance of property, depends upon its fraudulent character, it must be shown that the grantee participated in the fraud and the fact that the grantor alone is guilty of it is not sufficient to invalidate the instrument. Conceding this to be the doctrine of the State of North Carolina, we are of opinion that it can have no important application to the case before us, because the fraud here is one in law, as distinguished from actual fraud; that is to say, that while the parties to this transaction, either grantors or grantees, probably never had in view the ultimate loss of the debts of the unsecured creditors by their acts, and may really have supposed that they were taking the best means to insure payment to them all, yet the law has said that the means which they took is to be regarded as a fraud in law by necessary implication. All experience has shown how very common it is for failing or insolvent debtors who have any considerable means on hand, and especially in cases where a mercantile business of considerable value is still going on, to delude themselves with the idea that, if they can get time, they can pay their debts; that if their creditors will delay until they can make such arragements as they believe themselves capable of, that they will be able to pay everybody, and even to save a very considerable surplus out of their business. This delusion leads them to undertake to obtain this delay by means which the law does not sanction. If the creditors refuse to extend time on their obligations, and thus give them the delay which they deem necessary, or if they fear to expose their condition to their creditors, they adopt, in many instances, the principle of making an absolute sale to certain friends, who will settle up their affairs, and return to them any surplus; or they make assignments or deeds of trust, conveying the title to all their property to some trustee or assignee, and vesting it in them; thus opposing an obstruction to the efforts of creditors at law to collect the amounts which may be due to them. In this manner they frequently take the law into their own hands, and attempt to secure that delay which can only be obtained by the consent of the creditors, or by such a conveyauce as leaves the creditors in no worse condition than they were before. It has always been held that whatever transfer of this character, that is, of the title to property by a failing or insolvent debtor, may be valid, any instrument which secures to the assignor an interest in or an unlimited control over the property conveyed, and which has the effect of hindering or delaying creditors, is void, as being a fraud upon those creditors. A very similar case to the one before us was that of Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 N. Y, 581, in

which the court decided that the mortgage, which, besides permitting the mortgagor, by its terms, to retain possession of the goods, and on its face conferred on him the power to sell and dispose of them as his own, was therefore fraudulent and void in law as to creditors. Another decision of like character was made in Nicholson v. Leavitt, 6 N. Y. 510, the head-note of which correctly expresses what was decided, in the following words: "An assignment by insolvent debtors of their property to trustees for the benefit of their creditors, authorizing the trustees to sell the assigned property upon credit, is fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the assignors." This is founded upon the ground that such a provision has the effect of hindering and delaying creditors. A very instructive case, and very like the one before us, is that of Davis v. Ransom, 18 Ill. 396. A chattel mortgage of a stock of goods had been made, reciting the indebtedness of the mortgagor, but with an agreement that he should keep possession of the goods, and sell them in the usual course of trade. Out of the proceeds he was to pay certain preferred creditors, dividing the remainder pro rata among the others, with the right in the mortgagee to take possession of the property under certain contingencies. This mortgage was held void upon the principles already cited. To the same effect is the case of Bank v. Hunt, 11 Wall. 392, which cites with approval the case of Griswold v. Sheldon, supra. But this whole subject has been so frequently discussed in the American courts that it would be an immense labor to go very extensively into the authorities. The prevailing doctrine however is unquestionably that which we have stated; and its fundamental essence is, that an insolvent debtor making an assignment, even for the benefit of his creditors, cannot reserve to himself any beneficial interest in the property assigned, or interpose any delay, or make provisions which would hinder and delay creditors from their lawful modes of prosecuting their claims. Nov. 19, 1888. Means v. Dowd. Opinion by Miller, J.

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STATUTES - REPEAL-NEW YORK CONSOLIDATION EX POST FACTO - PROSPECTIVE OPERATION (1) The Penal Code of New York, section 72, prescribing the punishment for bribery, repealed New York city charter, section 100, and subsequently the Consolidation Act, the purpose of which was to codify the existing laws local to the city, passed July 1, 1882, to take effect March 1, 1883, re-enacted section 100 as section 58 of the new act. The Penal Code, section 725, which took effect December 1, 1882, excepted from its operation acts granting or amending the charters of municipalities, except as repealed by subsequent laws. The Consolidation Act provided that as to the operation of the two acts, the Penal Code should be treated as taking effect after the former act. Held, that section 725 did not preserve section 100 of the former charter as section 58 of the Consolidation Act, but that section 72 became the law applicable to bribery in the city, as to cases arising after its passage. Following People v. Jaehne, 103 N. Y. 182, and Same v. O'Neill, 109 id. 261. (2) Though said section 72, which increased the penalty for bribery, was by its adoption by the Consolidation Act made applicable to bribery in the city committed before it took effect, and as to such is void, its validity is not affected as to offenses arising after April 1, 1883, when both the Consolidation Act and the Penal Code were in force. Nov. 12, 1888. Jaehne v. People. Opinion by Fuller, C. J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CARRIERS -OF GOODS DELIVERY TO HOLDER OF UNINDORSED BILL OF LADING.-A carrier is liable for