GREAT COST OF REVENUE COLLECTIONS.

57

civilization. Bare-faced robbery has been committed, and the poor immigrant who looks to the Institution for protection finds that his helplessness and forlorn condition afford but a readily seized opportunity for imposition and swindling." And yet the Senate of the great State of New York was so debauched by the vicious patronage system that it refused to confirm the man who would have stopped this imposition and swindling! In 1877 the Jay Commission,* among other things, reported to President Hayes that the expense of collecting customs revenue in the United States was more than three times as large as in France, more than four times as large as in Germany, and nearly five times as large as in Great Britain. The revenue collections in this country were then made under the patronage system, while those of the foreign countries named were made under the merit system. Again, the Commission said, on the authority of the New York Chamber of Commerce, that in 1874 it cost the United States about $7,000,000 to collect the duties on imports of the value. of $642,000 000, while in the same year it cost Great Britain only $5,000,000 to collect the duties on imports valued at $1,800,000,000!

Under the patronage system it was frequently difficult to remove incompetent and unworthy officials because of the "influence" of the politicians who vouched for them. "The same vicious, extraneous influence," says Mr. D. B. Eaton, "which puts them in office, keeps them there." Under the merit system they can be

*The Commission was composed of John Jay and Lawrence Turnure of New York and J. H. Robinson of the Department of Justice at Washington. Mr. Jay has since served as a New York State Civil Service Commissioner from 1883 till the fall of 1887, when he and his equally faithful colleague, Henry A. Richmond, were removed without fault of theirs, Mr. Augustus Schoonmaker having resigned in June, 1887.

58

DUPLICITY CAUSED BY PATRONAGE SYSTEM.

readily removed, because there is no power behind the throne to protect them. *

Under the patronage system the President was now and then greatly embarrassed on account of some Congressmen reporting on some applications for office both favorably and unfavorably. Under the merit system Congressmen are not allowed to sign recommendations for office, except as to an applicant's character and residence. J. D. Cox says (North Am. Review, January, 1871, p. 84): “It is no uncommon thing for one who has written a high eulogium on the character and acquirements of a place-hunter, to write a private note begging that his formal indorsement may not be regarded as of any weight, or to seek a private interview, in which he will state that the person is quite the reverse of the picture drawn of him in the testimonial filed." Sometimes, says Mr. Cox, the President and his Secretaries are confronted by both the officeseeker and his sponsor, while in the drawer of the table at which they sit, listening to the latter's mock praises, is the be fore mentioned private note contradicting every word uttered. It is not strange that Mr. Cox should say that Congressmen in those days (1869-70) often apologized for their importunity, nor that an effort was made to stop the disgraceful practice. Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced a bill in 1869 making it a misdemeanor for

* The Chairman: The common question among employés is, "Who is your influence?"

Mr. Graves: That is a standard phrase in the Department, "Who is your influence?" Where persons have very strong influence, they are apt, if any difficulty occurs in the Department, to threaten to go and get their "influence" and have the matter set right. Manliness and independence are destroyed by such a system. (Senate Report No. 576, for 1882, p. 132.)

Mr. Edward O. Graves at the time (1882) had had eighteen years' ex perience in the Treasury Department at Washington,

THE WHITE HOUSE BESIEGED.

59

Congressmen to directly or indirectly recommend men for office, "except such recommendation be in writing, in response to a written request from the President, or head of a Department asking information, or a Senator giving his advice and consent in the manner provided by the Constitution."

The unanimous report of the Senate Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment,* *made on the 15th day of May, 1882, both corroborates and supplements Governor Cox's statements. The following extracts speak for themselves (Senate Report No. 576, for 1882, pp. 2, 3): "It has come to pass that the work of paying political debts and discharging political obligations, of rewarding personal friends and punishing personal foes, is the first to confront each President on assuming the duties of his office. * * * Instead of the study of great questions of statesmanship, of broad and comprehensive administrative policy, either as it may concern this particular country at home, or the relations of this great nation to the other nations of the earth, he must devote himself to the petty business of weighing in the balance the political considerations that shall determine the claim of this friend or that political supporter to the possession of some office of profit or honor under him. * * * The executive mansion is besieged, if not sacked, and its corridors and chambers are crowded each day with the ever-changing but never-ending throng. Every Chief Magistrate, since the evil has grown to its present proportions, has cried out for de

*The Committee was composed of members of both parties as follows: Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, Chairman; George H. Pendleton of Ohio, Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, John I. Mitchell of Pennsylvania, M. C. Butler of South Carolina, James D. Walker of Arkansas, John S. Williams of Kentucky, Edward H. Rollins of New Hampshire, and John P. Jones of Nevada.

60

CONGRESSMEN HAUNTED NIGHT AND DAY.

liverance. Physical endurance even is taxed beyond its power. More than one President is believed to have lost his life from this cause. * * *

"The malign influence of political domination in appointments to office is wide-spread, and reaches out from the President himself to all possible means of approach to the appointing power. It poisons the very air we breathe. No Congressman in accord with the dispenser of power can wholly escape it. It is ever present. When he awakes in the morning it is at his door, and when he retires at night it haunts his chamber. It goes before him, it follows after him, and it meets him on the way. It levies contributions on all the relationships of a Congressman's life, summons kinship and friend. ship and interest to its aid, and imposes upon him a work which is never finished, and from which there is no release. Time is consumed, strength is exhausted, the mind is absorbed, and the vital forces of the legisla tor, mental as well as physical, are spent in the neverending struggle for offices."

Representative John J. Kleiner of Indiana declined a renomination for Congress in 1886 because of the annoyance of officeseekers. As reported by many daily newspapers, he said: "It is no wonder to me that the House was charged with inefficiency last session. The Democratic members were kept so constantly engaged in looking after places for constituents that they had not time to give legislative subjects consideration. I know that I found it impossible to keep the run of current business. The greatest reform we could bring about would be to free Senators and Representatives of all responsibility as to the distribution of offices."

NOTE. The above extracts from the Senate Committee's report appeared originally in a speech of Senator Dawes. (See Congressional Record, Jan. 24, 1882, .p. 1082. Also for his civil service bill.)

CHAPTER V.

THE DANGER OF AN OFFICEHOLDERS' ARISTOCRACY.

The importance of the Subject.-The Cause of and Remedy for Aristocracies.-No danger in Life Tenures when based on Merit.-George William Curtis's opinion of them.-Insolence of Office.

Ir is feared by some that the civil service law system will create an officeholders' aristocracy. This is a matter of importance, and is not to be pooh poohed, notwithstanding the fact that the same system has not only checked the English aristocracy's long monopoly of public office, but has, as before said, so purified the English civil service as to cause the annullment of the act of 1782, an act that disfranchised 40,000 customs, postoffice, and other officials for corrupt practices at elections. But the fear, it may as well be said first as last, so far as officeholders who draw low salaries are concerned, is certainly unfounded, notwithstanding officeholders are human, and are therefore liable to err. The idea of an aristocracy of public inspectors, accountants, weigers, clerks, &c., in this country, is almost ridiculous. It is as improbable perhaps as an aristocracy among soldiers, sailors, or private employés. Mr. E. L. Godkin says ("The Danger of an Officeholding Aristocracy," p. 13): "There is no country in which it would be so hard for an aristocracy of any kind to be built up as this, and probably no class seeking to make itself an aristocracy would. in the United States, have a smaller chance of success than a body composed of un