in difficulties; and though he may possibly be sometimes right he never can explain why he is so, or guard against the recurrence of perplexities.

Accuracy of expression will naturally lead to accuracy of thought, for the practice of carefully examining the shades of difference between words is not only useful in regard to writing, but also exercises a most salutary influence upon the thinking power. Now there are grounds to fear that language is, by many, considered as something existing of itself, and independent, rather than as connected with its proper origin, or as to be referred to a higher principle. In studying language we should never lose sight of the fact, that it is the visible and audible expression of the mind, and that, therefore, all the phenomena of language are to be referred for their source to the intellectual powers. It is, then, only by investigating the modes in which Nature works in the human mind, and by patiently observing her operations, that we can expect to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the philosophy of expression. In these researches, the study of metaphysics is our only way to arrive at any satisfactory result, for from no other source can we acquire any solid information on this subject, nor upon any other principles can we safely proceed in our investigations. Though many scholars have displayed wonderful ingenuity and sagacity in philological research, which cannot fail to command the admiration of all who make this subject their study; no one has yet set forth a system of language referable to the human mind, and applicable to human expression; no one has yet tested the significations of words, their differences, their various classes of differences, and the causes of those differences, in such a manner as to reduce them to a system; or has laid down principles to serve as a basis upon which to ground a general and comprehensive classification of our language.

Though the author of the present work is far from pretending to supply this desideratum, he thinks it may be not wholly useless to mention some opinions he has long entertained on the subject, and to explain some principles to assist in forming a plan by which the unpractised writer may be enabled to

avoid the looseness of expression so common with the majority of writers, and to compose in a clear and intelligible style.

It is to be observed, that in every department of science, a classification of its materials is one of the leading principles upon which philosophers have founded their systems. This is a natural and universal principle, drawn from our observation of external objects, and found not in one only, but in every department of natural science. An attempt to acquire solid information upon any other method of instruction will infallibly fill the mind with crude and confused ideas, and impart no sound or lasting knowledge. Hence the maxim “Divide et impera" (divide and conquer) has been successfully applied to every object of human knowledge, and hence it is generally received as the only safe road in which to proceed in every description of study.

Language, among other objects of study, has been subjected to the application of this principle. Grammarians have, accordingly, classified words under the various heads of nouns, verbs, particles, &c., as they observed their signification to possess certain properties. Thus names of things were classed as nouns, names of qualities as adjectives, and names of actions as verbs, &c. But though these classes may be sufficient for grammatical purposes, and though they are sufficient to distinguish the more striking differences of words, they are wholly useless when we wish to distinguish more nicely among those of each class, and between the exact shades of meaning in those more closely related to each other; that is, though there may be no difficulty in determining between a verb and a noun, or between an adjective and a conjunction, we have no unerring principle upon which to found a difference between two nouns or two verbs which approximate closely in signification. Thus the difference between an answer and to answer presents no difficulty as to the grammatical distinction of their two natures; but if we wish to distinguish between to answer and to reply, we are immediately at a loss to determine their respective meanings, because we have no fixed principle upon which to proceed in our investigation of their difference.

It so happens that, in respect of synonymy, the English language presents the student with greater difficulties than any other language of Europe. This peculiarity may be accounted for by its structure, and by the circumstances which led to its formation. The difference of its materials, and the great variety of the respective modes of feeling and expression in those nations which contributed to its formation, are sufficient in themselves to explain the cause of this difficulty. In connection with this remark, it may be observed, that there are many words in our language which, on a superficial view, appear to convey precisely the same signification, and present, even to the scholar, no other than an etymological difference. This is the case with many pairs of words, one of which is of Saxon, and the other of Latin origin, such as: freedomliberty; happiness-felicity; help-assistance; and many others. The notion which many entertain of such words is, that as they were respectively drawn from different sources, and as each word stood in its original language for the same idea, they have no difference of meaning in English. But this must be the notion of those who probably do not bestow much attention on the subject; for it requires but little reflection to convince us that such a fact would be an anomaly in the history of language, and strongly opposed to a first principle of nature. And even supposing that two words could have precisely the same meaning in the same language for a short space of time, it is altogether contrary to every law of language that they should continue in that state for any lengthened period. The intensity with which Nature is said to abhor a vacuum can only be equalled by her abhorrence of identity; an exact sameness is nowhere to be found among her works, and she seems to take delight in baffling every attempt. to interfere with her dominion and oppose her laws. It cannot, however, be denied, (in applying this law to our own case,) that at the Norman conquest in 1066, many words were introduced by the conquerors into England which were identical in meaning with others in common use among the people of the country before the invasion. In fact, at that time, and during a considerable period after, two distinct languages ex

isted in this island: one used by the lord, and the other used by the tiller of the soil. But this state of things could not continue very long: for, by a natural law, as soon as the two dialects amalgamated, and became one language, one of two terms which had till then identically corresponded, either lost a portion of its original meaning, or suffered some alteration in use; or, if this did not happen, it met with the common fate of all words so situated-it disappeared from the language. In this we see the direct effect of a universal law of nature, viz., the necessity for one of two identical things becoming altered, or else the impossibility of its remaining in existence.

There can be little doubt that the same principles of difference which our senses discover in the external world operate in the very constitution of the human mind; and that properties belonging to the nature of material bodies and external action find corresponding conceptions in the mind, and consequently, corresponding expressions in language. Thus, many words may be observed to differ from each other, as the species from the genus, as we may perceive between to do and to make; a very large class of words may be distinguished under the heads of active and passive, as between ability and capacity; the principle of intensity may be observed to operate in the difference between the words to see and to look; others have a positive and negative difference, as between to shun and to avoid, and many, which do not appear to depend on any uniformly acting principle, may be ranged under the head of miscellaneous.

The heads, then, under which the words explained in the body of this work are arranged in their respective sections are:-1. GENERIC and SPECIFIC; 2. ACTIVE and PASSIVE; 3. INTENSITY; 4. POSITIVE and NEGATIVE; and 5. MISCELLANEOUS. It is not pretended that this classification is perfect or complete; but, in the absence of any other, it is hoped it may prove useful to the student, not only in supplying him with the information required concerning the words here treated, but in furnishing him with principles applicable to other pairs of words, not here explained, which may present him with any difficulty.

A very large class of synonymes may be ranged under the heads of GENERIC and SPECIFIC; that is, the one word will be found to differ from the other, as the species from the genus: as in such words as to do and to make; to clothe and to dress; praise and applause, &c. But as these terms, generic and specific, may not be familiar to the generality of young students, it may be useful here to explain them. In their classification of natural objects, philosophers have divided them under three grand heads, or, as they are termed in scientific language, kingdoms. These kingdoms are divided into classes and orders. These orders again are divided into genera, and the genera into species. This system of classification, though it may not be applied so extensively to language as in natural philosophy, will in many cases assist in discovering differences not so easily perceived by the application of any other principle. Rejecting the terms kingdom and class, we may consider the part of speech, as noun or verb, to represent the order; then the genera may be classed under each order as expressing some general or leading principle, and the species under the genus, as describing the latter more particularly. Let it be required to discover the difference between to do and to make :—Applying the principle above explained, both words will fall under the order verb:-as to do expresses general action, it will be the generic; and as to make describes a more specific mode of doing, it will be the specific term. By the same principle, applause will be a species of the genus praise, both belonging to the order noun. Again, robust will be a species of the genus strong, and belonging to the order adjective. In the exercises under this head, we have to do only with the genus and species, for the order, or part of speech, is equally applicable to both words, and will be of no assistance in our endeavour to determine their respective meanings.

It will be here necessary to explain the signification of the terms ACTIVE and PASSIVE as applied to the philosophy of sy◄ nonymy, and under which head the words in the second section of this work are arranged. Many words possess an active or passive meaning, wholly independent of the grammatical sense of these two terms. A word that expresses a passive