the citizens alone are interested in them, the general public of the State at large has no interest in them, any more than they have in the waterworks when owned by a city, by which its citizens are supplied with water, and in this very important particular differ from the streets of the city, which are for the benefit of the public generally."'36 As the city is liable for the negligent management of its sewers, an explosion of a sewer underneath residence property is itself entitled to be considered as warranting an inference of some negligence. Notice of facts may be inferred from lapse of time when they are of such a nature as to attract general public attention.37 Where, in consequence of the negligent manner of constructing a sewer, a private lot is flooded by water, the city will be liable for the resulting damage. Such a work is not a matter of supreme necessity involving the safety of the people. Hence, the maxim "salus populi suprema lex" can have no application. The right to the use of the street is a property interest, and the lot holder is as much entitled to protection in it as in the lot itself. Hence, the landowner will be entitled to compensation for the resulting injuries under the State constitution.38 So where water accumulating on the street by reason of obstruction to the catch basins of sewers, overflows and damages private property, the rule of surface water being a common enemy which everyone may fight off his own premises, has no application, since the property owner had a right to rely on sewers built at the expense of the property owner for the purpose, among others, of conveying off such surface water.39 Thus, when a city neglects, after notice, or after such time as notice will be imputed to it, to remove an obstruction in its sewers, and property is overflowed and damaged by reason thereof, a cause of action exists.40 Although the rain

36 Per Burgess, J., in Donahoe v. Kansas City, 136 Mo. 1. c. 667; Johnson v. District of Columbia, 118 U. S. 21; Woods v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 272; Collins v. Waltham, 157 Mass. 196; Hazzard v. Council Bluffs, 79 Iowa, 106; Kearney v. Thoemanson, 25 Neb. 147; Seymour v. Commins, 119 Ind. 148; Rice v. Evansville, 108 Ind. 7, 58 Am. Kep. 22; 2 Dillon, Munic. Corp. §§ 980, 1049.

Fuchs v. St. Louis, 133 Mo. 168.

38 Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, in effect overruling St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20, Hoffman v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 651. 39 Woods v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 272. 40 Woods v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 272.

doing the damage was of an extraordinary character, yet if the negligence of the city in failing to keep its sewers open concurred and contributed to the damage, then the city would be liable.41 A city is liable in an action for damages for piling stone in a street gutter, causing the overflow of surface water on the abutting property to its damage; and the principles of law as to surface water do not apply in such action. 42 A city is only liable for the want of ordinary care in providing and maintaining sufficient curbing, guttering and sidewalks. If, "by reason of the want of such care and prudence, the curbing and guttering become defective and out of repair, and this defective condition of the curbing and guttering becomes an active agency with the act of God in producing the damage, then the city will be liable. The commingling negligence of the city must amount to the want of ordinary care."'43 There is a wide difference between the power of a municipality with respect to natural streams and surface water. A municipality has not the right, with respect to the former, to injure the property of others "by badly constructed and insufficient culverts or passageways obstructing the free flow of water. Thus, city was held liable for the damages caused by damming up a water course in the grading and filling of certain streets." Likewise, a city was held liable for damages caused by it in changing the channel of a natural stream under the authority of its charter by reason of the new channel having been constructed of a width and depth insufficient to afford a passageway for the water of the stream equal in capacity to the old channel. 46 In approv ing and applying this doctrine, the Kansas City Court of Appeals said: "In making

45

44

a

41 Woods v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 272. See Chicago & W. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Ayers, 106 Ill. 578. 42 McInery v. St. Joseph, 45 Mo. App. 296.

48 Haney v. Kansas City, 94 Mo. 334, 336, citing Rodgers v. R. R., 67 Cal. 607. See Judd v. Hartford (Conn.), 44 Atl. Rep. 510; Louisville v. O'Malley (Ky.), 53 S. W. Rep. 287.

44 2 Dillon, Munic. Corp. (3d Ed.) § 1038, approved in Young v. Kansas City, 27 Mo. App. l. c. 115. 45 Rose v. St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509.

46 Imler v. Springfield, 55 Mo. 119, where it was said, at page 126: "A liability would exist against a city for filling up or damming back a stream of running water, so that it would overflow its banks and flow upon the land of another; but a very different rule exists with reference to surface water." The doctrine of this case was approved and applied in Barnes v. Hannibal, 71 Mo. 449, 451.

the culvert in the present case it was the duty of the defendant, absolute and imperative, to so make the culvert as not to obstruct the water of the running stream, to the injury of others. As to that duty the defendant had no discretion. The defendant did not have to build a culvert at all, but in building a culvert, when it was determined to build one, the defendant had to build one in accordance with the requirement named, i. e., so as not to obstruct the water of the stream, to the injury of others. The defendant had to build a sufficient culvert; the defendant had not the right in building a culvert to create a nuisance. Hence, the act of determining the dimensions of the culvert was a ministerial, and not a judicial act, and defendant was liable for all damages caused by the insufficiency of the said dimensions."4 St. Louis, Mo. EUGENE MCQUILLIN.

47 Per Hall, J., in Young v. Kansas City, 27 Mo. App. 1. c. 116, citing numerous authorities.

ESTOPPEL-SILENCE - FAILURE TO ASSERT TITLE-PLEADING-DEFECT OF PARTIES.

RADANT v. WERHEIM MFG. Co.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, April 27, 1900.

Plaintiff and his father lived on premises of which the father was vendee in an unrecorded land contract, which he bad assigned to plaintiff. Plaintiff ordered building material of defendant for use in constructing a building on the land, defendant supposing the material sold to plaintiff's father. Defendant filed a material man's lien on the property, the summons and complaint being served on the father; but plaint iff, supposing himself the person sued, appeared and answered, but, discovering on trial that the father was sought to be sued, withdrew his answer, without disclosing the true state of the title. Held, that plaintiff, by his silence till defendant had incurred the expense of obtaining the lien, had estopped him. self from asserting the true state of the title in an ac tion by him to restrain a sale of the property on the judgment against the father.

A defect of parties in a complaint will be deemed waived, unless taken advantage of by answer or de

murrer.

MARSHALL, J.: Action to remove a cloud on the title to real estate on the following facts: In 1873, when plaintiff was quite a boy, his father, August Radant, Sr., purchased the real estate in question for a home for himself and family and occupied the same as such thereafter, the son residing with him. March 25, 1889, Radant, Sr., conveyed the property to one Henry Gruenwald by deed absolute on its face for the purpose of securing a loan of money, taking back, as evidence

of his interest in the property, a land contract. The deed and contract were immediately recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the proper county. A few days thereafter Radant, Sr., assigned his land contract to plaintiff, but the assignment was not recorded till May 27, 1897, during all of which time August Radant, Sr., to all appearance, was the owner of the property the same as he always had been, save and except for the mortgage thereon created by the transactions with Gruenwald as before stated. The land contract was assigned to plaintiff partly as a gift from the father and partly in consideration of what plaintiff had done by way of improving the property. In 1895 the Radants obtained some building material of the defendant for use in constructing a building on the land. The plaintiff intended in the transaction to become the defendant's debtor for the building material, but defendant supposed its customer was Radant, Sr. The material not being paid for a lien was filed on the property pursuant to the laws of this State relative to mechanics' and material-mens' liens, and thereafter an action was commenced to enforce such lien. The summons and complaint were served on Radant, Sr., but plaintiff, supposing he was the person intended to be sued, appeared in the action and answered. Plaintiff discovered on the trial that the real party sought to be charged was Radant, Sr., whereupon he withdrew his answer without disclosing the true state of the title to the property. He kept silent, with full knowledge of the facts, while defendant proceeded to perfect judgment against Radant, Sr., as the debtor and the owner of the property sought to be charged with such debt. Thereafter defendant proceeded to enforce such judgment by a sale of the property, whereupon this action was commenced to restrain such sale and to quiet the title to the property in plaintiff as against such judgment. On the trial the defendant offered to release its claim to a lien against the property on payment of the original indebtedness claimed in the complaint, which proposition plaintiff refused to accept. On such facts the court decided that defendant was entitled to a dismissal of the action and to recover its costs and disbursements of the plaintiff because of a defect of parties defendant, in that Henry Gruenwald, and others not necessary to be mentioned, were not joined as defendfendants, and for want of equity. Judgment was rendered accordingly.

The judgment appealed from is grounded, first, on a defect of parties, and, second, want of equity. The first ground mentioned is untenable. A defect of parties must be taken advantage of by demurrer if it appears on the face of the complaint, otherwise by answer, or it will be deemed to have been waived. Kimball v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695; Druetzer v. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 594, 17 N. W. Rep. 423; Hallam v. Stiles, 61 Wis. 270, 21 N. W. Rep. 42. The objection that there is a defect of parties, either plaintiff or defendant, is never a good ground for the dismissal of a complainant on a trial upon the merits.

The second ground upon which appellant's claim was dismissed must be sustained, if at all, upon the familiar principle of equitable estoppel, that he who keeps silent when in good conscience he ought to speak shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent."

If appellant owed a duty of disclosure to respondent respecting his title, and, by failure to do so, respondent was led to incur expense to perfect his lien judgment and enforce it, upon the belief that Radant, Sr., was the owner of the property, equity cannot properly aid him to change his situation to respondent's prejudice.

Among the earliest applications of the principles under discussion are cases where the owner of property stood by without disclosing his ownership, while another in good faith dealt with such property as that of a third person; and it was held that such owner was in duty bound to correct the error of such other before he so acted as to be prejudiced thereby. Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469; Gregg v. Wells, 10 Adol. & E. 90; Heane V. Rogers, 9 Barn. & C. 577, 586; Graves v. Key,3 Barn. & Adol. 313, 318; Niven v. Belknap, 2 Johns. 572. In Pickard v. Sears, supra, to which most of the later authorities refer, it was said, in effect, that one who stands by and keeps silent while his property is being dealt with in good faith as the property cf another, ceases to be the owner of such property so far as otherwise the party misled would suffer. That is elementary and has often been applied by this court. Waddle v. Morrill, 26 Wis. 611; Anderson v. Coburn, 27 Wis. 558; Kingman v. Graham, 51 Wis. 232, 8 N. W. Rep. 181; Manufacturing Co. v. Monahan, 63 Wis. 198, 23 N. W. Rep. 109. That doctrine was applied in Baehr v. Wolf, 59 Ill. 470, where a person who held an unrecorded land contract, knowing that another was negotiating to purchase the land of his vendor without notice of the existence of such contract, failed to notify such other of the true state of the title.

The last case cited brings out the principle under discussion, as applicable to this case, quite clearly. It appears by the record that respondent dealt with Radant, Sr., as the owner of the property in controversy, from the time the indebtedness accrued. The appellant knew that fact soon after the action was commenced. His claim to the property was under an unrecorded land contract. He knew, or ought to have known, from the time the action was commenced, that respondent was proceeding in error as to the true state of the title. He was the real beneficiary of the material for which the indebtedness constituting the lien claim accrued. Notwithstanding these facts, he kept silent as to his unrecorded contract, though he at one time actually appeared in the action, till respondent had incurred the expense of obtaining the lien judgment and further expense toward enforcing it, and then, without offering to pay for the material, for which appellant acknowledged on the trial of this action he

was the real debtor and beneficiary, he commenced such action.

Equity cannot aid the appellant, under the circumstances stated, to prevent the enforcement of the lien judgment. It will consider Radant, Sr., for the purposes of this action, as the owner of the property affected by the judgment.

Appellant could readily have brought the true state of the title to the attention of respondent before the lien judgment was entered, and thereby have prevented its rendition and all necessity for this action, unless the judgment were based on an adjudication that the respondent's claim, under the circumstances, was a lien on appellant's interest in the property. Appellant failed to do that till respondent, with his knowledge, incurred considerable expense in efforts to collect its claim by the remedy given by the lien statute. Such failure was accompanied by circumstances clearly indicating a design to mislead respondent up to a point where appellant's interest in the property could not be reached in a lien suit. As soon as that point was supposed to have been passed, appellant placed his land contract on record so as to deter respondent from enforcing its judgment; and that not being effectual, appellant appealed to a court of equity to aid him. The trial court correctly decided that appellant has no standing in a court of equity.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

NOTE-Recent Decisions on Equitable Estoppel by Silence and Failure to Assert Title.-When one who holds a mortgage on part of a tract of land permits the owner to mortgage it to another who insists upon a first mortgage as security, and takes the proceeds of the loan to apply on debts due him, saying nothing about his own mortgage, of which all parties but himself are ignorant, though it is recorded, he is estopped to set it up as against the new mortgagee. Kuhn v. Morrison, 23 C. C. A. 619, 78 Fed. Rep. 16. Where a widow paid off a mortgage given by her de ceased husband, in which she joined, and suffered a third party to purchase the shares of the heirs in the mortgaged property, without asserting any claim, she was estopped from claiming a lien by reason of such payment. Taylor v. Dawson, 65 Ill. App. 232. That one lived in the vicinity for 10 years after suit was brought to subject certain lands to the payment of a decedent's debts, and knew of a mortgage thereon, but never appeared, or in any way claimed the land, though it was in the possession of the others, who were using it as their own, is a circumstance tending to show that whatever claim he had against the land was satisfied in the decedent's lifetime. Doss v. Kincheloe's Admr. (Ky.), 36 S. W. Rep. 1127. When property is taken under a writ in the presence of a third person who is in possession of it under claim of title, but the officer taking it acts in ignorance of such claim, and such third person, with every reason to believe that he is regarded merely as the bailee of the defendant to the writ, fails to in any manner disclose his title to the officer, and, moreover, virtually consents to the taking of the property, he is estopped from asserting that the taking was tortious. State v. Staed, 65 Mo. App. 487. One of several claimants of alluvial land who acts as conveyancer between two others, and fails to assert at the time a different title

to the land, which he knows they think is being conveyed, cannot afterwards urge such title as against them. Price v. Hallet (Mo. Sup.), 38 S. W. Rep. 451. Where plaintiff in replevin obtained possession under a bill of sale from the husband, defendant was not estopped from claiming title under the wife by the mere fact that she frequently saw the property in plaintiff's possession. Ingalls v. Alexander (Mo. Sup.), 39 S. W. Rep. 801. That a mother who, in good faith, loaned to her son money with which to buy a store, and, upon his subsequent insolvency, induced him to confess judgment in her favor for the debt, knew that he was conducting the business solely on the money borrowed from her, but neglected to give the public notice of that fact, did not estop her from claiming the proceeds of the sale under the judgments confessed, as against the son's other creditors. H. T. Clarke Drug Co. v. Boardman (Neb.), 70 N. W. Rep. 248. Defendant, mortgagee, and mortgagor agreed that defendant was to buy the premises, paying a fixed sum therefor, part of which was to be paid to the mortgagee in satisfaction of his claim, part applied in payment of mortgagor's debts, and the bal ance paid to him. Pursuant thereto the mortgagee conveyed to defendant. Held, that the mortgagor was estopped from claiming that defendant held title as a mortgagee, and one claiming under an unre. corded conveyance from him was likewise so estopped, under Gen. St. 1883, sec. 215, providing that deeds shall take effect as against subsequent bona fide purchasers and incumbrancers only after recording. Sliney v. Davis (Colo. App.), 53 Pac. Rep. 686. When the contract vendee of land, under a contract contemplating the erection of a building on the premises, lets contracts for the work, and the contract vendor, with knowledge of the facts, fails to disclose his legal title to the contractor, he will be estopped to set up his lien for purchase money to the prejudice of the con tractor's lien. Rice v. Gould, 73 Ill. App. 538. A married woman, who joins with her husband in a mortgage of land which by unrecorded deed he had conveyed to her, having joined with him in leading the mortgagee to suppose it was still his property, is estopped to assert against the mortgagee, after he had acted to his disadvantage on the supposition, the stat ute relieving a married woman from liability on a contract of suretyship. Galvin v. Britton (Ind.). 49 N. E. Rep. 1064. A wife, with the knowledge of her husband, included property belonging to him in a mortgage given by her to secure her debt. The hus band made no objection, except to his wife, but al lowed her to obtain goods on the faith of the mort gage, assisted her in selling them, and did not inform the mortgagee that he claimed the property until two years after the execution of the mortgage. Held, that the husband was estopped from asserting his ownership as against the mortgagee. Churchill v. Hohn (Ky.), 45 S. W. Rep. 498. When the original purchaser at a tax sale and subsequent grantees took the land with knowledge that the tax judgment was void because rendered against a dead person, who left a will devising the land, the failure to record the will, as required by Rev. St. 1889, sec. 8899, does not estop the devisees from claiming title. Dameron v. Jamison (Mo.), 45 S. W. Rep. 258. An intestate left a house and lot, which descended to his widow, two daughters, and a minor son. The husband of one of the daughters bought the property, taking a deed from all the heirs, except his wife and the minor son, and an agreement signed by the minor son and signers of the deed, providing for the execution of a conveyance of the son's interest on his becoming of age.

Where a man,

All the heirs except the wife, who was not included, received their share of the consideration of the deed. The son died under age and unmarried. Later, the husband conveyed the property to the plaintiff. Held, that since the daughter had never in her lifetime asserted any right to the property of the deceased son, though she knew his title had not been conveyed, nor did her heirs at law assert title until many years afterwards, the grantee in the meantime having made valuable improvements thereon, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to the daughter and heirs as heirs of the deceased son. Jones v. Duerk, 49 N. Y. S. 987, 25 App. Div. 551. A grantee of a deed stipulating that he should pay the interest on certain mortgages on the property conveyed,is estopped, after payment of such interest on two occasions to say that he did not know of the condition, and is not bound by it. White v. Kenyon, 53 N. Y. S. 13. Where one, after mortgaging property, sold it, the purchaser agreeing to pay the mortgage notes, the mortgagee who takes the notes of the purchaser in place of those of the mortgagor, and surrender's the mortgagor's notes to him, and by his conduct and actions with respect to the property leads the mortgagor to believe that his notes are discharged so far as he is concerned, whereby the mortgagor is induced to act on this theory in his relations and dealings with the property, is estopped to assert the notes and the lien of the mortgage therefor against the mortgagor. Hale v. Dykes (Tenn. Ch. App.), 42 S. W. Rep. 64. after conveying property through a third party to his wife, took and recorded a power of attorney from her, authorizing him to manage the property as her agent, under which he made leases in her name, and during the remaining 30 years of his life many times admitted, and never denied, her title to the property, his devisees are estopped from denying the legal sufficiency of the deeds by which the title was conveyed to her. Robb v. Day (U. S. C. C. of App.), 90 Fed. Rep. 337. Where a mortgagor's son, who had a lien on the land, took an active part in procuring the loan, and often inquired how the negotiations were getting along, and rode over the land with the agent who procured the loan, and did not tell them of the lien, he is estopped from claiming a lien superior to the mortgage. Ashurst v. Ashurst (Ala.), 24 South. Rep. 760. Where an administrator, acting under a misapprehension as to the law, believes that certain land belongs to his decedent's estate, when as a matter of fact he is one of the owners, sells it for the payment of his decedent's debts to one with knowledge of the facts, but also mistaken as to the law, he is not thereby estopped from afterwards claiming his interest in the land. Gjerstadengen v. Van Duzen (N. Dak.), 76 N. W. Rep. 233. Where defendant stood by and permitted representatives of complainant's grantor to survey land for the purpose of selling it to complainant, and permitted the sale, without asserting any claim or title, he is estopped to assert title. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. McDowell, 100 Tenn. 565, 47 S. W. Rep. 153. Where a judgment creditor, having a lien on real and personal property, sold the latter, but made no attempt to enforce his lien against the former, which the debtor conveyed to a subsequent attaching creditor, who thereafter with knowledge of the judgment creditor, paid the taxes thereon for several years, it was held that the judgment creditor was estopped to claim that the conveyance was void because defectively executed. Call v. Cozart (Tenn. Ch. App.), 48 S. W. Rep. 312.

CORRESPONDENCE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

STARE DECISIS.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

If all the crimes against humanity that have been committed in the name of law under the plea of stare decisis could be properly scheduled it would be as tounding to behold. All the murders committed since the days of Cain would not equal it. To the layman these simple words, though incomprehensible, ap. pear innocent enough. The Latin coating in which this legal term is couched may, and no doubt does, give it an air of respectability; it does give it a veneering, antique and semi sacred, but herein lies the danger. Nevertheless as a legal term, and a legal principle, it was conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity. No man knows its origin. It parentage is obscurity itself, wrapped up in that status of uncer tainty, suggestive, at least, of illegitimacy. It has no relations, not even next of kin. Stare decisis! Think of its power and influence in the world. It has robbed millions of men of all that was near and dear to them. The sacred precincts of the constitution have been invaded and its honored precepts trampled down by the cloven feet of this monster. The wheels of legislation have been clogged by its unholy touch. Civilization in its onward march has been retarded by its influence. If there is anything buman in all this wide world that should inspire mankind with hope, hope in his personal security, hope in the en joyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, hope in all that makes life worth living, it should be found in our courts. But alas it is there, more than any where else, that this plague of humanity finds its virgin soil and an atmosphere propitious for its growth. Our schools, colleges and universities may sharpen the intellect, and our charitable institutions may do much to relieve the sufferings of mankind, but, after all, it is to the courts we must look for relief from nine-tenths of the ills that beset us. There the rich and poor alike may go for even and exact jus tice in all the relations of life. It is there the scales of justice are evenly balanced and the presiding goddess is blind. It is there that decrees and judgments mete out to each and all the full measure of justice and equity, unless, indeed, some accident or adverse wind has wafted to the wool sack some moss covered sinbad who places a higher estimate upon precedent than justice. In such case right and justice, law and equity, are thrown to the wind, because forsooth of some judicial ipse dixit that never was the law, and should not have been followed. Illustrations are numerous. In Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, a principle of law regarding personal property was established in the Supreme Court of the United States which had been overthrown by the highest courts of England for nearly a hundred years, and had received the condemnation of Chancellor Kent, and other able jurists of this country, and was contrary to the public policy of all continental Europe. In Bowen v. Parkhurst, 24 Ill. 247, a principle of law was established by the Supreme Court of Illinois which was contrary to the great weight of authority of this country at the time, and has been repeatedly attacked as unsound by the bar from that time to this. Both of these cases still stand as the law of their respective jurisdictions, not because they are law or right, but purely and simply because of the doctrine of stare decisis. Chicago, Ill.

JOHN W. SMITH.

READINGS IN THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY.

The plan of this work is one of those happy thoughts the simplicity and utility of which cause us to wonder that it had not been thought of before. Every one who has tried wading through the writings of the old masters in search of living principles that lie buried beneath so many technicalities and obsolete doctrines, has felt the burden which this publication seeks to remove: Namely, that of being compelled to read so much that is of no practical utility in order to get at the foundation principles of the law from original sources of authority. By judicious selections from the writings of those authors who have most clearly and succinctly stated the elementary principles of the law, the editor of this compilation has succeeded in producing a connected treatise, at once historical and elemental in character.

The compiler of this collection is Mr. George W. Kirchwey, Professor of law in Columbia University. His work is primarily intended for the use of stu dents. It will also be valuable to the practitioner as a book of reference, embracing as it does extracts from the leading authorities from Glanville and Brac ton down to the more noted of modern text writers, supplemented by the principal English and American statutes bearing upon the nature of estates and the creation and transfer of interests in land. The plan of the publication is to some extent a departure from the usual method of preparing text books, and has the disadvantage, it may be said, of destroying that feeling which places the reader more closely in touch with the author of an original production. A feeling which is, perhaps, more a matter of imagination than reality, yet nevertheless a real factor in the interest awakened in the mind of the reader. Then, too, there is naturally more continuity of thought in a treatise written throughout by a single author in a uniform style of expression. It is doubtful, therefore, if col lections of this character will ever become popular as a class. But the subject of real property is peculiarly adapted to this manner of treatment. The history and classification of estates and the elementary principles governing their creation and transfer are more clearly and adequately expounded by the old masters, while the technical discriminations which incumber the mare for the most part obsolete, and may be eliminated with profit to the reader. The editor of this collection has rendered valuable service to the his. torical student of the law of real property. The book contains 500 pages, 8vo. bound in buckram, printed on good paper. Published by Baker, Voorhis & Co., 66 Nassau St., New York.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

American Bankruptcy Reports Annotated (Cited Am. B. R.) Reporting the Bankruptcy Decisions and Opinions in the United States, of the Federal Courts, State Courts and Referees in Bankruptcy. Edited by Wm. Miller Collier, Author of "Collier on Bankruptcy," and James W. Eaton, Instructor on the Law of Bankruptcy in the Albany Law School. Vol. III. Albany, N. Y. Matthew Ben. der, Law Publisher, 1900. Review will follow. The American State Reports, Containing the Cases of General Value and Authority Subsequent to those