Imágenes de páginas

between the principal stockholders and bondholders (who were for the most part the same persons and also the oficers of the company), by which the new com. pany was to issue its bonds to the old bondholders and its stock to the stock bolders of the old cor pany, can not be made effective to relieve such property from the claims of general creditors of the old company, whose rights therein are superior to those of Its stockholders, and such transfer will be set aside in equity, so far as necessary to protect the equitable rights of such creditore.-ST. LOUIS TRUST CO. V. DES MOINES, ETC. RY. CO., U. 8. C. C., 8. D. (Iowa), 101 Fed. Rep. 632.

76. REAL ESTATE AGENT Rigbt to Commissions.-A real estate agent employed to find a purchaser for the property is not entitled to commissions, though presenting one willing to pay the price; the person presented not being the real customer, who had instructed the agent to buy tbe property if be could get it at a fair price, and the agent having refused to tell the landowner who the real customer was, for fear she would understand bis need of the property (be belpg the owner of the next lot), and would raise the price. -WILKINSON V. MCCULLOUGH, Pend., 46 Atl. Rep. 357.

77. BEMOVAL OF CAUSES-Prejudice or Local Influence.-An application for the removal of a will contest to a circuit court of the United States for “preju. dice or local influence," If authorized by the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, providing for the removal of causes "at any time before the trial thereof," comes too late wben first made after a mistrial of the cause in a state pro bate court.-MCDONNELL V. JORDAN, U. 8. 8.O., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 886.

78. RES JODICATA.-lo a former action, brought by plalntiff on a contract to recover the stipulatod amount for services rendered, defendant secured a judgment upon the ground that the contract had not been com pleted. Io a second action plaintiff sued to recover the reasonable value of the same services. Held, that the judgment in the former action was not a bar to the latter.-ROSSMAN V. TILLENY, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 42.

79. RES JUDICATA-Pleading Former Judgment as Bar.-An action by a bondholder of a city against the city treasurer in ble official capacity for a mandamus to compel payment of interest coupons is virtually an ac. tion agalost the city, and a judgment therein adjudg. ing the coupons void may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent action brought by the plaintiff against the city by name to recover judgment on the same coupons.RANSOM V. CITY OF PIERRE, U. 8. C. C. of App., Eighth Circult, 101 Fed. Rep. 665.

80. SALE8-Conditional Sales-Validity.-Under Code 1873, $ 1922, declaring that no conditional sale shall be valld against a creditor of the buyer in actual possession thereunder, without notice, unless in writing, ex. ecuted by the seller, and acknowledged and recorded the same as a chattel mortgage, a bill of sale wherein title to the goods was retained by the seller till full payment, executed by the seller, and acknowledged and recorded, was sufficient to protect tbe seller's right to such goods against a subsequent creditor of the buyer, though such instrument was not execnted by the buyer.-NATIONAL CASH-REGISTER CO. V. SCHWAB, Iowa, 82 N. W. Rep. 1012.

81. SALX8-Delivery-Demand.-Where the agent of a nursery sold an order of trees to defendant, to be paid for on delivery, an instruction that tender of the stock was tosuficient if coupled with a demand for the pur. cbase price, because the agent had no right to make such a demand, was erroneous where, by the terms of the contract, the plalotiff was entitled to his pay on delivery.-RICE V. APPEL, Iowa, 82 N. W. Rep. 1001.

82. SALES-Fraud-Rescission.-A seller of goods pur. chased by the buyer under falso and fraudulent representations as to his solvency cannot maintain an ac. tion to recover possession of the goods sold, or lo the alternative the price thereof, since he must elect to either affirm the sale and sue for the price, or rescind tbe sale and eue for possession of the goods.-WEAR &

BOOGHER DRY.GOOD8 Co. 7. CREWS, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 75.

83. TAXATION-Assessment-Payment of Portion.Where a taxpayer paid a part of a tax, which was thereafter returned to him by the collector on the tax. payer's inability to pay the balance before the expira. tion of the time when the tax must either have been paid or the land returned for delinquent taxes, such payment did not affect the State's lien on the land for the entire tax, por invalidate a sale of the land for the game.-SAYERS V. O'CONNOR, Mich., 82 N. W. Rep. 1014.

84. TAXATION-Io heritance Tax Law-Exemption of United States Bonds.-A legacy of United States bonds is not exempted from the inberitance tax laws of a State by the provisions of the act of Congress of July 14, 1870, and the declaration on the face of the bonds is. sued thereunder, exempting them from taxation in any form by or under State authority, since the inher. Itance tax is not imposed on the boods, but on the privilege of acquiring property by will or inheritance, which is a right and privilege created and regulated by the State.-PLOMMER V. CULER, U. S.S.C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rop. 829.

85. TRADE-MARK-Geographical Name.-The use of the name “Pocahontas Coal" by the selling agents for the owners of coal mined at or near a town called Po. cabontas will not create an exclusive right in such agents to the use of tbe name for all the coal from that field, or deprive the mine owners of the right to use the same name.-CASTNER V. COFFMAN, U. S. 8. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 842.

86. TRESPA88- Punitive Damages.-The mere unau. thorized use by the owner of coal under land of plaint. Iff of bis tunnel to transport coal from adjoining lands does not entitle plaintiff to punitive damages, or any. thing but nominal damages, and such further dam. ages, if any, as will compensate bim for any injuries resuting from the wrong.-SPRINGER V. J. H. SOMERS FUEL Co., Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 370.

87. TRUST-How Declared-In Personal Property.-A trust in personal property may be declared, admitted, or created by parol declarations, and may be proved by parol evidence, and as to such trusts the statute of frauds does not apply; but a trust relating to real prop. erty must be declared and proved by some writing ex. ecuted by the parties creating the trust.-SKEEN V. MARRIOTT, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 296.

88. Trust-Proof-Sufficiency.-Where defendant executed a warranty deed to land to his mother for a val. uable consideration, which sbe devised to her daugh

and which defendant claimed she had orally agreed to hold in trust for bim, to be reconveyed on demand, loose declarations and statements said to have been made by the mother, “that George has a drawn-up contract with me that will bring him out all right, if he took care of it," and the testimony of a feeble-minded brother that he heard his mother and defendant "talking about contracts or making the land over," were insuficient to establish tbe trust.-MULOCK V. MULOCK, Mo., 57 S. W. Rep. 122.

89. TRUST-Spendthrift Trust.-A spendthrift trust is created as well in the case of the son as of the wife, where testator directs his executors to hold property in trust to pay the whole net income thereof quarterly to his wife, “into her own hands, for her separate use and maintenance," for lite, "and not to be liable to anticipation, and ber receipt alone to be the sole dis. charge to my sald trustees," and, on her death, then to pay said net income quarterly to his son, 'lor bis use and support," for life, "and not to be liable to antici. pation, and bis receipt alone to be the sole discharge to my said trustees."-WINTHROP CO. y. CLINTON, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 435.

90. TRUSTEE-Purchase of Trust Property-Laches.A cestui que trust, who delays for 21 years to attack the title of the trustee acquired at execution sale under judgment of the trustee against the cestui que trust, is barred by laches.-CHURCH V. WINTON, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 363.


91. UNSAFE APPLIANCE8-Negligence of Independent Contractor.-A master is not relieved from the positive personal duty which he is under to the servant by let. ting work to a contractor, and he cannot avold liability for ao lojury to the servant due to the dangerous condition of appliances which he is required to use, on the ground that such dangerous condition was caused by the negligent acts of an independent contractor, whom the master had employed to make certain repairs about the premises.-TOLEDO BREW. & Malt. Co. v. BOSCH, U. 3. C. O. of App., Sixth Circuit, 101 Fed. Rep. 630.

92. VENDOR AND PURCHASER--Conditions-Waiver.Where a vendor agrees in writing to sell lande, and, on the vendees' being unable to comply with the contract, a written modification is made, whereby the vendees are to pay less, and the vendor is to convey subject to a mortgage, and then develops that there are two outstanding mortgages, and on being presented with the deed and discbarges of the two mortgages the vendees request that the mortgages be extended, and after. wards request further time for tbemselves, the request for the extension of the mortgøges is a waiver of the vendees' excuse for non-performance that there were two mortgages instead of one, and such excuse cannot be urged as a defense to the vendor's action for a lor. feit payable on the vendees' default.-HURLBURT V. FITZPATRICK, Mass.,57 N. E. Rep. 464.

93. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Specific Performance. - Where the vendor in a contract to convey land, of which time was made of the essence, grants such in. dulgence to the vendee, in permitting the time of pay. ment to go by without declaring an immediate forfeit. ure, as might reasonably lead the latter to believe that he did not intend to insist on an immediate perform. ance of the contract according to its terms, it works a suspension of the vendor's right to declare a forfeiture without notice.-EATON V. SCHNEIDER, III., 57 N. E. Rep. 421.

94. WAREHOUSEMEN-Damages Several Action.Under a contract, signed by a frult company and a number of fruit growers, providing that such growers might deliver prunes to the company to be weighed, separately dried, and, after being graded into several sizes, weighed again to the respective owners, after wbich it inight be mingled with other fruit in the bios used for the purpose, and that a receipt should be given to the owner calling for so many pounds in bulk, the contract, as between the fruit growers, was not joint, but several, and one of such growers was entitled to sue the company for damages to him under the con. tract.-ARNOLD V. PxODUCERS' FRUIT CO., Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 283.

95. WAR REVENUE ACT-Tax on Legacy of Inber. itance-Exemption of United States Bonde.-United States bonds included in a legacy or distributive share of a decedent's estate are not exempted from the tax on the transmission of such property, imposed by the war revenue act of 1899, $$ 29, 30, by reason of the dec. laration in the federal statutes and on the face of the bonds to the effect that they are exempt from taxation, since the tax is not upon the bonds, but on the right of transfer by will or under the interstate law.-MORDOCK V. WARD, U. S. 8. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 775.

96. WATERS-Navigable Waters-Obstruction of.-A pass or crevasse caused by the overflow of the Missig. sippi river, making a channel to the Gulf of Mexico, through which a few fishermen have occasionally gone with small vessels carrying oysters for planting, and through which one or two cargoes of willows and timber may have passed, but which has not been used for any purpose of Interstate commerce, and the gull end of which has become closed, does not constitute a pavigable water of the United States in such a sense that a dam erected therein for the purpose and with the effect of reclaiming overflowed lands and rendering them fit for cultivation will constitute an obstruction in navigable waters, within the prohibition of the

act of Congres8 of September 19, 1890, against such ob.. structions without authority of the secretary of war.LEOVY V. UNITED STATES, U. S. S. O., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797.

97. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Water Priorities. -Gen. St. 1893, $8 1762, 1766, providing a mode of ad. judicating questions concerning the priority of rights to 'water appropriation for irrigation purposes, have no application to cases where the point of diversion is within the State, but the lands to be irrigated lie with: out its territorial limits, and hence, In a proceeding under such statutes, water will not be decreed to Irri. gate New Mexico lands.-LAMSON V. VAILES, Colo., 61 Pac. Rep. 231.

98. WILLS-Absolute Devise-Life Estate.-Where & will recited testator's advancements to his children, and that he desired them all to be made equal, and, after they each received an amount making them equal with a son to whom a larger advancement had been made, anything remaining should be equally divided, and directed that a daughter's sbare should be vested in ber to ber separate use and control, and to be di vided, at her death, among her children, the daughter acquired an absolute estate in such devise.-COLVILLE v. WOMACK, Tenn., 57 8. W. Rep. 196.

99. WILLS-Capacity to Execute – Evidence. – The probate of a will will not be set aside for incapacity of the testator, an aged man, to make it, on contestant's evidence that testator's mind was altogether off, be. cause bis talk was from one tbing to another, and be did not seem to have the mind be ought to have, and would answer both yes and no when asked to do any. thing, where proponent's testimony shows that testa. tor, when he execáted the will, was of sound mind, and understood his business transactions.-APPEAL OF VOGLESONG, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 424.

100. WILLS-Conversion of Real Property.-The equi. table conversion of real property into personalty by will is a matter within the exclusive province of the courts of the State in which the land lies to determine, although the will was made and has been probated at the domicil of the testator in another State, where it is construed to work such conversion of the real prop. erty wherever situated, and it immaterial that the executor has not assumed to make any conveyance of the property.-CLARKE V. CLARKE, U. 8. 8. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873.

101. WILLS-Devise-Conditions Subsequent.-Where a testator devised lands to his son, providing he should care for and support his mother as long as she should live, and the mother, by reason of ample means, did not need the son's support, and supported and cared for both herself and the son, the condition of the devise was only a personal condition subse. quent, which the wife waived; and hence the fee of the land vested in the son on testator's death, and at the death of the son passed to his heirs.-ALEXANDER V. ALEXANDER, Mo., 57 S. W. Rep. 110.

102. Wills- Devise-Vested Estate.-When testator devised a child's part of his real estate to his wile for life, the share of any child dying without living issue to go to the surviving children or their representatives, and the sbare devised to his wife for life to be equally divided on her death among the children and the issue of deceased children, the children took a vested estate in the devises and remainder, conditioned only that each child's share, at his death without living issue, should go to the surviving cbildren or their helrs; and, as executory devises could bind their belrs and convey absolutely their contingent interest, a deed by such wile and children conveyed a valid title in fee.LITTLE V. BROWN, N. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 173.

103. WITNESSE8-Impeachment-Homestead.-A wit. ness cannot be impeached by proof of his commission of a theft, wbich he denies, though the objections of bis counsel to his examination on such question are sustained on his admission that such fact may be shown by other witnesses for the purpose of impeach. ment.-WINN V. WINN, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 80.

Central Law Journal. An important decision affecting tbe ex

emptions of homesteads in cities has recently

been rendered by the Supreme Court of ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 24, 1900. Florida. According to this decision the ex

emption of a homestead in an incorporated

city or town does not extend under the State The recent case of Morris v. Dodd, by the constitution to any other improvements or Supreme Court of Georgia, involves an inter

buildings than are comprehended under the esting question of bankruptcy. It was held

terms “residence and business house of the that a policy of insurance on the life of a

owner," and, where the buildings or improvebankrupt though payable to his legal repre

ments in excess are not physically connected sentatives, does not, if it have no cash sur

with the residence or business house, such render value, vest in the trustee in bank- improvements or buildings and the land upon ruptcy as assets of the bankrupt's estate.

which they are situated may be sold under Accordingly, where a husband, within four

execution for the owner's debts. This is true months prior to the filing of his petition in

even though such improvements are insepabankruptcy, transferred to his wife an insur

rably attached to or form parts of an undiance policy on his life, which before such

visible building which likewise constitutes transfer was payable to his legal representa- the residence and business house of the owner. tives, it was held that it was error in the court

The ground of the decision is clearly indibelow, on the petition of the trustee filed upon

cated in the opinion of the chief justice of the death of the bankrupt pending the pro

the court, who says that in those cases where ceedings in bankruptcy, to enjoin the widow

a non-exempt improvement or building is from collecting and the insurance company combined in a single structure that likewise from paying to her the amount due upon the

constitutes the residence or business house of policy, it appearing that it had no cash sur.

the owner, the soil perpendicularly under and render value, either when the transfer was covered by any such non-exempt improvemade or the petition in bankruptcy was filed.

ment is improperly dedicated to other uses

than are consistent with the constitutional A law passed at the last session of the New

right of exemption, and is, therefore, not exYork legislature and which goes into effect

empt, and this whether such non-exempt imon the first of next month is worthy of atten

provement be situated upon the first, second, tion. This law provides that hereafter no

third, fourth or tenth floor of a many-storied person or persons shall carry on or transact

building, and notwithstanding the fact that business in the State under any assumed

the space perpendicularly above or below name or under any designation, name or style,

such non-exempt improvement may be propcorporate or otherwise, other than the real

erly utilized by the owner for legitimate resiname of the individual or individuals carry

dence or business purposes. The court said ing on such business unless after filing in the

that it might be that in the application of the office of the clerk of the county where such

rule the whole of the residence or business business is carried on, a certificate setting

house exemption might be taken away and deforth the name under which the business is to

feated, but it declared that in such case the be transacted and the true full name or names

blame must fall upon the exemptor, who thus of the person or persons conducting the busi

devotes the same soil to two inconsistent uses, ness, with his or their post-office address.

the one legally sufficient to support the exPersons now carrying on business under an assumed name, or under any designation sufficient to defeat or destroy it. This is an

emption contended for, and the other legally other than the real name, are required to file

illustration sufficiently familiar in judicial & certificate such as is above described within

records of where the courts step in to check thirty days after the act takes effect, and any

evasions of the law by applying the rule of person failing to file such certificate is de

equity and common sense. clared guilty of a misdemeanor. The object of the law is to prevent the use of assumed names or of corporate names where there is no real incorporation.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. it shall be paid. Hence, when, from the provis

ions of a will prior to the gift of legacies, it is WILL-LEGACY-CHARGE ON LAND.-In Clo- seen that the testator must have known tbat he tilde v. Lutz, 57 S. W. Rep. 1018, decided by the bad already so far disposed of his personal estate Supreme Court of Missouri, it was held that a tes- as that there would not be enough left to pay the tator, who had no personal property at the time legacies, it is reasoned that the bare fact of giving he executed his will and bequeathed certain spe- a legacy indicates an intention that it shall be met cific legacies, will be presumed to have intended from real estate.' In McCorn v. McCorn, 100 N. to charge them on his lands. The court said in Y. 511, 3 N. E. Rep. 480, the testator executed a part:

will previous to the day of his death, by which he “The question presented by this appeal is bequeathed to his wife $1,000, and to his son M whether, under the facts stated, the various lega- $400, and gave the residue of his estate to four cies bequeathed in the will must fail because there children, to be divided equally between them. is no personalty out of which they can be paid, The personal estate left by the testator was inor, in the absence of express provision in the will sufficient to pay his funeral expenses. In an acfor their payment out of the real estate of which tion to have the widow's legacy declared to be a the testatrix died seized, are they a charge on charge upon the real estate, it was held that the such real estate? The rule announced by this intent of the testator was that both legacies should court for the construction of a will is to give full be so chargeable; the court saying: “Whether a force and effect to every word and sentence in it, legacy is charged upon the real estate of the deif possible to do so, and then construe it as a cedent is always a question of the testator's intenwhole, so as to meet the intention of tbe testator, tion. The language of the will is the basis of the and, in order to arrive at such intention, there is inquiry, but extrinsic circumstances which aid in no better way than to put one's self, as near as the interpretation of that language, and help to may be, in the position of the testator at the time disclose the actual intention, may also be considof its execution. The will provides that all of the


His personal estate was insuffibequests shall be paid, if practicable, within six cient even to pay his funeral expenses, and the months after the death of the testatrix, and after two legacies to the widow and son were mere the payment of all her debts, funeral expenses mockeries, unless meant to be a charge on the and bequests, she gave all the rest and residue of real estate. The testator must bave known that her personal property, wbatever tbe same might he had no personal estate with which to pay the consist of, to her husband, George A. Lutz. At smallest portion of his bequests; and, unless he the same time she must have known that she did meant to charge them upon the land, we must not have any personal property with which to pay impute to him the deliberate and conscious intensaid legacies, or even her funeral expenses, much tion of making bequests to his wife and son which less a residue to give to her husband. Upon these he knew could never be paid.

But the faets is predicated the argument that they make situation is such that all possibility of innocent these legacies an equitable and implied charge mistake is removed, and the facts drive us to the upon the real property of the estate. General alternative of believing that the testator, in making legacies are more favored in law than specific his last will, under the solemnity of approaching legacies, and it has been the disposition of all death, indulged in bequests known to be useless courts to maintain all general legacies which the and vain, or meant that they should be paid from testator clearly intended should be paid, regard- the only possible source. No reasonable intelliless of the sufficiency of the fund; and it has been gence can hesitate to draw the latter inference.' said: 'If the language of the will indicates that So, in Duncan v. Wallace, 114 Ind. 169, 16 N. E. the testator intended legacies to be paid, knowing

Rep. 137, it is said: “Where a testator gives legthat his personal estate would be insufficient for

acies and so disposes of all his personal property that purpose, or if it appear that, in giving the

that it cannot be made available for the payment legacies, he had the real estate in mind, there will of the legacies, the natural presumption is that he be a charge thereon, although it be devised.' 2 intended to charge the land with the payment of Am. Law Admn. (2d ed.), pp. 1096, 1097, sec. 491. the legacies, since a different rule would attribute In Downman v. Rust, 6 Rand.587, a single woman,

to him a purpose to make a gift in appearaoce, having but little personal property, and real es- and not reality.

So, where a testator tate of considerable value, having only one has no personal property at the time he executes brother, who would have been ber heir and dis- a will and bequeaths specific legacies, the reasontributee, by her will bequeathed certain legacies able presumption is that he intended to charge to two of her friends as tokens of affection, and them on the land, for it is not to be premade the brother executor and residuary legatee.

sumed that he did no more than make an It was held that she must be considered as intend. empty show of giving a bounty to the ing that the legacies should be paid out of the legatees. But this presumption does not land. In Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142, it is said: prevail where there is personal estate at the time 'It is assumed that no man, in making a final dis- the will was executed, although it may subseposition of his estate, will make a legacy, quently be lost to the testator.' save with the honest, sober-minded intention that

""That the testatrix was possessed of no per


[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

sonal property at the time of the execution of the association and loaned it $100,000 to make will was clearly shown by the facts and circum

the guarantee good. The president of the stances, and especially by the testimony of Mrs.

railroad company was ex officio president of Catbarine Bauer, a witness for defendant, who testified, in so many words, that the testatrix

the association, and a committee appointed by 'stated to her that she did not have any money to

and from the board of directors of the rail. pay the legacies, and that they were to be paid road company formed a board of managers by selling one of the houses ;' and, while the lan

of the association, had custody and control guage of the will is the basis of the inquiry as to

of its funds, and deposited them in bank the intention of the testatrix, and parol evidence inadmissible to add to or subtract from it, this

along with, and undistinguished from, the evidence was admissible for the purpose of show- moneys of the railroad company. The meming that she had no personal property with wbich bers of the relief association, i. e., the emto pay the legacies (McCorn v. McCorn, supra;

ployees of the railroad company whose assessDuncan v. Wallace, supra), and tends strongly to

ments, dues, etc., formed the relief fund, show that ber intention was to charge them on the real property." ;

were represented in the management thereof by an advisory Committee. The railroad company collected the premiums due the as

sociation by deducting the amounts assessed THE ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS

from time to time, from the monthly wages FROM RAILROAD EMPLOYEES' RE

of its employees,' gave it other aid in the LIEF. ASSOCIATIONS AS A DEFENSE furnishing of medical aitendance to the inTO ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE RE

jured, clerical force, office, etc.8 The exSULTING IN PERSONAL INJURIES

pressed objects of the association, among OR DEATH.

others, was to extend relief in case of sickIntroductory.—In the pioneer case, wherein

ness, injury, old age and death to the em. the relief defense” was first interposed,' it

ployees of the railroad company and their was clearly proved that the negligence pro

families, to receive deposits on interest from ducing the accident wherein plaintiff was in

said employees and their wives, and loan jured was that of his fellow-servant, and the

them money at lawful rates of interest in or

der to provide them with or to improve hometrial court therefore properly directed a verdict for the defendant. The curiam opin.


steads, and generally to promote their wel

fare. The relief fund formed by accumulating ion makes no references to the release nor

the contributions made by and the assesswas its consideration necessary to a decision of the case.

ments, premiums and dues collected off of The case

is only found in unofficial publications. The relief as

the men, rose in a few years to over a half sociation, membership in, and

a million dollars in the aggregate, while the

acceptance of benefits from

liability of the railroad company to be called

which lied on, in part, as a defense in that case,

upon to make good its guaranty grew corwas known as the Baltimore & Ohio Employ

The benefits tbat the

respondingly remote. ees' Relief Association. It was formed for

railroad company expected to derive, and the benefit of a railroad company and its em

m. | wb

which were in fact obtained, by its promotion ployees.? Employment by the railroad com

and maintenance of the association, was impany was conditioned on membership in the 4 Owens v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 715, relief association; in other words, member- L. R. A. 75; Graft v. B. & 0. R. Co. (Penn.), 8 Atl. ship therein was compulsory on employees of

Rep. 206.

3 Ibid.; Baltimore &0. R. Co. v. Flaberty (Md.), 39 the railroad company.3 The railroad com- Atl. Rep. 1076; Cf. Fifth Annual Report of the Commr. pany guaranteed all obligations of the relief

of Labor.

6 Fifth Annual Report, Commr. of Labor, 23.

7 B. & 0. Rel. Assn. v. Post, 2 L. R. A. 41, 46; Gralt v. B. & O. R. Co., 6 Cent. Rep. 633, 8 Atl. Spitze v. B. & 0. R. Co., 75 Md. 162, 23 Atl. Rep. 307;

Martin v. B. & O. R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 125, 126. Baltimore & 0. E. R. A., 67 Md. 433, 8 Fuller v. Baltimore & Ohio Employees' Relief As. 10 Atl. Rep. 237, Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Cannon, sociation, 67 Md. 433, 10 Atl. Rep. 237.

9 Graft v. Baltimore & Ohio Relief Assn. R. Co. Id ; Fuller v. B. & 0. Emp. Rel. Assn., 67 Md. (Penn.), 8 Atl. Rep. 206, 208, 6 Cent. Rep. 633. 443, 10 Atl. Rep. 237; Martin v. B. & 0. R. Co., 41 10 Owens v. B. & 0. R. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 715, 1 L. R. Fed. Rep. 125, 126; State v. B. & 0. R. Co., 36 Fed. A. 75; Baltimore & 0, R. Co. v. Flaherty (Md.), 39 Atl.

Rep. 1076.




Rep. 206.

? Fuller v.

(Md.) 20 Atl. Rep. 123.

Rep. 655.

« AnteriorContinuar »