*

their performance compelled under penalties; but the corporators who are made such nolens volens, are not, and cannot be considered, in the light of persons who have voluntarily and for a consideration assumed obligations, so as to owe a duty to every person interested in the performance. The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability to private actions, based upon neglect to perform a public duty, does not apply to villages, boroughs and cities, which accept special charters from the State. The grant of the corporate franchise, in those cases, is usually made only at the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and it is justly assumed that it confers a valuable privilege, and which is held to be a consideration for the duties imposed by the charter. By those charters larger powers of self-government are conferred than those confined to towns or counties; larger privileges in the acquisition and control of corporate property, and special authority is given them to make use of the public highways for the special and peculiar convenience of the citizens of the municipality in various modes not permissible elsewhere. These grants raise an implied promise on the part of the corporation to perform their corporate duties, and it inures to the benefit of every individual interested in its performance."

The cases quoted from and others which proceed upon the same principle may be grouped in three principal classes with reference to the nature of the public duty imposed upon the municipality; where the duty is to keep in repair public streets and sidewalks, 15 where the duty is to abate and remove public nuisances,16 and where the duty is to pre

15 Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black (U. S.), 39, 17 'L. Ed. 52; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 23 L. Ed. 440; City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. Rep. 705; Jansen v. City of Atchison, 16 Kan. 358, 380; Hutson v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 9 N. Y. 163: Conrad v. Trustees of Ithica, 16 N. Y. 158; City of Guthrie v. Swan, 5 Okla. 779, 51 Pac. Rep. 562. 16 City of New Albany v. Slider, 21 Ind. App. 392, 52 N. E. Rep. 626; City of Tallahassee v. Fortune, 37 Fla. 19, 52 Am. Dec, 358; Gould v. City of Topeka, 32 Kan. 485, 4 Pac. Rep. 822; City of Kansas City v. McDonald, 60 Kan. 481, 57 Pac. Rep. 123; Clayton v. City of Henderson (Ky ), 44 S. W. Rep. 667; Mayor, etc. of of Baltimore v. Mariott, 9 Md. 160, 66 Am. Dec. 326; Moore v. Townsend (Minn.), 78 N. W. Rep. 880; Conrad v. Trustees of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Spier v. City of Brooklyn, 139 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. Rep. 727; Dillon v. City of Raleigh (N. Car.), 32 S. E. Rep. 548; Little v. City of Madison, 42 Wis. 643, 24 Am. Rep. 435.

serve the public peace. Notwithstanding the apparent unanimity of reason in the cases cited, a number of the most respectable courts unfortunately have not recognized this notable distinction between strictly private or quasi corporations and municipal corporations proper as to liability for breach of public duties; and, therefore, it has been held that, as to such duties, municipal corporations proper are agencies of the government, the same as quasi corporations; that, according to the nature of the duty concerned, they are sometimes strictly public or quasi corporations and sometimes municipal corporations proper, and that in their former capacity they can never be held liable for negligence or malice.18

FRANCIS J. KEARFUL.

[The Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma, in Wallace v. Town of Norman, 60 Pac. Rep. 108, has lately held contrary to the views of the writer and the decisions from

which he quotes. None of those decisions are distinguished or even cited in the Wallace case, and the only citation is Western College v. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375,

for which reason the decision is not as satis

factory as might be desired. The point involved is unusually interesting. Wallace, a white contractor, was injured by a mob because he brought into the town in his employ a colored laborer; and the mob acted with the sympathy of most of the inhabitants and the active co-operation of the municipal authorities, pursuant to a conspiracy which had existed unsuppressed since the beginning of the town, having for its purpose the absolute exclusion of negroes from the corporate limits, and pursuant to which many acts of violence had been committed with the connivance of the municipal authorities. The municipal duty to suppress this most

17 Taylor v. Mayor, etc. of Cumberland, 64 Md. 68 20 Atl. Rep. 1027; Cochrane v. Mayor, etc. of Frostburgh, 81 Md. 54, 31 Atl. Rep. 703; Speir v. City of Brooklyn, 139 N. Y. 6, 34 N. E. Rep. 727; Little v. City of Madison, 42 Wis. 643, 24 Am. Rep. 435.

18 City of Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139, 4 S. W. Rep. 450; Winibigler v. Mayor, etc. of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Hewison v. City of New Haven, 37 Conn. 475, 9 Am. Rep. 342; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 Mich. 84, 4 Am. Rep. 450; Pray v. Mayor, etc. of Jersey City, 82 N. J. L. 394; Young v. City of Charleston, 20 S. Car. 116, 47 Am. Rep. 827; City of Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 525

abominable public nuisance was imposed by statute and admitted by the court to exist, and the town was a municipal corporation, properly invested with all necessary powers for the performance of the duty, yet it was held that the failure to diligently discharge this duty gave no action to Wallace, who had, because of such failure, suffered a special injury. The public welfare would seem to demand that this case be decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and its decision will be awaited with much interest.-ED.]

GAS COMPANY-RULES-FAILURE TO PAY BILLS-DISCONTINUING SERVICE

--MANDAMUS.

MACKIN v. PORTLAND GAS CO.

Supreme Court of Oregon, May 28, 1900.

1. The defendant gas company was operating under a franchise to supply gas to the inhabitants of a city. Plaintiff, who has signed an order for gas, consenting to a rule of the company that the gas would be shut off in default of payment, refused to pay a bill for gas furnished at a certain place. After he had moved to another place, the company fur nished gas for a time, but discontinued his supply on his refusal to pay the former bill. Held that mandamus would not lie to compel the company to supply gas to plaintiff till the former bill was paid.

2. A peremptory writ of mandamus to compel a gas company, which has cut off the gas from plaintiff's premises for his failure to pay a former bill, to continue such a supply, will not issue by reason of the fact that the alternative writ and answer show that there is a controversy concerning the correctness of such bill, as the right to the writ must be clearly established before it will issue.

BEAN, J. (after stating the facts): The only question on this appeal is whether the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to defendant's answer, and ordering a peremptory writ. Briefly, the facts are that in March, 1897, the plaintiff purchased gas of the defendant for use at No. 284 Morrison street, under a contract which provided that, in default of the regular payment of a bill, the company would discontinue the supply until payment should be made. Some time in that month he quit using the gas, and left, as the defendant alleges, an unpaid bill of $5.25. Thereafter, and in September, 1899, he again applied to the company for gas to be used at 107 Fourth street, and it was furnished him up to November 11th, when he was notified by the defendant that unless he paid the old bill it would be discontinued. This he refused to do, and the company cut off the gas. Upon these facts, the inquiry is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a

writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to turn on the gas.

The right of a court to compel by mandamus a company engaged in furnishing gas for general consumption to supply all persons along its main or conduits who offer to and do comply with its rules and regulations is undoubted and unquestioned. Haugen v. Water Co., 21 Oreg. 411, 28 Pac. Rep. 244; State v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 17 Neb. 126, 22 N. W. Rep. 237; Crumley v. Water Co., 99 Tenn. 420, 41 S. W. Rep. 1058; Shepard v. Light Co., 70 Am. Dec. 479, and note; 27 Am. Law Reg. 277. And the authorities are agreed that such a company may adopt and enforce whatever reasonable rules and regulations may be necessary to protect its interests, which would include one providing that the supply of gas may be discontinued if a customer fails or neglects to pay his bills when due. American Waterworks Co. v. State, 46 Neb. 194, 64 N. W. Rep. 711, 30 L. R. A. 447; State v. Sedalia Gaslight Co., 34 Mo. App. 501; Tacoma Hotel Co. v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 3 Wash. St. 316, 28 Pac. Rep. 516, 14 L. R. A. 669.

The contention for the defendant is that, under its rules in force at the time the contract was made with the plaintiff, and which became a part of the contract, it had a right to discontinue the supply of gas to a customer at one set of premises until payment of a delinquent bill for gas furnished him at another, and in this we think it is supported by the authorities. The cases of People v. Manhattan Gaslight Co., 45 Barb. 136, and Gas Co. v. Cadieux (1899), App. Cas. 589, are in point. In the former it appears that the relator commenced taking gas in 1858 at No. 61 Seventh avenue, and was supplied with same until the 28th of December, 1861. He paid his bills up to the 19th of August, 1861, but not thereafter. In May, 1864, he applied for gas at No. 121 West Sixteenth street, which was furnished without objection on account of the former indebtedness until the 9th of February, 1865, when the company shut off the supply, and refused to furnish any more because of his failure to pay the balance due for gas furnished at No. 61 Seventh avenue. A judgment denying an application for a mandamus requiring the defendant to supply gas at No. 121 West Sixteenth street was affirmed. In Gas Co. v. Cadieux the statute defining the powers of the gas company provided that "if any person supplied with gas by the company shall neglect to pay any rate, rent, or charge due to the * * * company at any of the times fixed for the payment thereof it shall be lawful for the company * on giving twenty-four hours' previous notice to stop the gas from entering the premises, service pipes, or lamps of any such person * by cutting off the said service pipe or pipes, or by such other means as the company shall think fit." The respondent was a customer of the company. He had two sets of premises in Montreal,-No. 1125 Notre Dame street, and No. 282 St. Charles Borromee street,

*

*

where he resided,-and took gas for both. The company cut off the supply from No. 1125 Notre Dame street for non-payment of the bill for gas furnished to that house. This measure had no effect in producing payment, whereupon the company gave notice that unless the other bill was paid it would cut off the gas at his residence, and, after repeated notices to that effect, carried its threats into execution, and cut off the gas at his residence as well as at No. 1125 Notre Dame street; whereupon he brought an action to compel it to continue the supply of gas at his residence, and, upon appeal to the privy council, it was held that he was not entitled to the relief demanded. In the opinion it is said: "The only question is a question of fact. Is the respondent, in the words of the act, a person supplied with gas by the company who has neglected to pay a rate, rent, or charge due to the company at the time fixed for the payment thereof? It cannot be disputed that he is. The occasion, therefore, has arisen which authorizes the company to stop the gas from entering his service pipes. There is nothing in the act to limit the right of the company to the service pipes of the defaulter in a particular building, or connected with a particular meter, in respect to which the default has been committed. There is nothing in the act to throw the rate, rent, or charge for gas upon the premises for which the supply is furnished, or to make it payable out of the premises of the defaulter. The supply is to the consumer, and the default is the consumer's default. His liability to the company is a liability for the whole of the debt which he owes them at the time." This argument seems particularly applicable to the rule of the defendant. There is nothing in it limiting the right of the company to shut off the gas to the particular building in which default has been committed, but the provision, in effect, is that, in default of the regular payment of a bill by a customer of the company, it will not supply gas to him until payment is made. The cases principally relied upon by plaintiff are distinguishable from the one at bar. Wood v. City of Auburn, 87 Me. 287, 32 Atl. Rep. 906, 29 L. R. A. 376, was a suit to enjoin the defendant from cutting off the supply pending a judicial investigation; and, besides, in that case, and also in State v. Neb. Tel. Co., supra, there was no rule of the company or stipulation in the contract providing for shutting off the supply in default of payment of bills. In Gaslight Co. v. Colliday, 25 Md. 1, the contract provided that gas should be introduced into the premises described, "and that in default of payment for gas consumed in said premises the flow of gas shall be stopped until the bill is paid," etc., and the court very naturally held that under such rule the company could not shut off the supply at one building on account of a default in payment for gas furnished another. Lloyd v. Gaslight Co., 1 Mackey, 331, was also based upon the construction given by the court to the contract between

the company and the consumer. If, therefore, we take the allegations of the answer to be true (as we are bound to do on this appeal), the defendant, under its rules and the terms of the contract, had a right to refuse to supply the plaintiff with gas at No. 107 Fourth street, because he had made default in payment for gas previously furnished to him at other premises.

The plaintiff contends, however, that, taking the alternative writ and the answer together, it appears that there is an honest controversy between the company and the plaintiff concerning the bill for gas furnished at No. 284 Morrison street, and the defendant had no right or authority to cut off the supply in order to coerce the payment of the disputed bill. But this is an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus, and to entitle plaintiff to the relief demanded his right must be clear. If he has paid or tendered payment of the rates legally due, he is entitled to the writ; otherwise, not. People v. Green Island Water Co., 56 Hun, 76, 9 N. Y. Supp. 168. It is said to be well settled that a court of equity will, in cases of this character, prevent by injunction the shutting off of the supply pending the determination of a dispute between a customer and the company. 27 Am. Law Reg. 283; Sickles v. Gaslight Co., 64 How. Prac. 33; Wood v. City of Auburn, supra. But a mandamus is an affirmative remedy, and before a peremptory writ will issue the plaintiff's right must be clearly established. 2 Spell. Extr. Relief, sec. 1386; American Waterworks v. State, 31 Neb. 445, 48 N. W. Rep. 64; State v. Town Board of Sup'rs, of Delafield, 69 Wis. 264, 34 N. W. Rep. 123. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as may seem proper, not inconsistent with this opinion.

NOTE.-Right of Gas Companies to Discontinue the Supply of Gas for Non payment of a Disputed Bill. The laws regulating the operation of pub. lic utilities for which a public grant or franchise is necessary, and which are generally in the nature of monopolies, controlled by quasi public corporations, are to be strictly construed against the corporation and in favor of the public. In this respect there is a great difference between quasi public and strictly private corporations. The quasi public corporation controls a public necessity, such as the supply of water or gas or the means of transportation and communication. The safety and convenience of every citi zen depend upon their safe, continuous, and impartial operation. They have not the same right with a private corporation to interrupt the operation of their business at their own pleasure, or to serve one person and decline to serve another at their own discretion, or to favor one with terms more advantageous than they do another. Bearing in mind these general principles, the solution of many otherwise diffi. cult problems connected with the operation of public franchises, will be more clearly evident.

It is a general rule, supported by every considera. tion of sound reason, and uncontradicted by authority,

that a gas company, enjoying a franchise and occupy. ing the streets of a town or city, owes it as a duty to furnish gas to those who own and occupy houses on such streets where such owners or occupiers make the necessary arrangements to receive it, and comply with the reasonable regulations of such company; and if the company neglects and refuses to perform such duty it may be compelled to do so by writ of mandamus. Portland Gas Co. v. Keen, 135 Ind. 54. While it is true that gas companies have the right to make all necessary rules and regulations for the safe and profitable conduct of their business, still such rules must be reasonable and not burdensome to the consumer. This latter consideration often raises questions of considerable difficulty. Where the return of an alternative writ of mandamus, demanding a gas company to furnish the relator with gas, set out his refusal to pay a monthly rental upon and for the use of the meter furnished by the company, of $1.25 per month, in accordance with a rule of the company imposing such a payment in all cases where the consumer consumes less than 500 feet of gas, and which rental was to be taken in full for such gas not exceeding 500 feet in any one month, held, such rule was not unreasonable. State v. Se dalia Gas Light Co., 34 Mo. App. 506. In this case the court said: "It is a well understood principle that corporations so engaged as the appellant gas company may in its dealings with the people adopt and enforce such reasonable and just rules and regulations as may be necessary to protect its interests and further the designs of its incorporation. They have such power, too, without an express grant to that effect. It is an inherent power implied from the nature of the business in which they are engaged, limited only by express statute or ordinance, or by a sense of what is right, reasonable and just." To same effect see Wendall v. State, 62 Wis. 300. A regulation adopted by a gas company authorized the company by its inspector to have free access at all times to buildings and dwellings, to examine the whole gas apparatus, and for the removal of the meter and service pipes. It was held that the company could not require an applicant for gas to subscribe to this regulation, as a condition precedent to being supplied therewith. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Co., 6 Wis. 539. In this case the court said: "The fact of this exclusive right conferred upon the company to manufacture and sell gas in the city, to be consumed therein by citizens thereof, would imply an obligation on the part of the company to furnish the citizens of the city with a reasonable supply on reasonable terms. A gas company with exclusive rights to manufacture and sell gas is not a mere private corporation for the manufacture and sale of a commercial commodity. Gas is not a commercial commodity. It is not in its nature interchangeable, but merely consumable, and consumable only at the place of delivery. Odious as were monopolies to the common law, they are still more re. pugnant to the genius and spirit of our republican institutions, and are only to be tolerated on the occasion of great public convenience or necessity. And they always imply a corresponding duty to the public to meet the convenience or necessity which tolerates their existence. We think that there can be no doubt that the company was bound to furnish gas to the plaintiff upon his complying with such reasonable conditions or terms as they might rightfully impose." If a person who applies to a gas company to have his building or premises supplied with gas, is indebted to the company for gas previously supplied to him at the same building or premises, the company may re

fuse to supply him until the debt is paid. This is a reasonable regulation, and for the non-payment by a customer for gas of any amount furnished to him, the company may shut off his supply and remove its meter from his premises." Detroit Gas Co. v. Moreton, 111 Mich. 401. But whether a gas company can refuse to furnish gas to a consumer at certain premises because he has not paid a bill for gas consumed at other prem. ises, is a question upon which the authorities are not altogether agreed. In Maryland, for instance, it has been held that where a gas company enters into two distinct contracts with A, to supply different houses with gas, each requiring its own meter, a failure by A to pay for gas furnished to one of the houses, or to comply with any terms in relation thereto, will furnish no excuse or ground for the company to withhold gas from the other house. Gas Light Co. v. Col. liday, 25 Md. 1. In this case the court said: "The contracts for the two houses were separate and dis. tinct and in no wise dependent. They were entered into at different times, each for its distinct property. Bills have been made out and rendered separately. Each house had its own meter. We are of the opin. ion that where several contracts are made between the same parties for different pieces of property, each requiring its own meter, as in this case, the failure to comply with any terms in relation to one furnished no exeuse or ground to the company to withhold the gas from the other. As long as the terms in regard to the latter are complied with, the company continuing its manufacture is bound to continue the supply of gas to it." This case may be explained in that the con. tract specified that the gas should be turned off by the company from such premises for which the owner was delinquent at the time. In the case of Wood v. City of Auburn, 87 Me. 287, a water company proceeded to shut off the water supply, of one of its customers, on the ground that an old overdue and disputed bill for six months previous was remaining unpaid, although it had continued to supply water for the succeeding six months and accepted payment for the subsequent installment. The court enjoined the water company from shutting off the water, and held that the accep tance of the subsequent installment of water rates was a waiver of their right to shut off the water for nonpayment of the previous installment. The court uses these strong words: "The only trouble is over an old and disputed bill. The Acqueduct company could have insisted upon payment of this bill in advance but did not. It could have shut off the water during the time covered by the bill but did not. It preferred to let the bill in dispute stand. It accepted Mr. Wood's money for the next installment; after having resumed these relations with Mr. Wood, the company now insists that he be summarily deprived of an instant and constant necessity, in order to coerce him into a surrender of his position of defense against the old bill. The parties are not upon equal ground. The water company cannot do as it will with its water. It owes a duty to each consumer. The consumer once taken on to the system becomes dependent on that system for a prime necessity of business, comfort, health and even life. To suddenly deprive him of thi this water in order to force him to pay an old bill claimed to be unjust, puts him at an enormous disad vantage. He cannot wait for the water, he must surrender and swallow his choking sense of injustice. Such a power in a water company places the consumer at its mercy. It can always claim that some old bill is unpaid, the receipt of which may have been lost or the money embezzled by the collector. The water company at one time had the right to insist

upon the payment of the old bill before furnishing water. That right is now fully and effectually waived and cannot be resumed at the pleasure of the com. pany." In the case of Lloyd v. Gas Light Co., 1 Mackey, 331, the plaintiff on moving into his place of business signed the following agreement: "I hereby agree to take gas from the Washington Gas Light Co., on the condition that the company reserves to itself the right to refuse to furnish or at any time to discontinde gas to any premises the owner or occupant of which shall be indebted to the company for gas or fit. tings used upon such premises or elsewhere." Held, that this contract related only to future differences and that defendant was liable to damages for cutting off plaintiff's supply of gas because of non payment of an old bill for gas furnished before the signing of this contract, and at another place. In this case Judge Wylie dissented, and said: "This case presents the question whether a man who moves about from one house to another and runs away without paying his gas bill can compel the gas company to furnish him with gas at every new removal, without being obliged to pay his old bill. I put my dissent to this decision of the court upon grounds entirely independent of the special contract entered into by the parties. I base my opinion on general principles. The business of a gas company is in some respects like a common carrier, but a common carrier is not required to carry a man's goods who refuses to pay up for past dues, and this company I think had a perfect right to say to this man, we will not furnish you with gas unless you pay up your arrears."

The only question of real dificulty in this whole subject arises in the principal case, but is not fully nor satisfactorily discussed, i. e., to what extent a gas company has the right to shut off gas from the prem. ises of the consumer when an honest and reasonable dispute arises over the payment of a former bill or a bill for gas furnished other premises. Suppose a partnership firm engaged in business makes objec tion to the payment of a bill for gas furnished at their business premises, has the gas company the right to coerce payment of that bill by cutting off the supply at the residences of the individual partners? The authorities are agreed on two ways of procedure which the consumer may take when confronted with a situation of this kind. If the gas has not yet been turned off he may bring an action in equity to have the dispute between himself and the company adjudicated, and enjoin the company from discontinuing the sup ply of gas furnished his premises until the dispute is legally determined. Sickles v. Manhattan Gas Co., 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 33; Wood v. City of Auburn, 87 Me. 287. Or else he may pay the amount of the bill claimed to be due, under protest, or refuse to pay, and in either case will be entitled to damages if his objection to the payment of the bill is sustained and the company was unwarranted in cutting off the sup ply. Lloyd v. Gas Light Co., 1 Mackey, 331; Gas Light Co. v. Colliday, 25 Md. 1; Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Co., 15 Wis. 818; Morey v. Metropolitan Gas Co., 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. 185. In the case of Sickles v. Manhat tan Gas Co., 64 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 33, it was held that a law allowing a gas company to stop the supply of gas in case of the non-payment of bills for the gas, did not make the gas company the sole judge of the ques tion whether any, and if so what amount of remuneration, is due to it. When a dispute arises between the company and a consumer, the latter is entitled to have his rights investigated by a court and an injunction will be granted to prevent the cutting off of the supply of gas until the cause can be tried. In this

case the plaintiff claimed that a bill for 1,000 feet of gas consumed was unjust, because he was out of the city during the whole of the time, and his house was shut up. He therefore brought suit to have the exact amount used ascertained, and that in the meantime the defendant be restrained from cutting off the gas from his premises. The court said: "It has long been settled that a court of equity will intervene by injunction to prevent irreparable injury. This seems to me to be a case in which if the plaintiff is right it cannot be justly claimed that he can be fully compen. sated by an action for damages. The use of gas in cities has become almost as great a necessity as the use of water, and the deprivation of one or the other would cause, I think, such damage as to call for the intervention of a court of equity."

The amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled for the failure on the part of the company to supply him with gas is such as will compensate him for his pecuniary loss, also for the inconvenience and annoyance expressed by him in his mercantile business arising out of defendant's refusal to furnish gas to him. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas. Co., 15 Wis. 318. The measure of damages for violation by a natural gas company of its contract to supply a glass factory for a certain period with sufficient fuel to operate its plant, whereby the company was compelled to suspend its business, is, where the business was a new one in that vicinity, the expense necessarily, actually incurred in organizing the factory, the fair rental value of the idle factory, if it has any, and if it has none, the interest on the money invested therein, together with interest on any idle working capital, the use of which has been lost by the violation of such contract. Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614. In conclusion, the following general rules, may be deducible from the authorities. A gas company is under obligations to serve without discrimination all citizens who comply with its regulations; that a gas company may make any regulation for its own convenience or that of the public which is reasonable and just; that a regulation to shut off the supply for nonpayment of a bill for gas previously furnished, is reasonable and just; that where an honest dispute arises between the company and the consumer, the latter is entitled to have his rights investigated by the courts and to have an injunction preventing the company from cutting off the supply of gas pending the settle. ment of the dispute; that where the company refuses arbitrarily and without reason to supply a citizen with gas and the right of the citizen to demand the services of the company is clear, a writ of mandamus will issue against the latter compelling it to furnish the amount of gas requested; that where the right of the citizen or consumer is not clear, or where a dis pute exists between them, a writ of mandamus will not be available, but that in such cases the consumer is thrown upon his action for damages against the company for its unlawful or unwarranted refusal. St. Louis. A. H. ROBBINS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY.

In this treatise the authors have attempted to depart somewhat from the beaten track. In most works on the law of real property much space has been given to obsolete law. In this work the authors have given their attention chiefly to branches of the law which are practically useful and important, and